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Abstract 
This study offers an ethnographic account of life at a regulatory agency to offer a new perspective on an 
important question: how does a regulatory agency become and remain independent? Relying on an analytical 
framework based on scholarship in legal anthropology, this study provides elements of an answer based on an 
insider‘s view of regulation, illuminating the complex, messy, and political nature of what may seem from the 
outside as calm and neutral application of technical expertise.  
The formal account suggests that legislative action defines the position and mandate of such an agency 
making it independent—immune from political influence in its decision-making. However, experience has 
shown that the making and maintenance of independence is a challenge, especially as these agencies typically 
enter arenas much after other powerful economic and political interests have established their own positions. 
The result is that in spite of efforts of international financial institutions, governments, and regulatory staffers 
worldwide to create independent regulatory agencies, many of these agencies are severely constrained in their 
ability to function effectively. 
Using unprecedented access to individuals working at the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), this 
study will show that regulatory staffers are constantly struggling to make and maintain their position, define 
their role, and keep their agency going. These individuals engage in strategic choice-making, applying ideas 
and creating rituals in their various attempts to define a role for the agency. Even if they could call upon a 
formal mandate as defined in the law, the agency‘s position is largely determined through the actions of the 
individuals working at the agency and, interestingly, through the actions of other entities in the arena. The 
role and position of the regulatory agency thus has various sources and is defined through multiple activities, 
including the act of regulation itself. 
If regulation is political, this study proposes rethinking regulation in terms of its semi-independence. A 
regulatory agency‘s procedures and decisions are all part of the attempt of that agency to define a role for 
itself and are, consequently, political in nature. This political behavior is shaped by the preferences, values, 
and relative positions of other entities in the arena. By engaging in such political behavior, the agency 
becomes semi-independent; it might not be an apolitical rule-applier, but it may also be able to define a more 
meaningful role for itself. Rethinking regulatory independence as an ongoing effort thus situates an agency 
within political and social contexts, allowing us a new perspective on this widespread activity. 
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Chapter 1. Rethinking Regulatory Independence 
Sitting on the dais, the Chairman of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was getting visibly 
irritated. The telecommunications service providers present at the public meeting he was leading were giving 
lukewarm, uncommitted responses to his proposals to curb unsolicited telemarketing calls. The regulator 
would need service providers to implement specific technical and business practices to prevent such calls; 
without their support for his proposals, it would be unlikely that TRAI would be able to curb telemarketing 
calls effectively. 
If he did not get support for its proposals, it would be a blow to the regulatory agency‘s position that it was 
concerned with consumer protection. In October 2006, the frequency of unsolicited calls had increased to 
such a level that almost everyone I met who knew that I was working at TRAI asked me the same question: 
why was TRAI doing nothing to stop annoying telemarketers? The agency had been slow to respond to this 
issue, and other agencies and individuals had begun to address it first. The Rajya Sabha, India‘s upper house of 
Parliament, saw the introduction of a legislative bill on this issue. Consumer activists had also filed a series of 
complaints in the consumer courts on the issue, and lawyers were approaching various courts seeking 
protection from the invasion of privacy due to unwanted telemarketing calls. However, telecommunications 
law identified TRAI as the agency that should regulate telecommunications services to protect consumer 
interests. Because TRAI had not immediately addressed the telemarketing issue, some consumer rights 
advocates had already accused it of siding with the telecommunications firms against the consumers‘ interests.  
The Chairman was keen to respond to and disprove these accusations. In November of that year, he put a 
small group of TRAI staff in charge of seeking public feedback on the matter and identifying a set of 
potential solutions to the problem. In line with TRAI‘s standard consultation procedure for regulatory issues, 
this group prepared and published a ‗consultation paper‘ that sought public comments.* The television news 
channels and newspapers covered the regulator‘s action and release of this consultation paper, noting that the 
regulator was working to provide a ―welcome reprieve for millions of phone subscribers‖ (―Trai to put,‖ 
2006). Given the widespread complaints heard about telemarketers, one might expect that this paper would 
                                                   
* Such papers have a standard format: they include an examination of the issue at hand, a discussion of possible 
regulatory responses, and summarize international experience in dealing with unsolicited telemarketing calls. They close 
with a series of questions to help the regulator resolve the issue. Consultation papers are public documents and anyone is 
free to respond. 
2 
 
receive many responses from the public and consumer activist groups. TRAI received only 20 responses. Of 
those, seven were from service providers or their industry associations. Looking at the formal 
communication, it would seem like the proceeding was a non-starter. 
Notwithstanding this underwhelming response, TRAI continued to follow its formal procedures and 
organized an ‗open house discussion‘ on the topic a few days after the deadline for responses to the 
consultation paper. The open house discussion was organized in a hall at a conference center in New Delhi 
and had about fifty participants sitting in a U-shaped table with the Chairman and some of the other 
members of the senior leadership on a dais in the front of the room. As with written responses to the 
consultation paper, the service providers dominated the forum. The proceedings began with the Chairman 
explaining the cause of the proceedings—the rising number of unwanted telemarketing calls was increasingly 
bothering consumers—and proposing a solution—maybe India needed a do-not-call database to curb such 
calls?  
The tone of the response made it seem like any measure to curb unsolicited telemarketing calls was destined 
to fail. There was resistance from the representatives of the telecommunications service providers. This was 
not a surprise; TRAI estimated that telemarketers made over 10 billion calls annually at this time, and service 
providers were keen to continue having telemarketers use their networks—large call volumes were a major 
source of revenue. Furthermore, any regulatory moves against telemarketing would need service providers to 
invest in monitoring and enforcement equipment. Lower revenues and increased costs arising from any 
regulatory intervention against telemarketers were not going to delight any provider.  
As the representatives of the telecommunications service providers present at the open house discussion 
downplayed the issue and questioned the Chairman‘s eagerness to build a costly do-not-call database, the 
Chairman was faced with the prospect of not only being dismissed as operating out of the pocket of the 
telecommunications companies, but also as being ineffective in protecting consumers. 
After a few of the service providers gave a lukewarm response, the Chairman interrupted the proceedings and 
made clear his dissatisfaction. 
 ―Why is no one interested in helping consumers?‖ he thundered. ―Just a few days ago, I received a call from 
the Finance Minister. He was in Australia at the time and was angry because he was woken up in the middle 
of the night by a telemarketer wanting to sign him up for a credit card!‖ The audience burst out into laughter, 
3 
 
but it was clear that the Chairman was not in any mood to joke. Rather, he continued to admonish the service 
providers for not wanting to help because of their own selfish motives and lack of concern for consumers, * 
who were looking for relief from annoying telemarketers.  
For many participants at the meeting, this was a surprising outburst and it had a pronounced effect on the 
representatives of the service providers. The Chairman, Nripendra Misra, had a reputation of being a 
diplomatic, charming, and professional bureaucrat. Not someone anyone expected to have an angry outburst. 
Recognized they had angered this normally unflappable bureaucrat, service providers‘ representatives began 
to take turns to offer their help in tackling the problem, clarifying that they were not against helping the 
consumer, and that the Chairman had likely misinterpreted their intentions. The entire tone of the meeting 
changed. 
The Chairman‘s outburst had a significant effect. TRAI established a National Do Not Call Registry in 2007 
and as of mid 2010, about 70 million mobile telephone subscribers had signed up for it. Every month, 
estimates suggest that telemarketers check the registry over 50 billion times before they make calls. 
*** 
The formal account of regulation in industries such as telecommunications suggests that specific laws 
empower a regulatory agency to order the working of and relationships among a set of entities including 
telecommunications firms, consumers, and equipment manufacturers. In this account, the regulatory agency 
is supposed to be independent, using neutral expertise-based thinking to make and apply rules.  
In that context, it is useful to highlight some interesting features of the episode above. First, notwithstanding 
its legal position, it seems like the regulatory agency did not expect to be able to impose unilateral regulation 
on the telecommunications firms. Rather, it seems to have wanted these firms‘ support in fixing a problem 
for which these firms were partly responsible.  
                                                   
* It is useful to note that the concept of a ‗consumer‘ has specific meaning within policy debates (see Streeter 1996, p. 
302-305), especially as a means to distinguish production from consumption with the resulting separation of influence. 
For example, as Streeter suggests, the consumer is ―not invited directly into decision-making processes conserving 
production‖ (p. 302). Consumers are consequently a specific label for a group, one informed by the preferences and 
ideas that exist within an arena, rather than some clearly or naturally defined group of individuals. 
4 
 
Second, the decision at the regulatory agency to pursue this issue was not driven by some purely formal 
process of delegation. Rather, TRAI decided to step in after pressure began to build in the news media and 
after it became clear that an alternative agency might displace TRAI in its duties towards consumers. And the 
implications of a call from a powerful political figure suggest other sources of pressure to address this issue. 
Third, even as the regulatory agency began its proceedings, it was looking for non-rule based arguments to 
non-rule based objections. The rules for consumer protection do not consider the profitability of firms as a 
criterion for decision-making, yet staffers at TRAI were concerned about firms‘ objections based on this 
argument. And when the firms‘ stance became clear, the Chairman did not quote from the rulebook, but 
made a symbolic gesture where he reminded participants at the meeting that day about their social positions 
and repercussions to be had from angering him or not helping him placate the finance minister. The 
Chairman had reordered relationships—even if temporarily—and pushed an important proceeding forward, 
using social signals and implying political consequences for the disobedient. 
This episode reveals that the position of the regulator is neither predefined nor independent of other entities‘ 
actions or positions, but that it is constantly open to negotiation. The Chairman had to remind the people in 
the room that day of his role and position; the firms thought they could hold off a regulatory intervention 
(which was justified in terms of the agency‘s formal mandate) through an appeal to ideas such as profitability. 
It is also useful to note that events need not have turned out as they did. The Chairman might have remained 
quiet in a number of situations. He might have remained silent if he was unsure of his ability to invoke the 
finance minister; if he were sure the firms‘ arguments on profitability were powerful enough to outweigh his 
anger; if he had no powers or networks—formal or informal—to call upon that would coerce those who did 
not agree with him into following him. 
Thinking through this episode, regulation does not seem as independent, neutral, expertise-driven, and rule-
dependent as one might expect. We could suggest that regulatory activities take place within larger social and 
political contexts within which both TRAI and the firms were operating. Even though TRAI should be 
able—according to its formal mandate—to regulate these firms into compliance, it had to rely on other 
means to get its way. A regulator‘s position—its independence—seems to depend on more than its formal 
mandate. 
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The Focus of This Study 
This brings us to the central question this study addresses: How does a regulatory agency become and remain 
independent?  
In providing some elements of the answer, this study provides a new perspective on the concept of regulatory 
independence. A range of academics and practitioners define regulatory independence in its broadest sense as 
consisting of an ―arm‘s-length relationship‖ with regulated firms, consumers, and other private interests, as 
well as with political authorities, and ―organizational autonomy‖ defined as secure funding and other staffing 
rules that ―foster the requisite expertise and to underpin those arm‘s-length relationships‖(Smith, 1997, p.1). 
Drawing upon unprecedented access to staffers at a telecommunications regulatory agency, this study will 
provide readers an ethnographic account of regulation. We will see how regulation is a messy and highly 
politicized activity, not a straightforward application of rules by apolitical technocrats. The making and 
application of rules by individuals working in the regulatory agency depends on local values and preferences. 
In considering regulatory independence, we will view such political and social behavior of the inhabitants of 
the arena of Indian telecommunications not as an undesirable impediment to an apolitical and technocratic 
application of rules, but as a part of regulatory life. 
In this study, the reader will enter the trenches of regulatory life to see how one regulatory agency was born, 
worked, and struggled with other actors to position itself within the arena and maintain its independence. To 
do this, this study relies on ethnography that uses fieldwork conducted in 2006 in New Delhi at the Telecom 
Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). This allows us a rare look at regulatory life and the happenings in one 
regulatory area from the inside. 
Individuals within the regulatory agency and within the larger arena struggle against each other within and 
across agencies and institutions to get their way. These struggles and arguments are located in larger social 
and political contexts locally and globally. It matters what your educational qualifications are, if you are an 
engineer or a lawyer or economist, if you are an Indian or not, if you come from one professional group or 
another. Social, political, and economic history matters, peoples‘ actions in metaphorical past lives matters, 
global trends in telecommunications manufacturing matters, what your father asked you to do matters. By 
studying regulatory life, we will see how these contexts and the relationships, values, preferences, rules, and 
ideas within them animate the regulation of telecommunications.  
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The ethnographic fieldwork finds that the people working at TRAI have a specific approach to regulation 
that reflects a unique constellation of values and preferences. I call this approach ‗Nehruvian capitalism.‘ The 
Nehruvian capitalist has values and preferences and follows ideas drawn from global and local sources. These 
relate to, among other things, the position of India on the world stage, the appropriate organization of 
society, the characteristics of progress, and the right way to make decisions.  
These values and preferences are partly reminiscent of India‘s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, but are 
also a modern response to his perceived failings. The Nehruvian capitalists at TRAI, whom we will soon 
meet, believe in the emancipating power of technology and in the importance of dialog and consensus in 
decision-making. Partly rejecting Nehru‘s version of socialism, however, they have an accommodating yet 
complex relationship with private capital, which they see as critical to the attainment of public service and 
national development goals. These Nehruvian capitalists have specific ways of fostering debate among 
experts, yet are keen to serve the ‗common man.‘ They believe India‘s regulation should reflect local 
specificities but are also bound to global markets. 
This story of these individuals focuses on their attempts to make and keep TRAI independent. To make and 
maintain TRAI‘s independence in the arena, these individuals struggle with other actors and interests, most 
notably the babus, the powerful bureaucrats that traditionally controlled the entire arena of Indian 
telecommunications.* Consequently, the concept of regulatory independence itself takes on a specific meaning 
for the Nehruvian capitalists at TRAI; unlike fighting off capture by regulated firms, TRAI‘s staff are engaged 
in a constant struggle to avoid their agency being assimilated by the babus. Indeed, assimilation was the fate of 
another an agency that grew out of earlier attempts to create an independent regulatory commission ten years 
before TRAI‘s creation.  
In their struggle against the babus, staffers at TRAI draw upon an interesting range of tools, ideas, and rituals 
to assert their position and independence. When legislative action created TRAI in 1997, it formally delegated 
some of the Government‘s powers to oversee the telecommunications industry to this new agency. But while 
the law and the formal mandate affords some powers to the staff at TRAI, the individuals working at this 
regulatory agency have attempted to make and maintain their independence, defined in this specific manner, 
through other means. 
                                                   
* The babus are introduced in detail in Chapter 3. 
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Broadly speaking, TRAI staffers have positioned the agency to differentiate themselves from the babus. While 
the babus were keen to maintain their own control over the regulation and provision of telecommunications 
services, TRAI staffers positioned their agency as keen to protect the interests of the private 
telecommunications companies that had entered the arena following economic liberalization in 1991. Chapter 
6 focuses on how TRAI sought to build its core constituency among the private telecommunications 
companies and specific political figures that were keen to project India as open for private investments from 
domestic and foreign investors. As that chapter shows, TRAI staffers created a ritual of defiance against the 
babus as a way to strengthen the regulator agency‘s position even as its formal mandate weakened. 
TRAI staffers created rituals around concepts such as transparency. Beginning as a strategic differentiation to 
the babus‘ habit of making decisions behind closed doors, the initial group of staffers at the regulatory agency 
made a habit out of ‗consulting‘ with ‗stakeholders,‘ organizing events such as ‗open house discussions‘ and 
writing ‗consultation papers.‘ And in an interesting turn of events, as Chapter 7 describes, this transparency 
led the babus to choose TRAI as the venue for dispute resolution and policymaking proceedings. These rituals 
of transparency combined with the predictability of TRAI staffers‘ approach to telecommunications led the 
babus to accept TRAI as a dispute resolver even through the babus had earlier successfully removed this power 
from the regulatory agency‘s formal mandate. The Nehruvian capitalist mode of thinking among TRAI‘s 
decision-making senior staffers assured various parties that decisions would fall within the broad scope of 
outcomes that were accepted to them. And as Chapter 8 will describe, Nehruvian capitalist values and rituals 
also shapes attempts at policymaking in particular ways. This has the effect of making the non-essential 
regulatory agency a vital constituent of the policymaking process in Indian telecommunications. 
An underlying pattern here challenges the traditional account of the creation of independent regulatory 
agencies. That account suggests that the award of a formal mandate is the critical step in making and keeping 
a regulatory agency independent. However, this ethnographic account suggests that not only is the regulator‘s 
position within the arena constantly shifting and open to adjustment, but that the individuals at the regulatory 
agency—the Nehruvian capitalists—have a key part to play in defining their agency‘s role.  
Furthermore, that role is also defined through interactions with and the actions of other actors in the arena. 
As this study will show, TRAI‘s position as dispute resolver, policymaker, and indeed, regulator, has as much 
to do with its own staffers‘ efforts at role definition as it does with the efforts and preferences of other 
individuals—including the babus and the people at various telecommunications firms—that inhabit the arena. 
If one were to use the term loosely, one could suggest that a regulator‘s mandate and position in the arena 
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was being ‗co-created‘ by multiple parties,* and that such co-creation was keeping the regulatory agency 
relevant and making it effective. 
If a regulatory agency depends on a co-created position within the arena, then we challenge the foundations 
of the thinking on the making and maintenance of regulatory independence. This dashes any hopes that it is 
possible to insulate a modern regulatory agency from a social and political existence and make it ‗independent‘ 
(see, for example Petrazzini, 1996).  
To analyze the making and maintenance of regulatory independence, this study uses an analytical framework 
developed by Moore (1978) that views individuals as operating within what she calls ‗semi-autonomous social 
fields.‘ Every individual has the power to apply a variety of norm- or rule-based fields to a situation, and 
simultaneously, every individual comes under the influence of multiple fields that may order behavior 
differently. Fitting this concept with the topic at hand, this study proposes understanding the regulatory 
agency as ‗semi-independent,‘ rethinking regulatory independence and accepting that the individuals working 
at any regulatory agency are part of larger fields. 
Apart from seeking to rethink the concept of regulatory independence, this study also promises to expand our 
understanding of regulation through its methodological approach. This study uses unprecedented access to 
individuals in the Indian telecommunications regulatory agency to argue for the concept of semi-independent 
regulation and to show how semi-independence influences the ways in a regulatory agency works.  
The ethnography (details on the method are in Chapter 4) provides an insider‘s look at the working of the 
Indian telecommunications regulator to understand how such agencies and the individuals within them 
struggle with other actors in an attempt to become and remain independent. As a result, it supplements the 
political economic view of regulation by offering a new perspective of these processes—from the inside. In 
doing so, this study builds on the work of political economists and historians of regulation who have 
embraced complexity and provided highly influential and multidimensional views of regulation (see for 
example, Horwitz, 1989; Streeter, 1996).  
                                                   
* Co-creation is a concept that has caught on in management studies. The concept, originally proposed by Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy (2000), suggests that ―co-creative enterprises... focus their entire organization on the experiences of all 
their... stakeholders that stem from interactions with products, processes, and people (Ramaswamy & Gouillart, 2010, p. 
247). 
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This rest of this chapter will introduce the concept of regulatory independence in detail. It will then turn to a 
description of how telecommunications regulation in India exhibits local characteristics even as it is part of 
global contexts. This introduction will close with a roadmap for this study. 
The Evolution of Regulatory Independence 
This study has significant consequences for the concept of regulatory independence, the defining 
characteristic of the modern regulatory agency. In considering how local actors and characteristics come 
together to define the mandate and position of the regulatory agency, this study illuminates the role of the 
social and political in regulation, and forces us to rethink regulatory independence.  
Independence is said to give an agency unique powers within an arena to make and apply rules that might not 
be profitable to the agency‘s political principals or to regulated firms. Formally, legislatures or governments 
would delegate a subset of their functions to these regulators. Rather than be driven by a political agenda, an 
independent regulatory agency was to rely on technical expertise to make decisions in a neutral manner. 
Analysts suggest that the presence of regulatory agencies in the liberalized telecommunications markets of the 
developing world have helped reduce ‗regulatory risk‘ (Jamison, Holt & Berg, 2005) by displaying ‗credible 
commitment‘ (Levy & Spiller, 1996) to reforms and contracts. 
Setting up independent regulators has become an important means to assure other actors in the arena of the 
credibility of market or economic liberalization efforts. Governments, international agencies, lawyers, and 
consultants have supported the creation of independent regulatory agencies as a means to signal liberalizing 
reforms and readiness to attract private (and often foreign) investment.  
But serious questions remain at the theoretical level on how such ‗independent‘ agencies might be 
accommodated within governance frameworks that seek accountability. Moreover, a number of practitioners 
face significant challenges in realizing political independence in the working of regulatory agencies. Most 
practitioners will accept that independence is an ideal goal and that rule by rules alone is not possible. Much 
work has focused on how political and social forces inevitably act to influence the design and operation of 
regulatory agencies. The challenge for scholars and practitioners alike is the absence of an analytical 
framework that allows them to accommodate these political and social forces in a way that does not treat the 
influence of these forces on regulation as deviance, but rather as a part of the regulatory process. 
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This section details the notion of regulatory independence and discusses these challenges. It then introduces 
the concept of semi-independence as a means to rethink the structure and working of regulatory agencies.  
The notion of regulatory independence. Independent regulators are a relatively recent invention, 
proliferating globally over the past two decades. The Interstate Commerce Commission of the United States, 
which was set up in 1887 to regulate the railroad industry, is widely considered the first attempt to create a 
modern independent regulatory agency. The historical objective behind the creation of independent 
regulatory agencies has been to put in place an agency that protects the public interest against the corporate 
interest (Horwitz, 1989). 
It is interesting, however, that regulatory agencies have rarely stopped from interpreting their mandate to 
protect the public interest in a way that allowed them to serve the interests of regulated firms. For example, as 
McChesney (1993) writes in his history of U.S. radio broadcasting, the Federal Radio Commission soon after 
its creation in 1927 clarified that its approach to protecting the public interest would require that the 
Commission should ―allow the industry to determine the nature of broadcast regulation as much as possible, 
regarding it as an ally‖ (p. 18). This is a value-laden interpretation of the regulatory mandate, adjusting it to fit 
with preferences for large firms to dominate media channels and to concentrate the distribution of media. It 
turns the notion of the public interest—that might have been defined in terms of its preference for 
competitive media distribution—on its head. 
The gap between regulators‘ theoretical mandates to protect the public interest and their actual work in 
safeguarding the interests of regulated firms ended with the spread of economic liberalization in the 1980s. 
Accompanying liberalization, the objectives for a regulatory agency clearly shifted to focus on protecting 
private firms from expropriation by the state (see, for example Stern, 1997). In a toolkit for regulators, the 
ITU, the United Nations agency for information and communication technology (ICT) issues, and infoDev, a 
program hosted at the World Bank focusing on the topic of ‗ICT for development,‘ write that: 
Effective regulators are normally associated with being independent to some degree. The 
rationale for establishing independent, often sector-specific, regulatory institutions is based 
on ensuring non-discriminatory treatment of all players in the liberalized market… 
Reinforcing investor confidence through an independent and effective regulator will attract 
private investment in the ICT sector (infoDev & ITU, 2010a). 
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In industries such as telecommunications, the focus of this study, regulatory agencies are now commonplace 
worldwide. Since the beginning of the liberalization of telecommunications markets in the 1980s, the number 
of independent regulatory agencies has grown. As of 2010, over 130 countries had set up such agencies to 
regulate their telecommunications markets (International Telecommunications Union [ITU], 2010). 
The effect of regulatory agencies might then be seen in terms of the estimated US$2.5 trillion in private 
investment made in telecommunications since 1990 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD], 2009; The World Bank Group, 2009a), and the growth in the number of telephone 
subscription, for instance, from a measly 528 million in 1990 to over 6 billion in 2010 (Wireless Intelligence, 
2010). As one ITU publication suggests, investors often take measures of regulatory independence into 
account while assessing new markets (ITU, 2002).  
There have also been significant investments to create or support independent regulators. The International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU, 2008) spent over US$12 million in ―regulatory capacity building programs‖ 
in 2008. For its five most recent operations in the telecommunications sector as of July 2010, the World Bank 
has programmed over US$35 million—about 7 percent of total lending—to set up or strengthen regulatory 
agencies.* 
International modernization and capacity building programs like those of the World Bank mean that new or 
recently redesigned regulatory agencies are continually appearing in countries around the world. Most 
recently, legislative attention to the problems of media convergence have provided an opportunity to review 
regulatory structures and merge, destroy, revolutionize, or otherwise modify telecommunications regulators 
(see Bar & Sandvig, 2000; Singh & Raja, 2010). 
The origins and evolution of independence. The traditional account credits the creation of 
independent agencies for the rapid expansion in telecommunications since the 1980s, and specifically their 
apolitical, neutral, and expertise-based rule making and application. However, the origins of independence are 
less apolitical. As Moe (1982) writes, the original intent of making the Interstate Commerce Commission 
‗independent‘ has less to do with a theoretically or intellectually rigorous process than with political 
considerations. I quote: 
                                                   
* Author‘s estimate based on information from the World Bank Projects database (see The World Bank Group, 2010a).  
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The first independent commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission [of the U.S.], was 
originally placed in the Interior Department…; and it was not until a few years later that 
Congress—apparently suspicious of incoming President Benjamin Harrison, formerly a 
lawyer for the railroads—voted to move the ICC out of the department, extending it a 
special place in the scheme of government organization. Congress took these momentous 
steps without any explicit recognition of the far-reaching implications of agency 
independence…(Moe, 1982, p. 198-199).  
It is clear that even at the inception of the idea of the regulatory agency these agencies had roles defined 
beyond their formal mandate, serving specific political causes in their very design. Furthermore, the idea of 
regulatory independence kept evolving as individuals struggled with each other within the arena around the 
American railroads industry: 
[Congress] did not discover the great wisdom of its move until the early 1900s, when the 
concept of independence first came into use and admiration in congressional debates as a 
means of limiting presidential power…(Moe, 1982, p. 198-199). Since the earliest days of the 
[Interstate Commerce Commission], when the independent form of organization emerged 
without plan or rationale… conceptual ambiguity, combined with the controversy 
surrounding the independent form, has guaranteed that the organization positioning of the 
commissions has actually been determined over time through the struggles, adjustments, and 
choices of the political process (Moe, p. 200). 
This explanation is useful because it shows that regulatory independence is a political idea, subject to 
‗struggles,‘ ‗adjustments,‘ and individual ‗choices‘ that might happen in the ‗political process‘ that go on in and 
around any arena.  
Indeed, modern definitions of independence also suggest that an ‗independent‘ agency might not be 
‗insulated‘ from its social and political contexts. For example, a more recent examination of the idea of 
independence comes from the OECD, which explains that an agency should respond to political institutions, 
ideas, and circumstances: 
[I]t is very important to have a regulatory body independent from all interested parties in 
order to ensure fair and transparent competition in the marketplace. However, it is 
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important to bear in mind that the ultimate objective is not to have an „independent regulatory body‟ 
per se but an effective regulatory framework which enables the market to become competitive, 
stimulate technological diffusion and enhance efficiency, while ensuring that consumers benefit. In fact, 
close co-operation between the independent regulator and policy maker is essential to ensure 
that regulation is more responsive to government policy decisions. Furthermore, the independent 
regulator is an administrative body of the government, which requires that its actions are 
monitored and that it is accountable for its actions. So there must be administrative measures 
to oversee the activities of the independent regulator (OECD, 2000, p. 15). 
There is thus an interesting contradiction within the thinking about the independence of regulatory agencies. 
Referring to the above quote, they should be ‗independent‘ to ‗ensure fair and transparent competition,‘ 
(which in itself is a very specific task) but not so independent that they somehow do not allow an ‗effective 
regulatory framework‘ for the market to ‗become competitive‘ or do other important things. Ultimately, ‗its 
actions [should be] monitored,‘ and the agency should be ‗accountable.‘ 
Indeed, the italicized phrases and terms in the above paragraph suggest a number of justifications—that 
might be presented by any participant in a arena—that could be used to counter the independence of the 
regulatory agency. For instance, ‗stimulat[ing] technological diffusion‘ could become important as an 
organizing idea and might allow one or more actors (including within the regulatory agency) to justify 
overcoming a regulatory decision. It might thus be possible to suggest that ‗independence‘ does not have a 
static, primary power in the arena, even if it is deployed by the state and backed by legal instruments that aim 
at insulation and autonomy.  
Challenges to the concept of regulatory independence. The concept of regulatory independence 
has proved to be a problematic concept at both the philosophical and practical levels. Independence from 
political oversight goes against notions of the accountability of agencies in democratic societies, while 
practitioners often complain that insulation from political or economic influence is difficult to define or 
achieve.  
Philosophically, part of the challenge with defining independence is the challenge it poses to notions of 
accountability. An independent agency neither consists of non-elected officials nor fits within any of the three 
branches of governments. It is part legislative rule-maker, part rule-applying executive agency, and part 
adjudicative committee. Many hold this to be inconsistent with the principles of accountability within 
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democratic societies. The lack of accountability creates the possibility of capture of the agency by either 
regulated firms or political principals (within or outside the agency) (Graham, 1998; Majone, 1996).  
The result of this concern with accountability in practical terms has been the effort to subject supposedly 
independent regulatory agencies to some level of political oversight. For example, the ITU-World Bank‘s 
toolkit on ICT regulation explains: 
Absolute independence of regulatory bodies is neither possible nor desirable. A regulator should not 
set and implement its own agenda. ―Independent‖ regulators are expected to be subject to 
government oversight and a system of checks and balances… However, regulators need insulation 
from political intervention, so that the regulatory process is not politicized, its decisions are not 
discredited and the policy of the government is implemented (infoDev & ITU, 2010ba). 
The problem, left untouched in the traditional account, has been the lack of any consideration of how the 
oversight of regulatory agencies might create avenues for capture by political agents. As a result, the 
regulatory agency is seemingly stuck between capture by political or economic agents, depending on the 
balance between accountability and independence. There has been little effort to address this challenge. 
Another challenge to its definition is that independence, as many other political concepts, has shifted in 
meaning. As Moe (1982) notes, ―the term ‗independence‘ has always been an ambiguous one, used to describe 
varying degrees of political insulation as well as simply the location of agencies outside the regular executive 
departments‖ (p. 199). For example, the reasons for having an independent regulator have vacillated between 
protecting the public interest against corporate interests and protecting private investors against discretionary 
state action. These are two different and often contradictory goals, surprisingly stated together as 
justifications for the setting up of regulatory agencies.* 
Practically, no regulatory agency can ever be truly independent. The anecdotal evidence suggests that 
regulators in many countries are facing the problem that their theoretical independence and formal ability to 
function do not support a regulator‘s position in practice. Many countries have rushed to create and invest 
                                                   
* For example, the TRAI Act of 1997 (Government of India, 1997, Preamble) states that the Government created the 
regulator to ―protect the interests of service providers and consumers of the telecom sector.‖  
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significant resources in independent regulatory agencies, but there are serious questions about whether new 
regulatory agencies will be effective in a meaningful way. 
Yet, it is also incorrect to say that political principals or regulated firms either can always or can never 
influence regulatory agencies; independence is not binary in nature. In combining the conceptual and 
definitional problems, Moe (1982) makes an interesting and useful conclusion, that ―the organizational 
positioning of the commissions has actually been determined incrementally over time through the struggles, 
adjustments, and choices of the political process‖ (p. 200). The problem facing the study of independence is 
that while there is a tacit understanding of this ambiguity, theoretical and analytical studies have had a 
problem in developing a framework to discuss this in a conceptually interesting way. Many empirical studies 
have attempted to quantify independence (see for example, Montoya & Trillas, 2007), while few qualitative 
researchers have written on regulatory independence while considering political and social influence as a ‗fact-
of-life‘ and have rather focused on the aspect of deviance from an idealized version of independence (Cutler 
& Johnson, 1975). 
Rethinking regulation as semi-independent. In looking at the ways in which the individuals at 
TRAI invariably exist and work in multiple overlapping political and social fields, this study also finds that it 
is more useful to view and analyze regulation as ‗semi-independent.‘ It is important to note that semi-
independence specifically describes the condition of the regulatory agency as opposed to any other group 
within the arena. Moreover, semi-independence provides the appropriate language for a discussion about 
regulatory independence, highlighting that a new approach might be necessary to rethink the position of 
regulatory agencies. 
Semi-independence offers us a means to consider the limits of independence, identify the sources of order in 
the arena other than formal rules, and to find how individuals in the regulatory agency and the arena broadly 
create and use various ordering mechanisms to achieve various objectives and get ahead in personal and 
professional struggles. In doing this, this study shows how individuals inside and outside the regulatory 
agency use political and social fields and how the resulting semi-independence of regulatory agencies 
influences these agencies‘ operation as decision makers and adjudicators. 
Studying regulation as semi-independence accepts that it is not possible to ensure the complete insulation of 
individuals within regulatory agencies from the larger political, economic, and social fields. In these terms, the 
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individuals I have written about in this study have social and political values and preferences and cannot be 
disconnected from the social and political fields within which they operate.  
The goings on in these fields will undoubtedly have some influence on the ways in which these individuals 
work, and simultaneously, these individuals will have the ability to use multiple fields to order others that 
might occupy the same fields. Consequently, semi-independence implies that a regulatory agency is located 
within larger social and political fields that no formal or legal framework can insulate.  
The concept of semi-independent regulation represents a rethinking of work on regulatory independence 
combining analytical frameworks from legal anthropology developed by Moore (1978). Her approach, which 
I discuss in detail in Chapter 2, derives from the recognition that ―the same social processes that prevent the 
total regulation of a society also reshape and transform efforts at partial regulation‖ (Moore, 1978, p. 1).  
Moore (1978, Chapter 1) proposes that any study of order should accept and analyze two contradictory sets 
of forces. One set is regularizing forces, characterized by the efforts of governments and legislatures to 
formalize independence into laws that create regulatory agencies and into the rules that define these agencies‘ 
functions. Such regularizing forces ideally would have created a space within the arena where the regulatory 
agency (and individuals within it) would have operated insulated from political or social influence.  
The second set of forces contradicting efforts at regularization follow from the efforts of individuals adjusting 
these definitions and practices directly or indirectly to suit their own circumstances and agendas. Such forces 
of adjustment arise from manipulation by individuals of their position, the shifts in the preferences of 
individuals, or the weakening of regularizing forces. 
As this study will show, the presence of these contradicting forces has limited attempts to codify 
independence and insulate regulatory agencies from influence and making such agencies semi-independent. A 
wide range of academics and practitioners alike recognize that regulatory independence is difficult to ensure 
(Moe, 1982). However, such recognition has had limited effect. Beyond the organizational, legal, or formal 
definitions and some simplistic quantitative analyses of independence, there is little to deepen our 
understanding of regulation.  
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The Local in Telecommunications Regulation 
For an outsider looking in, Indian telecommunications regulation may seem to fit easily into a global pattern. 
For example, the outsider may describe how India has an independent regulatory agency—broadly defined as 
one that is organizationally and functionally separate from political agencies. They will describe that India has 
a working legal system based on common law, is a large parliamentary democracy, runs mostly free and fair 
elections, has a high-capacity bureaucracy, and has had mostly stable coalition governments in place since the 
1990s.  
The outsider might also see how these elements, proposed by international agencies and consultants as 
important to support private and especially foreign investments, have led to the rapid growth of 
telecommunications connectivity. Following economic liberalization in the early 1990s, subsequent regulatory 
reforms, and the opening of the industry to private and foreign investment, India has become a focal point 
for the global telecommunications industry. As of 2010, it has about 600 million mobile telephone 
subscriptions, consumes over 10 million telephone handsets a month, and provides much of the outsourced 
labor to the industry globally. India also holds significant growth potential: at least 400 million people remain 
to be connected to telephone services, and over 900 million have not yet used the Internet (TRAI, 2010).  
A small but interesting set of studies of telecommunications policymaking and regulation look at how these 
ostensibly globally standardized activities are actually products of local preferences and circumstances. These 
scholars writing about telecommunications regulation have shown, global concepts undergo significant 
translation when they enter a specific arena. They become locally specific through mediation by local actors 
and circumstances, and in some cases, by global actors as well. I offer one example here. 
*** 
Late one evening in June 2005, I was working in my office on the first floor of the building that housed 
TRAI. I was part of a team of three mid-level and senior TRAI staff working on a much-awaited consultation 
paper on Mobile Number Portability (MNP). MNP allows subscribers to switch cellular service providers and 
keep their old phone numbers. My team members saw MNP as beneficial for subscribers who were 
dissatisfied with the quality of service they were receiving from their phone companies, wanted to switch to 
another service provider, but felt that changing their telephone numbers would be too troublesome. We had a 
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clear understanding that the senior staffers at TRAI were also keen to introduce MNP as a way to use 
competition to improve quality of service among service providers.  
Yet, our team knew that the service providers would resist the proposal to introduce MNP for three reasons. 
First, MNP typically resulted in some ‗churning‘ of subscribers among service providers as they migrated 
from poorer to better quality or towards less expensive subscriptions. Second, MNP placed some financial 
and technical burdens on service providers. Setting up the required MNP systems would cost more than 
US$300 million by some accounts. Finally, given that about 70 percent of India‘s mobile subscriptions were 
‗pre-paid‘ (pay as you go) with limited brand loyalty, the notion that a subscriber would resist switching 
networks simply to keep their phone number was questionable. The team believed that the key resistance to 
their proposal would be the service providers‘ business logic of seeking profits and keeping costs low. 
Firms looking to maintain their profits had one powerful argument that was considered most damaging to the 
cause of MNP: timing. Regulators in other countries had introduced MNP only when the percentage of 
subscribers was about 50 percent as was evident from consultants‘ reports and international news coverage. 
This would allow critics and the unwilling to question the entire proposal by questioning its timing. As a 
member of the team writing the paper, I spent a few days to find an example of a country that introduced 
MNP in the early stages of its cellular market‘s growth. At that time, in the summer of 2005, only six percent 
of India‘s population used cellular phones, and the best example we could find was The Netherlands, which 
introduced MNP when 27 percent of the population had cell phones. It seemed like the timing issue was 
going to be problematic. 
I was trying to get a response to this that evening, and it was late that day when I found exactly what we were 
looking for. On an Internet news archive, I discovered that Pakistan was planning to introduce MNP by the 
end of 2005. Pakistan, I thought, did not have too many cell phone subscribers. A quick visit to the Pakistan 
Telecommunications Authority‘s website later, I had an example: Pakistan, with a seven percent penetration 
of mobile telephones, had already begun to move towards MNP. This fact found its way into the consultation 
paper (TRAI, 2005, p. 30), and was repeated as a justification for introducing MNP at an early stage in India 
in a number of press articles and debates about this issue. 
Why did three lines on page 30 of a 45-page document make a difference? For an Indian, the answer is 
simple, and probably goes something like, ‗if Pakistan is doing something, shouldn‘t we also?‘ The rivalry 
between India and Pakistan is a major factor in how both countries play cricket, test nuclear weapons, or 
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introduce MNP. The long-standing competition with Pakistan has made ―Pakistan-bashing‖ a national sport 
and vote winner in India (Anderson, 2003).  
We had suddenly graduated the seemingly esoteric discussion about MNP into a discussion about India‘s 
positioning with respect to its favorite rival. A technical discussion about MNP had become, even if only to 
some extent, an issue of national pride. But MNP is not the only telecommunications policy issue that has a 
nationalist characteristic. In their ethnography of the Internet in Trinidad, Miller & Slater (2000) explain how 
the Trini regulator‘s opinions with respect to keeping the Internet unregulated were related not only to their 
visions of national development and liberalization, but also significantly of projecting Trinidad as an 
―educated, entrepreneurial and industrial‖ nation, especially in contrast with labels such as ―key-pressing 
Bajans or desperate Indians‖ (p. 137). Similarly, the investment into and expansion of broadband 
telecommunications infrastructure became a national priority, in some countries at least, because of a desire 
to outdo their regional rivals. South Korea set the development of broadband infrastructure as a national 
priority as a way to outdo Japan, and when the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) published 
its national broadband plan in 2010, the FCC began by appealing to the need to protect America‘s position as 
a world leading economic and technological power (Broadband.gov, n.d.). 
TRAI argued for MNP against the ‗bad timing‘ lobby by drawing on the nationalism inherent in symbolic 
arguments that pitch Pakistan as a comparator. The likely reason why I, as an Indian, picked up that specific 
example was because it was an example from Pakistan. It might have been useful to have an example from 
another neighboring country such as Sri Lanka or Nepal; these would have also had some supporting effect. 
But no other example would have as much of an effect on how an Indian thinks about MNP as that of 
Pakistan. 
The global and local in telecommunications regulation. The example above is useful because it 
shows how a seemingly global regulatory concept, such as MNP, had a very Indian entry into that arena. This 
entry might even alter the way in which MNP works when it begins operating. For instance, if the objective 
was to compete with Pakistan, the intention to hurry deployment might force its designers to set up a limited 
version of MNP that allows them to claim equality with a rival. If, on the other hand, the Pakistan angle did 
not figure here, the regulator might have had to wait until mobile telephony was widespread, necessitating the 
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design to satisfy those requirements. Thus, social and political considerations have an influence on regulation 
beyond the rhetoric and in the design and implementation of the regulated systems.* 
In one analysis of how the global and local combine in regulation, Vogel (1996,) takes the view that states do 
not simply accept global ideas pushed by local interest groups or driven by market pressures, but that they 
―have reformulated regulations in response to a common set of pressures… in distinctive ways reflecting 
their particular ideological and institutional legacies‖ (p. 10). Vogel argues that while globalization has pushed 
ideas such as ‗deregulation‘, governments have gone about implementing such ideas in a variety of ways. 
These global ideas interact with local ideas and institutions that are present in each country and lead each 
instance of regulatory reform to be contingent on a prior ideological predisposition. 
Another interesting analysis, based on ethnographic work, comes from Miller & Slater (2000, Chapter 5) who 
provide an interesting case of how debates in communications policy and regulation relate to local values (p. 
24). They are interested in how regulatory behavior regarding the Internet reflected Trini national identity, 
self-perception, and their visions about deregulation and freedom (Chapter 5).  
Miller & Slater find that in Trinidad, the behavior of regulatory agencies cannot be comprehended 
independent of the Trini construction of identity and cultural values of freedom and their visions of 
themselves as an industrialized country (Miller & Slater, 2000). They find ―clear ‗paradigms‘ about [seemingly 
global activities such as] Internet provision and Internet business as the basis for future national economic 
development‖ (p. 117). They define these paradigms as the ―ideals that are held about how such 
developments [in Internet provision and business] ought to be proceeding,‖ and these paradigms ―have deep 
resonances in Trinidad‘s constructions of its values and its self-conception‖ (p. 117).  
Miller and Slater (2000) described how Trini people and some government officials believed that the Internet 
should grow freely not dominated by the local monopoly, and they suggest that this is in line with a new 
model of development, a new paradigm, that took Trinidad away from being oil-dependent to becoming an 
important player in the information economy (p. 119-120). Trinis were optimistic about free trade and 
                                                   
* This resonates with Hughes‘ (1993) analysis on the ―style‖ of electric power networks. Hughes finds that the design of 
electricity networks in major cities reflected the political organization of those cities and their inhabitants. Taken from a 
global pool of technology, these networks became something specific in a given location. According to Hughes, ―the 
differences… stemmed mostly from the nontechnological factors of the cultural context‖ (p. 405). ―The style of each 
system was found to be based on entrepreneurial drive and decisions, economic principles, legislative constraints or 
supports, and geographical factors, both human and natural‖ (p. 462).  
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deregulation, and the paradigm reflected this optimism, apart from the sentiment that made Trinis believe 
they were not ―a low-wage, unskilled and largely service or argricultur[al]‖ people, but ―educated, modern 
First World citizens,‖ participating not in capitalism, but Trini capitalism (p. 136-137). Miller and Slater posit 
that debates about communication policy relating to the Internet reflect cultural values: ―the deepest concerns 
of Internet provision overlap considerably with values such as national sentiment and freedom‖ (p. 142). 
Again, global technology acquires a locally specific meaning. 
Finding Nehru. Consequently, when one looks at Indian telecommunications regulation one might 
also expect to find specific values and preferences. Chakravartty (1999, 2004) studied the cultural reasons 
behind India‘s particularly plodding telecommunications sector reform, finding that ―the negotiation of 
telecom policy must be seen as more than a problem of the absence of institutional, technological and 
economic resources‖ (2004, p. 227). She found that ―the complex process of negotiating telecom policy… is 
rooted in unresolved debates about technology, development and national interest that are specific to India‘s 
postcolonial history‖ (2004, p. 244).  
Importantly for this study, Chakravartty found that the discussion about telecommunications for 
development is incomplete if it is not understood as a feature of the cultural legacies of the state. She finds 
that the extreme poles of the discourse on the role of technology in India‘s post-colonial development 
revolved around two key figures: Gandhi and Nehru.  
Understanding India‘s approach to technology requires an understanding of the tensions between the 
‗Nehruvian‘ forces of industrialization and the ‗Gandhian‘ critique of Western modernity. The Nehruvians 
believed that India must ―industrialize or perish‖ (Chakravartty, 2004, p. 234). For Nehru, the success of the 
Soviet Union and its technology-focused planned-economics was the way forward for India. The Gandhians 
critiqued technological modernization and believed that India would ―industrialize and perish‖ (p. 232). They 
saw technology as a colonial legacy, something to be discarded as India returned to the village-centric and 
manual-labor oriented economy of its Golden Age. 
The result of the mix of these Nehruvian and Gandhian visions was the ―combination of centralized state 
ownership coupled with long-term political neglect of everyday operations‖ (Chakravartty, 2004, p. 232). The 
Nehruvian nature of the state led it to control all telecommunications networks, while its Gandhian nature led 
it to see telecommunications as a luxury that would serve only the elite (p. 233). As a result, 
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telecommunications networks remained firmly under the control of a deeply entrenched bureaucracy and 
served the state as a tool for communications and a tool to generate employment and patronage. 
Apart from the Nehruvian-Gandhian discourse on the role of technology in post-colonial India, there is a 
third, often ignored, pole in this discussion. Represented by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, another key figure in the 
freedom struggle, whose greatest contributions to modern India were the Constitution, of which he was the 
lead drafter, and his leadership of the lower castes and especially the so-called Untouchables, a social group 
into which he was born. 
Ambedkar‘s role in mobilizing the lowest castes in the traditional Hindu social hierarchy was significant even 
if not unique. Since 1947, caste-based politics has played a critical role in independent India, along with 
political mobilization based on religious and linguistic grounds (see Misra, 2008; Guha, 2009). As 
Chakravartty (1999) proposes, ―Institutional actors… mobilize different networks of publics—based on class, 
caste, region, etc.—through parliament, the media, trade unions and the judiciary to contest and validate their 
competing positions in the context of Indian democratic politics‖ (p. 6).  
As might be expected, such politics do not remain confined. Chakravartty (2004) finds that, ―the narrow 
discussions over technical policy spill over to the wider political debates about appropriate technology, caste 
factors, corruption, self-reliance and foreign control‖ (p. 246). For example, Chakravartty focuses on how 
caste-based affirmative action programs led to the expansion of the telecommunications workforce to the 
point where India had one of the highest telecommunications employees-to-telephone lines ratios in the 
world (pp. 233-234). Caste-based (and later, religious and regional) politics, where political agents swap 
government job quotas for votes, is thus a critical factor in the manner of telecommunications network 
development in India. It has repercussions today; people within the telecommunications bureaucracy note 
that one of the reasons the state-owned company has fallen behind private companies is because of the ‗dead 
weight‘ imposed by excessive employees. 
Chakravartty (2004) also provides another example of how telecommunications policy intersected with caste 
considerations. In the mid 1980s, the Government set out to reform the telecommunications sector by 
addressing the needs of businesses and the urban middle-class, both of which were largely anti-caste in their 
outlook and, for the most part, fed up with the poor performance of the state-owned monopolies (pp. 236-
238). As Chakravartty writes, this suggested a possibility for ―nonhierarchical market mechanisms – the 
village entrepreneur having power over the Brahmin bureaucrat‖ (p. 243). During this period, a technocratic 
23 
 
vision took hold that ―linked education and employment opportunities and the basic rights of citizenship to 
access to telecom‖ (p. 239). This effectively allowed the technocrats to conflate the Gandhian concern for 
human development, the Nehruvian desire for high technology, and the global pressures (from the World 
Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF)) for liberalization. Clearly, this was ―not a case of simple 
mimicry of the World Bank‘s position‖ (Chakravartty, p. 239). However, this vision failed to make sufficient 
headway, and by the late 1980s, a new Government came to power ―by directly challenging Rajiv Gandhi‘s 
‗upper-caste‘ technocratic vision‖ (Chakravartty, p. 239). The vision partly failed because it was unable to 
muster the broad support of the various political constituencies that make up India‘s complex caste and class 
structures.  
Chakravartty‘s writing is useful for this study because it suggests that traits of these three key figures—Nehru, 
Gandhi, and Ambedkar*—are visible in the thinking of individuals in the arena of Indian telecommunications. 
However, while Chakravartty suggests that there is an element of ‗Gandhian capitalism‘ in Indian 
telecommunications, I found a different set of traits, more indicative of Nehruvian capitalism. Chakravartty 
(2004) explains that in the late 1980s, ―the Gandhian critique of telecom as an urban luxury was now turned 
on its head with new proclamations by reformers who claimed that access to telecom was ‗the great social 
leveler… second only to death‘‖ (p. 238). However, the individuals working within the regulatory agency in 
2006 had few Gandhian inclinations; while they believed in the emancipative capacity of telecommunications, 
they approached this from what I have labeled a Nehruvian capitalist perspective.† Let us now examine this 
perspective. 
The Nehruvian capitalist as regulator. Jawaharlal Nehru had an indelible influence on the birth 
and life of the Indian state. Nehru played many roles: as a central figure in India‘s independence movement 
against the British, as the first Prime Minister of independent India, as the leader of its largest national 
political party, and as leader of the Non-Aligned Movement during the initial years of the Cold War. Much 
has been written and said about him. Some of this writing is adulating (Pandey, 2001; Wolpert, 1996), some is 
less flattering (Shourie, 2008), but almost all of it analyzes his role in imagining and creating post-colonial 
                                                   
* While Gandhi‘s village- and manual-labor centric vision for development has been left far behind in the ongoing quest 
for economic development through trade-in-services, urbanization, and high technology, Ambedkar‘s vision was of an 
equal society through affirmative action based on caste. Affirmative action programs in India have focused on creating 
educational and employment quotas for the lower castes as defined in the Hindu tradition. 
† This difference in observations is likely because Chakravartty‘s finding seems to rely on the speechifying of one specific 
individual who was active in the arena in the late 1980s rather than prolonged observation of a group in action in the 
mid 2000s.  
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India (see especially Akbar, 2004; Brown, 2003; Nanda, 1998; Tharoor, 2003). It is thus difficult to summarize 
this complex and still-analyzed personality into a few key ideas.  
Yet, as the fieldwork progressed and my interactions with the officials working at TRAI deepened, I began to 
realize that the people whom I was studying were, metaphorically speaking, the children of Nehru. They had 
grown up in the shadow of this towering political figure who had defined a vision of India in its first two 
decades of independence.  
Some of the social and political values and preferences of this group of Nehruvian regulators have been 
informed by their experiences in the India that Nehru had imagined and led for almost two decades. My 
interlocutors had imbibed from the Nehruvian manner their love for strong, technically competent, and 
independent institutions. Like Nehru, they struggled with the bureaucracy even though they recognized its 
importance, and they loved technology seeing it as a means out of poverty. Yet, they had also rejected some 
key elements of Nehru‘s India. Importantly, these individuals rejected one of Nehruvianism‘s most cherished 
ideas: socialism.  
Throughout this study, we will see how these Nehruvian capitalist characteristics play a role in the semi-
independence of the regulatory agency and simultaneously lead staffers to behave in specific ways to maintain 
their position in the arena. Let us turn to these characteristics. 
Nehru‘s ambition was to build strong institutions of the state that were technically competent and effective in 
fulfilling their mandate. One such agency that Nehru was integral to the creation of was the Planning 
Commission, arguably the prototype of the Indian regulatory agency. Inspired by the Soviet experiment with 
economic planning, the Commission is an agency charged with developing five-year plans for India‘s 
economic development. Nehru was its first Chairman (and the Prime Minister of India has retained titular 
Chairmanship since), and ―as the Chairman… he endowed it with great prestige and authority, and insulated 
it from the vicissitudes and short-run political pressures of India‘s democratic system‖ (Nanda, 1998, p. 209).  
Recognizing that the Prime Minister himself was responsible for the creation and functioning of the Planning 
Commission, one might wonder about how politically independent that Commission might have been; 
nevertheless, it at least suggests an attempt by a visionary leader to privilege technocratic decision-making. As 
we will see in Chapter 6, this is not unlike the situation faced by the Nehruvian regulator in 1997 when the 
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fledging telecommunications regulatory agency came under intense pressure to submit to the entrenched 
bureaucracy and to political control. 
Almost as a resistance to the bureaucracy, which remained practically unchanged in its structure and working 
through the transition from British to Indian rule, Nehru was keen to make his Government transparent. 
Unlike the conservative and opaque bureaucracy, Nehru was keen to have public debate on important 
decisions and seek consensus. The Prime Minister‘s Letters to Chief Ministers span three volumes from 1947 to 
1964; Nehru would write these letters every fortnight concentrating on ―broad issues of policy,‖ as an attempt 
to ―think… aloud about important developments and possibilities‖ (Nanda, 1998, p. 199). Nehru sought ―a 
common approach to basic problems,‖ and ―took pains to brief the Chief Ministers in great detail so as to 
promote a national consensus on India‘s foreign policy,‖ which was his exclusive competency (Nanda, p. 
199).  
Similarly, the individuals this ethnography describes were dedicated to open discussion and transparent 
decision-making as a means to distinguish their agency from the babus. At TRAI, this commitment has 
become a ritual, with a systematic public consultation process followed for each important policy or 
regulatory discussion. This ritualized transparency and consultative behavior makes TRAI an attractive site 
for other actors to organize policy and regulatory discussions. For example, the babus turn to TRAI when 
faced with politically sensitive decisions where the opaque nature of their decision-making style (as opposed 
to the regulator‘s) might open the possibility of accusations of favoritism or corruption.  
Faced with a major crisis related to the telecommunications licensing policy, the babus turned to TRAI in 2001 
for help to resolve a dispute among telecommunications firms. Interestingly, this was just months after the 
babus had effectively won a court battle where it stripped TRAI of its powers to regulate licensing and resolve 
disputes. As Chapter 7 discusses, the desire for the individuals at TRAI to be transparent as a differentiating 
strategy made TRAI a desirable site for dispute settlement. 
Another important Nehruvian characteristic I found in this group of individuals was a love for technology. 
For Nehru, embracing technology was the only way forward for India. In 1961, Nehru proposed that 
―science alone... can solve the problems of hunger and poverty, of insanitation and illiteracy, of superstitions 
and dreading customs and traditions, of vast resources running to waste, of a rich country inhabited by 
starving people.‖ An atheist, Nehru referred to modern technology as the ―temples of modern India‖ (Raja, 
2006, 211). 
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The Nehruvian regulators at TRAI had grown up during the Nehruvian era (in the 1950s and early 1960s) 
during which India made significant progress in high technology such as nuclear and space research. 
Moreover, most of them had studied at the technological universities set up by Nehru in his pursuit to 
establish ―a solid and broad-based economy and a population increasingly trained to make full use of the 
resources of modern science and technology‖ (Nehru, 1963). The Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) were 
part of Nehru‘s vision to train the future generations of Indians and ―represent[ed] Indian‘s urges, India‘s 
future in the making‖ (Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, n.d.).  
This fondness for technology and technocratic thinking—as embodied in the creation of the Planning 
Commission—makes the Nehruvian regulators at TRAI proud to be highly qualified engineers trained at 
some of the best universities in India. They use this technological knowledge in their work, considering the 
policy and regulatory questions about telecommunications that land on their desks ‗as engineers‘ as many of 
them were quick to say.  
Hence, when questions about licensing reform or radio spectrum policy would come up, these individuals 
would approach these complex political questions with an interesting ‗engineering mindset.‘ Because for 
them, a policy that stopped the ‗march of technology‘ (see Chapter 8) was the wrong policy. And even as 
these individuals grappled with questions about licensing or radio spectrum, they never let go of their desire 
to have technology be the way India‘s poor would go from poverty to abundance. Whichever way would 
bring technology to the public was the right way. 
All the same, these individuals had also rejected one of Nehru‘s most recognizable features: his commitment 
to Fabian socialism.* Influenced by the thinkers he encountered during his education in England in the 1910s 
and thereafter by the events in Russia, Nehru was drawn to the idea that ―there was… no way of ending the 
poverty and subjection of the Indian people except socialism‖ (Nanda, 1998, p. 186).  
In the India of 2006, the Government had discarded socialism as a credible development strategy. Certainly, 
there are still rhetorical moves to highlight how India remained committed to a socialist development model, 
                                                   
* Fabian socialism was part of Nehru‘s program for economic revitalization. Rather than revolutionary socialism, the 
Fabians sought to introduce socialism gradually within a democratic framework. A key concept for the Fabians was that 
economic development and equality was possible to achieve through government control of resources, particularly 
through an impartial and technocratic state (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.). Both ISI and Fabian socialism had an 
influence on India‘s approach to economic development and policymaking until the 1970s. 
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and a variety of large social protection programs had been set up in the 2000s. But since economic 
liberalization that began, albeit haltingly, in 1984, India had slowly dismantled much of the state apparatus 
around the idea of socialism. For the individuals at TRAI, socialism was a dirty word, something that justified 
state-control of resources, the babus controlling telecommunications, and a return to poor quality and limited 
services. As such, even though they were reacting broadly to Nehruvian socialism, they were reacting 
specifically to the bureaucratic control of telecommunications that used socialism as a justification for its 
existence. 
Nehru‘s version of social combined state control with the presence of influential private sector Indian 
conglomerates operating at the time led India to adopt a ‗mixed‘ model for its economy, where the public 
sector would provide much of the investment in infrastructure and operate in (an increasing number of) 
strategic industries such as railways, telecommunications, and defense production. And where the private 
sector would be managed in line with economic plans through an increasingly complex regulatory system of 
licensing, operating permits, production quotas, and bureaucratic control. Nehru is criticized widely today for 
these choices, which many say led India to lose great economic opportunities due to bureaucratic control.* 
The senior staffers at TRAI were of the opinion that the bulk of investments in infrastructure and service 
provision come from the private sector. The public sector, in their opinion, should only remain as an enabling 
regulator and as a service provider that fills gaps left behind by the private sector. 
These individuals at TRAI were thus not Nehruvian in a traditional sense. Rather, they were Nehruvian 
capitalists, accepting the primacy of private investors (both domestic and foreign) in telecommunications. As 
we will see, this desire to maximize private investments is a key characteristic that defines much of their 
decision-making. They accept and support the role of private firms in building and operating 
telecommunications networks. For the Nehruvian capitalists, Nehru‘s vision of the mixed economy had to be 
ditched in favor of a private-sector led model of telecommunications development, with the public sector as a 
passive player.  
                                                   
* Interestingly, Nehru‘s experiences in the wake of independence, when India faced major political and social crises, 
slowed down his desire to make the Indian economy entirely socialistic. India did adopt economic planning, nationalized 
key industries including telecommunications, and a focus on land reforms. Nehru‘s socialism was pragmatic. Writing at 
the time, he noted that, ―I cannot by sheer force of circumstances do everything that I would like to do,‖ and 
importantly, ―I do not care what ‗ism‘ it is that helps me to set [India] on that road [to development] provided I do it. 
And if one thing fails, we will try another.‖ (Nanda, 1998, 186-187) 
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Interestingly, one important Nehruvian characteristic displays itself through absence. Specifically, Nehru was 
not only an atheist, but also anti-casteist. Nehru did not have the time or patience for religion nor for caste-
based social hierarchies. He appointed a number of people of the so-called ‗untouchable‘ caste to key political 
and diplomatic positions, for example, based on political calculus or his evaluation of their technical skills. It 
might also be said that given his position in Indian politics at the time—the unbeatable politician—Nehru 
could afford to not care during his time about the delicate calculus of communal politics that has dominated 
India since the 1970s. Yet he was acutely aware of the importance of religious, linguistic, and social groupings 
in Indian politics.* Similarly, at no time during my fieldwork did caste, religious, or linguistic distinctions 
appear except for in extremely odd ways that were disconnected from the professional lives of these 
individuals at TRAI. Yet it was clear that these Nehruvian regulators had not only experienced these 
distinctions first hand, sometimes in their previous positions or through their opposition to accepting these 
distinctions. Consequently, this study does not focus on these distinctions, often the subject of 
anthropological research on India. 
Nehruvian capitalism thus plays a critical animating role in the structure and working of TRAI and is an 
integral part of the way in which the individuals I observed during my fieldwork think and work.† This spirit 
also has implications for the wider study of semi-independence; social and political fields around and within 
which the arena of Indian telecommunications operates define and link with specific Nehruvian capitalist 
characteristics of the individuals working at TRAI. For example, their understanding of the role of the public 
sector in telecommunications ties, their commitment to the creation of a stable regulatory agency, their 
preference for higher education and specific types of expertise, each is a manifestation of a larger field that 
includes them and other actors in the arena. 
Alternatives. It is useful at this point to ask how the Nehruvian capitalists at TRAI might differ 
from another country in its approach to telecommunications policy and regulation. What might be the 
defining trait for say regulators in some other country if it is indeed different? 
                                                   
* Nehru had to give in to political movements to redraw state boundaries based on linguistic groupings, provide 
concessions to minority religious groups to secure their support in the early years of the republic, and launched a 
number of affirmative action programs aimed at lower caste groups. See Guha (2007) for a summary. 
† I would like to add a short disclaimer here: Even as these individuals might be Nehruvian in their approach to 
telecommunications policy and regulation, this in no way should imply that they are supporters of Jawaharlal Nehru as a 
political leader. Indeed, a number of these individuals were staunchly critical of Nehru as a political leader. 
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To answer this, at least in part, I turn to an interesting study of how local considerations influence the 
decisions made in the telecommunications arena in the United States. Streeter‘s 1996 study on the policy of 
commercial broadcasting in the U.S. is concerned with how ―ideas, habits of thought, have figured in the 
creation and maintenance of American commercial broadcasting‖ (p. xi). His analysis looks at ―the interaction 
of ideas with social practices and structures‖ (Streeter, p. xiii). Streeter‘s analysis emphasizes ―the imaginative 
character of the institution,‖ (p. xii) and focuses his attention on how U.S. broadcast policy reflects ―a 
consistent pattern of broad social vision, of ideas about the way human life is ought to be‖ (p. xii).  
Streeter finds that policymaking in the U.S. relies on a social vision he calls ―corporate liberalism.‖ He finds 
that policy is not the product of ―impersonal forces such as technology or economics or some behind-the-
scenes conspiracy,‖ but is only explained by considering the influence of ―corporate liberal habits of thought‖ 
(p. xii).  
Corporate liberalism ―embodies a faith in the broad liberal framework of property rights, the market, and 
minimal government, coupled to and qualified by a faith in expertise, administrative procedure, and a reified, 
paternalistic notion of the public good‖(Streeter, 1996, p. 109-10). Broadcasting policymakers in the U.S. 
work within a community of lawyers, engineers, and economists who interact to generate ―[a] shared, 
relatively stable set of interpretations‖ (Streeter, p. 115) that comply with this social vision. These 
assumptions form the basis of debates and decisions.  
If Streeter were to apply his approach to Indian telecommunications regulation, he might find some traits 
among individuals at TRAI that suggest hints of corporate liberalism. It is commonplace, for example, that as 
they make decisions and resolve disputes, these individuals will seriously consider the views of the large firms 
that they regulate. Yet, the similarities will quickly run out.  
For example, debates in Indian political economy tend to focus on the balance between the public and private 
sectors rather than an elimination of the public sector. The role of the state in people‘s lives is also well 
entrenched; the state is seen as a provider of jobs, services, and social assistance. Other countless differences 
might be drawn, but as a final distinction, as one of these individuals, a senior official at TRAI, told me during 
one late evening discussion on radio spectrum policy: ―This is not the U.S. We don‘t simply auction 
everything off.‖  
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The Nehruvian capitalist would feel out of place in the U.S., where (at least they have the opinion that) 
everything is auctioned off. Yet, this individual would not be caught unawares. These individuals are globally 
aware but with a specific Indian viewpoint. They apply global ideas to their work, but believe that the rules 
and decisions they make have to fit local circumstances, or at least, their understanding of the local. It should 
not be surprising then that these individuals have suggested auctions for some of India‘s radio spectrum, 
while preferring (at least at the time of this writing) administrative rationing for much of the spectrum (see 
Chapter 8). 
Organization of This Study 
In answering its central question—how does a regulatory agency become and remain independent?—this 
study will look at the motivations and methods of various individuals within and outside the regulatory 
agency to make or unmake TRAI‘s position in the arena of Indian telecommunications. As this chapter has 
summarized earlier, the focus will be on the ethnographic account—derived through participant observation 
and interviews—to analyze the strategies and tactics that various actors in the arena use to co-define the role 
of the regulatory agency in that arena. Yet, it is also important to understand the political, social, economic, 
and historical factors that led to the creation of the arena and put in place these various actors in that arena.  
To provide this analysis, the rest of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 details the analytical 
framework derived from Moore‘s work in legal anthropology. This framework, introduced above, suggests 
that indeterminacy is the prevailing condition in any legal arena, and that individuals are part of multiple semi-
autonomous fields that order their behavior in different, sometimes contradicting ways, and lead to the 
potential for a constant struggle between regularization and adjustment. 
Chapter 3 then begins the introduction of the reader to the arena of Indian telecommunications. This chapter 
provides an historical political-economic account of the creation of the arena and the entry of the various 
actors in that arena who will play key roles in the remainder of the study. 
The ethnographic account begins with Chapter 4, which introduces the reader to the individuals working at 
TRAI and describes the various semi-autonomous fields that operate within the regulatory agency as well as 
‗come in‘ through these individuals‘ positions in society. This chapter will also provide a view from my 
interlocutors‘ perspectives of the other actors that popular the arena and are part of those or other fields. We 
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will begin to see how the Nehruvian capitalists at TRAI attempt to maintain their position within the arena, 
identifying some of the themes that will be detailed in further chapters. 
Following this introduction to the arena and the individuals working at TRAI, this study will turn to an 
analysis of some of the ways in which staffers at TRAI have struggled against the babus to establish and 
maintain their position as the regulatory agency. Tactics include strategic differentiation and defiance and 
constituency building (Chapter 6), deployed politically powerful ideas and traditions of transparency (Chapter 
7), and preferences for specific forms of expertise (Chapter 8). Through these themes, each of these chapters 
also provides an alternative view of important activities in regulation including adjudication (Chapter 5), 
dispute resolution (Chapter 6), and policymaking (Chapter 7). Along the way, we will also illuminate how 
globalization, ideas about equality and fairness, and specific visions of national development have influenced 
the regulation of Indian telecommunications. 
Chapter 9 closes this study by offering a few concluding thoughts on what this study means for those who 
wish to make and maintain effective regulatory agencies. In considering the impact of semi-independence in 
regulation, the study closes with a consideration of how individuals in regulatory agencies might use such 
strategies and tactics to make their agencies more capable of functioning in arenas where they face intense 
challenges to their existence. By drawing on the multiple fields, relationships, and adjustments—the same 
ones which prevent it from being entirely independent—the regulator might actually end up achieving more 
than if it were insulated. 
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Chapter 2. An Analytical Framework 
This chapter discusses the analytical framework that allows us to recognizes the role of and analyze the 
influence of the political and social ideas and forces in regulatory life. As I have noted earlier, the analytical 
framework used here derives from Moore‘s (1978) work in legal anthropology. Moore‘s fundamental 
argument is that total regulation of a society is difficult if not unlikely due to the inherent struggle between 
people and their ideas (1978, p. 1). She proposes that ―legal theory and practical affairs are far apart,‖ that ―in 
legal theory, the power of law to control behavior can be infinite,‖ but, ―in practical fact, it is highly 
circumscribed‖ (p. 7). This section will discuss Moore‘s analytical approach and framework to understand law 
in society. 
Moore‘s concept of the ―semi-autonomous social field‖ is particularly useful as a way of study the working of 
law in complex societies. Moore‘s influential essay proposed that one might understand how regulation (in its 
broadest sense) happens by studying the ―small field observable‖ to an individual in terms of ―semi-
autonomy.‖  
As Moore (1978) describes, the small field observable to an anthropologist ―can be studied in terms of its 
semi-autonomy—the fact that it can generate rules and customs and symbols internally, but that it is also 
vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the larger world by which it is surrounded‖ 
(p. 55). This allows the analysis of regulatory decisions and actions in a specific site in terms of both local 
circumstances and global forces. Moore‘s framework and the concept of semi-autonomy of social fields is 
thus a close parallel with the idea of semi-independence of the regulatory agency.  
This chapter begins with a brief summary of the literature in legal anthropology that addresses how rule 
making and rule application are local. It then proceeds to a discussion of the analytical framework, based on 
Moore‘s work on law as process. 
Understanding Law as Local 
Legal anthropology has, for a long time, debated on how local values and customs enter legal systems. In her 
review of the history of legal anthropology, Moore (2001) explains that legal anthropology is centrally 
concerned with understanding ―how and why the legal acquires a particular form in a particular social setting‖ 
(p. 96), and how the law and legal activities reflect unique cultural values.  
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Early work in this area includes Bohannan (1965, 1969), who proposed that law in any society was a unique 
cultural achievement. Almost two decades later, Geertz (1983, pp. 167-234) wrote an influential article where 
he suggested that law was a ―craft of place,‖ working by the ―light of local knowledge‖ (p. 167). Geertz had 
three objectives: to get lawyers and anthropologists to work together (pp. 168-170), to present the legal 
process as cultural (pp. 175-181), and to illuminate, through the exploration of Islamic, Indic, and Malaysian 
legal systems, ―different sense[s] of law‖ (pp. 181-214). 
Geertz (1983) comments that these three cultural traditions had different legal sensibilities. He compared 
these three systems and highlighted the differences between them by comparing how they used the concepts 
of fact—what things are—and law—what is right. He examined different notions of fact and law in these 
systems and found that they ―do not just regulate behavior, but construe it‖ (p. 215). These norms and 
happenings are rooted in local culture, having a ―method and manner of conceiving decision situations so 
that settled rules can be applied to decide them,‖ and becoming the local legal sensibility (p. 215).  
In his influential study of law as culture in Islamic society, Rosen studied judicial decision-making within its 
cultural context (1989). He explains that analyzing a legal system requires more than an understanding of the 
―struggle among contending interest groups,‖ and the ―tug of conflicting economic strains‖ that ―enacted 
themselves in the forum of the law‖ (p. 5). Rather, it is also important to ―see how the substantive and 
procedural ideas available at a given moment constitute the terms through which events are discussed, 
shaped, fought over, and fought for‖ (p. 5).  
Rosen wanted to understand how an Islamic judge, the qadi, with seemingly vast discretionary powers actually 
operates within an overall set of cultural assumptions and beliefs that make his decisions consistent (pp. 3-4). 
Specifically, he was interested in understanding how culture affects the qadi‘s view of the meaning of fact, 
public interest, right, and knowledge. He found that decision-making by qadis depends on locally specific 
social ideas. Rosen notes that ―most of the concepts and procedures employed in the legal system are 
replicated in a number of other domains of Moroccan life,‖ and that the logic of rule making and dispute 
resolution ―reveals itself most clearly when seen in the context of the entire culture‖ (p. 11). 
In her own writing, Moore has attempted to bridge the gap between the schools of thought that see universal 
characteristics in law and that see law as locally specific (Moore 1978, Chapter 7). Moore‘s discussion of fields 
and the regularization and adjustment activities within those fields allows us a simultaneous consideration of 
global and local actors and contexts.  
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Semi-autonomous fields, such as local telecommunications regulation, are influenced by larger contexts, such 
as the globalization of telecommunications service provision. This means that it is possible to find a peculiar 
‗Indian‘ way of telecommunications regulation even though the ‗Indian‘ way is part of global contexts; for 
example, the preference among international financial institutions for independent regulators influences the 
ways in which India‘s government approaches regulation, even as the arena of Indian telecommunications is 
influenced by other local fields (e.g., a preference for caste-based reservations, technological utopianism). 
Even though it might sound or look like the activities in the arena are the same in India as they are elsewhere, 
regulation is a ‗craft of place‘ and must be understood within the context of the local culture. To help us 
analyze the local in the seemingly global, this study proposes an analytical framework, to which this chapter 
now turns. 
Moore‟s Framework and the Concept of Fields 
The starting point in Moore‘s (1978) study of regulation and law is to presume indeterminacy in social life (p. 
49). Indeterminacy as the fundamental quality of an arena means that each individual will act on its own 
preferences in an unordered manner. In doing so, Moore eschews any attempt to suggest that any ordering 
mechanism can control social life at all times and everywhere. She takes away the assumption that the law can 
order all types of social activity in a given society; by presuming indeterminacy, she allows for the daily 
adjustments and reinterpretations of control mechanisms by individuals to suit their immediate 
circumstances.  
However, the indeterminately behaving individuals populate an arena that comprises other individuals, and 
some cultural, social, economic, and political norms—enforced by these other individuals—will exercise some 
control on each actor‘s behaviors. This also means that each individual has to ‗behave‘ as these norms dictate 
only when one of two conditions are met: first, when it is in contact with other individuals who might be in 
that arena, and second, when there is an individual who can induce and coerce compliance to those norms. 
When neither of these conditions is met, indeterminacy will prevail. 
Fields are the smallest unit of order in the arena. They help overcome indeterminacy through rules and 
customs backed up with the fields‘ own means to induce or coerce compliance. Fields are defined by some 
processual characteristic—their ability to order behavior—rather than some organizational feature. Yet, these 
fields are also semi-autonomous, they have their own existence and their own rules and customs, but are also 
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embedded in the larger social, economic, and political contexts that impinge on these fields and their 
constituents in a variety of ways (pp. 57-59).  
Fields connect individuals to each other, forming long and complex chains, and are also interconnected by 
common individuals that exist in multiple fields. Anyone at any time could deploy a field, rather than only 
some subset of society such as the state, bureaucracy, corporations, or civil society organizations.* The extent 
of the field will be determined by the ability of its creators or users to define a processual characteristic that 
orders activities of the individuals in the arena. 
The making and unmaking of order. For Moore (1978), studying fields helps in analyzing the 
constantly ongoing ―processes of regularization‖ that seek to build and reproduce durable social and symbolic 
orders in society and coerce and induce compliance with them. Such regularizing activity takes place within 
the field when individuals in a position to impose order on others in the field apply specific ideas or seek 
adherence to rituals.  
Yet, there are simultaneous ―countervailing activities‖ that ―operate to reinterpret, replace, or alter these 
supposedly durable cultural forms whenever it is situationally advantageous for someone to do so‖ (p. 6). 
Moore terms these countervailing activities as the processes of ―situational adjustment‖ (pp. 39-41). Moore 
(1978) suggests that adjustment is possible because of the presence of one individual in multiple 
interconnected social fields, each of which generates and enforces its own set of rules. Each set of rules thus 
serves to organize behavior in a social field, and fields intersect to create multiple systems of order that might 
influence individuals.  
                                                   
* In this way, Moore‘s idea of fields aligns with legal pluralism. Pluralism is fundamentally concerned with the sometimes 
coexisting and sometimes conflicting legal regimes and sources of authority in the same society. In a seminal essay on 
the topic, Merry defines pluralism as ―a situation in which two or more legal systems coexist in the same social field.‖ 
She is also careful to note that a legal system includes ―the system of courts and judges supported by the state‖ and 
―non-legal forms of normative ordering‖ (Merry, 1988, p. 870). Pluralists accept that ―the legal reality anywhere is a 
collage of obligatory practices and norms emanating both from governmental and non-governmental sources alike‖ 
(Moore, 2001, p.106). They accept that ―the capacity for enforceable rule making is not found in the courts alone, nor in 
the legislature, nor in administrative agencies, nor in the police, but also in myriad unofficial sites of policy-making‖ 
(Moore, 2005, p.247). Consequently, they use the term legal pluralism to refer to the ―whole aggregate of governmental 
and non-governmental norms of social control, without any distinctions drawn as to their source‖ (Moore, 2001, p.106). 
Pluralists are thus open to the possibility that ‗rules‘ and ‗norms‘ have similar ordering power and may be deployed by a 
range of actors who participate in some social process. 
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Individuals that have the power to organize behavior, and the means to enforce compliance, deploy these 
rules. In some cases, the power to develop and enforce rules comes from law, for instance, because an 
individual occupies a legally powerful position with specific authority, such as being Chairman of TRAI or a 
Supreme Court judge. In other cases, the power to develop and enforce rules comes from the individual‘s 
social, political, or economic power, such as being a rich businessperson, respected elder of the community, a 
father or mother. In this way, individuals attempt to order fields using various strategies.  
The idea of specific types of relationships ritualized into marriage for instance, seeks to order the behavior of 
individuals within a field around a community. Failing to accept the idea or the ritual means one risks being 
evicted from that community. An individual might break with rituals of marriage and yet not be evicted from 
the community if that individual can introduce an adjustment: wealth, power, or some religious belief that is 
backed up by its own coercive force. Thus, even as an individual attempts to make order through the 
application of some field, it is possible for that ordering individual or a targeted individual to give or gain 
exemptions because of membership in or influence of some other field. 
It is difficult to imagine a situation where an individual does not generate or is included in multiple fields. 
Staffers in a regulatory agency, for example, may deploy their own fields based on the legal authority ceded to 
them by the rules that create the agency. They might also deploy field based on their social positions (e.g., 
being highly educated, members of a specific community), or on their political philosophies (e.g., being 
libertarians). Simultaneously, they are included in other fields defined, for instance, by their nationality (e.g., 
being Indian), gender, or caste grouping.  
A representative of a service provider might also deploy fields (e.g., membership in an industry association, 
social connections with political figures). And regulatory staff is also included in other fields created by 
powerful individuals such as judges, police officers, legislators, and through memberships in professional and 
social fields (such as bar associations, alumni associations, community groups, old boys‘ clubs, religious 
associations). Each of these fields matters because they are articulated or overlapping; actions of an individual 
in one social field will have repercussions in another.  
The dual nature of fields. What is a ‗field?‘ Two possible meanings might be interpreted. According 
to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), ―field‖ (as a noun) could mean a ―ground; a piece of ground,‖ 
which serves as an ―area of operation or observation.‖ Or it could mean ―the area or space under the 
influence of, or within the range of, some agent‖ (OED). In the first case, one might envision a football field 
37 
 
or battlefield, where individuals come to fight out over some issue and then leave. In the second, one might 
consider magnetic fields, where individuals exist through time, but an ordering force appears for some time, 
orders or re-orders the actors, and might stay—at least for some time—and then disappear. This 
consideration is important because in the first case, the field is somewhat permanent and various individuals 
cycle in and out, while in the second case, the network of individuals is somewhat permanent, but various 
fields come and go.  
This duality—even if keeping the intentions of the author ambiguous—is useful. Some fields are almost 
permanent or at least remain in place for extended periods through innumerable changes in the composition 
of actors. Other fields are truly temporary in nature, moving quicker than actors who might often last a long 
time and appearing only as adjustments to other fields. As this study will show, the dual nature of the concept 
of fields allows us to consider the making and unmaking of order. 
It is useful to point out the links between the duality of the meaning of ‗field‘ between the (seemingly) 
permanent and the (seemingly) provisional and Moore‘s discussion of regularization and situational 
adjustment. Regularization captures the attempts to create order through fields, while adjustments are 
individuals‘ attempts to break order by calling upon other fields that could re-order the behavior of other 
individuals, or help them explain their change in thinking. 
On the other hand, provisional and permanent fields are the types of fields that are present within some 
arena. The permanent fields are set up around ideas that have staying power (e.g., Indianness) and might have 
been ritualized (e.g., singing of a national anthem); they tend to include roles and positions as opposed to 
individuals (e.g., a Prime Minister). Provisional fields, on the other hand, might rely on ideas or influences 
that do not have staying power in the arena under consideration and might only make an entry based on the 
characteristics of one or a few individuals.  
Put another way, regularization and adjustments are operations while permanence and provisionality are 
characteristics of fields. It is possible to adjust or regularize using either type of field. If provisional fields are 
used often and widely enough, for instance, they might become permanent, and vice-versa. In some cases, that 
provisional field is adopted widely and overtakes a now-no-longer-permanent field. And, as Moore suggests, 
the action of adjustment is done often by a large group of individuals, it might become a regular mechanism 
of ordering (Moore, 1978, p. 51).  
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In our consideration of the making of independent regulatory agencies, then, we are effectively looking for 
how a group of individuals in the arena might create a permanent field around them that can order behavior. 
Yet, this field is not permanent by default; it is useful to turn to understanding the processes of sustaining 
these fields. 
Processes of sustenance. Semi-permanent fields must undertake processes of re-assertion and 
attempt to order the activities that occur within as much as possible if it is to remain alive. Moore (1978) 
suggests that the semi-autonomous field is defined ―not by its organization‖ but ―by a processual 
characteristic, the fact that it can generate rules and customs and coerce or induce compliance to them‖ (p. 
57). Consequently, the semi-permanent field should have a mechanism to make and impose such rules over 
time over members of the field if it is to be sustained. 
In order to expand on the concept of the ―processual characteristic,‖ it is useful to consider Moore‘s own 
analysis. She writes: 
The term [process] is variously used in ethnographies: (1) to describe universal contexts of 
social contact such as processes of competition, or of co-operation, and the like; (2) to 
describe series of events that recur again and again in certain institutional contexts, such as, 
political processes, economic processes, educational processes, and so on; and (3) to describe 
the kinds of circumstances that lead to certain results, such as the process of 
industrialization, the process of urbanization, the process of segmentation, the process of 
stratification, and so on (pp. 42-43). 
She continues with the proposal that all these processes ―involve movement in the fortunes and relationships 
of individuals,‖ and at the ―microscale‖ alter the situations of individuals involved, ―but they do not 
necessarily involve social and cultural change on the macroscale‖ (p. 43). People rise through hierarchies, are 
demoted, or fail in their ventures; in each of these cases, an individual‘s fortunes are made and unmade by 
processes such as social succession, improved qualifications, or a failure to stick to agreed norms. Yet, even as 
these individuals move, the overall arena remains the same with no change in the fields at work. 
Moore continues with a rough classification of the two broad categories of processual studies. The first 
category has to do with the movement of individuals through roles and positions, while the second has to do 
with the changes of norms and of social/cultural regularities. This categorization also usefully suggests that 
39 
 
Moore‘s ambiguity about the field as battlefield versus field as magnetic field is likely purposeful. While 
individuals might move through positions in the same field, there are also instances of changes or 
adjustments due to effects of other fields. Indeed, Moore also suggests that these ―are not and cannot be 
exclusive categories‖ (p. 46). Put another way, the changes in individuals will influence changes in social 
regularities, while the reverse will also occur. 
Semi-autonomy of fields. From the foregoing, it is evident that a field may ―generate rules and 
customs and symbols internally‖ and ―induce or coerce compliance‖ (Moore, 1978, p. 55). However, the field 
is also susceptible to changes from within or without. As Moore explains, even as it generates its own order, 
the field is also simultaneously ―vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the larger 
world by which it is surrounded‖ (p. 55). Consequently, every field is semi-autonomous; it has the ability to 
order some part of activity, but is also ―set in a larger social matrix‖ that can and does ―affect and invade‖ the 
field, ―sometimes at the invitation of persons inside it, sometimes at its own instance‖ (p. 56). 
It is useful to consider an example here. India sees hundreds if not thousands of cases of bride burning every 
year (Kumar, 2003). This practice—where the groom‘s family sets the bride on fire for not paying up the 
demanded or additional dowry—has been outlawed since 1961, when the Government of India passed the 
Dowry Prohibition Act, making the dowry-taking process illegal. Yet, the practice continues among a set of 
individuals who see it as a social custom. The practice of bride burning is indeed still condoned by some 
families who see it as their ‗right‘ to burn a bride who refuses to pay up. Yet, a suspecting bride who gets a 
dowry request can now approach the police, report this incident, and in most places find security or relief, 
something not formally possible prior to the passage of the Act. The imposition of the Act is thus incumbent 
not on the state alone simply because such surveillance and enforcement is impossible; the police cannot 
break down doors in expectation of this crime. However, it is an option—even if as a threat—for an 
unwilling bride (and in many cases for the grooms that join them) to use as a tool.  
In terms of Moore‘s framework, the family is its own semi-autonomous social field, with the ability to impose 
its own rules and induce compliance. The ability of the family to demand a dowry is the first instance of 
seeking compliance (here of the bride‘s family, which pays) to an idea created by a wider field (of social ties) 
that (even if anachronistic) snares the bride‘s family. On the other hand, since 1961, the bride has the ability 
to counter this by dragging the groom‘s family not to court, but to the field created by the passage of the 
Dowry Prohibition Act. Other counters are also available: the intervention of common family friends, local 
strongmen, or even politicians (implying that the state is only one player in a field comprising of evil rituals 
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and well-intentioned goons). Hence, even the most private and well worn of fields—the Indian family—is 
semi-autonomous and susceptible to the influence of wider social, political, and economic forces.  
Making the Regulatory Field Permanent 
It is now time to tie the multiple threads of the introductory and this chapter together. This study takes 
Moore‘s framework and applies it to telecommunications regulation. In doing so, this study takes a 
framework from legal anthropology and uses it in a field that has a rich history of analysis by historians, legal 
scholars, economists, and sociologists.  
This study explores the duality of the field, something Moore devotes less time to, specifically in terms of the 
use of ideas and rituals to keep regulatory agencies effective, even as they make them semi-independent. This 
study thus takes Moore‘s work and looks at how individuals use ideas and rituals to bring fields into existence 
and to sustain them. As part of this, the framework is expanded to look at how fields might become 
permanent or remain provisional, transitions and conditions that Moore does not explore in as much detail. 
The creation of a regulatory field through an act of law does not guarantee its long-term existence. Rather, the 
field once created through a law might be a provisional field. Either no one cares enough to implement the 
law, or if it is implemented, the individuals who are tasked with setting up and maintaining the field do not or 
cannot. It is possible that in some cases, where the rule of law is truly powerful and the entities present in an 
arena are coerced into following the law, that the mere legislating-into-existence of a regulatory agency might 
be sufficient. 
However, in many cases, as practitioners have complained and scholars have noted, some additional effort is 
required to make the regulatory field a (seemingly) permanent one. This study will focus on the efforts of 
various individuals in the creation of such permanence.  
As Moore suggests, for a field to exist, it should have a processual characteristic. For a regulatory field to 
exist, then, the individuals who seek to maintain the field should be able to make rules and induce 
compliance. Again, if the rule of law is strong, it is possible that a legal act alone might provide the group of 
regulatory staffers enough tools to make and maintain the field, where they use the law as a means of ordering 
others—bringing them into the field—and inducing compliance. 
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But for those many cases where laws are insufficient, we must look to other sources of order within the 
regulatory field. This is the focus of the rest of this study. 
Moore offers us some clues about where individuals might turn to for ordering devices. She discusses the role 
of legal rules, social relationships, cultural concepts, and the threat of exclusion as possible means to order. In 
this study, we will see all of these devices at play, making a regulatory field and the working of the various 
actors within that field political and social. 
However, this study will also highlight three interesting mechanisms that have helped TRAI create and 
maintain a regulatory field since 1997. First, this study will look at the role of ideas such as technocracy, 
neutral decision making, rational policy formulation. Second, we will see how rituals—proceedings, hearings, 
report writing, fines—all may help reinforce this regulatory field. And third, we will look at how a regulator‘s 
independence and the field around that agency is sustained and maintained not only by regulatory staffers but 
also by other actors in the arena. 
Thinking of regulation in terms of fields and semi-independence brings some of the fundamental features of 
arenas into relief. Considering regulation as a semi-independent activity confronts the challenge of dealing 
with the politics inherent in regulatory activity without treating the political behavior of regulatory agencies as 
deviance or an aberration. It allows us to consider the role of individuals, social ideas, and formal and 
informal ordering systems in regulation all together.  
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Chapter 3. From Small to Worst: A History of Indian Telecommunications 
Indian telecommunications began in 1851, when the British East India Company established the first 
telegraph lines near Calcutta. In the 160 years since, Indian telecommunications has gone through significant 
changes, some of which are technological, others that have to do with the economic organization of the 
industry, and yet more that relate to the role of telecommunications in Indian society.  
This is an historical account of the making of the arena that focuses on telecommunications regulation in 
India and on identifying those institutions and events that are integral to an understanding of how regulation 
happens. These are events that take place well before the setting up of TRAI, but which have a bearing on the 
goings on even today, either through the legal rules they put in place, or through the institutions created since 
1851. At every step along the way, individuals made decisions to attempt regularization of new ideas and 
institutions, while others attempted to create ambiguities and adjust order. The result is that in this period, the 
arena has seen the introduction and working of many semi-autonomous fields.  
This chapter covers the development of the arena until 2005, which is just before the fieldwork used to write 
this study began. This historical account provides a political economic analysis of developments in the arena, 
focusing on the key institutions that will be present throughout this study. It draws upon the various 
academic accounts of the history of the Indian telecommunications industry (see for example, Chakravartty, 
1999; McDowell, 1997; Singh, 1999). Much of this writing focuses on the political and economic 
developments in the industry, and the role of the state, capital, international institutions, or social agencies in 
dictating its structure and performance.  
The development of the arena of Indian telecommunications has been synchronous with changes in the 
market structure, key policy decisions, and the creation of new agencies. It is useful to preface this chapter by 
identifying some key themes that have dominated the arena in different periods since its creation about 160 
years prior to the writing of this study. The first period, between 1850 and 1947, saw telecommunication as 
an infrastructure of strategic importance to the state and as a network primarily meant to serve the British 
Empire and its interests and agents in the sub-continent. In the second period, which extended from 1947 to 
1984, the state—now Indian controlled—retained its control over the network but with a shift towards the 
notion that the state was the only entity that could serve the public appropriately. This it did not do very well; 
until 1984, Indian telecommunications remained restricted to a small number of users; there were about 3 
million telephone subscribers in 1985 (The World Bank Group, 2010b). 
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Historians of telecommunications might not be surprised that 1984, the start of a new period for the arena, 
saw the idea take hold that widespread access to telephones was essential for national economic development. 
After all, this was the time when a growing number of international organizations were making the link 
between telephones and economic development. In December 1984, for example, the famous Maitland 
Committee Report of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) was released.* This report, titled 
The Missing Link, forcefully made the case that ―the gross and growing imbalance of telecommunications 
throughout the world was not tolerable,‖ (The Independent Commission for Worldwide 
Telecommunications Development, 1984, p. 3) and that ―telecommunications can play [a role] in economic 
and social development and in enhancing the quality of life‖ (p. 4). However, apart from the growing 
international pressure to reform, many local events and circumstances led to a significant reorganization of 
the Indian telecommunications arena. During this era, perhaps unsurprisingly, telecommunications was 
viewed as ―a tool for economic development.‖† 
The arena saw its next major change in 1997, when TRAI was established. This again represented a major 
reorganization of the arena, the first such change since the initial steps towards liberalization in 1984, and 
since the opening of telecommunications service provision to private investors in 1992. In this phase, which 
continues today, the focus for the Government has been on allowing the entry of new technologies, 
promoting private investment, and increasing access to telephone services. Yet, older themes, especially those 
related to the importance of state-provided services as an equity-ensuring measure, or that 
telecommunications was essential for economic development, continue. 
With this introduction, I now turn to a description of the evolution of the arena, and the identification of the 
institutions and ideas that have shaped telecommunications regulation in India. 
Imperial Communications and The Government Monolith: 1851-1947 
The period between the introduction of the telegraph until Indian independence from British colonial rule 
saw telecommunications, and especially the telegraph, as a tightly controlled service used to manage the 
colony. The British installed the first segment of what was to become India‘s telegraph network in 1851 
                                                   
* The official name of the Committee was the Independent Commission for World Wide Telecommunications 
Development. 
† I discuss the global circumstances leading up to this idea in the subsequent section of this chapter. 
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around the eastern city of Calcutta. By 1948, there were 118,395 kilometers of telegraph lines and 3,324 
telegraph offices (Singh, 1999, p. 118). As Singh explains, the telegraph system was ―the mainstay of imperial 
communications until 1947‖ (117-118). Mody (1995, 109) writes that, ―the British Indian telegraph system 
was a political, not a commercial, undertaking.‖ The British did position the system as providing a public 
service, but this may have been only to make it ―contrary to the public interest to cut telegraph lines‖ (Singh, 
117-118). Its positioning as a public service meant keeping rates for telegrams low, and these rates were cross-
subsidized by telephone services when they were introduced in 1881 and especially after their use spread in 
the 1920s (Singh, 118-119).  
In 1881, the British Government of India granted telephone service licenses to private companies in Bombay, 
Calcutta, and Madras (Singh, 118-119). Cross-subsidies to telegraphy ensured that telephone services were 
expensive while telegraphic messages remained inexpensive, perpetuating the notion that telephones were 
meant for businesses and for the rich, and that telephone service was a ‗luxury.‘  
It is useful to understand the notion of luxury in the context of Indian telecommunications. Broadly speaking, 
a luxury item may have two characteristics: (1) a high price and (2) limited availability, especially for an elite 
group of consumers. At this time when telephony was still a relatively new service, India‘s telephone services 
were expensive similar to other countries such as the U.S. (Fischer, 1994). But there was also a sense that 
people who owned telephones were in an elite group. This was a society where the rich were often the Indian 
monarchy or the colonial elite, and telephones were likely owned and used by the ‗rich‘ or by their businesses. 
As Singh explains, the colonial administration perceived the telephone as a ―luxury suited to the intracity 
communication interests of business firms‖ (Singh, 1999, p. 118). The telephone thus was tied to a notion of 
being a technology for the elite, not something the ‗common man‘ would or should use. If a ‗common man‘ 
were to use the telephone, it would be for very important calls; as one famous Hindi movie song from 1949 
showed, calls between a wife at home and husband working abroad, in Rangoon, may classify as such (Varma 
Films & Rawail, 1949). 
By treating the telephone as a luxury, it was possible to charge more for the service, and keep it out of the 
reach of most Indians. Classifying the telephone as a luxury also matched the colonial administration‘s 
interest in depressing the supply of telephones; the telegraph was much more easily controlled and censored 
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than the telephone.* The Government was also not as keen a user of telephony because it remained expensive 
and was not as reliable as the telegram, especially over long distances. Furthermore, the colonial bureaucracy 
saw the telephone as less pompous than the telegram with its messengers and office peons. This reduced the 
demand for telephones within the state at the time.  
Even as telegraphy covered the country, there were comparably much fewer telephones in India than in other 
developing countries. Due to the lack of attention paid to telephone service due to its classification as a 
luxury, and the British raj‘s hesitations about letting its subjects speak freely, there were only 82,000 
telephones across the country in 1948 (Singh, 1999, 118-121).  
The genesis of rules. The legal basis of the Indian telecommunications industry was established in 
this period. Interestingly, the Indian Telegraph Act of 1889 remains the legal framework even today, although 
the Government has modified or amended it from time to time. The staying power of this law might be 
surprising to those not familiar with India‘s legal system; it is unremarkable in the Indian context. A number 
of fundamental laws that still operate today were written in the colonial era, a testament to the non-
revolutionary transfer of power from colonial to post-colonial administrations.† For some Indians, this is a 
testament to how the White Sahibs were simply replaced by the Brown Sahibs—a complaint that the state did 
not reform itself to serve the people even as it moved from colony to republic. However, some of today‘s 
bureaucrats admire the staying power of British-written laws. Noting the number of times the Cable 
Television Networks (Regulation) Act of 1995 had been amended, one senior member of the civil service 
who was working at TRAI commented that, ―this one is only 10 years old and has seen so many changes, 
while the Indian Telegraph Act is compatible with broadband and convergence even after 100 years!‖ 
The Central Government of British India through the Telegraph Act retained the sole right to build, operate, 
and maintain ‗telegraphs,‘ although the term covered (as the official noted) any type of communications 
service. The preference for state control of telecommunications was reiterated when the British Government 
of India nationalized most industries in the 1940s, including, eventually, the telephone companies.  
                                                   
* It was possible to monitor most if not all telegraph messages—the sender had to hand the message to a post official to 
send it. Telephone calls could be made from the privacy of one‘s home.  
† For instance, the Indian Penal Code, which covers most criminal activities and their punishment remains largely 
unchanged since its writing in 1860, while the Evidence Act dates back to 1872. Much of family law similarly dates to 
colonial times. The Constitution itself is based on the Government of India Act of 1935, which was established by the 
British government.  
46 
 
It is thus possible to identify at least two themes that defined the rules around which the arena grew during 
this first period. The first was a preference for state control of telecommunications, initially indicated by the 
Government‘s preference to control the strategically important telegraph network, and later to nationalize the 
few private companies of the time. The idea of state control of telegraphy and later telephony was powerful 
because of their importance to the continuance of British rule in the Indian subcontinent. Concerns about 
subversives and nationalists using the widespread telegraph network to communicate with each other 
reinforced the need to keep that network firmly under state control. British officials‘ desire to control 
telephone networks was apparent from their actions at home; telephone service in the U.K. also began as a 
privately provided service in 1878, just three years before the same happened in India. However, by 1912, the 
General Post Office had taken over the provision of most telecommunications services (The British Postal 
Museum & Archive, n.d.). 
The second idea that influenced the development of the arena was that the telephone was a luxury service, 
meant primarily for businesses, the rich, and maybe a few willing Government officials rather than something 
the public could use to communicate freely.  
When the (relatively) peaceful transition of power took place in August 1947, many of the Indian Civil Service 
officials remained, and this ensured the continuance of a professional and technically competent bureaucracy 
that held many of the ideas and stuck with the laws put in place by the British. The widespread belief in these 
ideas—state control and luxury—remained, creating the foundations for the rules and institutions that would 
regulate Indian telecommunications. These ideas were in place in the arena as early as the 1880s, influencing 
the regulation of even the few telephone companies and the telegraph system in colonial India. As we will see 
in the next section, these ideas remained firmly in place in post-colonial India. 
Small to Worst: The Un-development of Telecommunications from 1947-1984 
When India became independent in 1947, telecommunications was subject to the tensions that existed 
between the Gandhian‘s aversion to western technology and the Nehru‘s technophilia combined with an 
interest in state control of the commanding heights of the economy (Chakravartty, 2004). This allowed, oddly 
enough, the values held by the British government to continue, state control combined with a lack of interest 
allowed a tolerance for the un-development of the telecommunications sector well into the life of 
independent India. 
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That India was lagging in telecommunications infrastructure development was becoming clearer by the 1950s. 
In 1951, for example, even major Indian cities such as Bombay and New Delhi had a teledensity—telephone 
lines per 100 inhabitants—of about one, while cities such as Buenos Aires and Cape Town had teledensities 
more than 10 (Singh, 1999). More surprising is that India continued to lag behind other regional peers such as 
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Chile, Mexico, and Brazil through the 1980s (The World Bank Group, 2010). Rural 
telecommunications access was abysmal. Estimates among TRAI staffers suggested that less than 0.3 percent 
of India‘s rural population had access to working telephones right until the early 1990s. 
It is possible to assign four reasons for this poor showing. First, the colonial attitudes towards the telephone 
remained in place through this period. From 1950 to 1983, the Government retained the classification of 
telecommunications as a ―luxury,‖ putting it on par with ―five star hotels‖ (Singh, 1999, pp. 127-128). Put 
another way, telephones were not something that needed to be emphasized in a planned economy that sought 
to quickly reduce poverty and reinvigorate the Indian economy. 
It is useful to note here that while the notion of luxury continued over from colonial times into independent 
India, the underlying meaning of luxury did change. In colonial times, the classification as a luxury was in 
support of a desire for censorship and a keenness to control access to an ‗elite‘ technology. In independent 
India, however, the classification as a luxury was a reaction to the links between the telephone and the elite.  
Seen as a symbol of the Western colonial power that had just been ousted, the telephone was rejected as 
inappropriate for the masses. This was a Gandhian response to an unneeded luxury ―for a nation where the 
vast majority of citizens live in poverty in rural areas,‖ and where ―social policy dictated that public 
expenditure prioritize other infrastructure areas over telecom‖ (Chakravartty, 2004, p. 233). From the colonial 
definition of luxury to exclude the masses, this was a redefinition of luxury to minimize unnecessary 
consumption. This classification also served a particular financial logic. The Government kept 
telecommunications services artificially expensive to subsidize the much more politically important postal and 
telegraph services (Bagchi, 2000; Desai, 2006).  
Hence, the period from 1947 to 1984 for Indian telecommunications was, as Singh puts it succinctly, in the 
―shadow of the empire‖ (Singh, 1999, p. 115). In per-capita terms, by 1984, India‘s telephone network 
connected about 0.38 percent of the population, less than Pakistan (0.48) and Sri Lanka (0.51), and much 
lower than Brazil (5.03) or Argentina (8.7) (The World Bank, 2010). 
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Second, the telecommunications industry received little attention from economic planners during the era of 
total public sector control. A policy of autarky and import-substitution-industrialization* (ISI) dominated the 
political economy of India from 1950 to 1980 (Rudolph & Rudolph, 1987). Enamored with Fabian socialism, 
a philosophy to which Nehru was deeply attached, much of the ruling class in immediate post-independence 
India wanted the state to occupy the commanding heights of the economy. This also fit with private interests 
and preferences of the state.  
Mody (1995) writes that the state assumed ownership and control of most industrial activities (including the 
railways, steel, electricity, and telecommunications) because ―politicians and bureaucrats… had little faith in 
the ability of domestic capital to act as agents of national development‖ (p. 109). This ―little faith‖ was partly 
the result of apprehensions based on caste distinctions—the bureaucracy‘s high-caste members being unsure 
of the lower-caste trader roots of business (Mody, p. 108). It was also the result of the state‘s willingness to 
have the greatest level of control over the economy, both for personal benefit as much as to adhere to the 
ideas of state control in service of a planned economy. 
Third, attempts at state control resulted in a strengthening of the power of domestic capitalists and a 
bureaucracy that was disconnected from the conditions of life for most Indians. As has been well recorded 
elsewhere, the state failed in its development program. Moreover, the state restricted any private sector 
initiative to develop either telecommunications technologies or services even as it failed to fill gaps in the 
network. The state could not provide an adequate quantity or quality of services—most social and economic 
indicators either dropped or stagnated during this period—and nor did it develop innovative technologies in 
the telecommunications industry. Much of the state‘s resources were instead wasted on importing obsolete 
equipment that was poorly replicated domestically by large state-owned manufacturing concerns (Chapter 8 
discusses the state of telecommunications manufacturing in India). The state was thus unable to provide for 
its businesses or its citizens, and instead became bloated with much of the regulatory regime designed to 
maximize the opportunities for corruption.  
                                                   
* ISI emerged as a powerful ordering idea in post-colonial India, particularly as a response to two centuries of British 
rule. Nationalists such as Nehru believed that the British had extracted resources to the detriment of the Indian 
economy, and that the only way to economic development was a program to industrialize the nation while minimizing 
imports. Doing so, it was held, would both allow Indian industry to grow and reduce dependence on foreign goods 
(Frankel, 2005; Rudolph & Rudolph, 1987). 
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A key development that took place in this period was the creation of what is now known widely as the 
‗license-quota-permit raj‘ (raj trans. rule; the choice of terms not accidentally referring to the British raj). This 
refers to the licenses and permits needed to manufacture goods, provide services, and in many cases, even to 
make minor modifications to business plans and techniques. Quotas also existed for many goods such as cars, 
two-wheelers, and consumer electronics. This was a result of the Government‘s economic planning efforts 
tied with the state‘s suspicion of private industry. These regulations created very high formal and informal 
barriers to market entry, and interestingly, also perpetuated monopolies or oligopolies constituted largely of 
Indian conglomerates, and in some cases, large multinational corporations that were willing to capitulate to 
often arbitrary and usually restrictive rules. Corruption within the political class and bureaucracy also grew 
due to their ability to exert control on specific aspects of business processes; as Mody notes, ―licensing 
became an instrument of patronage‖ (1995, p. 112). 
There were subtle shifts and moves within this framework, but the deeply entrenched interests within the 
bureaucracy and indigenous private sector ensured that there was little shift away from the (at least rhetorical) 
allegiance to self-reliance that benefitted them (Nayar, 2001). On the thinking on the political economy in the 
late 1980s, Mody summarizes Bardhan (1988) who argued that the Indian state is more powerful than what is 
―visualized in the Marxian or neoclassical political economy of class or pressure group politics,‖ and is a 
massive bureaucratic entity with interests of its own. Similarly, Nandy (1989) ―described the Indian state as 
the hegemonic actor in the public realm; it is perceived as an institution that has absolute priority over all 
other aspects of Indian civilization-society in every instance is required to adjust to the state‖ (as cited in 
Mody, 1995, p. 108).  
Finally, the monolithic structure of the telecommunications system, where one Government department 
provided all services, generated few incentives to meet user demands (Singh, 1999, p. 129). These firms would 
install outdated equipment of poor quality, and had low efficiency in the use of inputs (i.e., labor and capital) 
(Singh, p. 131). The telecommunications industry remained a state controlled monolith with staff that had 
lifetime appointments and stable, predefined salary structures. There was no competitive pressure to 
innovate, no shareholder pressure for efficiency, profitability, or growth in sales and market capitalization 
(Athreya, 1996). Importantly, there was little political pressure generated by the lack of a debate about the role 
of telecommunications in a democracy; rather, the only political debate about telecommunications related to 
the jockeying among labor unions for a greater share of the spoils in the sector. Indeed, one of the most 
noticeable changes in Indian telecommunications in this period was ―the major increase in staff size,‖ as the 
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state used its control over the public sector to create more jobs, even if unnecessary (Mody, 1995, p. 110-
111).  
Although the telecommunications industry was a Government-controlled and operated monolith in this 
period, it would be inaccurate to say that there were no disputes among different interest groups within the 
Government. Policymaking for the industry was the responsibility of the Department of Posts and Telegraph 
(DoPT) that had existed since 1856, and much in line with international practices of the day. As Athreya 
(1996) points out, until 1985, telecommunications was ―buried‖ under the postal department (p. 12). As he 
notes, the DoPT Board was ―dominated, as an inevitable historical hangover, by [officials] from a postal 
background‖ (Athreya, p. 12). There was only one Board member assigned to—what was another sign of the 
poor state of telecommunications—the ―telegraph sector.‖ This member was responsible for telegraph, telex, 
and telephones. This institutional neglect ensured that telecommunications systems development had low 
priority.  
By the early 1980s, India‘s telecommunications infrastructure was widely considered to be the ―world‘s worst‖ 
(Singh, 1999, p. 132). No matter from which perspective one might analyze the telecommunications industry, 
it is clear that under the control of the state, telecommunications grew very slowly, not addressing the 
demand from businesses or from the growing urban middle class (Singh, 1999, p. 132-137), and much less 
from rural communities where telephones were unheard of. Held up by poor planning and management, and 
under the complete control of the state, the local, domestic, and international telephone systems had limited 
reach and a terrible reputation. The waiting list for residential telephone service in 1980-81 was about 447 
thousand, a fifth of the total number of telephone lines nationally (Singh, 1999, p. 137). Teledensity was 
among the lowest in the world at 0.5 (The World Bank Group, 2010).  
And even if you had a telephone, service was poor. I recall numerous instances even in the late 1980s when 
the telephone at my home in Bombay would go ―dead‖ for days, often due to water seepage or other natural 
causes. Complaints would take a long time to address, and it would take repeated attempts to get the trunk 
operator to connect us with family in the United States. Every three minutes, the operator would come on the 
line during these calls, and warn us that we were taking too much time. The less friendly ones would simply 
disconnect the call after a few minutes. 
Indians who lived through this period note that this preference for control over development was primarily 
due to the ability of the state to control redistribution and hence derive political power—creating a politics 
51 
 
around scarcity. As Mody (1995) notes, ―until the mid-1980s, policy was made by the engineers and civil 
servants in the state telecommunications monopoly. The politics of telecommunications was limited to 
getting scarce telecommunications lines, through personal connections or bribes‖ (p. 114). The politics of 
scarcity remained squarely in place.  
Attempts to propose alternative arrangements would lead to an unfavorable branding as ―market wallahs‖ 
(wallahs trans. people of).* Being called a market wallah was undesirable during the era of socialism and 
autarky. Market wallahs were not the people of the Indian model of economic development, of growth with 
equality, and of Indian self-sufficiency tied with non-alignment and freedom from control by Western 
capitalists. Instead, market wallahs were friends of the Americans, undercover capitalists, uncommitted to the 
cause of economic growth through ISI, and hence of dubious loyalty to the country itself. For a political 
regime that derived its power through a politics of scarcity (and the state‘s ability to minimize scarcity for 
specific groups), proposing any alternative version of economic growth was anathema.  
Telephones thus remained a luxury item because of the attempts at socialism and redistributive politics where, 
in the words of one political leader, the focus was not to redistribute wealth, but to redistribute poverty 
(Commanding Heights, 2001). In the case of telephones, then, the Government machinery was not focused 
on ensuring that every Indian could have a telephone, but to call the telephone a luxury, tax it, and control its 
availability, ensuring that few Indians could have it. India‘s telecommunications networks were thus not 
unlike its railways, also a major public sector undertaking. As one Minister of Railways explained, referring to 
the poor quality of passenger care, the approach was to ―degrade the first class‖ rather than ―elevate the 
second class‖ (Guha, 2007, p. 526). The Indian political economic model was not aimed at maximizing 
productive capacity or expanding the availability of high quality and low cost services; rather, it was aimed at 
managing inputs (e.g., jobs) and outputs (e.g., telephones) to maximize political power and create 
opportunities for patronage.  
The arena in the “shadow of empire.” Colonial ideas remained dominant in the 
telecommunications industry from the 1950s to 1970s, even as India moved firmly forward following 
                                                   
* For one account of such branding—and through it an attempt at shaming, see Das (2002, p. 198). Das recounts how, 
during a meeting of representatives of Indian industry with then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, he attempted to put 
forward a proposal to reduce the state control over the economy. Das recalls Mrs. Gandhi response: ―Ah, we have a 
market-wallah, do we?‖ And he notes, ―she smiled and gave me a look as though I belonged to the school for the 
mentally disabled that she had opened the previous day‖ (p. 198).  
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independence from British rule in 1947. As Mody (1995) points out, the ―Brown sahibs‖ took over from the 
―White sahibs‖ during this time (p. 110). Mody writes in her account:  
The law-and-order maintenance structure of the colonial civil service set up by the British to 
control the natives was not modified for public accountability, decentralization, or state-
guided capitalism as they were in the newly industrialized countries of East Asia. The 
authoritarian system of the colonial administrator was adopted by the Brown sahibs waiting 
in the wings to take the jobs of the departing White sahibs (Mody, 1995, p. 110). 
No doubt that some changes did occur within this framework. One key development was that the 
bureaucratic networks that managed the telecommunications monolith became stronger and two core 
bureaucratic institutions were created during this period. One was the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), 
the administrative civil service. The widespread perception is that the IAS runs the country, forming the core 
of the executive arm of the Government. Even today, its members are in key positions across the public 
sector.  
Like their colonial predecessors, IAS officers are the management cadre of the Government. Thorough 
generalists (a mere handful have progressed through more than one post at the same ministry in their 
careers), they hold the view that they make better managers than the technically oriented ITS personnel. Their 
close interactions with the political class lead them to leadership positions where they have major influence 
on policymaking and the running of the state, including conducting elections, managing public sector 
organizations, serving as advisors to politicians, and holding senior positions in many regulatory agencies 
(including since 2003, TRAI). 
The other institution that appeared at this time was the Indian Telecommunications Service (ITS), which was 
created in 1965 as a permanent cadre of engineer-managers that could work in and manage the various public 
sector telecommunications manufacturers and service providers. Like other specialist cadres (e.g., the Indian 
Police Service, Railway Services, and Forest Service) the ITS was supposed to allow hiring of competent 
engineers who could work up the hierarchy within the telecommunications bureaucracy to ultimately captain 
one of the organizations. Today, ITS officials occupy most of the senior offices of organizations that 
descended from the DoPT (such as the Department of Telecommunications [DoT], Bharat Sanchar Nigam 
Ltd. [BSNL], and Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. [MTNL]). Most of the advisors and senior staff at DoT 
and TRAI are also ITS personnel.  
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While both cadres play an important role in the arena, there is intense competition between them and the 
tension between the generalists and technical specialists has never been resolved. The IAS controls a wider 
scope of the economy and has access to the most powerful positions in the bureaucracy. But within the 
telecommunications bureaucracy, they have to compete with the ITS officers. Indeed, IAS officials have no 
choice but to rely on the ITS officials for advice, support, and deep connections within the 
telecommunications bureaucracy, labor unions, and work force. 
This tension between the two has never been resolved. For example, as of 2009, IAS and not ITS officers 
staffed the top (non-elected) leadership of the telecommunications ministry and regulatory agency. This is a 
source of resentment among ITS officers; in 2000, when the Government fully corporatized BSNL, ITS 
officers went on a political offensive when the Government announced it would select an IAS official as the 
Chairman of the corporation. The Government had to back down (―Work-to-rule,‖ 2000).  
Breaking from the historical account for a moment, it is important to introduce one of the most important 
groups that will play a role in the arena. My interlocutors at TRAI called this mass of bureaucrats babus (trans. 
clerks, but figuratively means bureaucrats). For them, the babu was either an IAS or ITS official, or possibly 
another member of the bureaucracy who tried to maintain these rules and control over the 
telecommunications sector. Babus thus represented a group separate from TRAI‘s staff that also had the 
ability to control the regulatory arena, but whose ideas and values were significantly different and in many 
cases was opposite to theirs.  
The babus represent a powerful field within the telecommunications bureaucracy in India, with most of them 
working either at DoT or in MTNL or BSNL. Their deep networks from DoT though the state-controlled 
service providers, connections with the politically powerful labor unions, and in some cases, the political 
leadership, ensured their ability to control both industrial and social activity within the field. I detail some of 
these ideas and mechanisms of control in the field of the babus throughout this study. At this point, it is 
important to note their presence, and especially their presence much before TRAI or any private 
telecommunications firm existed. With this mention, I return to the historical account. 
Competition within Government: 1984-1991 
The early 1980s was when India began its slow shift away from the ISI growth model to integrating itself with 
global markets. This was the effect of the entry into political life of a number of younger leaders, among 
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whom the highest profile was Rajiv Gandhi‘s, who in 1984 would become India‘s youngest Prime Minister at 
40 years. Mr. Gandhi brought with him a set of younger political leaders who did not have the same 
commitment to the Nehruvian development model, due either to their Westernized education or to their 
personal interests. The Thatcher-Reagan model was also proving to be a powerful force that combined with 
the weakening of the Soviet Union in the 1980s was beginning to make it look like the days of socialism were 
ending.  
The weakening of state control was also due to some reforms by a right-of-center coalition that was in power 
between 1977 and 1980 that implemented a number of liberalizing policies. These reforms were in response 
to what was widely considered the failure of the inward-looking and state-as-capitalist approach to enable 
economic development, and were the result of a long-suppressed ambition among leaders of that coalition to 
upset the Nehruvian model; many of the leaders of that coalition were Nehru‘s fiercest critics. 
It was at this time that the Government‘s attitude towards telecommunications began to shift. For example, 
the telecommunications industry shifted from the list of luxury to core sectors in 1983. There were a number 
of reasons for this, global and local. 
First, this shift coincided with the declaration by the ITU in 1984 of the International Year of 
Communication and the release of the Maitland Commission Report, The Missing Link (Independent 
Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development, 1985), which was the first high-level global 
study of the links between telephones and economic development. This report is now legendary in 
telecommunications policymaking circles around the world. 
These moves at the global level were not apolitical, however. They reflected specific values that privileged 
public investments in telecommunications, the creation of new networks, and the connection of rural areas. 
As Shields and Samarajiva (1990) note, ―the [Maitland] Commission‘s remit did not involve questioning the 
importance of telecommunication. Rather its purpose was to persuade Third World policymakers to increase 
their procurement of telecommunication‖ (p. 212). They also note that ―Commission members have a vested 
interest in telecommunication gaining priority in the Third World; many are affiliated to telecommunication 
equipment companies or hold positions in Third World PTTs‖ (p. 212). The thinking about 
telecommunications and its impact on development was informed by manufacturers and service providers—
many from the developed world—seeking new markets. By the 1980s, these firms had seen stagnation in their 
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home markets and competition from European and East Asian upstarts, and were looking to drive growth 
through exports to the newly industrialized countries such as those in Asia and Latin America.  
This push at a global level met with demand from an emerging younger and reformist Indian political class of 
the time, led by Mr. Gandhi. Having lost trust in the traditional models of state-provision of services, this 
group touted the newly established link between telecommunications and economic development, as 
suggested by the Maitland report, to convince key political figures such as the Prime Minister at the time, Mrs. 
Indira Gandhi (Rajiv Gandhi‘s mother), to reform the Indian telecommunications network and the associated 
bureaucracy. 
With little debate within India about the approach to improve access to telecommunications, the 
Government began to move towards liberalization and greater private participation in the 
telecommunications sector (Chakravartty, 2004). The seriousness of the Government to improve 
telecommunications is evident from the inclusion in the Seventh Five-Year Plan (for 1985 to 1990) of a clear 
statement of the importance of telecommunications for overall economic development, and specifically rural 
development: 
The modern communication system is an integral part of the development process, and can 
aid in the acceleration of the growth of the economy by providing the necessary motivation 
and information. Therefore in the Seventh Plan, all existing communication capabilities— 
both hardware and software—will be harnessed and also augmented to the extent required. 
The electronic means—radio, T.V. and telecommunications—will have to play a major role 
in this effort. While the communication system will be used to serve all segments of society, 
it will be developed to accord special priority to the rural people and to the deprived sections 
(Planning Commission, 1985, vol. 2, 9.1). 
From 1984 onwards, a series of moves injected dynamism into the Indian telecommunications industry. 
Three of these moves are important for this study. The first of these was the reorganization of the DoPT and 
the creation of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT). The DoT came into existence in 1985 under 
the Ministry of Communications. With the creation of the DoT, telecommunications services were separated 
from the Department of Posts (Petrazzini, 1996). 
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The DoT was set up as part of the executive arm of the Government of India. It was responsible for 
establishing policy and licensing in the telecommunications industry. It thus has primary responsibility in 
implementing the Government‘s agenda for the industry. The DoT also manages, through its subsidiary the 
Wireless Planning and Coordination Wing (WPC), the radio spectrum.  
As Singh (1999) notes, the creation of DoT allowed the ‗engineers‘ or ITS officers to gain authority over 
operations and so they supported this move. Yet, the IAS officials fought to retain control, and they did so by 
keeping key high-level positions at DoT and ensuring that the Ministry of Finance, which they dominated, 
would ―evaluate every telecommunications project for its financial viability‖ (Singh, p. 143). 
The original plan was for DoT to become the regulatory agency, with all of the operations spun-off to six 
regional units—along the lines of the breakup of AT&T that had happened in the U.S. just a year before 
(Schiller, 1999). Policymaking functions would be assigned to a new agency called the Telecom Commission. 
However, amid concerns about having their influence diluted, the telecommunications bureaucracy led by the 
ITS, pressured the Government to experiment with creating only two independent providers.  
These two public sector telecommunications enterprises, partly privatized and independent from the DoT, 
managed specific segments of the market. In 1986, the Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL, the 
Metropolitan Telephone Corporation Limited) was carved out of DoT to provide telecommunication services 
in New Delhi and Mumbai. The other agency, the Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL, International 
Telecommunications Corporation Limited) was set up to provide international telecommunication services in 
India. The rest of India‘s telecommunications networks were managed by a Department of 
Telecommunications Services (DTS), which remained part of DoT.* 
As Athreya explains, the ―policy objectives‖ in setting up MTNL were to introduce modern management 
policies and systems, serve the growing demand for telecommunications services in the two important cities, 
and to establish a model for the system (Athreya, 1996, p. 13). In order to produce incentives for improved 
performance and to attract private capital to the telecommunications industry, the Government partially 
privatized MTNL. As of 2010, the Government held a 56.25 percent stake in MTNL (MTNL, n.d.). 
                                                   
* DTS was formally corporatized only in 1999, and became the Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (Indian 
Telecommunications Corporation Limited) in 2000. 
57 
 
However, the experiment with MTNL (and VSNL) did not result in further reorganization of DoT‘s 
operations. Part of the reason was that MTNL became profitable quickly and was able to fund its own 
expansion and reward its employees with pay raises and bonuses that other DoT units including DTS could 
not (Athreya, 1996; McDowell, 1997). The resulting friction added to the worry that post-further breakup, 
DoT and its units would be left with the worst of the Indian market and would fail to remain sustainable 
without the more profitable units to cross-subsidize it (Bagchi, 2000; Singh, 1999).  
In order to control MTNL and prevent what many of them were said to see as a ―dangerous erosion of their 
power,‖ DoT officials ―opposed, diluted, and emasculated‖ the corporation (Athreya, 1996, p. 13). Hence, as 
Athreya points out, some DoT staff put a number of roadblocks to MTNL becoming fully functional. To 
maintain pressure through professional networks, MTNL staff was not permanently sent over, but were 
―seconded‖ for five years at a time. Further, the MTNL Board of Directors was not fully constituted, and the 
corporation was not ―treated as an autonomous financial entity.‖ As Athreya points out, ―some in the ITS 
and DoT hoped that… MTNL could be proved to be ineffective and absorbed back into the government 
departmental structure‖ (p. 14). 
Notwithstanding all of these efforts, the creation of MTNL proved resilient. Its public offering of stock in 
India and its listing on the London Stock Exchange was well subscribed (Rediff on the Net, 1997). MTNL 
remains in operation as of mid 2010. 
A final move to inject dynamism into the industry was to create the Telecom Commission, intended to take 
over and separate the policymaking responsibilities from the DoT. This Commission replaced an older group 
called the Telecom Board, which was part of DoT and responsible for all policy decisions about the industry. 
The Telecom Commission was thus the first attempt by the Government to break up the powerful 
telecommunications bureaucracy and weaken their hold over the arena. 
The Commission arose from efforts by a non-resident Indian (NRI) businessman, Satyen ―Sam‖ Pitroda, to 
convince then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi about the need for institutional reform and improved 
coordination in telecommunications. Like many NRIs, Mr. Pitroda had grown up in humble surroundings—a 
member as he points out of a ―lowly carpenter caste‖—and excelled academically during his early years in 
India. His masters degree in physics, he explains, ―gave [him] membership in a new technological caste that 
superseded the one [he] was born to‖ (Pitroda, 1993, p. 67). He then emigrated to the U.S., a common 
destination for job- or opportunity-seeking Indians, and worked his way up the corporate ladder to head a 
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large telecommunications firm based in Chicago. As with many NRIs, during this professional rise, Mr. 
Pitroda not only became influential within the NRI community, but also had the financial means to support 
business and personal forays into India. 
In May 1989, with the Prime Minister‘s patronage, Mr. Pitroda took over as DoT Secretary and became 
Chairman of the Telecom Commission as the apex body of the DoT. The Commission had a wide range of 
executive, administrative, and financial powers and had a primary mission to formulate and regulate policy 
and prepare the budget for DoT. 
Unfortunately for the Commission, its existence became intricately tied with Mr. Pitroda. The 
telecommunications bureaucracy did not appreciate an outsider (and that too an NRI!) taking over their 
business. For the bureaucrats working in the Indian government, their positions and social relationships were 
all well defined with a hierarchy that had been in place for years. Mr. Pitroda was an outsider entering at a 
high position without having to serve as they had in the boondocks or having to struggle to rise up the ladder. 
Not only did he represent a disturbance to their way of life, he also represented a threat to them as 
individuals. His entry would undoubtedly change the chain of promotions and sinecures for which every 
bureaucrat would secretly wish.  
Almost immediately, the Commission got embroiled in controversies over the importation of 
telecommunications switching equipment. The result of this and other controversies hit in 1990 after the 
Rajiv Gandhi government fell, when Mr. Pitroda was accused of corruption. As he wrote in a 1993 article in 
the Harvard Business Review:  
My own effectiveness with the Indian Telecom Commission ended in 1990. Rajiv Gandhi 
was defeated in parliamentary elections in November, 1989, and I came under political attack 
a short time later. Eventually I was accused of corruption. Businesses owned by my family in 
the United States were said to have profited by contracts I awarded… A thorough 
investigation by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India turned up no evidence to 
support this allegation (Pitroda, 1993, p. 78). 
Further, the bureaucratic positioning against the Commission led to all of its proposals with financial 
implications having to be cleared by the Ministry of Finance, including any changes to ―pricing, investments, 
imports, and pay raises and incentives‖ (Bagchi, 2000, p. 14).  
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Thus, after Mr. Pitroda‘s departure, the ―fate of the… Commission… was up for grabs.‖ The DoT 
successfully persuaded the next Government, formed from the earlier Opposition parties, to curtail the power 
of the Telecom Commission. By 1990, its work had been halted, and in 1991, the Government appointed a 
senior DoT bureaucrat as Chairman (Singh, 1999, p. 147). Like many other technical officers of the DoT, the 
new Chairman was not in favor of deregulation and competition. Changes in basic services were put on hold 
(Athreya, 1996, p. 18). The bureaucracy had reasserted itself. It was not until macroeconomic reforms created 
pressure and a non-DoT Chairman was appointed in 1993 that the Commission came alive again. 
All of this stirring proved relatively futile in terms of impact on the sector as well. From 1980 to 1990, 
teledensity increased from 0.31 to 0.60—a doubling for sure, but lower than peer countries (Pakistan: 0.78; Sri 
Lanka: 0.71) (The World Bank Group, 2010).  
And the quality of service remained abysmal. In 1989, the monopoly public television broadcaster Door 
Darshan (trans. distant vision, meaning television) began a broadcast of a comedy series titled ―Flop Show.‖ 
Directed by satirist Jaspal Bhatti, the series became instantly popular by satirizing the problems faced by the 
‗common man.‘ One of the ten episodes produced was dedicated to, ―those few people due to whom the 
telephone department has a bad reputation and from whom the producers got their inspiration‖ (Bhatti & 
Bhatti, 1989). In that episode, a family was shown as waiting for seven years to secure a telephone connection 
to their home. They decided to get their daughter married to a lineman from the state-owned telephone 
company, against her wishes, to have his help in securing the sought-after telephone connection. To which 
one character tells the girl, ―I never dreamt that your father was that intelligent!‖ (Bhatti & Bhatti, 1989). 
And jokes about MTNL abounded. I recall going for a theatrical play in 1990 in Bombay. One of the 
characters in the play—a murder mystery to boot—noted his telephone provider was MTNL, but not the one 
everyone knew. Instead it was ―mera telephone nahin lagta,‖ or ―my telephone doesn‘t connect.‖ The feeling was 
widespread enough to garner heavy laughter from the audience. 
The evolving arena. The period from 1984 to 1990 saw the creation of two important institutions 
in the arena. The first was DoT, which emerged as a stand-alone department within the executive arm of the 
Government with responsibility for telecommunications policymaking, regulation, and operation. The desire 
of DoT and its associated bureaucratic cadre, the ITS, to control the telecommunications industry was clear 
from the start. Soon after its creation, DoT—led by management fears of dissent from its politically powerful 
labor unions—opposed the creation of MTNL (Singh, 1999). Further, DoT opposed the creation of the 
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Telecom Commission and its reins being given to an outsider, Mr. Pitroda. Indeed, as I have described above, 
the DoT bureaucracy was successfully able to push Mr. Pitroda out soon after his political godfathers lost 
power. They also moved quickly to consolidate control over the Commission. Thus ended India‘s first 
experiment to separate operation and policymaking in telecommunications from its regulation. At the time of 
this writing, the Commission has been completely absorbed into the DoT structure; it will not figure much 
again in this study. 
The second participant in the arena is the state-controlled MTNL. MTNL is important because it fills a no-
man‘s-land in the arena. As a state undertaking, it does not have a formal license, but more a letter from the 
DoT that authorizes it to provide telecommunications services on its behalf. This makes MTNL important 
because it means that the DoT can, at will, add or subtract license conditions or obligations. It also means 
that MTNL does not usually pay license fees that later private entrants would have to. Hence, MTNL is quite 
free to enter (and leave) market segments without any of the entry (or exit) conditions that other service 
providers might have to satisfy. As we will see in Chapter 6, disagreements over this unequal ability have had 
significant implications for the structure of the arena.* 
As described above, the concerns of the telecommunications bureaucracy about losing control over their 
domain led to MTNL‘s subjugation within that bureaucracy. However, efforts to reform the 
telecommunications bureaucracy faced significant resistance from within and led it to be very resistant to any 
attempts to reconfigure the arena or the telecommunications industry, especially if this reconfiguration would 
reduce their control over the arena or the larger industry. Following the experience of Mr. Pitroda, it was clear 
that attempts at reconfiguration would be met with serious repercussions.  
Liberalization and the Entry of the Private Sector: 1991-1997 
In the words of one observer, the summer of 1991 was ―the golden summer‖ (Das, 2001, p. 213, 214). The 
year did not begin with such optimism; 1991 was when the Government of India almost defaulted on its debt 
payments. India got into a balance of payments crisis when foreign exchange reserves dwindled to the point 
                                                   
* MTNL is also important because it foreshadowed the subsequently created state-controlled Department of 
Telecommunications Services (DTS). In 2000, the Government corporatized the DTS and created the pan-India (except 
Delhi and Bombay) company, the Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL, the Indian Telecommunications Corporation 
Limited). Hence, in 1990, the arena from the perspective of this study consisted primarily of the DoT and MTNL with 
occasional entry of the Ministry of Finance, the Prime Minister, and Planning Commission. 
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that could cover only two weeks of imports (Ministry of Finance, 1992), and faced a psychological blow when 
the Government had to move 67 tons of its gold reserves to Switzerland and the U.K. to secure emergency 
loans from the IMF (―India climbs,‖ 2009). Pawning gold to cover expenses was deeply traumatizing in a 
society that recognizes gold as the ultimate store of value and the ultimate measure of prestige.  
This crisis had been building up since the mid 1980s, when the partial liberalization of economic activity and 
trade by the Rajiv Gandhi government led to increases in imports without corresponding growth in exports 
or in domestic economic strength. Much of the fiscal deficit that was accumulating was supported by debt 
issuance, and much of this came due at exactly when a series of external events triggered a global financial 
slowdown. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and three shocks hit India, precipitating the economic crisis. First 
was the spike in oil prices that upset the import bill. Second was the sudden stopping of the significant inward 
remittances from Indian expatriate workers in the Gulf who were affected by the war, cutting foreign 
exchange income for the Government. And finally, the Government had an emergency expense, spending 
over US$100 million to airlift 110,000 Indians out of the area and to safety (Air-India Limited, n.d.).  
The Government‘s response to the crisis was to take emergency loans from the IMF and World Bank, both 
of which were conditional on macroeconomic reforms aimed at dismantling the excessive controls on 
domestic economic activity and trade (The World Bank Group, 2001). Things moved very quickly to the 
point that Das explains that ―within hours the [Government]…eliminated miles of red tape, months of 
delays, and the hassles, anguish, and corruption that the Indian state had built up over decades‖ (Das, 2002, p. 
216). Over the summer of 1991, through the national budget and a series of deregulatory measures, the 
Government dismantled the infamous ‗license-quota-permit raj‘ that had controlled business since the early 
1950s. 
Along with other industries, the Government also deregulated telecommunications services and opened it to 
private investment. Here too the bureaucracy delayed the finalization of the telecommunications policy. Their 
opposition stemmed from worries of the ―DoT bureaucrats and labor unions who, threatened by job loss, 
became united in their opposition to any changes in the state monopoly‖ (Bagchi, 2000, p. 21). This was 
overcome through the Government accommodating the unions and the DoT, leading to the creation of a 
policy that opened up supposedly luxury services such as mobile telephony and paging to private investors 
while keeping DoT in control of the widespread and seemingly more important wireline telephone and 
national and international long-distance businesses (Chowdary, 1995). 
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Hence, in 1992, the Government announced an auction of mobile telephony licenses in four major cities 
(New Delhi, Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta). The DoT designed the auction to award two licenses in each of 
these cities. 
However, the auction of these licenses, which were supposed to highlight the openness of the new India to 
the world, was quickly stuck in a court battle. The problems began when one of the largest mobile telephone 
groups of the time globally, Hutchison Max, was disqualified for a typographical error on its tender form in 
spite of scoring the highest in the bidding process (―BCE plays,‖ 1993). Claiming that the process had been 
rigged to favor another company, Hutchison Max challenged its rejection in court and the process of license 
award was held up until October 1994, when the Supreme Court of India sided with Hutchison (Desai, 2006). 
This case marked the first high profile intervention of the courts in the telecommunications arena. 
The next major step in liberalization opened the basic services or fixed telephony market to private firms. 
This followed the announcement of a National Telecom Policy in 1994, which recognized that it was 
―necessary to give the highest priority to the development of telecom services in the country‖ (DoT, 2002). 
The Policy also opened the fixed telephone market to the private sector. Subsequently, auctions were held for 
basic fixed telephone services in January 1995, and for mobile telephone services in the remaining parts of the 
country in December 1994 (Bagchi, 2000). 
While the mobile licenses were auctioned off without much problem in this round, the fixed telephone 
license auctions were another story. One company won a number of states‘ licenses by bidding irrationally 
high (Bagchi, 2000), and could not pay the fees on time. The Minister of Communications at the time then 
changed the rules of the auction to allow one company to win only three states‘ licenses, and a second round 
was held for the cleared states. The result was disinterest in the fixed telephony licenses—the credibility of 
the auction process had been ―destroyed‖ in the words of one observer (Desai, 2006, p. 78), and the Minister 
was soon forced to step down. A few months later, he would be charged for corrupt behavior in another 
case. 
In spite of these problems, India‘s telecommunications industry was beginning to move forward even if 
slowly. By 1997, total private investment in telecommunications was US$5.8 billion (The World Bank Group, 
2009b), and the number of telephone subscriptions (fixed and mobile) had grown to 18.68 million, an 
increase of 545 percent over 1984. However, India with a teledensity of 1.94 was still lagging other countries, 
even if marginally, such as Pakistan (2.1), North Korea (2.25), and Indonesia (2.98). This was also well behind 
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the average for lower-middle income countries (4.76) (The World Bank Group, 2010b). Rural 
telecommunications remained poorly developed; in 1997, only 0.3 percent of the rural population subscribed 
to telephones. Moreover, the delays in licensing the mobile telephone companies and the confusion 
surrounding the licensing of fixed telephone companies dented the potential for growth.  
DoT for its part was playing fully its role as dominant incumbent and ensuring that the entry of private firms 
would not have a significant impact on its revenues or market dominance. Given the overwhelming force of 
the liberalization of Indian telecommunications in the wake of the Indian economic crisis in the early 1990s, 
DoT could not entirely prevent the entry of private firms. However, it did manage to delay competition to its 
core businesses of fixed line telephony and long distance communications, allowing private firms entry only 
in a few market segments such as mobile telephony. These market segments were acceptable for liberalization 
because DoT did not see them as valuable enough, but as luxury markets that could not pose any threat to 
the incumbent; in 1992, few people would have predicted that mobile telephony, seen as an even more 
luxurious telecommunications service, could have the kind of reach it does in 2010.* As telephones were 
luxuries to so-called core development priorities such as water or health until the 1970s, thus were mobile 
telephones luxuries to the fixed telephone in the 1990s. The mobile telephone was, at least until the late 
1990s, considered a luxury—a tool for business and the rich who were willing to pay a premium for mobility. 
Consequently, there was little pressure on the mobile companies to keep prices low. Just as with the plain old 
telephone in the 1950s, the high cost of license fees and expensive network deployment led to high consumer 
prices and reinforced the notion that the mobile telephone was a luxury for Indians.  
Consequently, as Desai (2006) notes, DoT saw the new entrants as ―milch cows,‖ and enforced conditions on 
them to ―ensur[e] their unviability‖ (p. 47). For instance, DoT charged these operators interconnection fees—
the fees one network pays another to have it carry calls to its subscribers—that were well above costs, a 
standard incumbent tactic. In late 1996, DoT created what Desai calls a ―tariff barrier‖ around its network by 
pricing interconnection to make it cheaper for people to call within the DoT (and MTNL) networks and 
otherwise have mobile telephone subscribers pay for calls entirely (Desai, p. 48).  
                                                   
* As late as 1999, one paging company executive was quoted as saying, ―We have to accept that a mobile is a useful tool 
of communication. Those who can afford it will go for it. It is more about whether you can afford Adidas shoes or Bata 
shoes. There are many who can‘t afford Adidas.‖ And the Vice President of Hutchison Max, a major mobile telephony 
company, was of the opinion that ―consumers with a monthly income of Rs 10,000 or even less can‘t afford to spend 10 
per cent on mobiles. They would prefer the flat Rs 300 a month for a pager any day.‖ (―Pager firms,‖ 1999) 
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Moreover, the private firms had to pay license fees that DoT and MTNL did not, and they had to pay high 
prices to have DoT carry long distance calls. Consequently, DoT‘s position as policymaker, regulator, and 
operator—a handover of the days when the state controlled all telecommunications—and its interest, as 
noted in the earlier section, to retain control and ensure its own welfare led to the mobile companies 
becoming unsustainable. 
Yet, one idea that had certainly weakened in its hold was that all telecommunications was a luxury. By the 
time of macroeconomic reforms in the early 1990s, the majority of Indian bureaucrats saw 
telecommunications as critical for development and global competitiveness (Singh, 1999). In the preamble to 
the 1994 telecommunications policy, for instance, DoT (2002) explains: ―The new economic policy adopted 
by the Government aims at improving India‘s competitiveness in the global market and rapid growth of 
exports… Telecommunication services of world class quality are necessary for the success of this policy. It is, 
therefore, necessary to give the highest priority to the development of telecom services in the country‖ (sec. 
1). And the policy is rich with rhetoric to assure local political interest groups that in spite of allowing private 
investment in, the Government would ensure a focus on rural and affordable services (Singh). For instance, 
service providers would be ―required to maintain a balance in their coverage between urban and rural 
areas,‖(DoT, 2002, sec. 10) with the objective of ―universal service covering all villages as early as possible‖ 
(DoT, sec. 2(b)). Nevertheless, in a hangover from the days of ‗telephones as luxury‘, the bureaucracy was 
willing to label some services, such as mobile telephony, as a luxury, even as they began to come around to 
the idea that fixed telephones were a necessity. 
The arena post-liberalization. Between 1991 and 1997, DoT dominated the telecommunications 
industry and the arena. It had subdued and more or less assimilated the Telecom Commission. It also was 
successful in delaying liberalization and attenuating its effects first by opening selective markets and then by 
using its powers to regulate the market to its and its subsidiaries‘ favor.  
Yet, even though DoT dominated it, the arena now had multiple institutions that ordered it. The entry of 
private firms had the effect of introducing the judiciary into the arena and made other arms of the 
Government participate directly or indirectly in telecommunications policymaking and regulation. Moreover, 
private firms and their supporters played a major role in reactivating the Telecom Commission and pushing 
the Government to create an independent regulatory agency. But DoT‘s political power within the arena 
remained stronger than that of the private operators‘ because these firms had not grown to a point where 
they could call on political principals to challenge the incumbent in non-legal settings (as they would later).  
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This period marks the entry of the judiciary into the arena. When Hutchison Max filed its case against DoT in 1992 on 
the auction of mobile licenses, the Indian judicial system made its firm entry into the telecommunications arena. It has 
remained firmly embedded since. The Hutchison case is more than a mere application of ‗the law‘ to the 
telecommunications industry. Rather, it marks the first occasion of the use of the judicial system as a tool by actors in 
the arena to slow down or in some cases, speed up reforms or market adjustments (Petrazzini, 1996).  
 
The second set of actors that firmly entered the arena at this time were other arms of the Government, 
including the Prime Minister‘s Office and the Ministries of Finance and Commerce & Industry.  
These agencies entered the arena both on their own and because of the pull from private firms who were 
keen to have as many supporters as possible on their side to protect them against the DoT‘s dominance. The 
private firms believed this because their credibility and political capital were at stake on the 
telecommunications industry given its position as an early experiment with liberalization and private 
participation in infrastructure. Powerful political figures such as the Prime, Finance, and Commerce & 
Industries Ministers were at the highest level in the hierarchy of Government and had the political levers to 
get DoT to listen if they wanted to. At the very least, they could overrule the Minister of Communications 
and impose their views on him.*  
Underscoring the importance of individuals, the entry of the private firms also led to a brief resurgence of 
control, through the actions of a new Commission chairman, over the telecommunications bureaucracy. As 
Athreya (1996) writes, ―the winds of macroeconomic change were blowing so hard that even the Telecom 
Commission of 1991, composed entirely of internal members, had to initiate some change‖ (p. 18). Under 
pressure from both the private sector and international financial institutions to speed up telecommunications 
liberalization, in 1993 the Narasimha Rao government appointed a ―champion of change‖ to head the 
Commission. The appointee was Mr. N. Vittal, an officer from outside the DoT, an IAS officer who had 
served as head of the Department of Electronics, another government agency (Athreya, p. 19). 
                                                   
* This situation continues today. In 2010, the Prime Minister set up an independent panel of ministers, headed by the 
Finance Minister, to advise the Ministry of Communications on a matter relating to spectrum policy. This (unusual) 
move is ―seen as yet another move towards sidelining the Communications and IT Minister, Mr A. Raja, whose 
controversial decision on allocating 2G airwaves earlier on a first-come-first-serve basis is under investigation‖ (―PM 
wants,‖ 2010). 
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Mr. Vittal moved to speed up the privatization of telecommunications equipment manufacturing and quickly 
fell out with the then Minister of Communications who, under pressure from the labor unions and DoT 
cadre, was looking to keep the process moving slowly. The anti-reconfiguration force prevailed once again. 
After a particularly bruising battle with the Minister and DoT officials about whether majority foreign 
participation should be allowed in telecommunications companies, Mr. Vittal resigned in late 1994. 
However, as Singh (1999) notes, the period of Mr. Vittal‘s tenure saw the formulation and approval of the 
National Telecom Policy of 1994, which for all its drawbacks was at least friendly to serious private entry into 
the telecommunications industry. Following this, however, the Telecom Commission was again back under 
DoT control. The bureaucrats remained mostly undisturbed. 
Finally, this period also saw the birth of the idea of an independent regulatory agency for the 
telecommunications industry. As Singh (1999) notes, ―With the deregulation of value-added services in 1991 
and basic services in 1994, the pressures for an independent regulatory authority became intense‖ (p. 179). 
Following significant lobbying by a range of interested parties, domestic and international, the Government 
announced its intention to set up such a regulator in September 1994, and the cabinet gave its approval in 
May 1995 (p. 179). The regulator was finally activated in February 1997. 
Developments Since 1997 
Before continuing on to a description of the arena and the changes it has seen since the creation of TRAI in 
1997, it is important to summarize the major change in the telecommunications industry. In 1997, 1.9 percent 
of the population subscribed to any kind of telephone, fixed or mobile. There were about 18 million 
subscribers then (ITU, 2009). As of June 2010, the number of telephone subscribers has crossed 671 million 
and over 56 percent of the population has access to a telephone. By that time, rural telephone subscriptions 
were equivalent to about 26 percent of the rural population (TRAI, 2010). India has also seen a significant 
boost in its consumption of international telecommunications, led by the rapid growth of the outsourcing 
industry and growing economic and social ties globally. The volume of international telephone calls has 
grown over 12 times since 1997, with over 20 billion minutes of international calls made in 2008 alone 
(TeleGeography, 2010). 
However, even as telephone use has grown exponentially, Internet subscriptions lag. Less than one percent of 
Indians subscribe to broadband Internet services, and only about 10 percent have ever used the Internet. In a 
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situation oddly reminiscent of the past, a large number of Indians view the Internet as a useful business tool, 
or at best, something meant for urban sophisticates. The dominance of English as the language of the 
Internet also helps perpetuate the claim that the Internet is not meant for the vast majority of Indians as yet; 
the number of Indians who can read English may be as low as 3 percent (―English in India,‖ 1995). Even as 
India has become an increasingly sophisticated market for telecommunications, old habits die-hard. 
The arena since 1997. To recap, India‘s telecommunications market has been in operation since 
1850, when the British East India Company installed the first telegraph lines in the country. Between 
independence in 1947 and 1992, when the market was liberalized as part of broad macroeconomic reforms, 
the Government owned and operated telecommunications networks. In 1992, following the opening of the 
market, the Government licensed a number of private firms to provide both fixed and mobile telephony 
services.  
When it appeared in the arena in 1997, TRAI was the proverbial ‗late entrant.‘ By that time, there were 
already a large number of mobile and fixed telephone companies (including the two state-owned enterprises), 
and some other private and public firms in other market segments such as Internet, paging, and satellite 
services. Consequently, there were already other formal and informal relationships among these different 
parties existing by the time TRAI was created (―TRAI member,‖ 1997).  
The Parliament of India passed the TRAI Act in early 1997, creating a new institution within the arena. 
According to the law, this institution should have had the power to order the behavior of the DoT, MTNL, 
DTS, the private service providers, and a previously excluded group, the consumers of telecommunication 
services (Government of India, 1997).* It is important to note here that the creation of this regulatory agency 
does not end the ongoing relationships or cut the ordering capability of the other institutions and fields in the 
arena. Yet, by creating the regulator, the state altered the arena and its functioning. For example, in theory at 
least, regulators are supposed to provide some level of protection to service providers (especially private 
ones) against expropriations by the state. So the private firms now had another agency to which they could 
appeal for attention (something that we will see happen in Chapter 6).  
                                                   
* I include ‗consumers‘ because one of the official functions of TRAI in the 1997 Act (Government of India, 1997) was 
to ―protect the interest of the consumers of telecommunication service,‖ (Clause 11(1)(i))and because TRAI could also 
hear disputes ―among service providers or between service providers and a group of consumers‖ (Clause, 14(1)).  
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There have been other significant changes in the structure of the arena since the establishment of TRAI in 
1997. Four major changes stand out. First, the private sector operators have grown in size, importance, and 
political importance. They have led the charge in growing the size of the market from 18 million in 1997 to 
over 500 million in late 2009. Private firms have benefited from further liberalization—opening of the long 
distance and Internet markets, entry of a large number of private firms—combined with technological and 
business developments such as media convergence and mergers or acquisitions. Private telecommunications 
firms are well entrenched into the arena now.  
Second, the public sector operators‘ stars are fading. In 2000, DTS became BSNL, a fully separate corporate 
entity. However, the parochialism seen over the past five decades did not fade away. As a result of attempting 
to control as opposed to compete, BSNL has not been able to compete effectively with the private service 
providers who were far more aggressive, responsive to market demand, and certainly more innovative. Any 
super-normal profits from earlier monopolies such as international calling disappeared due to intense 
competition from private firms as these other markets also opened up over the years. This has led to the 
public sector losing ground in the provision of services. As of March 2003, MTNL and BSNL had 97 percent 
of the wireline telephone market, and about a quarter of the wireless market. In 2010, their share of the 
wireline market had fallen to 84 percent, while in the wireless market they only had a 12 percent share (TRAI, 
2010). 
Third, the dynamics of the arena have changed. The private operators now have the political connections and 
economic power to counter the dominance of the arena by DoT and TRAI. The sheer size of these firms 
makes some of them the largest telecommunications providers in the world, some of the largest private sector 
employers, and extremely important in economic terms. As of 2010, for example, the largest firm, Bharti 
Airtel serves over 140 million subscribers, employs 25,000 people directly,* generates over US$8 billion in 
annual revenues, pays about US$1.2 billion in taxes and fees to the Government of India, and has a 3 percent 
weight on the benchmark Bombay Stock Exchange index.  
Firms like this have an astonishing array of well-wishers and supporters, both within and outside the country. 
They have large legal teams, work with some of the most influential public relations firms, and are major 
                                                   
* A much larger number of people are involved in reselling and retailing, the outsourced operations, and ancillary 
services related to Bharti‘s telecommunications services. Unofficial estimates suggest that about Bharti might indirectly 
employ five times the number of its direct employees. 
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consumers of telecommunications equipment manufacturers (who have strong links of their own). As the 
private sector‘s share of the large telecommunications market has grown, so has the capacity of these firms to 
take on the state and its agencies. The remainder of this study focuses on these dynamics. 
Finally, in a restructuring of the arena in 2000, the Government created a new body by separating the 
adjudicating functions of TRAI from its regulatory functions. Known as the Telecom Disputes Settlement 
Appelate Tribunal (TDSAT), it is a unique entity in the world (infoDev & the ITU, 2010c). Everywhere else, 
either the industry regulator or the traditional courts serve as adjudicators of disputes among government 
agencies, service providers, and consumers. (Chapter 6 will discuss the creation of TDSAT.) And almost as 
proof that the formal reorganization of functions is often divorced from practical operation, Chapter 7 
discusses how TRAI continues to be integral to dispute resolution even if its formal (legally mandated) 
powers have been eliminated. 
The continuing importance of DoT. Even as the arena has evolved from what it was in 1997, as 
one of the early players in the arena, DoT continues to have ability to dominate that arena. This will be a 
significant theme in the following chapters. For individuals operating within the Indian telecommunications 
arena, DoT, even in its modified and constrained form, continues to be an important player. One key reason 
is that DoT continues to be the policymaker, even though it has to now deal with TRAI and in some cases 
other agencies that have a say in policymaking. 
Though DoT and its affiliates‘ importance as service providers has diminished, they remain politically 
important as employers—MTNL and BSNL together employ more than three hundred thousand staff 
(BSNL, 2009)—and for the political principals that control them. Both companies are regularly ‗obligated‘ to 
follow DoT‘s discretionary orders to provide subsidized services or pay fees. For instance, in 2005, the 
Minister asked BSNL to implement a uniform tariff plan across India, much to the chagrin of the BSNL 
management (―BSNL hangs up,‖ 2005). The same Minister declared 2007 as the ―Year of Broadband‖ and 
asked BSNL and MTNL to increase the speed of all their Internet subscriptions four times; as of 2010, there 
are about 0.6 million subscribers to this service (BSNL, 2004). Consequently, the pillars that seem to support 
DoT‘s continued existence now are the political principals overseeing the telecommunications industry and 
the labor unions that benefit from continued patronage. 
Even so, as the policymaking agency, DoT continues to wield considerable influence over the arena. This 
means that at least three institutions have the direct ability to order arena through rules: DoT, TRAI, and 
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dispute resolution tribunal TDSAT. While DoT is the policymaking and licensing authority, TRAI is the 
independent regulatory authority that makes recommendations on policy to the DoT and regulates the 
licensed service providers. TDSAT has an important role to play in shaping the arena, but as a separate 
judicial court-type body, it does not have a primary but rather a reactive role. 
The DoT has had an advantage because it has been around the longest of the current set of institutions in the 
arena. Any reorganization of the arena has really been about chipping away at the monolith that DoT used to 
be until the early 1980s. DoT has thus had a major influence on the development of the market and the 
arena. Furthermore, as the offshoot of the monolithic telecommunications industry that existed until 1984, 
DoT has been able to call upon an astonishing array of social, political, and economic resources to counter 
any threats to its primacy for a long time. 
Hence, DoT could resist a wide range of pressures to restructure or reform. It could minimize the effect of 
initial reforms in 1984 that might have led to the restructuring or breaking up of DoT. The Department also 
absorbed a provisional Telecom Commission. It could also, in the face of a sweeping tide of economic 
reforms, direct the force of liberalization to what it thought as an unimportant mobile telephony sector in 
1992. And DoT could delay the creation of TRAI until 1997. Further, the mechanisms of staffing the public 
sector and TRAI mean that DoT has a strong presence even within TRAI: as of September 2009, half of the 
senior officials at TRAI were from the DoT-managed civil service cadre.  
Hence, if one traces the history of the arena, then, it becomes quite clear that the erstwhile DoT monolith, 
with its associated and subsidiary organizations, service providers, social and professional networks, and 
political influence, has remained important within the telecommunications arena. Even today, it exercises 
significant power in its position as the policymaking, licensing, and radio spectrum managing agency, even if 
its service provider divisions have been separated from its policymaking units. 
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Chapter 4. A Note on Methods 
This study analyzes the making and maintenance of regulatory independence through an ethnographic 
account of regulatory life in Indian telecommunications. My intention from the beginning was to use the 
access that I got to TRAI to provide an insider‘s view of this typically closed off world of policymaking and 
regulation.  
The hallmark of ethnographic research is fieldwork. I had the opportunity to be in the field and experience 
the goings on in the arena first hand while embedded in India‘s telecommunications regulatory agency, TRAI, 
between June and December 2006. This period of fieldwork allowed me to collect the data on which this 
study is based through a combination of participant observation and interviews. Ethnographic methods 
offered me the appropriate tools to understand and describe in detail the ideas in action and the roles, rituals, 
and relations within the group of individuals working in the arena of Indian telecommunications, as I had 
observed and experienced during my fieldwork. 
Although it predates my fieldwork, I was also able to draw upon my experiences working at TRAI between 
May and July 2005. My experiences in this earlier period also helped in verifying my observations in and 
findings of this study. In 2005, the makeup of the Authority—the group of senior-most staffers—was 
different, with a different set of Members and a different Chairperson. It was also a period where I worked 
and observed a slightly different set of people than in my fieldwork. After 2006, I added to and built on my 
fieldwork through an analysis of press reports, writing on Indian telecommunications, and policy and 
regulatory documents in the public domain.  
Ethnography is ―a research process in which the anthropologist closely observes, records, and engages in the 
daily life of another culture—an experience labeled as the fieldwork method—and then writes accounts of 
this culture, emphasizing descriptive detail‖ (Marcus & Fischer, 1986, p. 18). In choosing to use ethnographic 
research methods for this study, I was embarking on a road less travelled when it comes to research on 
policymaking and regulation. There are few ethnographies of policymaking processes or regulatory agencies 
(for two examples, see Hall, Scott & Hood, 1999; Yanow, 1996). Nevertheless, I was spurred on by the rich 
body of work that uses ethnographic methods to study various types of adjudicating bodies such as courts 
(Rosen, 1989), tribal dispute resolution procedures (Moore, 1978), and the use of law in society (Geertz, 1983; 
Nader, 1969). Consequently, a combination of ethnographic research work and some of the more specialized 
writing on courts, dispute resolution, and regulation guided my choice of method.  
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I explain my choice of method and describe its execution in detail below. When I began my fieldwork, I 
wondered whether this group would let me observe what they were doing, talk to them about their 
interpretation of events, and allow me to write this. It turned out that my informants were not averse to my 
data collection and let me into their inner circle. My education, technical knowledge, and social similarity to 
my informants allowed me to build trust and get their support for my work. I also found eager talkers and 
staffers eager to show off their work and thinking. As a participant-observer, I quickly found myself ‗living‘ 
among the individuals I was studying, doing as they were doing and learning from them through a 
combination of participant observation, formal and informal interviews with a subset of informants, and an 
analysis of press and document archives. This unprecedented level of access would no doubt lead to an 
interesting study of regulation anywhere. 
The major challenge that I faced was in writing about what I had seen. Specifically, I felt a challenge in writing 
about a group of individuals that I felt was small enough to be identifiable by their manner of speaking, their 
body language, and possibly, their professional activities.  
As an example, a few months after I completed my fieldwork, I found myself speaking with an India-based 
telecommunications industry analyst who asked me about my dissertation (continuing an earlier conversation 
between us). I explained what I (then thought I) was writing about. This person asked me for an example, and 
I promptly provided one (which does not appear in this study), without titles, names, or even specific 
circumstances. He paused for a second and said, ―Oh, you are talking about Mr. So-and-so.‖ I was surprised 
and then immediately worried.  
If what I thought was an anonymous example was so easily identified, with this analyst noticing a particular 
phrase used commonly by so-and-so, what might that do for my informants? Might they be affected in the 
political circles in which they live and work? These individuals were sharing details of how regulation 
happened and their unabridged views on other actors in the arena. My duty to my informants was to keep 
them anonymous; for some time, it seemed like anything I was writing might compromise that. 
And, to add to and possibly multiply this concern, what might my writing do to my own interests? In the 
interest of full disclosure, not only am I continuing to work in the area of telecommunications policy, but I 
also have aspirations of returning to India in the next few years and of working on Indian 
telecommunications policy. If I write something that is honest but that my informants disagree with or think 
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is misrepresenting of their views, it would certainly hurt my own professional ambitions when I come across 
them in the future.  
These are challenges that few ethnographers have grappled with. Clifford Geertz likely did not want to 
become headman of a village of cock-fighters, and neither did Sally Falk Moore look to become a Chagga 
chief. Even the few ethnographers of policymaking institutions are firmly in the academic arena, something I 
do not foresee myself doing for at least the next few years.  
My hesitations about writing about his group of easily identifiable elites/individuals and concerns for my 
professional future led me to a writer‘s block. I blame this challenge for causing me to spend years in the 
wilderness worrying when it came to writing up this study. I thus hope that now, with this study ready to 
move into the wider academic community and my fears mostly quelled, my experience in the post-fieldwork 
writing stage of the ethnographic process might be useful for others that are looking to do similar research. 
This chapter has four parts. The first provides a summary of ethnographic method and its intellectual 
foundations, discussing the methodological choices made and the rationale for those choices. The second part 
describes the process through which I gained access to the site, focusing on the serendipitous combination of 
factors that positioned me in a manner that unlocked what I had initially felt was a very difficult site to gain 
access to. In its third part, this chapter describes the process of fieldwork with a focus on data collection 
methods. 
Finally, this chapter focus on answering the question I posed above: how might one write about a small and 
identifiable set of elites, especially in the situation where one might hope to be back amongst them in the 
future? Because this study was not intended to be an exploration of the ethnographic method, I keep my 
comments here short, hoping that these notes will be useful to others, but also laying the foundations for my 
own explorations of the method in the future. 
Methodological Choices 
The community of policymakers and regulators is likely one of the least studied communities using 
ethnographic methods. Indeed, while there is a significant body of literature on policy and regulation that is 
based on historical, economic, political, and legal analysis, there is little derived from personal experience or 
even formal interviews.  
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Those studies that exist are memoirs of ex-bureaucrats, often self-serving or justifying actions taken in their 
tenures (see for example Athreya, 1996; Chowdary, 1998). And much of the academic work on Indian 
telecommunications regulation depends on formal interviews (see Chakravartty, 2004). 
I thus made the choice of the ethnographic ‗participant-observation‘ method very quickly after I found an 
opportunity to access and work among this typically closed-off group of individuals in late 2004. I felt that an 
ethnographic study of regulation would be useful for three reasons. First, using the access I had to this  
closed-off world of regulators, an ethnographic account would allow me to talk about regulation as my 
interlocutors and informants saw it. I see this as a significant contribution to the study of policymaking and 
regulation, because the academic accounts that speak using the vocabulary of those in the field are few.  
The ethnographic approach would allow me to provide a narrative generated by my informants, an inductive 
‗emic‘ account, rather than one that dictated by a specific theoretical hypothesis or framework or an ‗etic‘ 
account. Furthermore, the ethnographer can come closer to understanding what their interlocutors think 
about what they do (Geertz, 1983); by being able to observe their interlocutor‘s behaviors first hand, the 
researcher improves data collection and interpretation.  
A second reason for choosing the ethnographic method was that it supported participant-observation, a 
powerful way to collect data in a manner that exposed how regulators actually behave, as opposed to seeking 
explanations ex post, something that I felt relying purely on formal interviews would lead to. Participant-
observation allows for direct observation of everyday activity which is missed otherwise (Bernard, 2002), 
while reducing the extent to which my subjects modify their behavior in my presence. This increases the 
validity of data that is collected through other methods such as formal interviews, a major advantage of the 
method. 
With participant-observation, the fieldworker is bound to learn a significant amount about a social world if 
they are present there over a significant period. As the ‗Becker principle‘ suggests, ―most social processes 
have a structure that comes close to insuring that a certain set of situations will arise over time.‖ Following 
this principle, a fieldworker will learn about and observe phenomena as they would normally occur in the 
community studied, and by exposing himself, he will observe it firsthand (Duneier, 1999, p. 338).  
The third reason for choosing ethnographic research methods was to fit in with the traditions of legal 
anthropology, from where I draw my analytical framework. This area has used participant-observation as a 
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primary data collection technique. Of these, a greater proportion of studies have the researcher acting more as 
an observer than participant (Bohannan, 1969; Geertz, 1983; Gluckman, 1955; Pospisil, 1993; Rosen, 1989), 
although there are some exceptions where the researcher participated in the proceedings of a court in a 
professional capacity (Posner, 1996; Rosen, 1989) or by happenstance (Rosen, 1989). 
Combining participant observation and interviews. I used participant observation as the main 
method for data collection, but I also realized that a larger prize was available if I strategically used informal 
interviews to learn about older regulatory and policymaking proceedings, and about the history of Indian 
telecommunications regulation as a whole. There were two reasons for this. 
First, soon into my fieldwork, I realized that various actors in the arena would rely heavily on their 
experiences and specifically on past proceedings to make decisions about new problems. Part of the reason is 
the Indian legal tradition, which is based on common law. But it was also common for individuals to refer to 
earlier decisions and proceedings when they were making their case in current disputes. This was not as much 
from a legal precedent-referral perspective as it was from a ‗you did this then, so why not now?‘ or ‗you said 
this in 2001, so why are you changing your mind now?‘ perspective. As a result, stories about the past kept 
coming up in the context of current discussions.  
Second, it was common for some of the senior staff to narrate their experiences from the past as a mark of 
their seniority, to make a point about some actor‘s thinking, or as a way to spend a lazy afternoon while 
drinking multiple cups of tea. I quickly was drawn to this storytelling and it became a major source of 
information on the past as well as helping me validate my own observations. 
Consequently, participant observation during my fieldwork helped me in collecting data that has directly fed 
into this dissertation and provided me with the ability to interpret my informants‘ actions and comments. But 
I have also relied on informal interviews with a smaller group of my informants to collect the data that 
informed the writing of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, both cases where the incidents happened much before my 
fieldwork. In my case then, interviews offered me the chance to triangulate and tap into accounts of pre-
fieldwork goings on, while participant-observation gave me the ability to understand my informants better 
and observe the goings on in the arena firsthand.  
The combination of interviews and participant-observation is common in ethnographies, especially when 
researchers live or work within the communities they study (Briggs, 1998; Duneier, 1999; Schieffelin, 1990). 
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As Briggs (1986) points out, participant-observers also rely on open-ended interviews, either with a pre-
determined problem in mind or interview a few chosen key-informants repeatedly to learn more about their 
subjects‘ assumptions or reasons behind their behavior. The participant-observation provided me with the 
tools to learn about the community I was studying and offered me the chance to write about regulation from 
the perspective of an insider. Interviews supplemented my data collection and allowed me to use stories and 
events from the past in my study even as they allowed me to clarify specific questions that arose during my 
fieldwork.  
The consent process. I had approval from the University of Illinois‘ Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) to use a process of passive informed consent to secure my informants‘ consent on their willingness to 
participate in the study. My research posed no more than minimal risk of harm to my informants and because 
my research involved ―the use of… interview procedures, or observation of public behavior‖ of ―human 
subjects [who were] elected or appointed public officials or candidates for public office.‖ This exempted my 
research from requirements under the Common Rule.* 
During my time at TRAI in 2005, I had already begun discussing the possibility of fieldwork to conduct 
participant-observation with some of the senior staffers at the agency. Feeling optimistic with their positive 
responses, I sought their permission to use my time with the agency in 2006 as an opportunity for fieldwork. 
Following my entry into the field, I began discussing my plans to use my time at TRAI as fieldwork for a 
dissertation with those TRAI staffers I was in contact with and especially with those individuals who were the 
focus of my data collection efforts through participant observation or interviews. I shared the IRB-approved 
content letters with these individuals at the appropriate times. One individual asked to be excluded; no 
information collected from speaking with or observing that person is used in this dissertation. I also excluded 
from this dissertation, on my own, almost all of the observations and statements of one individual with whom 
I continue to have a professional relationship.  
Apart from the IRB at Illinois, I did not seek approval on the consent process from any Indian organization. 
This is primarily because I did not find an appropriate framework within which to seek such approval or get 
guidance on the consent process. There has not been any obvious attempt to formalize norms about the 
appropriate conduct of research in India (The Indian National Committee for Ethics in Social Science 
                                                   
* Code of Federal Regulations Title 45, Subpart A §46.101 (b) (3) 
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Research in Health, n.d.). Indeed, until recently, informed consent was practically nonexistent even in the 
medical profession (Bal, 1999). 
Accessing TRAI 
This section discusses how I entered the field and the implications it had for my fieldwork specifically 
regarding my position in the field. It then turns to a discussion of how I carried out the participant-
observation and note taking, and ends with a discussion of my experience with talking with my informants. 
Gaining access to TRAI. I officially began my fieldwork in June 2006. However, my journey began 
much earlier, in May 2004 to be precise, and it is useful to provide an account of my winding road to 
fieldwork here. This will clarify how I might have had some relationships and better access to some views of 
the field than others might, and will also provide the reader with a sense of my position in the field. 
Through some academic contacts at Stanford University, where I was a Masters student in 2002-2003, I made 
a connection with a senior manager at one of India‘s largest telecommunications companies in early 2004. At 
that time, I was keen to get my hands dirty and work in telecommunications policy and regulation, a field I 
had been studying since 2002. Hence, in the summer of 2004, I found myself working in the regulatory affairs 
division of this company in Bombay, India. My three-month stint at this company was spent focused on 
preparing the company‘s response to a TRAI consultation paper on spectrum policy. During this period, I got 
to know a consultant to the company who was based in New York in the U.S. I also learnt about specific 
individuals at TRAI, although I never met them. I left with the impression that TRAI was an agency that was 
trying to regulate an unruly market with limited success. 
Then later in 2004, I was invited to a conference organized by the New York-based consultant where I met a 
senior official of TRAI. We struck up a conversation and I expressed my interest in working with TRAI, 
possibly to work on an internship if such an opportunity were available. At the time, this was like shooting an 
arrow in the dark. For someone growing up in Bombay, far from the political dealings of New Delhi, it 
always seemed like the Government and its agencies were impossible to penetrate. I was not sure if I would 
get a positive response. 
Yet, this person was interested in looking into the possibility, and by early 2005, I had secured the 
permissions needed to work for a three-month period with TRAI as an ‗intern.‘ I was very thrilled at this 
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possibility but also worried about whether this experience would be rewarding, especially given my negative 
view of Indian government offices. Yet, my curiosity and the opportunity to work with the regulatory agency 
was more than enough to make me find myself in New Delhi in May 2005.  
During my three months at TRAI in 2005, I worked as an ‗intern,‘ but seem to have proved myself to my 
supervisors, resulting in the Authority elevating my status to that of a ‗consultant.‘ Although it was only for 
three months, this initial period at TRAI was long enough for me to develop a set of useful relationships with 
mid-level and lower-level staffers. I also found that the staffers were welcoming; I did not sense any overt 
animosity from the staff towards my presence there.  
This is a good time to make a point about gaining access to TRAI. Gaining access to a site is a complex 
process of negotiating entry. My ability to access TRAI as a fieldwork site might have been very difficult; one 
might only guess the difficulty of gaining access to high-profile public officials by the lack of ethnographic 
materials on this group. However serendipitously, I was well positioned to work at TRAI, and due to my 
ability to assist my informants in their daily routine I was able to gain access to the site and observe them 
closely. As with most ethnographers, a combination of luck, interest, and skill unlocked what seemed to be 
the difficult gates to the site. 
My technical knowledge, and research and writing abilities were especially useful to my interlocutors; as one 
mentioned later, it was useful to have an intern who could write a note for senior staff using the correct 
technical language and grammar, and with citations from online and academic sources with which they were 
not familiar. My successful time at TRAI in 2005 thus opened the doors to the longer period and fieldwork in 
2006. 
I also figured out soon enough that I was lucky to have gained access through the senior official I had met in 
New York. Over lunch one day with some mid-level staffers, I casually mentioned that I was happy to have 
the chance to work at TRAI. They explained to me that I was lucky to have met the senior official. It might 
not have been this easy to gain access to TRAI if I had met someone else. Apart from being among the 
senior-most officials in the agency, it also turns out that the person I had met was also more receptive to 
having interns and consultants work with TRAI.  
My social position also allowed me access to senior officials in the agency. This was a combination of my 
education—as a telecommunications engineer from a well-regarded Indian university, my degree from 
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Stanford University, and my time spent as a PhD student in the U.S.—and possibly social markers of being 
from an English-speaking middle-class urban family with a professor father and psychoanalyst mother. This 
combination of factors allowed me the opportunity to develop the needed relationships to get into and stay at 
the site. 
I should also mention that my entry into TRAI was somewhat easier because I was an Indian and familiar 
with the social and professional etiquette. I ‗knew‘ whom to call ―Sir,‖ whom to refer to as ―ji‖ (an informal 
yet respectful suffix), and whom as ―bhai‖ (brother). I also knew the language(s) and was familiar with the 
style of speaking prevalent among TRAI staff. 
Much of the writing on the method suggests that a good ethnographer should be fluent in a language in 
which his informants communicate. In my case, the communication would happen primarily in English and 
Hindi, both recognized as ‗raj bhashain‘—literally state languages—and the primary languages in which the 
Government of India and its officials would work. Some conversations would see the introduction of Punjabi 
or Haryanvi, the vernaculars of the states from which a number of TRAI staff came from. However, staffers 
usually deployed their vernacular only to make a joke or in some instances share a proverb that seemed to fit 
a specific situation; business was invariably conducted in a raj bhasha and between them, even more so in 
English.  
Apart from the language of communication, the raj bhasha, given the nature of the research I was doing and in 
order to gain access to this typically closed group of informants, I had to also speak the language of the 
workplace. One might call this regulator-speak, and it consists of the symbols and ideas that would become 
the centerpiece of this study. These words are usually in English—few regulatory concepts exist in an original 
Hindi form—but they often have alternative and specific meanings to my informants.  
One useful example is ‗mixed-band allocation.‘ On the face of it, this concept refers to the mixing of two 
standards for mobile telephone and data services; India numbers among few countries in the world that has 
done this. But for my informants, mixed-band allocation signifies the importance of a regulator‘s role in 
ensuring competition among various service providers (and is discussed in detail later in this study in Chapter 
8). The phrase itself is arcane, and its political implications and specific meaning may never be clear to an 
outsider. The technical language of telecommunications regulation is also sometimes impenetrable to an 
outsider; words such as ‗portability,‘ ‗interference,‘ and ‗frequency‘ are meaningful to an insider but might be 
ignored by an outsider or in the worst case be misunderstood. 
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The knowledge of this language allowed me access to the inner workings of the regulatory agency because my 
interlocutors took me seriously and allowed me to participate in the working of the agency.* Because I had the 
knowledge and skills needed to contribute to serious policy and regulatory discussions, I was allowed to 
participate and observe. I have no way of verifying this for certain, but I doubt that I would have had the 
level of access and ability to observe so closely the working of this regulator without having the technical skill 
needed. I might have been relegated, against my wishes, to the position of being an interviewer rather than 
participant observer; not being technically competent would have had a significant constraining effect on my 
access to people and proceedings, and the ability to write this study. 
Apart from my ability to and interest in participating in regulatory activities, a factor that may have played a 
role in simplifying my entry into the agency and (most) individuals‘ acceptance of my role as a fieldworker 
was that I was a ―PhD student from the U.S.‖ For some of my informants, as they explained to me at various 
times, this indicated that I was a researcher doing something ‗academic‘ rather than something of direct 
relevance to the arena. When I explained to them that I was looking for how local ideas and concepts entered 
into and played a role in regulation, they would nod their heads. But at the same time, they would look at me 
in a way that would suggest that they might have thought that this was an esoteric academic interest of mine 
that would not pose any real political risk to them.  
When I returned to TRAI in June 2006 to begin my fieldwork, I thus re-entered a site where I already had 
relationships with most of the people who were to become my interlocutors and informants. Some of the 
people I had met in 2005 had resigned, retired, or been transferred to other government agencies. However, 
most of my interlocutors were the same. As a result, I was entering a site where I was familiar with not only 
the physical layout, but also the social layout (Bernard, 2002). 
My position in the field. This brings me to the discussion about my position in the social layout. 
During my fieldwork I was placed to support a small group of senior staffers to work on two of the high 
profile topics at the time, policy recommendations to the Government on spectrum policy and regulations for 
unsolicited commercial communications. My position during fieldwork thus put me in close connection with 
about 20 people of the approximately 150 employees at TRAI who were involved, directly or indirectly, in 
                                                   
* Hunter points out that elites expect researchers to be technically competent and be aware of what they are asking 
about. The display of preparation has consequences for being taken seriously or being dismissed (Hunter, 1993).  
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some of the key proceedings.* This put me in the position of participant observer at a time when the people I 
was studying were involved in important proceedings. Plus, it gave me access to those people who were 
familiar with stories about the earlier important proceedings that TRAI had been involved in.  
The strongest relationships I had were with informants in the senior and middle-level of the organization. I 
also had good relationships with people at the lower level of the hierarchy as well, but these were more social. 
This is a consequence of two factors. First, it is because I was involved in writing and discussing policy 
documents where the higher-ups are the only ones involved, and second, it is because I was viewed as 
someone not important to the hierarchies within the agency, that is, I did not have the power to make 
appointments or recommend promotions. As a result, no one at the lower level would need to know me; I 
could not get them promoted, for instance. However, over the two periods when I was at TRAI, I managed 
to get to know a few of lower-level employees due to my daily presence and because I needed their support to 
complete certain tasks. Many of them also got to know me because they were curious about why someone 
who had the chance to live in the U.S. might be interested in coming back to India; for them, this was not 
necessarily a good choice! 
I also believe that while there might not have been a positive reason to be friendly to me, that is, I could not 
award them a salary raise for instance, being uncooperative might have attracted the wrath of those who 
could, and for whom I was working. Again, this links back to my connections with, especially, the senior 
staffers. However, did does not mean that the senior staff treated me as a peer. Instead, they thought of me 
more as a student, consultant, or initially intern, while people in the mid-level were willing to deal with me as 
an equal.  
                                                   
* Of these 150 people working at TRAI, there are about 15 people who constitute the most influential and decision-
making body and include the Chairperson, Members, and Advisors. Below them are the Deputy Advisors (DAs), Senior 
Research Officers (SROs), and Technical Officers (TOs) who help the Advisors in their daily work and in collecting 
information and interfacing with industry personnel. Almost all decision making is concentrated in the first group, with 
minimal executive power spilling into the second group. The final group of employees consists of Assistants, Personal 
Secretaries, Chauffeurs, and Peons, who approximate errand-boys or messengers. This group has little official power, but 
can be extremely important in getting information about the goings-on at TRAI or in meeting and finding out about the 
first two categories of employees. 
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Fieldwork at TRAI 
Participant-observation. My time in the field was spent mostly in participant-observation, where I 
was working closely with my interlocutors as a consultant at TRAI. I was, in most cases, an active participant 
in the different meetings and discussions that took place during my fieldwork (described below). In some 
cases, such as the smaller internal meetings, I was one of the few people in the room and integral to the 
meeting itself. In the larger meetings, I would often write or listen more and speak less, although I was 
certainly participating rather than simply observing the meeting—what I had heard or written down would 
form the basis of future conversations and discussions.  
The final activity I would conduct daily was sitting in my room and working. ‗Work‘ would include online 
research, writing and editing policy documents, preparing speeches, presentations, and drafts of various 
regulatory documents, and making telephone calls to other TRAI staffers and outsiders.  
Each of these activities allowed me to participate and observe first-hand what the regulatory process was 
about. I took notes while I was engaged in, or immediately after these activities, or in some cases especially 
when the daily workload got too much, over the weekend.  
Apart from ‗work‘, there were plenty of opportunities to socialize and engage in casual conversation. Some of 
TRAI staff turned out to be gifted at telling jokes, while others would invite me to a cup of tea and chat about 
their professional lives or personal experiences. I discuss this in greater detail below. 
Talking: Interviews and „baat cheet.‟ As I described in the opening section of this chapter, I 
began my fieldwork thinking that I would rely mainly on participant-observation as my data collection 
method. However, I quickly realized that my informants were also rich sources of information about events 
past, and that it would benefit my study to discuss these events with them. 
As a result, I began to engage in informal, and at the end of my fieldwork, formal interviews with my 
interlocutors. I will say that the informal discussions were probably most useful, especially as they were often 
conducted in relaxed settings and were typically conducted immediately after or in some cases as an event was 
unfolding or another topic was being discussed. 
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Staying alone in New Delhi, and thankfully—given Delhi‘s notorious traffic situation—just a few minutes‘ 
walk away from the TRAI office,* I had a very flexible schedule. I would typically arrive in the office about 
8:30 AM, just as the first of the regular staffers were coming in, and I would stay until about 7 PM quite 
regularly. This let me observe much of what was going on in the office, and in the ‗after hours‘ period, sit 
down with some of the mid- and senior level officials and talk with them about regulation, Indian politics, 
telecommunications technology, my fieldwork and research project, and often (upon request) my experiences 
in the U.S. This last topic typically arose from questions posed by mid-level staffers who had young children, 
and for whom I was a source of knowledge on how an Indian middle-class family might plan their children‘s 
education abroad. I take it as a mark of the close level of interaction I had and the strong relationships I 
developed with these officials that we would talk about this wide range of topics in an open manner.  
Many of these officials would refer to such discussions as ‗baat cheet‘, literally ‗chit chat‘ to separate them from 
the work-related discussions we would have. Baat cheet would typically happen over a cup of tea, when the 
workday or week had ended, sometimes when others were present, or when one of the staffers had to make a 
point about something. It was also typically senior staff who would engage in baat cheet, although there were 
also some mid-level staff who engaged in baat cheet with me. In many cases, the baat cheet would begin when I 
would follow one of the senior staff into their office after a meeting, knock on their door to follow up on an 
earlier discussion, or simply go to meet the staffer towards the end of the day. In some cases, the baat cheet 
would have already begun when I would go to meet someone, and I would be added to the session. In a few 
cases, senior staff would call me to their office to engage in baat cheet, partly as a way to support my fieldwork, 
but I also suspect because they knew they had an eager listener who might not have heard about their past 
exploits. 
Baat cheet had the advantage of allowing my informants to tell me stories with the least amount of prodding 
from me, and often in detail. These stories were often about personal experiences with specific regulatory 
issues, or in many cases would weave in earlier professional experiences (from before the speaker‘s work at 
TRAI). The narrator would often tell these stories because they displayed some personal or professional 
                                                   
* This was the case throughout my time in the field except for the last two weeks, in December 2006, when TRAI shifted 
its office. 
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victory, or because they felt these stories had in them either some memorable lesson or event in their 
professional or regulatory career.*  
Indian bureaucrats (and I believe bureaucrats from other countries as well) enjoy such conversations because 
it is a mark of their seniority and experience. This is why I think baat cheet was more common with senior 
staff; it was what they did to show their wide ranging experience and was a mechanism to prove they 
belonged in their position of hierarchical superiority. Middle-level staffers would also engage in baat cheet, but 
this would often be more personal in nature, unless gentle prodding would push them to discussing 
professional experiences. 
Baat cheet was a powerful means for me to get rich detail about events in the past. Many of the senior staffers I 
would speak with had been intimately involved with TRAI‘s key regulatory decisions or had heard about them 
from others with such involvement when they came to work at TRAI. And given the penchant for Indian 
bureaucrats to tell a good story, the details were always there—how people spoke, the reactions from service 
providers, how the public response was, and how proceedings played out in court—all of this was typically 
narrated in great detail. The side benefits included cups of sweet hot tea, and in many cases, samosas† and 
biscuits. During my fieldwork, I had innumerable baat cheet sessions, maybe five or more every week, lasting 
anywhere from a few minutes to a few hours depending on the mood of my interlocutor and often on time 
constraints. 
I have written much of this study and especially Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 based on the many baat cheet 
sessions I had with senior TRAI officials during my fieldwork. Baat cheet also allowed me to validate stories I 
had heard or ask these officials about what they thought of my interpretations on their actions. 
Field notes. During my fieldwork, I was working fulltime at TRAI as a consultant. I was also 
observing the goings on and participating along with my informants in the daily routine work. I began my 
fieldwork with the idea that I would have one notebook that would hold my ‗consultant‘ notes and my 
                                                   
* This experience is not unlike Ostrander‘s who studied ―elite upper-class women‖ that had a similar inclination to ―just 
talk‖ as opposed to be guided through an interview. She writes that ―I think that the tendency of elites to ‗just talk‘ has 
everything to do with their being used to having others interested in what they have to say and in having what they say 
make a difference in the lives of others‖ (Ostrander, 1993, p. 22). 
† A samosa is a stuffed pastry and a popular snack in India. It usually has a fried or baked triangular pastry shell with a 
savory filling, which may include spiced potatoes, onions, peas, coriander, and lentils. 
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‗fieldworker‘ notes side by side. This worked for the first month, when the pace of the work was relatively 
relaxed. I would go back to the rented apartment I was living in over the weekend and write up a number of 
observations based on these notes. 
However, as the second month began, the amount of work quickly increased. This was primarily because I 
was working with the team that was assigned to draft the recommendations to the Government on spectrum 
policy, and by July 2006, the responses to the consultation paper had come in and TRAI was quickly moving 
forward on preparing the recommendations. Given my writing skills, I became—along with one of my key 
informants—the coauthor of the ‗recommendations‘ document. This significantly changed my ability to write 
‗field notes‘ separately from my ‗consultant‘ notes. I could not do both at the same time, especially during the 
intense meetings and discussions I was beginning to have at that time.  
As a result, my field notes became quick phrases or quotes that I would note down in the margins of my 
notebook, or specific observations that I would note down after I got back to my own office after a meeting 
or discussion. In some cases, the day would be simply too hectic to permit me to make these jottings any time 
before the end of the day, when everyone else had left and the only people left in the building were the 
security guards. Hence, by August 2006, two months into my fieldwork, my field notes started to become a 
regular feature in the margins and on the last few pages of my notebook.  
I do not feel that this approach to preparing field notes impeded me at any time in my post-fieldwork analysis 
or writing. It actually helped that I had these notes written close to the actual events and I would see the two 
together—the ‗event‘ in the main body of the notebook and the ‗observation‘ in the margin. This allowed me 
to capture a lot of detail regarding the proceedings I was involved in even as I was writing up this study more 
than two years after the fieldwork.  
I believe I might have been helped by the fact that I was very familiar with the language of the field, which 
reduced the note-taking burden especially when the discussion veered into something of a very technical or 
arcane nature that might have needed more description for a non-specialist. For example, one discussion I 
was in was about radio spectrum allocations where the speaker was discussing the relative benefits of one 
arrangement of spectrum blocks versus another (I imagine a confusing topic for most people). Given my 
familiarity with the technical discussion, I was able to participate in the discussion even as I was noting the 
reactions from TRAI staff in the margins of my notebook. By the end of my fieldwork, I had run through 
three notebooks of about 150 pages each.  
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I did not consider using audio recordings for my data collection. This was primarily because I believed that 
my interlocutors would react negatively to the introduction of an audio recorder during baat cheet or 
participant observation. I felt that they would either not want to be recorded or that they would switch into 
‗interview‘ mode, treating me akin to a press journalist. Because I wanted to hear their unabridged thoughts as 
they went about their work in the most natural circumstances possible, I had early on decided not to use 
audio recordings. 
After Fieldwork: Writing About an Identifiable Group of Elites 
Ethnographers have typically focused on those without a voice, or those who have been marginalized, that is, 
the non-elites (Duneier, 1999; Hertz & Imber, 1993). There are thus few ethnographic studies of elites. 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) conducted a two-year anthropological study at The Salk Institute for Biological 
Studies, by ―follow[ing] closely the daily and intimate processes of scientific work‖ (p. 12). Similarly, 
Gusterson (1993) conducted his doctoral dissertation research at the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, studying nuclear scientists, engineers, and Department of Defense officials. Apart from scientists, 
Sheehan (1993) studied another group of elites: intellectuals in Ireland. The Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 
had a special issue dedicated to ethnographies of elites (1993), and I refer to some of those articles below. 
However, other than these few examples, it is difficult to locate ethnographic accounts of the worlds 
inhabited by elites.  
In a relevant article about her studies of elite child and family welfare agencies, Ostrander (1993, p. 7) 
suggests that ―the problem of conducting such research [about elites] does not center so much on gaining 
access but rather on penetrating the class culture sufficiently to expose the ‗real‘ concerns and viewpoints of 
her subjects.‖ She is especially concerned with ―protecting the interests and integrity of the research and 
researcher, given the power of elite subjects‖ (p. 9), making useful recommendations such as negotiating with 
the agencies or people to allow them to correct factual errors, but not allow them to object to interpretations 
(pp. 14-15).  
She also explains how, in order to get a job at an organization where board-members were among her 
subjects, she agreed not to publish a book based on her research (Ostrander, 1993). She ends suggesting that, 
―it is a mistake to be too deferential to elites,‖ suggesting that the researcher should make her or his goals 
clear and give the other time to consider allowing the researcher into their world, asking that more research 
on elites be done (p. 26). Echoing recommendations to be well prepared when researching elites, Hunter 
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(1993) writes that, ―elites expect the researcher to know something and to have done their homework. The 
extent to which this preparation is displayed may have consequences for being dismissed or taken seriously by 
community elites.‖  
Many have explained this as a problem arising from the lack of ‗access‘ to elites either in terms of the 
difficulty in reaching them or in studying them because they are busy. However, as Nader (1974) explains, this 
is not unlike the problem in studying non-elites; ethnographers have to generate a high level of trust with any 
group being studied. She writes that ―anthropologists have had problems of access everywhere they have 
gone; solving such problems of access is part of what constitutes ‗making rapport‘‖ (Nader, p. 304). 
The foregoing description of my interactions with my informants at TRAI should indicate that I not only was 
able to build strong rapport with them, but that they let me into their inner circle, allowing me to study them 
and their work up close. This relationship was also based on trust; I sought my interlocutors‘ consent for my 
fieldwork and they knew I was writing about them and their work. A key part of trust building was an 
understanding between my interlocutors and me that they would remain anonymous (other than those few 
exceptions when what they said along with their identifying information was in the public record). It was 
essential that my ethnographic account should be presented to protect them from harm.  
This does not mean that I always agreed with them or cover up their actions in this study. It means that my 
writing should not directly negatively impact individuals. This is the case even though the probability that my 
informants will read this dissertation is quite low; they are busy individuals with enough written about them in 
newspapers and the trade press that they will not be bothered to read an academic tome about them and their 
thinking on regulatory independence. 
I understood early on that this was not a dichotomy between harming and not harming individuals. I 
understood that grey shades existed and I would have to make conscious decisions about what, and what not, 
to include in my account. Yet, when the time came to convert my field notes and observations into a written 
account, I faced significant challenges to putting ‗pen to paper.‘  
The nature of the work I was doing required me to disclose which country and agency about which I was 
talking. In the examples of the ethnographies of elites that I used to inform my own work, this is a common 
approach. The name of the organization is not changed or covered up but informants are anonymous (see 
Ostrander (1993) on the women running the Haymarket People‘s Fund, or Gusterson (1993) writing about 
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scientists in the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory). In my case, not mentioning India would have 
raised too many questions in the minds of my readers, and if nothing else, would have severely restricted the 
stories I could tell. India is also easy to identify for those who work in the field, and it would have been much 
effort to cover the site with uncertain rewards. And if I was talking about telecommunications regulation in 
India, there is only one Government agency that handles that topic. Again, it would be difficult if not 
impossible to cover up the agency‘s identity, and most likely that would have been unhelpful to my academic 
cause. 
I was relatively comfortable in the idea of disclosing the identity of the agency. But the episode where the 
industry analyst recognized one of my informants from a specific phrase that I used in an account was one 
instance that did much to worry me about writing about this group of elites. The key difference between the 
other ethnographic writing I had seen on elites and this study was that my informants were relatively well 
known and identifiable, at least in the arena about which I was writing. The work of the regulator is 
fundamentally political, and it has made many controversial decisions (some of which I write about in the 
following chapters). My concern thus shifted to inadvertently exposing my informants to personal criticism or 
harm for things they have done and for the stories and experiences that they had shared with me. 
This concern slowed down my writing of this study. I began to read and re-read every incident or episode 
multiple times to make sure no one might be able to identify who said what. There were days when I 
remained stuck at a statement someone had made wondering if its speaker would be identifiable. Some of the 
chapters were easier to write, such as Chapter 6, because the events they covered had happened well in the 
past and almost any of my informants would narrate these events in similar vocabulary, even if with different 
viewpoints. 
While not wishing to discard these fears as baseless, I do believe that I have understood better the source of 
my concern. There were primarily two issues: the confidentiality of informants that could be identified, and 
my worries about my own embarrassment if I returned to the field and faced my interlocutors and their 
disagreement on what I had written. 
(Mostly) overcoming concerns with anonymity. Let me start with writing about identifiable elites. 
In his ethnographic research among elites in Tonga, Marcus (1979) notes that ―a major ethical issue in 
ethnographic research on elites is the degree to which the privacy and anonymity of elite subjects can be 
preserved‖ (p. 147). Marcus explains that when an ethnography covers non-elites, it usually does not require 
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the identification of particular individuals because meanings and rituals are shared by a large population. On 
the other hand, when working with elites, ―the identification of individual personalities is often unavoidable, 
since the research domain is restricted to particular social units, and a major contribution of a cultural 
perspective on elites derives from the in-depth investigation of relationships within these units‖ (p. 147). This 
certainly applies to this study, where the particular social unit being studied, TRAI, is well known and most of 
the individuals working at TRAI, as well as the relationships among them and with other are easily identified.  
Marcus (1979) continues, saying that using pseudonyms ―is primarily a courtesy rather than a guarantee of 
anonymity.‖ This is because ―pseudonyms may effectively make elites anonymous to the ethnographer‘s 
readers beyond the former‘s regions or societies, but usually not within them‖ (p. 147). As my experience 
shows, people familiar with the social unit being studied can quickly identify even well disguised individuals 
through their manner of speaking, a favorite phrase, or even choice of words. For an ethnographer, whose 
job it is to represent those she studies using emic language, this is a potentially troubling situation. 
In his experience, Marcus (1979) explains that it is useful to draw a distinction between what the 
ethnographer knows and what the ethnographer writes about in relation to these elites (p. 174). My hand 
wringing when it came to writing this study was eased by this realization—I did not have to write about 
everything that I had seen, and what is left out will remain with me. As I progressed, I found that could write 
about much that I wanted to say without necessarily feeling the pressure or guilt that I could harm my 
informants by saying something or the other. ―Certain interesting questions,‖ however, ―might be avoided… 
because the subject is judged by the ethnographer to be too sensitive‖ (Marcus, p. 174).  
The interesting point Marcus makes is that the judgment about what might be published will depend on the 
standards prevalent in the ethnographer‘s own ‗culture.‘ When this distinction is easy to make (such as an 
American academic writing about Tongan elite), the author might make a choice to publish something that 
could be seen as ethically objectionable in the researched culture. In my case, however, the distinction is not 
as easy to make. Certainly, I am a ‗PhD student from an American university,‘ but this does not make me less 
‗Indian‘ or less aware of the politics of telecommunications regulation in India. Consequently, I feel that I will 
need to make some of my choices clear, even if these choices are invisible because my readers will see only 
what I include and not the data that I have excluded. 
When writing about past events, I was less worried about my informants‘ identities because the account 
presented in these chapters is based on baat cheet with multiple informants, most of whom were not involved 
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directly in the events, but were narrating folklore. I heard from multiple informants and constructed an 
account that would not identify one informant. 
Chapter 7 raised specific concerns because while it had happened in the past, many of my informants were 
directly involved in the events that transpired and might have been easily identified. And Chapter 8 included 
events that happened during my fieldwork. Both of these chapters were integral to my fieldwork experience, 
informed as they were by the participant observation and most of the baat cheet that happened in that time.  
Upon the advice of my academic advisor, and following later the findings from Marcus‘ own work, I began to 
rewrite these accounts using two strategies. The first strategy was to abstract and translate individual-specific 
commentaries and viewpoints into summaries to allow them to be de-personalized accounts that did not give 
away (at least in my opinion) the identity of the source. I had to take out some commentaries that were tied to 
one individual and were never repeated by anyone else, or which involved one individual in a manner that 
might be easily identifiable (e.g., a particular meeting chaired by or a unique question or viewpoint raised by 
an individual).  
This has led me to take out or reduce the detail on a few examples and events that could have added to my 
study in their original form. But this is a price I am willing to pay for my informants‘ confidentiality and for 
my own peace of mind. 
When they read what I wrote. Turning to the second concern—my own embarrassment—let me 
admit that in retrospect, it seems like this might have been the major constraining factor. It is unlikely that my 
informants will read any or much of what I have written here. This is partly because they are very busy in 
their professional lives; they have much to read for their work and much that is written about them in the 
news media. But it is also because, as Streeter (1996) suggests, academic work is too unusual for them and too 
out of the scope of their lives, with little seeming relevance. This does not mean that there is no chance that 
these individuals could read what I have written about them, all that might need is a fee to an online 
dissertation archive. It only means the likelihood of them reading this document is low. 
Certainly this allows me some room to be critical of my informants; if they read it, they might not approve of 
what is written here. As Becker writes, any good study of an organization will confront ―the irreconcilable 
conflict between the interests of science and the interests of those studied and thereby provoke a hostile 
reaction‖ (Becker (1964, p. 276) cited in Brettell, 1993, p. 11).  
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Once ethnography is produced, the texts ―take on a life of their own that is beyond the ethnographer‘s 
control‖ especially if the work is covered in the press or rumors about the conclusions spread in the 
community studied (Brettell, 1993, p. 4). It might be that my interlocutors will not like what I have written, or 
might disagree with what I have written, seeing my representation of their world as incorrect.  
Rosaldo (1986, cited in Brettell, 1993, p. 20) suggests three types of reactions to the challenges of native 
readers: the ‗chicken little reaction‘, the ‗two worlds reaction‘, and ‗one conversation reaction.‘ Instead of 
thinking that the sky is falling and that anthropology is doomed (like chicken little), or accepting that everyday 
life and science can never meet (that the two worlds shall never meet), Rosaldo suggests that ―new insights 
that can result from listening to native responses… often outweigh any misunderstandings‖ (Brettell, p. 21).  
My plan with this dissertation is to prepare it for publication as a book after 2012; the risk of my 
embarrassment will likely be highest then. By that time, most of my informants would have moved on to 
other jobs as some already have, and others would have retired from their regulatory careers. Yet, I hope to 
share that version of this document prior to publication to learn from what they might have to say about their 
regulatory lives seven or more years after I completed my fieldwork. This might be useful way to understand 
their disagreements with what I have written, and use their feedback to strengthen my arguments or rethink 
my analysis. ―The book was my best defense,‖ writes Davis (1993, p. 33), explaining that rumor and 
misunderstanding about what she had written caused her informants to feel betrayed or uncomfortable. 
A few concluding thoughts. In concluding this note on method, I would like to present two 
thoughts regarding how other ethnographers might be able to write about a small group of easily identifiable 
elites. First, I encourage the ethnographer to think carefully about how they might be able to construct an 
account that does not identify an individual but might still add value to the project. I used two broad 
techniques for this. In some cases where I was able to construct a composite account disjointed from 
individual identities by speaking with a number of individuals in the field and injecting where possible 
academic, press, or public documents as references. In other cases I had to re-create non-identifiable 
individuals or refer to people in very (sometimes frustratingly) broad ways to avoid any possibility of 
detection. All of this helped me write this study. It might not be as free of distortions had it been about some 
other group of individuals, but looking at the final product, I feel that it has balanced the academic enterprise 
with my duty to my informants. 
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Second, I suggest that any ethnographer who is writing about such elites should discuss their account as they 
are in the field not only as a way to validate observations or collect multiple viewpoints, but also as a way to 
identify which events and episodes might be easily tied to one individual. In my case, this happened by 
chance. During my long baat cheet sessions, I discussed different informants‘ accounts with others at TRAI. 
This helped me later in identifying which accounts were unique to an individual and hence potentially more 
important to disguise. 
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Chapter 5. Regulatory Life at TRAI 
In their influential study of the anthropology of science, Latour & Woolgar (1979) observe and analyze the 
working of scientists at the Salk Institute. Writing about what was observed, they characterize the business of 
the scientists working at this laboratory as the construction of scientific fact and ultimately, reality. Noting 
that, ―scientific activity is not ‗about nature,‘ it is a fierce fight to construct reality,‖ they find that ―the laboratory 
is the workplace and the set of productive forces, which makes construction possible‖ (Latour & Woolgar, p. 
243). Facts and artifacts, such as the chemicals these scientists produce, have meaning within specific 
circumstances, usually the same circumstances in which these individuals operate (Latour & Woolgar, chap. 
3). 
It is useful to consider Latour and Woolgar (1979) here because they are concerned with how a fact has great 
meaning within specific groups, and how these facts are constructed with the intention of differentiating one 
sub-group from others. In the case of these scientists, their choice to study the structure of the chemical 
compound as a way of description led the Salk Institute to shut out competitors due to the needed 
equipment, and at some point, ‗reality‘ was created when it became too difficult for anyone to contest what 
was being said about this chemical. 
While not the same, the behavior of individuals at TRAI has some similarities with the scientists at the Salk 
Institute. This chapter describes life at TRAI, focusing specifically on how the people working at TRAI are 
engaged in various ways with the making and maintenance of the regulatory agency‘s position in the arena. 
This is not their only objective; they have personal ambitions and rivalries and are always engaged in the 
professional and personal simultaneously. But this chapter will focus on the processes through which staffers 
at TRAI contribute to or take away from the agency‘s position in the arena. 
Just as the scientists in Latour and Woolgar‘s study are engaged in the construction of reality, I find that the 
regulatory staffers working at TRAI are engaged in processes that have to do with the construction of 
regulatory independence. Their constant struggle to remain independent and avoid assimilation by the babus is 
what animates much of their regulatory lives. Some staffers are more engaged in this struggle, some less; 
some could care less and are engaged in personal pursuits no matter the impact on the broader organization. 
But all of the individuals at TRAI add or subtract to the construction of regulatory independence. 
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This chapter describes TRAI from three perspectives. First, it will describe TRAI as a physical site. There is 
no doubt that TRAI ‗exists‘ beyond being an idea on a legislative act; but my informants feel that the physical 
characteristics of TRAI—its location and office design, for example—have specific implications for TRAI‘s 
position in the arena and in the power of the regulatory field. Second, this chapter will describe the 
organization of TRAI to highlight the structures of control and means through which formal and informal 
groups influence the power of the regulatory field. 
Third, this chapter will describe regulatory life at TRAI, focusing on two aspects. It will describe a 
metaphorical ‗day in the life‘ of a composite of senior staffers at TRAI. It will describe social activities at 
TRAI, which can all be grouped into the word ‗meetings,‘ one used by my informants no matter if it had two 
or ten people involved and was something related to work, office gossip, or baat cheet. The chapter will then 
discuss work flow and the nature of proceedings at this regulatory agency, showing how rituals and ideas have 
become part of the effort to define the regulatory field. 
Finally, this chapter will turn its attention to understand some of the ways in which TRAI staffers think about 
and work towards ‗regulatory independence‘ in their professional lives. In this section, I describe how staffers 
engage in specific rituals, learn specific ideas, and act in ways that emphasize and continuously re-declare their 
authority in the arena. Underlying these efforts is a constant effort among some staffers at TRAI to 
differentiate their agency from others in the field, and especially the babus. This strategic differentiation is at 
the heart of efforts at TRAI to remain independent. This chapter will thus form a starting point of the 
ethnographic account of life at TRAI and how the individuals at this agency have attempted to create and 
maintain a meaningful regulatory agency. 
TRAI as a Physical Entity 
When one visits the TRAI office, it looks like a ‗regular‘ modern office where people are walking around with 
papers in their hands, walking to and attending meetings, sitting in offices, working on their computers, 
chatting in the hallways, talking on the telephone, reading, or writing. There are offices with closed doors and 
cubicles, meeting rooms and common spaces, restrooms, and a small library filled with books, reports, and 
files with titles such as ―Spectrum Management 2000,‖ ―Radio Frequency Interference,‖ 
―Telecommunications Policy,‖ and ―Trends in Telecommunication Reform.‖ And spread everywhere are 
physical objects—desks, chairs, cupboards, filing cabinets, temporary partitions between cubicles, sofas 
outside some rooms, desktop computers, typewriters, stationery.  
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Until the last month of the period of my fieldwork (December 2006), TRAI occupied a five-floor building 
that housed its 150-odd staffers alone. Each floor had two wings; a front wing and back wing. A building core 
with elevators, a fairly large and open stairwell, and other facilities separated these two wings. 
When people would enter the building, it would be through the gates at the front of the building and up a 
short flight of stairs into the reception on the ground floor. The reception area covered the front half of that 
floor, except for an office to the side for one of the ‗Advisors‘, one of the group of senior staffers at TRAI 
that were the technical experts heading different divisions. The back of the ground floor had cubicles and 
offices. 
The basement had the information technology (IT) department, which managed the corporate servers, the 
website, and the office local area network. There were some meeting rooms, the library, and offices on this 
floor. The first and second floors were designed similarly with the two wings housing divisions of the 
organization. The Secretary, who acts as a CEO for TRAI, occupied an office on the second floor, while the 
rest was offices and cubicles for the other divisions. The third floor held the Chairperson of TRAI, its senior-
most official; the Chairperson had the largest office that included a partition-separated conference room 
covering the full front wing of the floor. The back wing of that floor had the offices for the other Members 
of the Authority, the two full-time and two part-time Members who together with the Chairperson 
constituted the full commission that officially made up TRAI. Given that space was limited in the building 
TRAI occupied, the agency also rented some space in an office complex across the street. I rarely went there. 
The official hierarchy at TRAI was reinforced through the organization of physical space. The Chairperson 
and Members—the Authority—occupied the top floor, and others were in spaces below them. You had to 
use the stairs to reach other floors; the elevators were strictly reserved for the Authority members and their 
companions, high-profile guests such as CEOs or senior bureaucrats of other agencies, or if you had an 
obvious or a visible disability.  
Even on every floor, the divisions were organized according to professional hierarchy. The Advisors, who are 
the highest-ranked officials and heads of the divisions, got the ‗corner office.‘ This was a larger room, 
typically in the corner, with more windows, and has sofas, a larger table, and typically with a personal 
secretary sitting at a desk immediately outside the office. It was possible for up to five people to sit in most 
Advisors‘ offices. The Joint or Deputy Advisors, second-in-command at the division, would have smaller 
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offices in rooms next to the Advisor. Their offices would have chairs and a smaller table, and could 
accommodate maybe three people sitting. 
The rest of TRAI‘s staff would occupy cubicles and shared spaces of varying sizes. I did not detect a clear 
match between the seniority of these individuals and their office spaces, but there certainly was a trend where 
the mid-level technical staffers would have larger desks and more space, while the lower-level staffers would 
have less space, often sharing two desks between three people. Only a few of the lower-level staffers would 
have their own cubicles, and this could be attributed to their position in the formal hierarchy or informal 
social positioning. For instance, personal secretaries used to have their own desks, and most women would 
have their own desks. Only a few male lower-level staff had their own cubicles. The one example I know of 
was an active member of the employees‘ union, which might explain how he had a small yet personal cubicle 
unlike others at the same professional position. 
The office building was, until December 2006, located on the intersection of Africa Avenue and Nauroji 
Nagar Marg, just outside Ring Road in New Delhi. This put the office in the fancy residential area of 
Safdarjung Enclave. It was comfortable and open with no musty filing cabinets or cupboards in sight. This 
was actually a surprise for me when I first arrived at TRAI in 2005; growing up in Bombay, my only 
interaction with the Government of India was when we had to speak with the police or tax officials. In both 
cases, offices were messy, poorly maintained, and crowded with filing cabinets that were so filled with 
yellowing sheets of paper that they seemed to be at their bursting point. 
TRAI‘s office was not sleek or fancy; it definitely was not as sleek or fancy as the offices of the private 
telecommunications firms. But it was far from being, at least for me, a regular Government office. There 
were roaches in the building, and the generator made too much noise when the electricity gave out (which 
was quite often), the elevators would break down, the paint was peeling in some spots, and the Internet 
connection was slow—ironic for a telecommunications regulatory agency. Yet, the physical layout was open 
and the space well-lit, an unusual feature for Government offices in India, which are more likely to have long 
corridors with small rooms on either side, and people scurrying between these rooms in lighting conditions 
that were close to darkness.  
Yet, for some staff, this office and especially its location just outside Ring Road was not appropriate. Like the 
Beltway, people inside the Ring Road, in an area called Lutyen‘s Delhi after the British architect who designed 
it, rule over India. The President‘s Palace, the Prime Minister‘s Office, the Supreme Court, and Parliament are 
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all located inside it, as were seemingly all of the Central Government‘s ministries and most of its agencies. 
Those who live and work inside the Ring Road are likely to be senior bureaucrats, ministers, and 
parliamentarians. 
Some at TRAI saw the office location outside of Ring Road as a marker of the agency being on the ‗outside‘ 
of the traditional power structures of Government. However, for others, it being outside of Ring Road made 
a difference to the way the agency functioned and thought. As one industry analyst later told me, TRAI‘s 
―distance‖ from the traditional power structures that regulated the telecommunications industry was what 
gave it the ability to approach regulation differently. Rather than be constrained by the past, the regulator was 
―forward-looking‖ and did not care much for the vested interests that had managed to control the industry 
for so long. 
In his study, Streeter (1996) also discusses the physical element in the position of interpretive community. 
Specifically, Streeter labels the community as being ―inside the Beltway,‖ (chap. 4) referring to the highway 
that surrounds the Washington metropolitan area. Taken literally, the people ‗inside‘ the Beltway include the 
poor and working class residents of Washington, DC who have little impact on broadcasting policy. Streeter ‘s 
focus, however, is on the institutions involved in and the perspective of the people working on U.S. 
broadcasting policy. This group of individuals spends at least some of their time physically located inside the 
Beltway, attending meetings, working in offices, and making presentations at conferences. Importantly, 
however, being ―inside‖ refers to accepting a specific way of thinking; in Streeter‘s argument, it means 
accepting the inevitability of a corporate liberalist model of broadcast television and thinking about and 
making policy based on that model. It is possible to suggest that being ―inside‖ means being part of a field 
that has corporate liberalism as its organizing principle; those on the ―inside‖ sometimes tolerate but usually 
exclude from debate and procedure those who do not accept this principle. Consequently, a physical 
location—even if loosely defined—has strong associations with a processual characteristic.  
In 2006 then, TRAI not only existed physically outside of the Ring Road, but also had individuals working 
there that made a conscious attempt to differentiate themselves from those on the ‗inside‘ of Ring Road. 
Those on the inside, mainly the babus, had ideas and operated in fields that these individuals at TRAI were 
unwilling to accept. In terms of symbolism, if nothing else, then, the address TRAI had at the time suggested 
that the agency was ‗outside‘ of the control of the babus. This attitude, the being able to claim TRAI‘s location 
outside of Ring Road, became apparent in the discussions that began around the selection of a new site for 
TRAI‘s office in late 2006.  
98 
 
TRAI had to think about relocation because of a revival of zoning rules in New Delhi. Safdarjung Enclave, 
being a residential area, was off limits to any non-commercial property owner or tenant (I refer to this in 
Chapter 6). Anticipating the enforcement of these zoning rules by the municipality, the Authority began to 
consider options. 
A very strong contender for location was an area in far South Delhi where the agency could acquire a large 
plot of land and build not only a custom office space, but also set up residential facilities for its staff.* This 
plot of land, as one senior staffer told me, had to be developed from scratch and offered TRAI an 
opportunity to build a ―world-class‖ facility. It offered TRAI an opportunity, this staffer believed, to show 
how the organization was ―different‖ from other government organizations. The problem with this plan was 
timing; police action to support the zoning rules enforcement in November 2006 required TRAI to move 
ahead with its backup option: an office that occupied three floors of a building owned by MTNL Delhi. Not 
very happy with this, one mid-level staffer commented to me at the time that he was ―disappointed‖ that 
TRAI had not selected this other location, even further away from Ring Road. Rather, the agency was ―going 
back where we have to sit in the same building as the people we should be regulating.‖ What was unsaid is 
that this would co-locate TRAI with MTNL, risking the differentiating strategy the regulator had adopted. He 
was not alone in this; throughout the organization others also voiced similar concerns. Some were more 
practical—the new office was off the bus route for one staffer, for example—but many were more direct. 
One mid-level staffer even joked that MTNL would not have to try very hard to hear about what TRAI staff 
were doing; another mid-level staffer said that the MTNL building looked like something out of ―the 50s‖ 
and was a ―horribly designed‖ structure that looked like a ―government office.‖  
This physical description of TRAI is thus important as a starting point for a theme that will tie much of this 
study together. TRAI is able to ward off threats from the babus, this theme suggests, because it is different from 
them. TRAI staff try to display this difference through physical means: choosing a location outside Ring 
Road, having an open floor plan, or thinking about building a ‗world class‘ business facility. For TRAI to 
relocate to a building populated by MTNL staff, many of them the babus that the regulatory agency might 
have struggled against, was a problematic concession of the regulator‘s independence. In regulatory life, 
location, especially as a marker of difference, seems to have had an important role to play in the making of an 
independent agency. 
                                                   
* Indian government organizations tend to provide free or subsidized housing to their employees.  
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The Organization of TRAI 
As per the TRAI Act, the Government of India is supposed to appoint five people to constitute the 
Authority. Two of these members are ‗part-time‘ members—typically accomplished academics or retired 
officials—and the remaining, headed by the Chairman, were full-time members. The members can be 
appointed from amongst persons who ―have special knowledge of, and professional experience in 
telecommunication, industry, finance, accountancy, law, management or consumer affairs‖ (Government of 
India, 1997, clause 4(a)). Formally, the Cabinet Committee on Appointments appoints the Members in 
consultation with the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. As a result, even in a formal 
sense, TRAI is not fully insulated from the political environment at the federal level.  
People working in the arena were aware of the political undertones of appointments to TRAI. There was 
intense competition among senior, often close-to-retiring bureaucrats to become TRAI Chairperson. Within 
TRAI itself, the attitude of some of my informants was that the appointment process was something out of 
their control. Hence, they felt that they were better off accepting the results of a process that could last a few 
months. In any case, most of the staff at TRAI had worked in other civil service jobs and they were used to 
working with and for people with whom they did not get along. In the worst case, as one mid-level staffer 
explained to me, they had to lay low for three years, the period of the Authority‘s appointment.  
Below the Authority in the formal hierarchy were the Advisors. The Advisors were senior bureaucrats drawn 
from one or the other civil service stream. For example, many Advisors in technical positions were from the 
DoT. Some Advisors came from the Indian Railway Service, which also operated a national 
telecommunications network, and from the Indian Economic or Revenue Services. There was also a 
Secretary, equivalent to a chief executive officer for TRAI, who handled daily administrative matters and 
coordinated meetings, discussions, and acted somewhat as a chief of staff to the Authority and especially the 
Chairman. The Advisors and Secretary were usually in the late forties or early fifties in age and had spent well 
over 15 to 20 years in the public service. 
The Advisors and Authority were the decision-makers at TRAI. For TRAI staffers and for other actors in the 
arena alike, these two sets of individuals formed the core of the regulatory agency. If they could be convinced 
about a regulatory or policy issue, it would happen. The Advisors and Authority members were thus the focus 
of much of the lobbying efforts of the various telecommunications firms and their industry associations. They 
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also were the formal groups in whose names the regulatory agency made its decisions and released various 
documents. 
Other than the Authority and Advisors, there were a number of employees at TRAI, taking the total number 
of staff to about 120 at the time. The Advisors headed different Divisions, and had below them mid-level 
staff including Joint or Deputy Advisors—their roles were similar, but they had different salary structures—
and Senior Research Officers. Finally the lower levels of TRAI‘s technical staff consisted of Technical 
Officers, Section Officers, and finally Assistants. There were also, like any self-respecting Indian Government 
agency, a group of drivers, cleaners, and office peons. Figure 1 shows the organizational structure of TRAI. 
 
Figure 1: Formal organizational structure of TRAI. 
Apart from this formal organizational structure, like any bureaucracy, there were some Deputy or Joint 
Advisors who were sidelined for a variety of reasons and some Assistants with significant informal or 
alternative sources of power. For instance, one Assistant was an active member and organizer for a labor 
union and wielded sufficient power with lower level staff and could thus get others to listen to him and oblige 
him with information and complete tasks for him.  
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Unexpectedly for me, TRAI staff seemed to worked harder than what I expected from Government 
employees. Many were at their desks by 9 A.M. in the morning and worked until 6 P.M. or in some cases, 
later. Some even came in on Saturday during periods of high activity or stayed late to complete their work 
even after others had left to go home on weekdays. Some of the mid-level staff complained about having little 
time to spend with their children during the week or (especially the female staffers) about the difficulty in 
managing housework and their professional work. At one point, one of the mid-level staffers exclaimed, upon 
being asked to come into work on Saturday, that he had never had to work so hard in his more than 10-year 
career with the Government. All of this was quite surprising to me because like most Indians and especially 
Bombayites, I had the opinion that Government officials were lazy as opposed to hard working individuals.  
Individuals working at the lower end of the hierarchy were more likely to be less busy and engaged in petty 
struggles with other lower-level employees. It was common, for instance, for lower level TRAI staffers to 
complain to me about how another lower level staffer had been promoted out of turn (usually over them), or 
about how their lives were all about managing their families. These individuals had very specific 
responsibilities, usually of an administrative and non-technical nature. But they had a place within the broader 
social hierarchy; they did not aspire to be senior staff or technical experts even, just to arrive at 9 A.M. and 
leave at 5 P.M. every day, earn a decent salary, secure lifetime employment and its substantial benefits and 
pensions.  
Mid-level staffers were the group where one began to see signs of ambition. Not surprisingly, these 
individuals were well educated, typically in some technical subject such as engineering, law, or economics. 
Most of them had opinions of how telecommunications regulation should work and would work closely with 
specific senior staff. This group would participate regularly in regulatory proceedings, but had limited 
decision-making power. If an individual was persuasive, had in-depth knowledge of a particular topic (e.g., 
spectrum policy, broadband), or had a professional network that allowed them access to information, then 
that individual would be able to influence decisions made by senior staff; but it would be the senior staff who 
would make decisions.  
An interesting feature among the individuals in this group was that gender seemed to be correlated with 
membership and ambition; female staffers were common among lower-levels of staff, but there were fewer 
ladies in the mid-level (and almost none among the senior staff). This is unsurprising for those familiar with 
the traditional notions of the role of women in Indian society: women are ‗supposed‘ to be ‗housewives,‘ 
taking care of the in-laws and children, sacrificing their professional careers and rejecting career progress in 
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order to manage their households. Some of the mid-level female staff at TRAI would regularly state that they 
were planning to leave the office by ―5:30pm latest‖ because they had to get back to their homes and prepare 
dinner for their families. This had the effect of limiting the ambitiousness of female staff, especially at the 
mid-level.* 
The mid-level staffers were also the ones who were engaged in the greatest amount of professional struggles. 
For them, acceptance of a policy proposal or getting to help resolve a regulatory dispute was the path to 
career progress. These staffers would thus be eager to build professional relationships with senior staff, seek 
to support senior staff in their work, and create a positive social impression with supervisors. At the same 
time, they would depend on relationships with other mid-level staff to shore up support and sideline 
competitors. In some cases, the competition would take on a personal flavor. On hearing that one of his 
competitors was promoted ahead of him, one mid-level staffer somehow secured a copy of the promotion 
letter and carried it around in his pocket to show anyone (including me) who was ready to sympathize. He 
discarded the letter only when he moved to another government agency at a higher position. 
The senior staff, consisting of the highest-ranking TRAI officials—the Authority and Advisors, would 
complain about their struggles against political interference in regulatory practice, against misbehaving service 
providers, and with having to deal with troublesome bureaucrats in other agencies. I describe this important 
group subsequently. 
There was a clear segregation of responsibility: lower and typically mid-level staff were seldom involved in the 
major decision-making discussions about regulation. As I describe later, their views were sought in internal 
discussions, but this long-standing and implied segregation meant that free discussion was somewhat 
circumscribed; views that contradicted senior staff were rarely put forward. 
This pattern of social organization has also meant that much of the image of the regulatory agency among 
other individuals in the arena has been shaped by the characteristics of the small group of senior officials that 
have worked at TRAI during its existence. Again, it is important to recognize that exceptions to this pattern 
                                                   
* Interestingly, female bureaucrats, once they reach senior status, would be in a much better position to manage personal 
and professional duties simultaneously. A senior bureaucrat (irrespective of gender) would be entitled to a small army of 
servants, cooks, and chauffeurs. This actually creates an incentive for women to try to rise to the top of the professional 
hierarchy. However, the power of tradition would lead many mid-level, competent female bureaucrats to delay or 
prevent a rise in the ranks. They would be eager to avoid being labeled by relatives or their peer group as ‗career minded‘ 
at the cost of their families.  
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exist. A few mid-level staffers would publicly challenge decisions by seniors, especially when these mid-level 
staffers were more experienced, had deep technical expertise, or some other adjusting advantage. In one case 
at least, one mid-level staffer would get away with challenging his organizational seniors because he was older 
in age than most of the senior staff; social norms demand respect for one‘s elders, even if one disagrees with 
them.  
Regulatory Life at TRAI 
TRAI was an active place. Staffers would be walking around going to meet colleagues, their superiors, going 
to lunch, going to have afternoon tea. Visitors were common; many of the employees of the various 
telecommunications firms would come to meet officials at TRAI, chat with lower-level staff trying to get 
some sense of the latest gossip, making presentations to the Authority on new technologies, services, or 
regulatory issues. 
Listening in on the various conversations, one finds various ongoing work-related discussions about some 
letter or memorandum, debating whether one or the other rule applies to a problem at hand, or about setting 
up meetings and getting permissions from superiors. One also hears personal conversations going on: people 
complaining about problems at home, people gossiping about job promotions, discussions about pensions 
and benefits, or simply talk about the newest movies, jewelry, or the high price of onions.  
It was possible to see various aspects of regulatory life by listening to, and through my interactions with and 
observations of regulatory staffers at TRAI. In this section, I focus on two aspects of regulatory life that are 
important to understand how staffers work within TRAI. I will describe a day in the life of a senior staffer 
and various meetings at TRAI. 
A day in the life. This section uses a composite of multiple senior staffers at TRAI to depict a 
typical day at the regulatory agency. It will show how this regulatory staffer has the ability to make important 
policy and regulatory decisions and plays an active role in making and maintaining TRAI‘s position in the 
arena. A composite character is used to reduce the possibility of inadvertently describing activities that may be 
tied to a specific individual; events have also been reordered to fit a compressed timeline. 
*** 
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A senior staffer at TRAI, Mr. X, typically arrives to work at about 9 A.M. Workdays are Monday to Friday, 
and officially continue until about 5 P.M., when most of the middle- and lower-level staff would head home. 
With few exceptions, all the official business would be conducted during these hours. 
Mr. X lives at some distance from the office and has to leave his home by 8 AM to have enough time in case 
of a major traffic jam. However, traffic jams do not bother Mr. X too much; sitting in an air-conditioned 
chauffeur-driven car, he is able to browse through at least some of the many files that he usually takes home 
with him.  
The car is a symbol of Mr. X‘s status in society. It is paid for by the office, and has a decal with the words 
―Government of India‖ or ―Bharat Sarkar‖ (the Hindi name of the Government, but written in English) on 
the back of the vehicle. Inevitably, Government cars are white in color, although of late civil servants and 
politicians can choose other colors. If Mr. X is of the highest level in the civil service, his car will have a red 
beacon light or colloquially, laal batti, on its roof.  
The laal batti is the ultimate status symbol in India. Only those individuals who are elected officials, or in the 
most senior levels of the civil service get to put a laal batti on their cars. The laal batti signifies that one has 
arrived, that the person in the back of the car wields great influence in the political sphere or controls 
significant resources of the state. Having a laal batti means few police officers will dare to stop you for traffic 
violations; indeed, up to a certain level in that hierarchy, the police officer must salute a laal batti. The laal batti 
is such a powerful symbol that gangsters and terrorists have used cars with fake laal battis on them to access 
and attack their opponents and Parliament house (Devasia, 2010); they are able to get through complex 
security arrangements just because of the unquestioning acceptance of the laal batti as a symbol of power and 
state authority in Indian society.  
Coming back to Mr. X, he reaches TRAI‘s building and promptly makes his way to his office. His office peon* 
seeing that Mr. X has arrived, rushes downstairs to the car to pick up his briefcase, the stack of files, and any 
other items that he thinks Mr. X might want. On his way to this office, Mr. X is greeted by almost everyone 
he sees in the corridor. His subordinates will greet him with a ―good morning, Sir‖ and stand up from their 
chairs as he walks by. Some of the staff, especially the security guards will salute him. Mr. X is used to this. As 
                                                   
* About 15 peons, or office boys, work at TRAI and assist staffers in various odd jobs such as carrying files, getting them 
water, tea, or snack for visitors. 
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a member of one of India‘s national civil service cadres, he has been saluted and greeted with deference since 
the time he started working at his first posting.  
Reaching his office, Mr. X gets behind his desk and turns on his computer. The computer has become 
ubiquitous at TRAI; everyone who has a desk has a computer. This includes everyone other than the peons, 
who might get to use someone else‘s computer after the person has left for the day, or who has a friend with 
a computer at their desk that gives them access.*  
For Mr. X, however, his computer serves as a means to access email, surf the Internet looking for news 
related to his work or related to his political or personal interests. Whenever Mr. X has a question on recent 
developments related to some regulatory issue he is dealing with, he either emails his contacts for information 
or ‗Googles‘ the terms he thinks will get him to that information. Mr. X also receives a number of bulletins 
from industry analysts, consultants, and firms that include press releases and information on recent 
developments. Mr. X believes that TRAI is outstanding in how it approaches regulatory issues and especially 
in how its staffers‘ international connections with experts in the public and private sectors and in academia 
give it access to the best knowledge. Accessing and getting information on emerging technical and regulatory 
issues through these professional networks showed off TRAI as a successful regulatory agency in a successful 
telecommunications market. 
The computer is also how Mr. X does some of the writing related to the documents he prepares. However, 
Mr. X does not type much of his official correspondence. Instead, he calls in his personal secretary who is 
typically a certified stenographer, able to transcribe his thoughts into typewritten text on a typewriter (rare) 
and typically on a computer.  
This reliance on his stenographer often creates more work for Mr. X. Most of the secretarial staff have 
middling skills in English and make a number of errors in spelling or grammar, or in many cases, simply 
mishear and mistype technical words. Interestingly, though, Mr. X does not see this as a problem always; he 
often uses the need to review the typewritten text as an opportunity to edit his thoughts and language.  
                                                   
* A curious pastime among some of the peons was to open Microsoft Word, the word processing software, and take 
printouts of their names in English using different fonts and sizes, or using different effects. They explained that they 
liked to see their names printed in this manner. 
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But the most regular form of writing for Mr. X is what is known as notings. Notings in files are the formal 
and official text inscribed into the official files of the Government. Notings are key elements in the working 
of the Government of India. Every issue, topic, program, or policy decision begins with the appropriate 
person initiating a file. This person then makes a noting in that file that could either be a question, proposal, 
reference to an attached letter, or some other inscription, to the next stop in the bureaucracy. The receiver 
reads the noting and makes his own noting; this could be a reply, forward, or approval or rejection depending 
on the receiver‘s role and position and his views. Thus begins the chain of notings and the movement of files 
that form the fundamental process by which the Government of India works. These files had a cardboard 
backing, held down by the green sheets of paper with notings on them and tied with a thick red ribbon (a 
literal red tape). 
As the notings increase, new pages are added to the front of the file, creating a historical record and an 
attendant mechanism (even if difficult to search through) of institutional memory making. Hence, the files are 
thick or thin depending on the history associated with the issue. I remember hearing about one very 
interesting case of history associated with a file. At one civil servant‘s first posting overseeing the 
administration of an agricultural community, he was tasked with having to resolve a land dispute between two 
individuals. This officer requested and got a very thick file. As he read back to the end of the file, he began to 
see notings made more than a century before by his British predecessors, ultimately finding a piece of 
evidence from some decades-old document attached to a noting that helped him resolve the dispute. 
Yet most Indians see the ‗file‘ as a symbol of the slow and unfriendly nature of the Indian government. 
Nothing in Government happens without a file and the appropriate noting, and everything that happens 
should be traced back to some or the other file or noting. In the days of the license-quota-permit raj, 
bureaucrats would hold files for months or years to extract bribes from those interested in getting these files 
to move. Since economic liberalization in the 1990s, the importance of the bureaucrats has reduced, but files 
remain the main mode of official communication within the Government. 
Mr. X typically has a new stack of files to read on his desk in the in-tray every day. Some are 
straightforward—requests for leave, changes to administrative procedures, a notice that his pay was 
increased—and some are complex with long histories and significant implications. Some files are marked 
―urgent‖ some ―Parliament Question,‖ which are the most critical; these are files originating from Parliament 
through DoT asking for inputs from TRAI on some questions that have been raised by Members of 
107 
 
Parliament. Those files always get looked at first and are typically returned to DoT within a matter of hours. 
Other files might have to wait days.  
Reading through these files takes up most of Mr. X‘s day. Inevitably, other tasks—meetings, phone calls, 
lunch—distract him from clearing up the files for the day and he has to take those he feels are urgent home, 
reading them on his way home in traffic, or on the way back the next day. In some cases, when TRAI staffers 
feel that an issue is too urgent or important to let it lie in a stack of files, they will walk over with the file 
(rather than handing it to the peon to take over) and make sure the recipient both reads and reacts to the issue 
that file addresses. 
At TRAI, an interesting feature of files is that they tend to focus on documenting official communication. 
When any staffer receives formal letters, she or he staples it to the green sheet of paper in the right file (or 
opens a new file), makes a noting, and sends it to the appropriate person. If they have to send out formal 
letters, a copy of that letter is also recorded in a noting. 
Apart from looking at files, Mr. X could be working on larger projects with specific outputs that he is 
responsible to the Chairperson or Members for. In this category of work are included all the policy and 
regulatory topics on which TRAI deliberates and releases official statements, recommendations, and 
decisions. Much of this work happens through face-to-face discussions. Only when decisions were made and 
documents prepared did they go on to the file. 
Much of the internal deliberation and debate about policy and regulatory issues happens face-to-face, not on 
the file. This cuts down the time for communication and has resulted in TRAI gaining a reputation among 
others in the arena as an agency that moves faster than most Government organizations. For example, on a 
typical day, whenever Mr. X needs to discuss a policy or regulatory topic, not a ‗routine‘ issue, he walks over 
or calls in—depending on the relative position of the other person—the person whom he needs to discuss 
that topic with. Mr. X can afford to do this because he works in an organization of 150 people, where such 
discussions would likely happen among about 30 of those people (the technical staff and his superiors). In 
some cases, he makes a telephone call, but this is infrequent; someone‘s secretary could be eavesdropping on 
a sensitive issue.  
For Mr. X, this ability to work with a small group of people is an important differentiator from the babus. The 
babus have to work in a very formal and controlled environment. While they can resort to informal 
108 
 
communications to discuss policy issues, they have to record everything they do in files and this slows down 
their working. It also has the effect of keeping the babus conservative, according to some of the senior staff at 
TRAI; people are less willing to take risks if they have to write an explanation based on which they might be 
investigated or pulled up later.  
Consequently, one of the most important type of events in the daily life of Mr. X was meetings. These were 
opportunities for staffers to get together, discuss ideas, argue, disagree, convince, and decide. Meetings 
happened all the time at TRAI, among senior staffers and their subordinates, between TRAI staffers and 
representatives of industry groups and private firms, among the Members and the Chairperson. I describe the 
various types of meetings in the next section. Let it suffice to say here that for Mr. X, the openness within 
TRAI made all the difference in how the agency functioned. It was not the case that everyone had something 
interesting to say, but that they all had the opportunity to say something interesting. The ability to engage 
across professional levels and discuss any of the important decisions he was making within the organization 
assured Mr. X that any decision he did make was thought through and well argued. 
By 6 P.M., most of his staff would have left to go home. Unlike Mr. X, they did not have chauffeur-driven 
cars and had to leave earlier to reach home at respectable hours and spend some time with their families. The 
senior staff would stay until much later, depending on the workload. When the agenda was less crowded, 
senior staff would usually head home about 6 P.M., while there were instances when work was very busy and 
they would stay until even 9 or 10 P.M. If things became too busy senior staff and in some cases mid-level 
staff would also come in to the office on the weekend. 
At the end of each workday, Mr. X would get up from his desk and begin his walk down the stairs. A peon—
the group would rotate amongst themselves to balance out late evening shifts—would carry his stack of 
remaining files, his briefcase, and other items back into his car. Most of the staff had left by now, and TRAI 
would wear a deserted look. Lights would be off in most offices and some of the divisions ‘ wings. Stepping 
out in to the New Delhi evening, in some cases, the only other time he would have a chance to be outside the 
office, Mr. X would wish the lone security guard good night, get into his car, and ask his driver to take him 
home. 
*** 
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This description of Mr. X‘s daily routine suggests some elements of how he and his colleagues in the agency 
think about what they do. They believe that they are different from the babus in their approach to thinking 
about technical matters, in how they engage with each other and with other entities in the arena, and in how 
they manage their agency. Reaching out to external expertise and sources of knowledge, the use of internal 
discussion to strengthen decisions, and the ability to work quickly through informal means rather than being 
tied down by traditional techniques of file-based debate, all of these were important practices within TRAI 
that made it different to work in than say DoT. Again, this differentiation hints at how TRAI sees its position 
within the arena, and provides us with some clues of how this differentiation might be acquired and 
maintained. 
Meetings. I could distinguish three kinds of meetings at TRAI. The first and most common were 
small internal meetings, which would happen among two to four TRAI staff and be focused on discussing 
some specific issue or question or even be a baat cheet session. The work-related meetings would also serve to 
support progress in thinking about some regulatory topic, and I participated in anything from one to five 
such meetings daily, depending on the pace of work. There were cases where such small meetings would also 
include an external individual, such as a representative of a telecommunications firm or a consultant, who 
sought to discuss some specific issue with TRAI staffers. However, meetings with outsiders and only one 
TRAI staffer were often discouraged to prevent the impression of ‗back room‘ dealings between TRAI staff 
and outsiders. Senior staffers were of the opinion that no TRAI staffer should meet with an industry 
representative alone anywhere; it would hurt the impression of transparent and fair dealings of the regulator 
with all actors in the arena. 
The second type was larger internal meetings, often including one of the Members or multiple senior staffers. 
Such meetings would usually happen between once and thrice a week, again depending on the level of work 
and the need for middle-level or a senior staffer to discuss an issue or get guidance from the Authority. These 
meetings would be more formal and typically of one hour‘s duration or even longer, depending on the 
number of issues that had to be addressed. Along with the third kind of meeting, this type was typically 
organized on the fourth floor of the building, in the Chairperson‘s conference room. 
The third activity was external meetings, which were when TRAI staffers—typically including at least one or 
two senior staff and a number of the middle-level staff—would meet with industry representatives, 
consultants, or academics to discuss any regulatory topic of interest. These meetings would usually include a 
presentation followed by a discussion among attendees. Such meetings became very common during the time 
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when staff would be preparing policy documents or regulatory instruments, as these meetings were seen as a 
way to engage with stakeholders and validate or question approaches and methodologies. During my 
fieldwork, I attended about 20 such meetings.  
These meetings would happen on the fourth floor in the conference room next to the Chairman‘s office. This 
room was one of the larger rooms in the building, and was the same size as and connected to the Chairman‘s 
office (Government rules define office sizes), both being divided by a separating wall made of wood. The 
Chairman would call for these discussions to get feedback from all the Advisors on an important issue or 
question. Meetings I attended focused on important topics such as the reserve price of spectrum for auctions, 
the development of recommendations on spectrum allocation, or the preparation for consultations on hot-
button issues such as mobile number portability or tackling unsolicited telemarketing calls. 
All the Advisors, and in many cases staff such as Deputy Advisors and other Officers, would come to the 
room a few minutes before-hand and sit down around the large wooden table in the center of the room. A 
few minutes of chitchat would follow as people settled down, and then, the Authority would enter, usually the 
three of them together or in close succession, in which case the Chairman would come in last.  
Discussions would begin with the concerned Advisor making a presentation on the issue at hand and 
proposed responses or results of work. In most cases, discussions and debates would begin as the 
presentation progressed and the concerned Advisor would make her or his presentation. In many cases, the 
Chairman and members would also interject with their own comments. But what was most interesting was a 
regular ―what do you think‖ posed to the mid-level or even junior members of the staff by the Chairman. In 
some cases, these staffers would also chime in, especially when the issue at hand was being covered by them, 
or if they had a question or comment related to the discussion. 
One of the senior staffers promised me that this was an unusual set up. ―Here even a [junior] level staffer can 
question the Chairman. I have rarely seen this elsewhere.‖ Another senior member of the staff made another 
comment, explaining that TRAI was different and hence more successful than other agencies because while 
they depended on a few high level staff to think and act, at TRAI, even the junior staffers were part of the 
process. 
And the junior staff recognized this unusual set up. It was not unusual for one of TRAI‘s chairpersons to 
stop by Advisors‘ offices in the evenings to discuss specific issues of his interest. Another chairperson would 
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have regular meetings with a cross section of staff. Both of these behaviors were appreciated by staff who 
were happy to be able to see the chairpersons at work, but more importantly, mixing with staff at all levels. 
―He comes to our floor!‖ one staffer once told me. 
While meetings served a substantive purpose, that is, they directly contributed to the content of decisions 
made at TRAI, they also served a symbolic purpose. Recognizing that the openness of senior bureaucrats to 
engage in debate with their subordinates was unusual, a number of TRAI staff saw this as a key differentiating 
point with the babus. As one explained, the babus rarely engaged in anything close to an open discussion on 
policy issues. ―Over there,‖ this mid-level staffer explained, ―it‘s all about secrecy.‖ 
From the perspective of the representatives of the telecommunications firms as well, TRAI‘s willingness to 
engage with them and discuss technical and regulatory issues was unusual. They appreciated this openness 
regularly, even as they used the opportunity to forward their own ambitions. As one senior staffer at TRAI 
explained to me, he saw the opportunity to discuss regulatory issues with the telecommunications firms as a 
way to build his own knowledge on this topic. Only someone who might be insecure or scared to expose the 
limits of their knowledge would have shied away from such an opportunity. 
This is not to suggest that there were no differences in opinion about these interactions. Some of the senior 
staffers were not as forthcoming in discussing regulatory issues with the representatives of 
telecommunications firms. Others were less enthusiastic about having their own subordinates participate in 
internal meetings where the Chairman or Members were present. But there were a group of senior staff at the 
time of my fieldwork who were of the opinion that open debate and discussion were the best approaches 
either to get superior decisions or to have an excuse if things went wrong. These senior staff would require 
that internal codes of procedure be followed—using the ordering power of these rules—and would ask these 
unwilling individuals to open up the key regulatory and policy issues for discussion at meetings with the 
Authority. Consequently, even these dissenters were forced to open their work up to debate at least some of 
the time. 
All of these meetings and the very style of regulatory life at TRAI were attempts by staffers to strategically 
differentiate themselves from the babus. Even if their perception of the babus was skewed, each of these 
actions and events was meant in some way to reinforce specific ideas about TRAI. For instance, regular 
meetings with external participants would show how TRAI was transparent in its working. The aversion to 
one-on-one meetings with external actors was explained as a way to display transparency but also fairness. 
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Hence, these ideas had been made into habits and rituals among TRAI staff, suggesting attempts by these 
staffers to position TRAI in a specific way within the arena. As we will see, such attempts at positioning and 
strategic differentiation continue into the ways TRAI would conduct its regulatory proceedings. 
Work Flow and Regulatory Proceedings 
According to its formal mandate, TRAI has two functions in the arena. First, it is supposed to provide policy 
recommendations to the DoT on telecommunications issues. Second, it is supposed to make and enforce 
regulations. From this formalist perspective, TRAI‘s role seems well defined and obvious. But from the 
perspective of regulatory life, the situation in practice is much more complex. 
To begin with, TRAI‘s powers are heavily circumscribed by the Act. For one, the agency cannot enforce 
regulations directly; it has to write to the DoT to ask it to enforce a regulation on the regulator‘s behalf. This 
awkward extra step is needed because DoT retains a legal role as the licensing authority, and is hence 
responsible for any interventions involving licensed telecommunications companies. A second limitation 
arises from DoT‘s ability to ignore policy recommendations from TRAI. One Chairman, increasingly upset 
that DoT was ignoring TRAI‘s recommendations, ordered his staff to prepare and publish a list of 
unaccepted recommendations with the intention of forcing DoT to move quicker (TRAI, 2005). Until 2000, 
TRAI had the formal power to intervene in disputes, but this too has been removed from TRAI and awarded 
to another agency, TDSAT. 
There is one area where TRAI has direct and formal power. This area is the regulation of telecommunications 
tariffs. The Authority can issue orders asking service providers to increase or reduce the prices of 
telecommunications services in line with the economic and financial analysis that TRAI‘s staff undertake. 
Here too, however, enforcement is through DoT.*  
                                                   
* Such analysis is initiated when a service provider seeks to offer an entirely new type of tariff plan (e.g., when the first 
―free telephone calls at night‖ plan was introduced), and is conducted by the Economics division of TRAI. The analysis 
might also be initiated at the request of the DoT or minister, or through calls in the press that tariffs are too high or 
there is evidence that tariffs could go lower. In either case, the objective of this analysis is to ensure that tariff plans are 
not predatory in nature, that is, they are abusing market dominance or implicit cross-subsidization in a manner that hurts 
competitive service provision by other firms. An analysis of this aspect of regulatory life at TRAI would be interesting, 
but is out of the scope of this study. 
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In a situation where TRAI‘s formal power in the arena is typically mediated through another agency, the 
regulatory agency has had to create opportunities to define its role. Interestingly, even as staffers at TRAI 
used elements of its formal power for this purpose, it has relied on creating fields of influence and attempted 
to make these fields permanent by continuously reasserting its relevance in the arena. Put another way, if 
TRAI had somehow not been continuously relevant to other actors in the arena, it would not have lasted as 
long. 
The objective of this study is to understand the different processes through which the agency made and 
maintained these fields and through them, its relevance. Much of what follows in the subsequent chapters has 
to do with how staffers at TRAI have used regulatory proceedings to reassert its relevance. To understand 
these activities, it is useful to describe a regulatory proceeding here, allowing us to identify some of the 
elements of how the regulatory staffers constructed independence at TRAI.  
Initiation. Regulatory proceedings at TRAI have a variety of starting points, but two broad 
categories exist. The first is where DoT asks TRAI for its recommendations on some issue through a formal 
letter. The second is where TRAI decides an issue is important enough to warrant the agency‘s action. 
Typically, staffers said that they could detect what issues would be coming up for discussion. Some topics, 
such as rural telecommunications and the expansion of Internet services were recurring topics that DoT and 
TRAI were both interested in working on. Other topics such as high-speed mobile data services (so-called 
third generation or 3G networks) were high profile and built up a crescendo in the media that these 
regulatory staffers would sense as markers of an impending query or file-initiation. 
More regularly, however, these staffers explained that for proceedings that were initiated by TRAI suo moto, 
the triggers took on many forms. In the case of technological innovations that needed some regulatory 
intervention, a telecommunications firm that sought TRAI‘s formal advice on their planned service provided 
the trigger. The firm would make a presentation to staffers at TRAI and ask them about whether TRAI could 
do something to clarify regulations or policies related to the ideas that they had. The formal ability to initiate 
suo moto regulatory proceedings did give the staff at TRAI the ability to insert the agency into the arena on a 
range of topics. Yet, it was clear that TRAI staff used this ability sparingly; it is not clear why, but likely due to 
the risk of being seen as too active and reducing the value of the agency‘s attention to an idea. 
In many cases, staffers would begin to see patterns emerge in complaint letters received at TRAI. Letters 
addressed to the agency would be directed by a staffer to the relevant division and within the division to staff 
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members associated with the topic of the letter. This allowed staffers to understand if there were issues that 
needed to be addressed. Inevitably, the topics most touched upon by these letters would relate to problems 
subscribers had with respect to tariff structures or with respect to quality of service problems (including 
customer service standards). 
In some other cases, the Authority members would begin to hear through their own professional networks of 
issues that were gaining momentum. For example, in late 2006, the number of people receiving unsolicited 
telemarketing calls seemed to have increased drastically. This led to a movement of different groups to solve 
the problem: there was a bill proposed in Parliament, consumer activists began to file cases in various courts, 
and activist-lawyers began to suggest that they would file public interest litigations* to protect their privacy. 
According to one mid-level staffer, the Chairman began to hear that TRAI had been slow to respond to the 
issue. This is what immediately led him to constitute a team to work on the topic of unsolicited telemarketing 
calls. 
Inputs. The individuals working on a specific regulatory proceeding would seek out inputs to help 
them make their decisions. The key inputs to a regulatory proceeding at TRAI included formal written 
responses to TRAI‘s consultation papers—oral comments made at ‗open house discussions‘ and in 
presentations to staffers—and other inputs made to individual staffers at various forums. In addition, TRAI 
staffers had a habit of searching on the Internet, through their professional networks, and in the library for 
materials that could assist them in understanding the regulatory issue. 
The most important and interesting aspect of input seeking at TRAI was the consultation proceeding. 
‗Consultation‘ was the cornerstone of TRAI‘s approach to making its decisions. Almost every informant 
would repeat at various points that consultation was the only way they could understand all sides of a 
regulatory or policy issue and make a decision that best achieved the intended goals. 
The consultation procedures included three stages. First, after identifying a specific topic on which the agency 
wished to work on, a team of staffers in the relevant division would prepare a consultation paper, under the 
supervision of the Advisor. This paper would typically have three sections: a description of the problem, 
                                                   
* Indian courts do not require that only a directly aggrieved party should file a case in court. Recognizing the limitations 
for many people in accessing courts, Indian courts have accepted everything from formal letters to telegrams to initiate 
public interest litigation where the people can call the Government to court to answer for broad policy or programmatic 
failures, or for perceived harm to someone‘s rights (Desai & Mahabal, 2007).  
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some description on the various possible approaches to solve the problem along with a description of 
international approaches, and finally a listing of questions on which the team and broadly speaking, the 
Authority sought inputs from respondents outside of TRAI. 
The consultation paper would be discussed internally, with much debate among staffers on various possible 
approaches, international practices, and the list of questions. Depending on the topic, there would also be 
questions about whether the issue is something TRAI was able to address, or if it was something out of the 
purview of the regulator‘s mandate. 
Once the consultation paper was vetted internally and after the Authority approved its release, the concerned 
Advisor would publish the paper. The release of every consultation paper would be accompanied by a press 
release sent to all of the national newspapers. For consultation papers on high profile topics (e.g., spectrum 
policy or telemarketing), television and newspaper reporters would approach the Authority for additional 
information and in some cases, interviews on the subject. 
Each consultation paper had a window for anyone to submit written comments on the paper and specific 
questions posed in that paper. After this window had closed, the responsible team would compile these 
responses and circulate them to all the Advisors and the Authority. They would also organize a second stage 
in the consultation: the open house discussion. 
The open house discussion was an opportunity for anyone to attend a public forum at which time the 
Authority would pose questions and ask participants to respond. Typically, the participants at the open house 
sessions would include a well-defined group of representatives from the telecommunications firms, their 
industry lobbies, the babus representing MTNL and BSNL (though not DoT), and in many cases, consumer 
groups or activists especially when the matter was linked with some consumer-welfare issue. The discussion 
would be recorded on audiotape and transcribed, with the oral submissions becoming part of the discussions 
within TRAI. 
The final part of the consultation procedure comprised of smaller meetings and discussions among TRAI 
staff—typically at the Authority or Advisor level—and representatives of various groups engaged in the topic. 
These discussions would include slide presentations to TRAI staff on why one or the other view was better or 
worse, and usually include discussions among the participants where, in the smaller group, TRAI staffers 
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would often pose direct questions and get down to specifics. Meetings would be called either by TRAI staff 
or requested by those participating in the consultation. 
Throughout the consultation procedures, the effort at TRAI was as much to glean content as it was to make a 
symbolic point. In their content, consultations were not always fruitful in drawing out some new information 
or clarifying what solution might work best. However, in their symbolism, these consultations were an 
excellent opportunity for the agency to display how it had a transparent and open approach to making 
important policy and regulatory decisions.  
This symbolism had two purposes: (1) it established TRAI as a place where various parties could feel like they 
got a fair hearing in an open environment—TRAI was made relevant to interested parties; and (2) it 
differentiated TRAI from the babus, who were widely perceived among the representatives of the private 
telecommunications firms and by industry analysts to be opaque and highly politicized in their decision 
making.  
In its effort to carve out a space for itself, TRAI was thus using the consultation procedures as a ritual to keep 
its field stable. The babus could not offer such an environment to these respondents, and the respondents 
wanted to be able to influence policy recommendations or regulations. TRAI was able to make its field 
permanent, interestingly using ideas and approaches—transparency and openness in its decision-making—
that barely figures in its formal mandate.* 
Thinking. After the consultation was completed, TRAI staffers faced the task of thinking about 
what they had to do. Much of this study is focused on this stage, where the ways in which TRAI staffers‘ 
thinking about specific regulatory and policy decisions is described and analyzed. Not wishing to duplicate 
these sections, I only mention here that in the making of decisions, TRAI had, at the end of its consultation 
process, a number of competing, conflicting, and in many cases, equally valid proposals.  
These proposals included not only the interpretation of law, but also the reasons for why TRAI should make 
specific changes to existing regulatory frameworks, and logic for how some scientific facts might be more 
correct than others. A TRAI staffer who was making decisions was thus not making decisions in some 
                                                   
* Clause 11 (4) requires that ―The Authority shall ensure transparency while exercising its powers and discharging its 
functions,‖ (Government of India, 1997, Chap. 3, 11(4)). There is no other mention of the idea of transparency. 
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neutral, apolitical environment; each decision was a choice among various options, each with its own political 
and social ideas and implications to support or harm it. 
Keeping in mind the theme of the making and maintenance of regulatory independence, one might imagine 
how these decisions may have been tied back to desires within TRAI to ensure the continued relevance and 
to secure the position of the agency. 
Outputs. At the end of the deliberative process, TRAI would produce its outputs. In the case of 
policy recommendations or regulatory proceedings, the outputs would be documents of different types. 
These documents were called ‗recommendations‘ by my informants when they were meant for the babus to 
read and act upon. Recommendations also usually included proposals to amend Government policies, 
licensing conditions, or specific decisions the babus might have made in the past. 
In the case of regulatory outputs, there were a range of documents that TRAI staff prepared. The first were 
‗tariff orders.‘ As their name suggests, tariff orders focused on instructing service providers to adjust their 
tariff structures per the instructions therein, although their enforcement was through DoT. The second type 
was ‗regulations.‘ These were new rules produced through the regulatory proceeding that became part of the 
overall legal framework for telecommunications. Regulations had the force of law, although these depended 
on the TRAI Act for their power. The final type of output was ‗directions.‘ These were instructions to the 
licensed service providers, directing them to perform specific tasks using the TRAI Act and in some cases the 
licenses as a basis for the instructions.  
In each case, these regulatory outputs relied on some other legal instrument for their power. While tariff 
orders were enforced through the license condition that required firms to adhere to TRAI‘s setting of tariffs, 
regulations were enforced based on the clauses of the TRAI Act, and directions were dependent on the TRAI 
Act and the licenses. TRAI‘s direct power over the firms in the arena was thus limited in a formal sense; 
much depended on their adherence to broader legal instruments. 
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Inevitably, these outputs were some type of paper documents.* They were rich in symbolism. They had the 
Government seal on their cover, or were published (as in the case of orders or directions) in the 
Government‘s official Gazette. They included references to the TRAI Act, the Telegraph Act, or other laws. 
They included references to the consultation as a means to support the decisions taken. They would include 
information on international practices to show how TRAI was either keeping up with or ahead of ‗best 
practice.‘  
Every document out of TRAI was, in its form, content, and procedure, part of a larger effort among the 
staffers of the agency to prove their relevance in the arena, to show off why TRAI should be around, and to 
maintain their position against challenges from other actors. 
Constructing Independence at TRAI 
The description in this chapter begins to show how staffers at TRAI go about their work but also how in 
performing these tasks, they are simultaneously making choices about how they represent themselves, their 
work, and their agency. We have begun to see some of the elements in the choices of how these staffers have 
attempted to define the regulator field.  
In terms of fields, the staffers at TRAI have somehow managed to take what might have been a provisional 
field around the regulatory agency in 1997 and make that into a seemingly permanent field that covers many 
of the entities within the arena. Specifically, there are behaviors and ways of thinking that these individuals 
use to define and maintain this field around the regulatory agency. Through these behaviors and ways of 
thinking, the staffers at TRAI are engaged in the construction of regulatory independence.  
Let us begin by identifying some elements of the processual characteristic at TRAI. For one, the field has the 
ability to order behavior among (at least some of the key) staff at the agency. Many of the Nehruvian 
capitalist characteristic played a role in this. For example, one of the powerful ideas that orders much of the 
behavior in this field is ‗transparency.‘ Many of my informants were proud of the fact that their agency was 
transparent in its working. To maintain this transparency, staff at TRAI would engage in the procedures 
                                                   
* There are other outputs from TRAI, such as reports on market data and statistics, survey results on the quality of 
services, reports on new technologies and case studies. While these outputs are interesting to analyze, their production 
was not part of the scope of my fieldwork and hence I do not discuss them here. 
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around consultation, as described above. I propose that consultation has become a necessary ritual; 
inhabitants of the arena that did not participate in the consultation and support the regulatory agency in 
reinforcing its position faced the prospect of being labeled as ‗non-transparent‘ or worse still, be suspected of 
attempting underhand dealings with the babus. Even if a participant might not have believed in the usefulness 
of the consultation, then she or he will participate at least to avoid being put in an uncomfortable social 
position within the arena. 
But ‗transparency‘ goes beyond organizing behavior in the arena through its rituals around consultation. It 
also supports the idea that the agency is relevant to the other entities in the arena. The private firms come to 
TRAI for assistance because they are not sure of getting a fair hearing among the babus. The babus come to 
TRAI to sort out problems among private firms because these firms will otherwise blame the babus for 
decisions that seem to favor one or the other firm. In being transparent then, the individuals at TRAI are 
strategically differentiating themselves from the babus.  
Like any field, though, there were holdouts within the organization that likely did not subscribe to the 
transparency/difference formula to justify TRAI‘s existence. I did not observe any overt dissent within the 
agency on this issue, but heard during some of my various baat cheet sessions of staffers that were not 
comfortable with defying the babus. 
Interestingly, however, these individuals were no longer at TRAI. This might have been the effect of staffers 
being polite and not calling out specific individuals for their dissent, but it is important to clarify that I did not 
observe any dissenters during my time at TRAI. If there were disagreements, it was on specifics of policy or 
regulatory decisions that could not reflect a fear of the babus. At least one of the serious dissenters had left 
TRAI quickly from what I understood, much before his tenure at TRAI needed to have ended. In this way, 
TRAI‘s staff might have exhibited the classical mechanism of exclusion, or its threat, to induce compliance 
with ordering principles such as ‗transparency.‘  
This chapter has also described that control over decision-making was concentrated in the highest levels of 
officials at TRAI. As Nehruvian capitalists would, decisions were argued and debated within the Authority 
and between the Authority and Advisors. Mid-level staff had some say into specific decisions, but typically 
restricted their role as pointing out flaws or advantages in specific approaches rather than pronouncing 
specific policy or regulatory positions. 
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Such a segregation of roles was also possible because of the clear organizational hierarchies that existed 
coupled with social norms that required respect for one‘s elders or for those with advanced educational 
degrees. The senior staff are typically much older than the rest of the staff and especially the mid-level 
staffers; similarly, the Authority members are typically retired or close-to-retirement bureaucrats in the early 
60s, while the rest of the staff would range in age from the mid 20s to late 50s. 
This concentration of power over decision-making and the relatively much higher profile of the senior staff 
allowed this group to define much of TRAI‘s image in the media, among other actors in the arena, and 
among the babus. As Chapter 6 will show, the perception among TRAI staff in 2006 was that the actions of 
TRAI‘s first Chairman in 1997 helped set the stage for TRAI‘s continued relevance in the arena. It might well 
have been that this Chairman was working under the advice and guidance of others; it might have been that 
the Chairman single-handedly did define the regulator‘s agenda. But in either case, his prime position in the 
organization made him the focus of the story whether he was its lone author or not. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that although TRAI exists in a legal and physical sense, the staffers at TRAI are 
continuously engaged in the construction of independence at TRAI. Their position in the arena as an 
independent agency is not secure; they have to struggle against the babus and assert their relevance 
continuously to escape the fate of the Telecom Commission. In the account that follows, I provide details 
about how staffers at TRAI were continuously engaged in the definition of their role, using the various 
opportunities afforded to them by the events in the arena, their outputs and decisions, and their behavior to 
assert and protect their position in the arena. In doing so, this study will show how ideas such as transparency 
and the manner of decision-making at TRAI helped the agency in defining a role for itself, and in making and 
maintaining its regulatory independence. To begin this account, the next Chapter will focus on the initial 
period of TRAI‘s creation.  
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Chapter 6. Defining the Regulator‟s Role 
November 8, 2006 began with me getting to the TRAI office as usual and working with my colleagues on a 
consultation paper related to unsolicited telemarketing calls. However, this was no ordinary day for many 
Delhiites.  
A few days before, India‘s Supreme Court had ordered the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) to 
remove all commercial establishments from residential areas in New Delhi. That day, the MCD began to ‗seal‘ 
all the offending offices and shops. Violence was expected from those Delhiites whose shops were to be 
closed; for them, the sealing drive meant losing their livelihoods and they were not going to give in so easily. 
A number of traders unions had already rioted against sealing. Protests against an earlier sealing drive had 
resulted in the deaths of four people. The state government called in the Delhi Police and the Central Reserve 
Police Force (CRPF, a paramilitary security agency) to protect MCD officials as they began the sealing 
process that November day.  
As the day progressed, rumors spread among staff that TRAI‘s office, which was located in the residential 
area of the posh New Delhi neighborhood of Safdarjung Enclave, would be sealed. Some dismissed these 
rumors assuming that the MCD would not seal a Government office filled with senior Government officials. 
Others were less certain, and began to watch as the street outside began to fill up with police and CRPF jeeps 
and personnel. 
Then, at about 3 P.M., just as I was finishing a telephone call with a colleague, a CRPF officer armed with an 
assault rifle stormed into my room and shouted at me that the building was to be sealed and I had only 15 
minutes to leave. I was downstairs in about 5 minutes, greeted by a mass of confused TRAI staffers who had 
spilt onto the street waiting for someone to tell them what they should do. 
―Should I go home?‖ asked one, while another was concerned that all of the office‘s files still remained in the 
now-sealed building. Referring to how TRAI was sealed despite being a Government office, one mid-level 
staffer commented in Hindi: ―this is just another example of how we are a washerman‘s dog, no one cares 
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about us.‖ The washerman‘s dog, a Hindi proverb says, belongs to neither the washerman‘s home nor his 
workplace.* 
The traditional account of the creation of regulatory agencies suggests that an agency is created and functions 
when a legislature or government defines its powers and role through an act of law. However, the comment 
from this irritated staffer at TRAI suggests that even nine years after its creation, the regulatory agency, like 
the proverbial washerman‘s dog, still had an unsettled position.  
In an immediate sense, the fact that the MCD could seal, would dare to seal, TRAI‘s office—the only 
Government agency office sealed as part of this drive and that too on its first day—was proof to this irritated 
staffer that the regulator was not in the position to prevent or at least delay this embarrassing situation.  
Furthermore, according to this staffer, sealing had implications for his interactions with others in the 
regulatory environment. Particularly, this episode was an embarrassment for him—it would weaken his 
position in relation to those that he was meant to have ordering power over. It meant that neither he nor his 
supervisor was powerful enough to hold off the municipal officers.  
Yet, he admitted that it was ―impossible‖ to go against this order from the Supreme Court. Doing so would 
be contempt of court. It would also not be good form for TRAI officials to challenge the Supreme Court, a 
body they would often depend on to impose regulatory decisions and rules over the arena. And as it was for 
me (as I guess it might have been for him), confrontation with MCD officials, who were at that moment 
represented by a battalion of armed CRPF officers, was not a practical option. 
All of this meant that through these happenings, which seemingly had with nothing to do with 
telecommunications regulation, the power and position of TRAI officials was being redefined in multiple 
ways, including in the arena of Indian telecommunications. There were at least two overlapping fields at work 
that day. First, the regulator had to listen to the municipal rules and could not offer resistance because the 
MCD had behind it an order from the Supreme Court, a rule-making body on which the regulator depended 
for its regulatory functions. As this staffer was indicating, it was ‗impossible‘ to upset that relationship, never 
mind that doing so would attract its own legal punishment (contempt of court). And second, there was a 
                                                   
* In Hindi, the proverb is rendered as ―Dhobi ka kutta na ghar ka na ghaat ka.‖ 
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terrain of power and influence between the regulatory agency and those it regulated, and somehow, this too 
was disturbed by the sealing.  
Consequently, even as this irritated staffer was complaining about his superiors‘ inability to influence the 
MCD to prevent the sealing of their offices, he was simultaneously disclosing one of the most interesting 
characteristics of this group of individuals at TRAI: that they were constantly struggling to define their 
position within the arena. Every incident—even those that were seemingly disconnected from their regulatory 
functions—was an opportunity to gain or loose ground in that struggle. 
Like many other episodes this study narrates, this episode had implications across multiple fields and 
demonstrated that the influence and position of the individuals working at a regulatory agency could never be 
taken for granted. Rather influence and position were forever shifting due to the actions of multiple actors 
operating across fields. 
The legislature may have awarded the individuals working at TRAI a formal set of powers and a position 
within the arena, but this has limited effect on actual political and social positions. Overlapping fields 
operating through the individuals within the arena were constantly shifting and indicated a continuing 
struggle, leading to an interesting and complex kaleidoscope of situations in regulatory life. In some cases, 
unexpected fields would enter the arena at the insistence of some group of individuals and have an effect on 
the position of the regulatory agency. What is especially interesting in the reaction of the TRAI staffer is that 
the effect of actions in one field—the interactions between TRAI and MCD officials—have implications for 
other fields, such as in the interactions in the regulatory field between TRAI officials and the representatives 
of service providers. In this case, the irritated TRAI staffer held that the enforcement of municipal zoning 
rules supported by the Supreme Court may have realigned relationships among individuals working on 
telecommunications regulation.  
The reaction of this TRAI staffer to the sealing of the Safdarjung Enclave office thus indicates an important 
feature of the regulator‘s position within the arena: that it is open to renegotiation at each interaction within 
that arena. At the same time, such renegotiation takes place with respect to broadly stable ideas and 
individuals in broadly stable roles. 
In such a case, the award by a legislature of a formal regulatory mandate is only one piece of the puzzle of the 
making of a regulatory agency. Adjustments and provisional fields ensure that this formal mandate does not 
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guarantee the regulator‘s position within the arena. Rather, every transaction creates an opportunity for the 
renegotiation of the position of the agency and the people working within it. At the same time, the regulatory 
staffers have some characteristics and powers that limit the range of possible alternatives. The formal 
mandate does count for something, as does the staffer‘s political or professional connections. Put another 
way, it is possible to renegotiate the regulator‘s mandate within the bounds imposed by multiple social and 
political fields. 
This episode forms a useful starting point for the core of this study. This and the next two chapters will focus 
on the various ways in which TRAI staffers have struggled to establish their position in the arena of Indian 
telecommunications. This chapter will focus most directly on the definition of the regulatory mandate. 
The Shifting Sands of the Regulatory Mandate 
The relationship between a new regulatory agency and incumbents within the arena is a complicated one. It is 
useful to review some of the non-anthropological literature on the definition of the regulatory mandate to 
position this chapter. Formally, the regulator‘s powers reside in the formal mandate, typically an act of law 
that defines the agency‘s functions and duties. The definition of the mandate is part of the process creating 
the agency. The mandate develops when the legislature, usually the body that sets up the legal framework for 
the regulator, develops an enabling legislation and delegates some of its own powers to the agency. The list of 
functions and powers delegated are supposed to become the regulator‘s mandate (Richards, 2002).  
This law also asks that incumbent actors in the arena should obey the instructions of a new entity. In Indian 
telecommunications, as Chapter 3 shows, in spite of liberalization in the early 1990s, DoT had retained its 
powerful position, a continuation of the time when it was a monolith controlling every aspect of the arena. 
This is similar to many other countries where liberalization precedes privatization and state-owned 
corporations continue to exist even as competitors enter the industry and in most cases, regulators are created 
to take over some of the responsibilities of the erstwhile monolith. As with any effort to break up a 
monolithic entity, this one also leads to disputes among the various actors, particularly between the regulator 
and the incumbent. 
A conservative view dictates that the regulator will stick to that formal list of functions and not experiment 
beyond them. Yet, experience shows that mandates are open to interpretation and that regulators 
consequently do not stick within a narrow interpretation of their mandate (Croley, 1998). One view, held by 
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public choice theorists, is that regulators use the freedom from close oversight—what political economists 
have termed ―slack‖—to benefit themselves and the regulated industry directly or indirectly (Barro, 1973). 
Another view, held by the new public choice theorists, is that a ‗Burkean regulator‘ will use this freedom to 
serve its own notion of the public interest (Levine & Forrence, 1990).  
However, in most cases, the regulator cannot exercise its mandate without constraint for two reasons. In his 
analysis of the creation and operation of regulatory agencies, Horwitz (1989) suggests that the regulatory 
mandate is quickly constrained by internal and external factors. He writes that the operation of a regulatory 
agency is ―not unrelated to the mandate‖ but ―is a separate issue, resting upon complexes of organizational 
behavior and institutional constraints‖ (Horwitz, p. 23). Horwitz writes that ―regulatory agencies are a new 
institution of political power,‖ and that ―they are situated within a terrain of power in which they are just one 
player‖ (p. 83).  
The first constraint on the regulator‘s exercise of its mandate is external, when it faces entrenched interest 
groups and gets into litigation to determine the scope of its powers (Bernstein, 1955, 79-86). Facing such 
opposition, the agency undergoes what Bernstein terms devitalization where it quiets down and attempts to 
avoid any confrontation with regulated firms. The agency might revitalize if a crisis develops or if some set of 
actors cause it to (―The pragmatic-administrative approach,‖ n.d.). 
The second constraint, as Horwitz (1989) suggests is internal. He explains that regulatory agencies are given 
―few clear guidelines‖ beyond ―vague and general proscriptions‖ such as the directive to regulate ―in the 
public interest‖ (p. 83). In the case of the FCC, which is Horwitz‘s focus, he finds that the agency had a 
―broad, but vague mandate,‖ that reflected the inability of the legislature to deal with complex and changing 
industries such as communication. However, instead of pursuing this mandate vigorously, the ―FCC 
interpreted its abstract public interest mandate pragmatically and conservatively‖ (p. 193).  
This ―pragmatic and conservative‖ approach may have been due to the thinking of some FCC 
Commissioners. Horwitz suggests that the Commissioners‘ attitudes ―reflected the institutional situation 
within which the agency operated.‖ It was ―an organizational adaptation to the many constraints the agency 
continually faced,‖ a result of the ―combination of a vague mandate and strong institutional constraints,‖ 
(Horwitz, 1989, p. 193) which included a well-established industry that was working well before the 
Commission came into existence.  
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This writing suggests that the formal definition of the mandate is only the beginning of a series of 
renegotiations on the regulator‘s actual position within the arena. It might seem that, at least in some cases, 
the individuals working at a regulatory agency might enter the arena armed with a law that awards them 
significant power, but are then completely constrained in their actions or unable to perform these functions 
because of political and social constraints.  
Yet, it is also possible that these individuals‘ positions within the arena are constantly shifting under the 
influence of various fields. How might this happen? What are the implications for our understanding of the 
regulatory mandate? This chapter will now answer these two questions based on the ethnography of 
telecommunications regulatory in India. 
At its creation in February 1997, the regulatory agency known as TRAI was an entity defined by an act of 
parliament. Importantly, this act defined a new set of roles in the arena, most importantly, that of the 
‗Authority‘. This formal definition of the role of the Authority included a number of duties and functions, 
and importantly, implied that the force of law should bind other individuals within the arena to listen to the 
Authority in those matters. The law thus formally created a space within which these other individuals—the 
targets of regulation—ought to be included. The literature on regulation refers to this as the competence and 
jurisdiction of the regulator, and this literature expects that such a definition would order the behavior of the 
targets of regulation completely. Put another way, there is an expectation that such a definition would 
regularize the reach and powers of the Authority. 
The definition of the Authority‘s position was much messier than this account suggests, however. As Chapter 
3 explained, the formal definition of the role and position of the Authority were themselves the subject of 
intense negotiation within the state between incumbent actors such as the babus, operators, international 
organizations, and political figures.  
Almost immediately after the first Authority assumed its position, it began staking out their agency‘s position 
and asserting their power to make and apply rules, directly challenging the primacy of the babus within the 
arena. This led to a confrontation between the Authority—led by the Chairman—and the babus, focusing on 
whether the Authority had the mandate to launch this challenge. Different groups aligned with one or the 
other side depending on how that served their own interests. The following section focuses on this series of 
events, looking at the initial few years of TRAI‘s existence and at how the position of the Authority within 
the arena shifted as various actors struggled against each to gain or re-gain their positions. 
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Respect the Regulator 
Almost immediately after TRAI came into existence, it was faced with a choice about how it should define its 
role in the arena. In a story that is folklore among the staff at TRAI, the then Chairman of TRAI chose to 
stand up against the DoT and its babus. This story, now reproduced here from accounts gathered in the field, 
provides us useful insights about how a regulatory agency might define its role. 
Licensing questions. In 1997, soon after Justice S. S. Sodhi took over as the first Chairman of the 
newly created TRAI, MTNL announced its intention to start mobile telephone services in Delhi and Bombay. 
As a state-controlled firm, the Government had the right to amend MTNL‘s license as it deemed fit. The 
bosses of India‘s private mobile telephone companies approached the Authority seeking relief against this 
action by the babus.  
The bosses complained that MTNL‘s entry into mobile telephone services was a problem for them in more 
than a few ways. First, they were interested in retaining the duopoly market structure, something they and 
their shareholders had paid significant license fees to secure just a few years before.  
Second, MTNL‘s entry into this cozy duopoly in two of India‘s richest markets, they complained, also came at 
a time when these firms‘ financial positions were precarious. According to the bosses, MTNL‘s entry would 
bankrupt them. MTNL was planning to offer mobile telephone services at cheaper prices. MTNL could do 
this, they claimed, because it owned prime real estate in both cities and could easily build towers on its 
exchanges. Moreover, since most subscribers were on MTNL‘s fixed telephone network, it would not have to 
pay the high interconnection fees set for mobile telephone calls, allowing it to keep most of its revenues. 
Finally, since it was a government undertaking, it did not have to pay the high license fees as the private 
companies had.* 
Most of the people who worked at TRAI in 1997 had left the agency by the time of my fieldwork. Yet, this 
story remains as folklore. What follows—the reaction of the Chairman to these bosses—ranked among a 
number of my interlocutors as a key event that defined the role of TRAI in the arena.  
                                                   
* The Cellular Operators Association of India, a lobby group consisting of the private firms, said at the time that these 
firms would be ―put at a serious disadvantage and would be totally annihilated by the entry of MTNL with its financial 
clout, vast infrastructure of telephone exchanges and transmission network‖ (―Indian private,‖ 1997).  
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According to the account from my interlocutors, the Chairman had two choices. He could either support the 
bosses against the babus or defer to the Government‘s decision to allow MTNL into the mobile telephony 
business. It is important to pause here to reflect on this choice. 
As the analytical framework proposed in this study suggests, an individual is part of multiple fields, and is 
subject to regularizing forces from each field, while also being able to make an adjustment by deferring to 
another field. In the case at hand, the Chairman was at a point of intersection of multiple fields that included 
among others the babus and the bosses. The Chairman had a choice because of an ambiguity in rules. He had 
the power as TRAI Chairman to recommend the need and timing of new service providers. At the same time, 
he was bound by the clause in the Indian Telegraph Act (to which any action in the arena is also subject) 
which gave the Government of India (and by extension its representatives the babus) the power to authorize 
any service provider. 
The fact that there was a choice to be made among rules was a manifestation of a choice the Chairman had 
between two fields. On the one hand was the field of the babus; choosing to stay silent on this issue would 
have meant that the Chairman and TRAI had subjected themselves to being limited in their competency 
when it came to the babus‘ decisions. On the other hand was the field that the Chairman wanted to create for 
his regulatory agency; by choosing to confront the babus, TRAI would be positioning itself as an agency that 
could and would rule over the arena including the babus. 
Per the account from multiple TRAI staffers, the Chairman chose to side with the bosses and challenge 
MTNL. The explanation from one senior staffer at TRAI for this choice was simple: if the Chairman had let 
MTNL go on unchallenged, it would mean that TRAI‘s presence had no effect on the babus‘ ability to do as 
they please. As this senior staffer explained, ―TRAI stood up to DoT on this. This was most important. It 
determined the future of the market and showed that TRAI would stand up to ensure a level playing field for 
new operators.‖  
―There was no other way to project this seriously,‖ he continued, ―without challenging DoT.‖ He explained 
that it was essential this entry happened in a manner consistent with the ―level playing-field and that it 
protects the interests of private investors who had invested a large amount of money but were still close to 
failure.‖ His simple and elegant summary: ―It was what we had to do if TRAI was to have a role in the 
market.‖  
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Defining a role. When faced with a situation where multiple ordering fields might apply, individuals 
make choices about which field they use. Understanding rule application under such ambiguous situations is 
critical to understanding the politics of regulation. The Chairman was not breaking the law for his personal 
benefit; rather he was exploiting the ambiguity in the situation to assert his position by referring to ideas that 
would have far reaching consequences for Indian telecommunications. 
As Moore (1978) writes, citing Gluckman, ―judges must choose among norms, some of them conflicting, 
many of them vague and ambiguous, and must decide which to apply to the case before them‖ (p. 211). 
These decisions are not always purely driven by self-interest, although that might play a role. Rather, these 
decisions also depend on how the judge perceives his role within a particular social and political context 
(Moore; Rosen, 1989).  
What might have influenced the Chairman‘s decision? From my interlocutor‘s elegant summary, one 
possibility is apparent: the bosses had presented the Chairman an opportunity to assert his position within the 
arena, and he took it, notwithstanding the considerations about which rules applied ‗more.‘ The Chairman 
was looking to assert his position within the arena. He did not want to be subsumed by the babus, and here 
was a choice between allowing business-as-usual or showing everyone who cared that the regulator had a 
meaningful role in the arena. 
Furthermore, as Moore suggests, his understanding of his role in the complex political and social landscape of 
the telecommunications arena might have been a determining factor. I did not have a chance to meet with 
Mr. Sodhi during my fieldwork, although I did have the opportunity to hear about him from the TRAI 
staffers that I did observe and interview. To understand Mr. Sodhi‘s thinking at the time, I switch briefly to 
his recorded statements in the press.  
Two specific ideas stand out in illuminating how Mr. Sodhi might have seen his role in Indian 
telecommunications. The first of these was a desire to assure investors to enable the greatest possible inflow 
of private and foreign investments into the industry. The second was a desire to ensure a ‗level-playing field‘ 
for all companies. These two ideas also help explain the possible reasons for why Mr. Sodhi chose to 
confront the babus. 
„Investor confidence‟. Soon after taking on the job of Chairman, Mr. Sodhi noted that in order for 
the telecommunications sector to grow and for it to have a positive impact on economic growth, there was ―a 
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need for financial resources which the Government alone could not provide. For this, there had to be private 
investment‖ (―TRAI to consolidate,‖ 1997).  
Speaking at a seminar a few months after becoming Chairman, Mr. Sodhi explained how TRAI‘s creation was 
part of the effort to make sure ―all the inputs in ensuring investor confidence are there.‖ Because of this 
effort, he continued, ―The next couple of years will see India rank among the major players in the world [in 
telecommunications]‖ (―Indian telecoms,‖ 1997). 
An important idea that many staff at TRAI even today hold is the sense that India is a unique market with 
significant growth potential that deserves the attention of international investors. Mr. Sodhi was no different. 
At the start of his tenure, he posited that, ―The next couple of years will see India rank among the major 
players in the world. Foreign investors have hailed the establishment of the regulator as a key step in assuring 
investors of a mechanism to ensure fair competition‖ (―Indian telecoms,‖ 1997).  
This attitude did not change. In January 2000, he noted that, ―We have to work to ensure that we get our 
rightful share of global investments‖ (―TRAI chief,‖ 2000). That India should get its ―rightful share‖ of global 
investments signals an assumption that the country deserved a certain level of interest and appropriate 
treatment from foreign investors. 
„Level playing field‟. Alongside his belief that his role was to ensure investor confidence in order 
that Indian telecommunications should attract both private and foreign investors, Mr. Sodhi was also quite 
clear on his role of Chairman as being one where he would have to balance the ‗playing field.‘ Soon after 
MTNL‘s plans to enter mobile telephony were announced, Mr. Sodhi wrote the firm clarifying that TRAI was 
keen to ―ensure a level playing field‖ (Gairola, 1997). In its announcement of the creation of TRAI, the 
Government also made it clear that the regulator ―would be responsible for ensuring a level playing field for 
private enterprises‖ (―Indian Cabinet,‖ 1996).  
These press accounts provide some insight into the Chairman‘s thinking about his role and how that 
influenced his thinking about which choice to make. Notwithstanding the questions about exactly what might 
Mr. Sodhi might have meant by ‗investor confidence‘ and the ‗level playing field‘, it is important to note that 
at least on the face of it both these ideas supported his alignment with the private firms.  
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By confronting the babus, the Chairman made a choice at the time let all the actors in the arena know that 
neither he nor his agency would shy away from going against the established and powerful field of the babus. 
DoT and its subsidiaries‘ interests were no longer more important than the private firms‘ especially after these 
firms were helping India to reach where it should be.  
Glory. Apart from making decisions about licensing based on his views on investor confidence and 
fairness, the Chairman was also likely looking to carve a niche for himself as a powerful regulator. Staffers at 
TRAI, even those who were not with the agency at the time but with DoT and in some cases MTNL, believe 
that the stand the Authority and especially the Chairman Mr. Sodhi took against DoT saved the organization 
from being swallowed by the babus. They believe that if someone else were in that position at the time, the 
bosses might not have found an eager ally who was willing to take on the babus. 
Others shared this belief. ―Respect the regulator,‖ began one newspaper article a few days after TRAI‘s 
decision to put a stay on MTNL‘s entry into mobile telephony, commenting that the order ―has reassured 
private investors that they could take their disputes to a non-partisan body and expect swift and impartial 
justice‖ (―Respect the regulator,‖ 1998). 
It is thus worth considering the motivating factor of glory to be an important factor in the decision making 
process. Looking for a chance to assert his role as a regulator, Mr. Sodhi now had the opportunity to break 
the mold and challenge the babus. 
Mr. Sodhi‘s reputation is still so strong among TRAI staffers that many of them seem to get nostalgic 
speaking of his time at Chairman even though few served under him. It was clear through my fieldwork that 
many TRAI staffers believed that Mr. Sodhi in his capacity as TRAI Chairman was critical to the positioning 
of the regulatory agency as a force to be reckoned with.  
Mr. Sodhi was former Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court—one of the oldest high courts in India, and 
which has jurisdiction over the most populated state in the country. Mr. Sodhi had trained as a barrister-at-
law from Lincolns Inn—considered among most lawyers in the Commonwealth of Nations to be among the 
most prestigious institutions in legal educations—and had worked as a district and sessions judge in the 
northwestern state of Punjab. This was not a personality, my interlocutors felt, who would like to simply give 
in to arbitrary action by the state; a lifetime as a powerful judge would have certainly reinforced this attitude.  
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Such recognition for a powerful but otherwise low profile judge might have been both unnerving and 
inspiring. While I cannot speak about Mr. Sodhi‘s views on this, my interlocutors were, even eight years later, 
inspired by the example he had set for them. Living their lives in quiet bureaucratic positions that rarely attain 
a high profile, being part of an agency that (at least then) was taking risks and standing up against the babus 
was exciting. One would imagine that there is little glory to be gained from a devitalized TRAI in a 
Bernsteinian sense (Bernstein, 1955: Chapter 3).* In stark contrast to the predictable babus, being part of an 
active agency that would find its way into the front pages of major newspapers on a daily basis is exciting.  
The babus fight back. Returning to the ethnographic account, let us now consider what happened 
next in this regulatory episode related to the entry of TRAI into mobile telephony business. In the preceding 
section, we saw how a new entrant into the arena grabbed an important opportunity to assert its role. In 
doing so, the Chairman directly challenged the primacy of the babus over the arena. In appealing to political 
ideas such as investor confidence and the level playing field, the Chairman also brought to his side the 
coercive and organizing power of the private telecommunications firms and their politically well-connected 
bosses as well as key political figures that had some level of control over the bureaucracy and also the babus. 
For many of my interlocutors at TRAI, this was the agency‘s defining moment. It had stood up to the babus, 
but as they expected, faced with this challenge by the Chairman, the babus fought back. Not only did MTNL 
and DoT launch a legal challenge, but the babus began intense lobbying with the Government to curtail the 
powers of TRAI regarding licensing. In order to support their arguments against TRAI, the babus began to 
co-opt the language of TRAI, related to investor confidence and the level playing field. 
A number of mid-level staff who were at TRAI during the time of my fieldwork were, incidentally, working at 
DoT when this episode took place. Consequently, it was possible for me to get a sense of the mood at DoT 
at the time, when these individuals were working among the babus. Many of these ex-babus remembered most 
clearly the legal challenge that DoT mounted against TRAI. But even as they remembered the actual legal 
question—if TRAI had the formal mandate to challenge DoT‘s licensing powers—they spoke of it in 
somewhat different terms. For these ex-babus now at TRAI, the entire episode was about the regulator‘s 
                                                   
* It is useful to note here that Bernstein, writing in the American context, talks about devitalization as the outcome of a 
regulatory agency challenging entrenched and powerful private firms, not a state bureaucracy. This is one example of 
how Indian telecommunications regulation differs from its American version. 
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interference among babus; if DoT had wanted to award MTNL a mobile telephony license, this it should have 
the right to do so.  
It is important to focus on the nuance in this explanation. According to these ex-babus, the dispute between 
DoT and TRAI over the regulator‘s mandate was not one about the appropriate limits of that mandate. 
Rather, it was about TRAI and its Chairman meddling in the affairs of the babus. 
This is evidence of how powerful the babus were, and clearly indicates the hope among its inhabitants that 
somehow, in spite of all the changes happening around them, that they might somehow remain autonomous. 
As they had done before with the Telecom Commission, maybe the babus were hopeful they might also 
swallow this new regulatory agency. TRAI‘s energetic first Chairman and his stand against MTNL‘s licensing 
dashed those hopes. 
Apart from the fact that Mr. Sodhi was interested in defining his mandate within the arena, the other problem 
for the babus was that he was not from among them. If somehow TRAI‘s first Chairman might have been an 
ex-babu or someone from within that field, it might have been possible—through the use of the processual 
characteristics of the field of the babus—to control and push that individual to be less confrontational (or in 
the best case subservient). In this case, not only was Mr. Sodhi from well outside the field of the babus, but he 
was an ex-judge with a reputation for being assertive. It was not possible for the babus to control him ‗from 
within‘ as it were. 
Also of importance no doubt was that others at TRAI were also from outside the field of the babus. The other 
two members of the Authority included one ex-Ambassador who had represented India at the GATT and 
WTO, and soon attracted a group of senior staff that were also from outside the field of the babus, for 
example, entering TRAI from the IAS and other branches of the civil services and from academia. 
Consequently, as my informants hinted, what perturbed the babus was not that the Chairman of TRAI had 
made a decision against their interests, but that there was no direct field of influence through which they 
could be sure this was a one-off episode. And it is interesting that this realization struck them the second time 
that TRAI ruled against DoT. Probably not expecting a repeat—hopeful that TRAI would come under its 
influence?—the babus had not challenged an earlier ruling by TRAI quashing a tariff hike DoT had proposed. 
This second infringement likely suggested to the babus that they could not take TRAI lightly. 
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As things turned out, the babus were able to convince both the courts as well as the political leadership that 
TRAI‘s mandate should be revised to exclude the institution of DoT from its purview. Pressure from the 
powerful labor unions working at BSNL and MTNL also played a role in influencing the Government in 
rethinking whether it was willing to let TRAI have the power to challenge the babus, who were after all also 
the managers responsible for the employment of almost four hundred thousand staff at these state 
corporations.* Within the prevailing political environment—the Government was composed of a leftist 
coalition that depended on the unions for its political survival—they managed to ensure a revision of the 
TRAI Act causing the regulatory agency‘s formal powers to resolve disputes to be granted to a new agency, 
TDSAT.  
Making its presence felt: The regulator and its mandate. What does this episode tell us about 
attempts to define the regulatory mandate? Certainly, the preferences of regulatory staff play a role in it seeks 
to do. The regulator chooses specific paths to follow based on their relationship to ideas and values that order 
not only the arena, but also could involve other powerful players in the process of defining the regulator‘s 
mandate. 
The tussle over mandates centered on the ideas of investor confidence and fairness. If one were looking at 
the formal communications, TRAI‘s decision on the MTNL issue was made based on an interpretation of its 
formal mandate and focused on how DoT should have asked for its recommendations before awarding 
MTNL its mobile telephony license. There is a mention of these ideas in TRAI‘s formal order (―The Telecom 
Regulatory,‖ 1998), but the argument starts and ends with its power to make recommendations on the entry 
of new service providers such as MTNL. Such behavior is typical: judges often use legal rules as a justification 
for decisions while the reasons for that decision are something else, relying not on rules but on political or 
social concepts such as a keenness to shore up one‘s position, ensuring investor confidence in India, and the 
importance of protecting private investors against the babus.  
It is especially interesting to find that the Authority‘s first major confrontation with the babus relied on a logic 
and ideas that had little connection with its formal mandate. It depended on attracting the support of 
powerful businesspersons, political leaders, and maybe international organizations. The Chairman, for his 
part, called upon these ideas because he believed they could get the attention of powerful political actors who 
would support the regulatory agency and help it overcome the powerful forces at play within the arena, 
                                                   
* This is the author‘s estimate based on BSNL, 2003 and MTNL, 2009. 
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namely the babus. The Chairman used these ideas as hooks with which he could leverage power and tame the 
might of the babus. 
Postscript. Even 8 years later after most of the people involved in this episode had left TRAI and 
on to other jobs or retirement (as did Mr. Sodhi in 2000), investor confidence and the level playing field 
remained important ideas to the staff at TRAI.  
At one point during my fieldwork, I was in a meeting with four senior officials to prepare a presentation for 
one of them to deliver in New York. As the youngest member of the group, I prepared a draft PowerPoint 
presentation and took it to the presenter‘s office for a preparatory discussion. 
Delayed by making final touches to the presentation, I reached his door a few minutes after the meeting was 
scheduled to begin. I knocked and opened the door to enter the room where the presenter was sitting at his 
table with three other senior colleagues sitting in front of him across the table. 
They had already begun discussing the presentation, the first international visit for this senior office during 
his time at TRAI. As I pulled up a chair to sit at the left of the table with my laptop computer and 
PowerPoint slides printed out, the presenter began to explain that this was going to be an important 
presentation. The audience was going to be a mixed group of telecommunications professionals and 
executives, investors, technology companies, and the press. Given that TRAI was working on issues that 
would determine the future of the Indian telecommunications sector, the presenter wanted to provide a 
reassurance to the audience that India was ready for investment. 
The importance of appealing to investors did not stop there. After I had run through the presentation, one of 
my senior colleagues mentioned that we should address the questions the moderator of the panel had sent. 
One of these questions was about the worries that India‘s telecommunications firms had low ―EBITDA 
margins.‖ EBITDA, or Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization is a measure of a 
firm‘s profitability and hence an important measure for financial analysts. Low margins meant something was 
wrong. 
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―How does one calculate EBITDA margins?‖ asked another senior colleague, turning to the colleague sitting 
furthest away from me.* As the only person at the table who had a finance background, it was likely natural 
for the table to expect the answer from him. 
―I don‘t know.‖ 
There was a short silence at the table, and my misfortune was that just as the financial expert mentioned that, 
the presenter turned and looked at me with a confused expression. Understanding this to be an expectation 
that I should answer the question, and possibly looking to show off my own training in financial accounting, I 
blurted out, ―divide EBITDA by revenues.‖ 
My response had the room surprised, and I turned to my neighbor—the participant who had posed the 
question—who gave me a slight smile. It was evident from the look on from the look on the face of the 
finance professional, however, that he was not as happy. 
As if to compound the matter, the presenter said, ―I wonder what it means for investor confidence when our 
financial expert does not know that.‖ 
As the private sector has taken hold of Indian telecommunications, controlling 84 percent of the mobile 
telephony subscriptions, for instance, TRAI—eager to show the world how good a job it is still doing—is still 
concerned about investor confidence. 
Fundamental Fissures 
TRAI‘s staff remains concerned about investor confidence partly because the struggle over the regulator‘s 
mandate continues until today. Much of the reason for this continuing struggle is the continuing unresolved 
tension within the state about its appropriate role in the telecommunications industry. As it was in 1997, in 
2006, the babus still sought to remain powerful in regulation and service provision; they were as unwilling to 
give up any power as almost ten years before. 
                                                   
* EBITDA is Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization. It measures a company‘s ―cash earnings 
without accrual accounting, canceling tax-jurisdiction effects, and canceling the effects of different capital structures‖ 
(Wikipedia, 2010a).  
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Yet, the power of the babus had shrunk in some areas, even if they were still powerful in others. For example, 
by 2006, it was clear that the public sector enterprises, MTNL and BSNL, were facing moving towards 
becoming financial unsustainable; the private sector firms had become tremendously powerful financially and 
politically. The bosses of these firms had established themselves as some of the richest and most politically 
connected individuals in the country. Along with TRAI, the babus had to contend with these bosses now. As 
these private firms grew in importance and size, the arguments about investor confidence and fairness thus 
gained further ground and, as I showed in the earlier section, at least remained as important as they were in 
1997. 
The growth of these private firms also came at the expense of the public sector enterprises. MTNL and 
BSNL could not generate the same level of revenues as they had enjoyed up to the 1990s. And many TRAI 
staff saw the public sector firms‘ procurement and network rollout processes as inefficient and slow; this 
limited how quickly the public sector firms could respond to new offers and services from the private firms.*  
In meetings at TRAI, and especially when DoT, BSNL, or MTNL were referred to in the discussion, it was 
common to hear, especially from the senior TRAI staff, many of whom had worked at some point in both 
companies, how the Government should have privatized them long before they had lost their pre-eminent 
positions. Now, as weak state-controlled corporations, BSNL and MTNL were just slaves to their political 
masters, who also controlled the babus.  
Announcements by the Government and especially the minister of political programs that BSNL or MTNL 
had to execute often exposed such sentiment. In one case, at the end of 2006, the Minister of 
Communications announced at a conference that 2007 would be the ‗year of broadband‘ and the BSNL and 
MTNL would be obligated to upgrade all broadband Internet connections while keeping prices the same. 
Leaving the conference, one senior staffer, who had worked at BSNL for about ten years before joining 
TRAI, told me that this was just political and made no business sense. Even though he admitted that the 
increase in speeds would help subscribers, he was of the opinion that such a politically motivated change 
would undermine BSNL‘s long-term viability in the Internet business. ―I wish the company had been 
privatized to prevent such interference,‖ was his closing statement. 
                                                   
* As one example, a tender from BSNL to expand its mobile network capacity to serve up to 93 million new subscribers 
had been progressing slowly since 2008, being cancelled in 2010. In the same period, the private companies had added 
more lines; Bharti Airtel alone had added 76 million subscriptions (―BSNL plans,‖ 2010).  
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There were thus two broad competing visions: the babus sought control over the arena and control over 
service provision, while the Nehruvian capitalists at TRAI sought the minimization of the babu‘s control. The 
continuing competition over these visions ties in with underlying unresolved tensions between two ideas: on 
whether the public sector or the private sector should be primary in India‘s political economy. 
The unquestioned need for private investment. It is useful to note that in the mid 1990s, much 
of the Government (including staff at both TRAI and DoT) agreed that the state did not have the financial 
resources to develop telecommunications to meet its own policy targets. In the 1994 policy, the Government 
set out the target of attaining ―telecommunication for all and telecommunication within the reach of all,‖ 
(DoT, 2002, sec. 2(a)) meaning ―the availability of telephone on demand as early as possible‖ (sec. 2(a)). 
Specific targets included making the telephone available on demand, connecting all villages, and providing 
one public phone for every 500 persons in urban areas, all by 1997 (DoT, sec. 4).  
The DoT, which developed and published this policy, noted, ―the rapid acceleration of telecom services 
visualized above would require supplementing the resources allocated to this sector [by the Government],‖ 
and that ―additional resources required to achieve the revised targets would be well over INR 23,000 crores,‖ 
or US$75 billion in 1994 exchange rates. The policy continues, ―this is beyond the capacity of Government 
funding and internal generation of resources. Private investment and association of the private sector would be 
needed in a big way [emphasis added] to bridge the resource gap‖ (DoT, 2002, section 6).  
As a comment by Mr. Sodhi early on in his tenure suggests, TRAI had also accepted that private investment 
was essential for the growth of the telecommunications sector. In an April 1997 press conference shortly after 
TRAI was set up, Mr. Sodhi explained that: 
…there was a direct link between economic growth and the growth of the telecom sector. It 
was in the interest of the consumer to encourage and facilitate competition. There was also a 
need for financial resources which the Government alone could not provide. For this, there 
had to be private investment (―TRAI to consolidate,‖ 1997). 
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Both TRAI and DoT thus agreed that the non-state investor was integral to telecommunications 
development in India. TRAI‘s Chairman had made his position well known up front: private investment was 
the only way India was going to attain any of its targets related to telecommunications.*  
Similarly, in the run up to its listing on the London Stock Exchange, MTNL‘s CMD had also clarified that the 
company was looking to external financing as a means to improve its network. Indeed, the financing required 
was significant. He commented that the then-in-planning offering ―is only a prelude, and… the equity issue 
will provide only a modicum [emphasis added] of the necessary investment‖ (―MTNL looks,‖ 1997). 
Indeed, that Indian telecommunications—even if it was MTNL—should attract international investors‘ 
attention had become a point of pride for DoT. MTNL‘s CMD explained that the decision to hold MTNL 
back had ―greater implications for future foreign investment in India‖ (―MTNL will,‖ 1997). 
The state versus the state. With the state not having the financial resources to cover this program 
for telecommunications network expansion, and under pressure from industry lobbies and rising demand for 
telecommunications from businesses and individuals, it turned to liberalization to allow private firms into the 
market (Singh, 1989).  
Yet, even after liberalization in 1992, Mody explains that the state sought a ―middle path‖ between state 
control that the babus and DoT-associated unions wanted and the complete privatization that private capital 
sought. She writes: 
The state chose liberalization (competition through new entrants) rather than corporatization 
(separation of its state monopoly into an autonomous corporate entity) or sale of DOT 
assets to private owners (privatization) to accommodate some of the interests of each of the 
interested parties (Mody, 1995, pp. 155-116). As is seen in the foregoing account, the 
adjustment of the state to liberalization was temporary. Soon enough, the private interests of 
the state, manifested in this case as the attempt to maximize the valuation of MTNL in the 
[London Stock Exchange] GDR issue and expand its dominance in telecommunications to 
                                                   
* In the midst of the dispute over its mandate relating to licensing, the Chairman remained sure of this. ―If we need 
investments, we need investor confidence,‖ he told a seminar in December 1997. ―As public investment is limited, 
private investment is crucial to develop infrastructure for which we need a transparent style of functioning,‖ he said 
(―India needs,‖ 1997).  
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mobile telephony, took over any structural reform package put in place to respond to the 
1991 crisis. 
The state remained an important part of the telecommunications sector. But there was no significant revision 
or resolution to the question of what the role of the state versus private capital should be. In the case of 
MTNL‘s licensing, the debate continued between the supporters of state-led capitalists, the babus, and the 
Nehruvian capitalists at TRAI. Even as it allowed private firms into the market, the state also continued its 
own search for capital to support the expansion of the state-controlled networks. The stage was set for a 
conflict of interests between the private and public operators, and through them, between the babus and the 
Nehruvian capitalists. 
The emergence of Nehruvian capitalists. By the time of TRAI‘s creation in 1997, the Telecom 
Commission had been long subdued and assimilated into the DoT structure and there was no means for 
opponents of this consolidation, within or outside the state, to resist the babus. With the entry of TRAI in 
1997, an actor was legislated into existence that claimed it could challenge the babus‟ dominance of the arena. 
TRAI entered the arena and soon became a site where private capital could resist the attempts of state-led 
capitalism. As we have seen, the babus also tried to quash that this new challenger.  
The Chairman‘s attempt to impose on the fields at play within the babus—altering the relationship between 
DoT and MTNL, for instance—and pushing back on behalf of the private firms on attempts of the state-
controlled operator to raise capital did not go down well with these interests. Consequently, as TRAI‘s staff 
began to define their agency‘s mandate and regulate the babus and their concerns, these interests—represented 
by the babus—immediately fought back.  
This struggle over the regulator‘s mandate was thus a debate about whether the telecommunications sector 
should be turned over to the private sector or if the private sector should only remain an investor while the 
state retains responsibility for service provision. Put another way, this struggle over the relationship between 
the state and private capital had implications for how that relationship should shape up in the post-liberalized 
Indian political economy. 
Continuing ambiguities. It is clear from the preceding analysis that there were two opposing views 
about which investors should be protected and confident. TRAI‘s Chairman sought to order activities in the 
arena by calling upon the notion that investors in the private telecommunications firms should feel confident 
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and be assured about the fair regulatory regime. On the other hand, the babus were looking to protect their 
own interests and indirectly those of their associated investors. But the babus were no longer the undisputed 
power in the arena as they were earlier.  
It is useful to point out here the unquestioned importance of private investment among all of these various 
opposing actors within the state. Those fighting over who should provide services did not disagree on these 
ideas: that India deserved to get its share of foreign investments and that private investments were necessary 
to build telecommunications networks. These underlying ideas were unquestioned and even served to order 
much of the struggle between the babus and Nehruvian capitalists; this struggle was more about how private 
investments should support telecommunications networks, not if it should or would.  
Yet, the question of whether the state or private firms should lead in the provision of telecommunications 
services remained unanswered. Even today, the debate continues although the structure of the market has 
entirely shifted to a point where the private firms are dominant; they control more than 75 percent of the 
overall telecommunications market by subscribers.  
One could argue that this question has remained unanswered because it allows some ambiguity for all sides 
including TRAI. The babus and state-controlled enterprises face politically powerful challengers now, and the 
regulatory agency can use this ambiguity to shore up its power and act as a mediator for both sides. At the 
same time, the private sector can escape the responsibility to take over universal telecommunications service 
provision.* And the public sector firms and their employees and principals are happy to know that the means 
for patronage continue to exist. 
This is a major disadvantage for development because it does not assign responsibility for access to 
telecommunications clearly. As I have pointed out above, that private investment is needed for 
telecommunications growth is unquestioned in the Indian arena. In a contradiction, the state and even private 
firms see the continued presence of DoT and the state-controlled telephone companies as a given.  
                                                   
* As much as the private firms might complain about these state corporations, they know that the existence of these state 
corporations is useful as a backstop to their own objectives; they can be assured that the public sector will ‗step in‘ to fill 
the gap that they leave in coverage or service provision. 
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The inevitability of private investment. Is the reliance on private capital for telecommunications 
development inevitable? The Indian political economy underwent a structural shift in 1991, abandoning the 
appearance of a socialist economy or state-led capitalism, and confirming an ongoing silent movement 
towards integration with the global economic system. Accompanying this shift, the Government began a 
major overhaul of the bureaucracy dismantling much of the license-permit-quota raj, and allowing private 
sector participation in most sectors of the economy. Some of the reasons for this shift are recounted in 
Chapter 3, but it is useful to explore the reasons for why encouraging private investment in 
telecommunications became the focus of the babus‘ and regulatory staffers‘ efforts. 
By 1997, India had long emerged from the economic crisis of 1991 and had moved firmly towards opening 
up much of the economy to private sector participation. But while the Indian economy had been growing 
quickly, the global economic situation had been weakened by the Asian financial crises, led by the collapse of 
the South East Asian economies beginning in July 1997. Significantly, some of India‘s most influential private 
telecommunications companies at that time had backing from Hong Kong and Singapore. Furthermore, as 
the Internet bubble was beginning to reach its peak Indian entrepreneurs were likely to be interested in 
ensuring that they should not fall behind others.  
For the babus, who had benefited from the license-quota-permit raj and now faced an uncertain future, the 
interest of private capital—foreign and Indian—in securing new licenses and permits to invest in 
telecommunications was no doubt appealing to them. It was an opportunity for them to take advantage of 
flows of private capital, which seemed to be and were proving to be much larger than any public expenditure 
they had seen. Mody alludes to this in her analysis of Indian telecommunications (Mody, 1995). Writing in 
1995, she focuses on ―changing state-capital relations in telecommunications in India‖ and ―focuses on how 
the state included the interests of particular external and internal forces in restructuring its telecommunication 
sector and how it consolidated its own interests in the process.‖ Mody‘s view is that ―the state is a central 
actor with consolidation interests of its own‖ as it considers the ownership of telecommunications ―between 
members of the ruling triple alliance of state, national capital, and foreign capital‖ (p. 107). 
For the staffers at TRAI, the opening of India‘s telecommunications market and the growth of the private 
sector firms was their surest reason for existence. If Indian telecommunications had remained a state 
controlled sector, TRAI would have not existed, or like the Telecom Commission before it, it would have 
been absorbed soon after its creation. As I explain here, private capital was important to TRAI‘s Chairman as 
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a justification for his agency‘s existence and the bosses of the private telecommunications firms were happy 
to lend their support to TRAI in its efforts to counter the babus‘ attempts to end their duopoly.  
Furthermore, recognizing that the political leadership saw raising foreign investment (and domestic private 
investment) numbers as a political priority, the Chairman was likely keen to do all he could to attract their 
support as well. He did this by projecting TRAI as an agency that could demonstrate India‘s readiness to be a 
safe investment destination. 
The story of defining the regulator‘s mandate and role in the arena thus became all about attracting private 
capital because this topic interested both the babus and TRAI‘s staff as a means to attain their personal 
objectives.  
How Does a Regulator Define its Role? 
In concluding this chapter, it is useful to consider the dispute between MTNL and the private firms as a 
starting point for a discussion on how a regulatory agency might define its role. As the opening of this 
chapter explained, the traditional account explains that the formal mandate is what energizes the regulator 
and gives it the power to rule over the arena. After that, however, interests engage in a tussle with the 
regulator and in some cases devitalize it, while in other cases, might remain in conflict with the regulator, one 
group never fully dominating the arena. 
Here, I consider the observations made through this account of how TRAI attempted to assert its role in the 
arena, defying the powerful babus and positioning itself as a supporter of private investment and fairness. My 
interlocutors believe that the role of the first Chairman, Mr. Sodhi, was critical in this definition. Yet, even 
after he has long moved on, TRAI has managed to hold its own, not being subjugated by the babus even 
though the struggle for dominance continues. In spite of setbacks and challenges, TRAI has avoided the fate 
of the Telecom Commission (see Chapter 3). 
Focusing on why this might be the case, this concluding section focuses on three important features of 
TRAI‘s daily life that provide a clue about why it might yet survive. First, I discuss how TRAI staffers think 
of legal rules as a tool in how they define their mandate. Second, I argue that TRAI has survived as separate 
from, and continues to challenge the babus because it positioned itself in a particular manner and built a 
powerful constituency that supports its continued existence. Third, I find that rituals of regulatory life at 
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TRAI have played a role in ensuring that the regulatory agency is seen as different and meaningful in the 
arena. 
Legal rules as a tool. Noting that TRAI is a regulatory agency with few lawyers amongst its staff, it 
is interesting to find that almost every consultation paper and recommendation report has, almost as the first 
statement, a clear reference to the TRAI Act. This reference provides TRAI‘s official explanation, based on 
the Act, for how it justifies its involvement in some regulatory or policy issue.*  
The importance of this tool to staff at different levels in defining TRAI‘s ability to speak on some issue is 
clear. As one example, one senior staffer once told me about how he had ―memorized Clause 11,‖ referring 
to the section in the TRAI Act on ―Functions of the Authority‖ (Government of India, 1997, chap. III). In 
one case, during a meeting on a contentious policy issue the senior-staffer chairing that meeting turned to a 
mid-level staffer sitting at one corner of the meeting room and asked him, ―which are the applicable clauses?‖ 
To which the staffer replied diligently, referring to his notes, the exact clause numbers and their text. Satisfied 
that TRAI could actually talk about this policy issue, the meeting chair signaled with a nod and an appropriate 
hand gesture that the meeting should continue. 
Working among these individuals, I also learnt the value of knowing Clause 11 well. A few weeks later, I was 
stopped in the hallway of the second-floor of the TRAI office by a mid-level staffer who asked me—in a 
somewhat challenging tone—‖on what basis is TRAI getting involved in the telemarketing issue?‖ To which I 
gave him three reasons from Clause 11—something I had spent some time learning given this task‘s 
importance at TRAI. Satisfied, this staff member said, ―Good… good…‖ and walked off. 
Referring to the Act served as a comforting gesture, assuring TRAI staff that the work they were embarking 
on, like an incantation, was going to protect them from accusations of over-reaching their ―functions.‖ Yet, it 
was clear that the Act served little purpose other than as an opening declaration, at least in the consultation 
papers and recommendations. In the more formal regulatory orders, TRAI‘s lawyers drafted, the language 
                                                   
* For example TRAI‘s (2004) Consultation Paper on growth of telecom services in rural India begins with the statement 
that: ―As per the TRAI ACT, TRAI shall make recommendations, either suo motu or on a request from the licensor, on -- 
measures to facilitate competition and promote efficiency in the operation of telecommunication services so as to 
facilitate growth in such services. -- measures for the development of telecommunication technology and any other 
matter relatable to telecommunication industry in general. Additionally, as per the Act, TRAI has to ensure effective 
compliance of Universal Service Obligation‖ (p. 3). Other documents have similar, if less detailed, statements. 
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throughout tended to be legalistic. Such language was also useful in defending decisions in front of courts or 
Parliament.* 
Yet, as one senior TRAI staffer explained to me during one of our baat cheet sessions, ―The role of the lawyer 
is marginal. Here what matters is the logic of the argument. I would not spend any time trying to get a 
lawyer‘s opinion on what I want to do. I will just put down my argument and send it to him. The lawyer 
serves little purpose other than writing this formally.‖ 
Even as the law played a role, it was not central to the regulatory process. Rather, legal rules were one tool in 
the TRAI staffer‘s toolbox, available to provide protection for the work they were doing and offering them 
some cover against legal challenges to their decisions. A key reason these laws were less important for TRAI 
was that the regulatory agency could not be called to court for its consultation papers or policy 
recommendations; these documents had no official or formal power until the time their findings or proposals 
were translated into actual legal orders or rules by DoT, which remained the implementer of policies.  
More importantly, the regular use of these incantations before TRAI began its proceedings was an indication 
that TRAI was looking to call upon legislative intent and the grant of its formal mandate by Parliament to 
keep DoT and its babus (and possibly others) away, creating a space within which the regulator could take up 
some issue. Talking about the law thus became a ritual at TRAI. A way to call upon a higher power to protect 
TRAI and its staff as they embarked upon the tasks they sought to do; a way to reassert that the regulatory 
agency had the ability to do what it was about to and to impose order on the parties that it would name in the 
proceeding that was to follow. 
Positioning and constituency-building. Apart from the law, what might have defined TRAI‘s role 
in the arena? Based on my fieldwork, I would like to propose that TRAI‘s role was defined not only by formal 
legislation, but by the actions of various individuals—the Chairman, the babus, bosses of the 
telecommunications companies—and through the intervention of various institutions such as the courts, 
DoT, and MTNL. Put another way, TRAI‘s role was open for a process of definition that was not part of the 
                                                   
* As Moore (1978) notes, ―whatever the real reasons for a judicial decision, norms are frequently explicitly cited or 
referred to by implication to support decisions‖ (p. 184). Similarly, if TRAI did not refer to the Act, it could have been 
accused of acting in a discretionary manner and in the worst case find its submissions inadmissible in courts or 
unacceptable to Parliament. But this did not mean that the Act determined the procedure or outcome, only that it played 
a part in allowing both. 
146 
 
genesis of the formal mandate, but rather conducted in terms of specific events and interactions among the 
various actors in the arena. 
It is important to note that even if the formal mandate might have existed, TRAI‘s future in 1997 was far 
from certain. At its creation, there was much excitement about TRAI in the Indian news media, among 
businesspersons, and in the international investor community. Few remembered that the setting up of the 
agency had happened with significant delays, mainly due to the resistance from the babus, who were unwilling 
to let another group take any power away from them.  
Even fewer remembered the ill-fated attempt at constituting the Telecom Commission in 1989 as a 
―semiautonomous policy/regulatory body‖ that would ―take regulatory power away from the DoT‖ (Singh, 
1999, p. 144). Less than a year after its creation, the babus—who had opposed its creation—had subjugated 
the Telecom Commission and it became a mere rubber-stamping body (p. 147). 
The fate of TRAI as a newly founded regulatory agency was uncertain because the babus could easily have 
subjugated it. It is not only a matter of having a powerful individual such as Mr. Sodhi in the Chairman‘s 
position; indeed, Mr. Pitroda, who headed the Telecom Commission with the direct political support of 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, had failed to assert that agency‘s position.  
Rather, the fate of TRAI and the definition of its role in the arena depended on the presence and support of 
other individuals in the arena. For instance, the significant economic and political influence of the bosses of 
the various private telecommunications firms played a role in shoring up TRAI‘s position. And the growing 
excitement about telecommunications in India, coupled with the promise of significant foreign direct 
investment, gave TRAI a high profile in the news media and among political figures who were keenly 
interested in encouraging such investments.  
Following a Nehruvian capitalist approach, TRAI‘s first Chairman also pushed his vision of how India‘s 
telecommunications market should develop. He saw the role of private investors (foreign and domestic) as 
critical to his vision and importantly, might be said to view the bureaucracy—the babus—more as 
troublemakers than help.  
It should not be surprising that the Chairman choose a path aligned with those individuals who would be 
sympathetic to TRAI‘s cause and opposed to the babus. Demonstrating the Nehruvian capitalist approach, he 
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made a strategic decision to secure the support of key individuals in the arena: the bosses of private 
telecommunications firms and key political figures. By involving these individuals in his confrontation with 
the babus, the Chairman was signaling to the babus that he had powerful ordering fields on his side. He could, 
for example, call upon a powerful politician‘s ability to get bureaucrats to follow his orders. He could also 
have the company bosses use their connections with these politicians to support his case for ‗investor 
confidence‘ and a ‗level playing field.‘  
But most importantly, by siding with the private telecommunications firms, the Chairman had signaled clearly 
that his agency, TRAI, was promising to ―shake things up,‖ as one of my informants—a senior TRAI 
official—used to say. Everyone in the arena understood that the Chairman and this agency would not be 
puppets controlled by the babus. Anyone who had anything to gain from this assertion—and there were 
plenty more of such individuals in 1997 than in 1989—was thus a possible supporter of TRAI and its 
continued existence. 
It is useful to focus on one group here: the bosses of the private telecommunications companies. Even as the 
TRAI Chairman was making choices about how he should have interpreted his mandate, the bosses were also 
making their own efforts at defining the regulator‘s role to their benefit. 
When the bosses of these companies approach the Chairman for relief, they were approaching an agency that 
had a formal mandate but more importantly had made at least rhetorical overtures to private capital. The 
private firms saw the newly set up TRAI, with its stated aims of protecting investor confidence and ensuring a 
level playing field, as a means to counter MTNL‘s entry into their business.  
The private operators knew that appealing to DoT, the licensing authority, was not going to get them far. 
This would be like asking the babus to review their own actions, likely not a useful strategy. As one industry 
commentator explained to me, DoT would have reminded the private firms that their mobile telephone 
licenses had the explicit condition that DoT (or its subsidiaries) reserved the right to enter that business when 
they pleased. The private firms also knew that the babus would support MTNL‘s attempt because of the close 
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professional and financial ties between those agencies. The private operators thus turned to TRAI, inviting it 
to make a decision on whether DoT‘s decision to license MTNL was appropriate.*  
As I have noted earlier, by going to TRAI, the private firms gave the regulator an opportunity to define its 
role in the arena; a court is useless if no cases are filed there. However, what is most interesting here is that 
the private firms approached TRAI with a plea to protect investor confidence and restore level playing fields, 
even though these ideas were not directly mentioned in TRAI‘s formal mandate. Consequently, not only were 
the private firms allowing TRAI to exercise its mandate and assert its authority over the arena, they were also 
reinforcing TRAI‘s attempts to define the role of the agency.  
The private firms were thus important in defining the role of the regulator. Not only did the Chairman 
position himself and the regulatory agency as a body that could be a powerful ally of the private firms, but by 
approaching TRAI and asking it to intervene the private firms invited the regulatory agency to impinge on the 
relationships among the babus.  
Indeed, the political positioning by the private operators (and by TRAI) might also be suggested by taking a 
second look at the situation of private investment in Indian telecommunications at the time. In spite of all 
this handwringing on investor confidence, a look at the data on private participation in infrastructure projects 
at the time suggests that India was doing rather well in terms of attracting private investment. Between 1990 
and 1997, private investments in telecommunications in South Asian countries were US$7.3 billion, 
amounting to about 35 percent of all private investments. Of this, India‘s share was significant—80 percent 
of the regional private investments in telecommunications were in India (about US$5.8 billion). 
More interesting is that in the period during the debate over the regulator‘s mandate and investor confidence, 
from 1998 to 2000, private investments in Indian telecommunications were US$2.4 billion, about 40 percent 
of the amount from 1990 to 1997 (The World Bank Group, 2009b). Even as there was a raging debate about 
                                                   
* Interestingly, the private firms did not directly oppose MTNL‘s entry into the market, but rather the way in which it 
was doing so. They ―challenged MTNL‘s plans on the grounds that it undermines the role, scope and authority of the 
TRAI and the action does not guarantee fair play and transparency.‖ One paper noted, ―MTNL has managed to do most 
of its paper work but has kept the licence a secret,‖ underlining concerns about the non-transparent process of licensing 
(―Pvt operators,‖ 1997). The chairman of one of the larger private firms, Bharti Enterprises, commented ―that the 
private operators were not in a mood to stifle competition [from MTNL] as long as the conditions of a level playing field 
were ensured‖ (―MTNL will provide,‖ 1997). 
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which agency should regulate licensing, and though this debate was couched in terms of investor confidence, 
investors were investing heavily into Indian telecommunications.  
If private investments in telecommunications were this strong, what was actually driving the concerns at 
TRAI about investor confidence? Why was the regulator using this idea to support its interventions in the 
arena? Rather than being about investor confidence, then, this episode shows that such ideas are useful to 
various actors in the regulatory who are looking to organize the arena around their preferences, calling on 
potential supporters to rally behind them, all while attempting to overcome powerful interests.  
Defiance as ritual. Speaking to TRAI staffers in 2006 it becomes clear that many of them credit Mr. 
Sodhi‘s defiance of the babus in 1997 as a singular event in TRAI‘s history. They felt that he shook the babus 
up and asserted his (and his agency‘s) role in the arena. If he had not done this, TRAI might have met the 
same fate as the Telecom Commission in 1989. 
Yet, as is evident from the reaction of the irritated staffer to TRAI‘s office getting sealed in 2006, it is also 
clear that TRAI‘s position in the arena is constantly at risk of being downgraded. Indeed, lower and middle-
level staffers at TRAI had the impression that the Authority and the Chairman had to struggle constantly to 
secure the agency‘s position in the arena.* They were constantly worried of having to play a secondary role to 
some of the others in the arena, especially the babus. 
A few weeks prior to the sealing, another mid-level and relatively young staffer at TRAI had made a similar 
observation. I was sitting at his desk in an open area of the second floor of the office while his neighbor, 
another mid-level staffer with a heavy regional accent had made a telephone call to someone in another 
government office. Many staffers had developed the habit of saying the acronym TRAI as a word, 
pronouncing it as ‗try.‘ However, due to his accent, this staffer had the habit of pronouncing TRAI as ‗terai.‘  
When the phone call ended, this young mid-level staffer, who had a mischievous look in his eyes the entire 
time we were listening to this phone call, laughed and pointed out to his neighbor that he should stop saying 
‗terai.‘ ―We are anyways close to becoming like the Terai,‖ he said, referring to the southern part of Nepal, 
―Why are you making it happen so easily?‖ 
                                                   
* They were not alone in this belief, the press has not been averse to labeling the agency the ‗toothless‘ regulatory 
authority (a play on the acronym). 
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He explained what he meant to me. ―No one cares about us,‖ he said. ―We‘re outside Ring Road, no?‖ he 
asked rhetorically, referring to the India‘s equivalent to Washington DC‘s Beltway or Paris‘ Boulevard 
Périphérique that circumscribes most if not all of the Central Government‘s offices and buildings. ―Outside 
Ring Road is the same as…‖ he ended there clicking his tongue and gesturing with his hand as if to indicate 
‗out there.‘ 
Undoubtedly, concerns that this regulatory agency was not seen as part of the Government of India but 
instead as a distant and irrelevant place were playing on this staffer‘s mind. This concern about TRAI‘s 
position in the arena went beyond the geographic to name-recognition. A few weeks prior to this telephone 
call, one of the administrative staff of TRAI was making a telephone call to someone when I entered his 
office. Not wanting to interrupt his call, I gestured that I would come back later, but he motioned with his 
hand for me to come in. When his call was connected, he began: 
―Hello, is this [Government Organization]?‖ The answer must have come back as yes, because he continued. 
―I am calling from TRAI,‖ pronouncing it, again, as ‗try.‘ It was obvious that the person on the other side, 
likely a person at a similar hierarchical level, did not understand what he was saying. 
―TRAI, TRAI.‖ No response. 
―Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, TRAI,‖ this person continued. No response. 
―Telephone Regulator,‖ and then the opposite side probably understood, because the conversation 
progressed. 
After he completed his conversation, which turned out to be shorter than the preliminaries, this gentleman 
put his office phone down, looked at me with frustration on his face, and said in Hindi, ―none of these 
people know who were are! Now what do you want?‖ I told him I would come back another time and 
promptly left.  
As Mr. Sodhi was setting up TRAI in 1997, he was faced with important choices that determined the position 
of the agency within the regulatory agency. In 2006, TRAI staff was telling me that Mr. Sodhi‘s interest in 
having a strong and independent regulatory led him to take a stand against DoT and the babus. He was 
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credited for doing this in spite of facing significant political pressure to let the status quo remain. As a retired 
distinguished judge, one of my interlocutors suggested, it would not suit his ego to let his agency, TRAI, be 
relegated to second place behind DoT. 
It is useful to consider why in spite of all the concerns about TRAI being in the boondocks or 
unrecognizable, the agency continues its existence as separate in operation and reputation from the Telecom 
Commission or DoT, and is still able to resist a takeover of the arena by the babus. Part of the answer lies in 
the TRAI Act and the formal mandate of this agency, and part of this answer lies in the usefulness TRAI has 
demonstrated to powerful business and political interests as a resisting force to the babus.  
But part of the answer lies in what I term as the ritual of defiance within TRAI, especially against the babus. 
This ritual of defiance clarifies that the continuing struggle over primacy in the arena between the Nehruvian 
capitalists at TRAI and the babus at DoT, BSNL, and MTNL is not linked to a specific individual, but is a 
widely shared movement.*  
By standing up to the babus, staff at TRAI had garnered a visibility and respect that assured its survival and 
positioned it as an agency within the arena that did have a role to play. The struggle over roles between the 
entrenched babus represented by DoT and MTNL and the regulator also exposes the role of disputes in the 
arena. At the end of this episode, ―everyone understood that TRAI was a new agency that did not have the 
same thinking as those babus,‖ said one young lawyer working at TRAI.  
The babus wished to continue control over the arena, irrespective of the presence of a regulatory agency. The 
defiance of the regulator to the power of the babus and their field signaled to other actors in the arena that 
TRAI could not be pushed around. Even though the outcome was for TRAI to be stripped off its powers, it 
made a rhetorical point that no one could deny.  
                                                   
* There were those who believed the struggle between the regulatory staffers and the babus was a momentary issue and 
simply a ‗clash of egos.‘ Following the defiance by TRAI, one newspaper explained that, ―it is quite apparent from the 
latest developments that the DoT is not yet reconciled to the powers of the TRAI and the fiasco took place only as a 
result of the DoT‘s deliberate attempt to bypass the TRAI which is not yet one year old‖ (―Telecom fiasco,‖ 1998). 
Another commentator explained that, ―the… problems relate to the DoT, TRAI organisational ego clash‖ (―Indian 
telecom needs,‖ 1998). The solution? That ―the Department of Telecommunication must bring itself to sit across the 
table with TRAI to sort out mutual differences and settle out of court‖ (―Ball in DoT‘s,‖ 1998). On the other hand, 
another commentator suggested that it was TRAI who should ―take a realistic approach towards its disputes with the 
DoT‖ (―TRAI urged,‖ 1998). Both sides, this commentator explained should, ―arriv[e] at a mutually acceptable solution, 
‗forgetting the problem of ego and perception of loss of power‘‖ (―TRAI urged,‖ 1998).  
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The defiance by TRAI of the field set up and controlled by the babus was thus an attempt to display to all 
concerned that TRAI was here to stay, a useful and effective regulator that could, if needed, challenge 
established powers. In doing so, TRAI also sought to define its role as a regulatory agency.  
If TRAI had not done so, it might have been quickly deemed useless and lost all relevance; the private firms 
would instead continue to curry favor with the babus as opposed to coming back to a respectable, even if less 
powerful TRAI. I asked the young lawyer about what would have happened if TRAI had not intervened in 
the dispute between MTNL and the private firms? ―It would have been the same old story as with the 
Telecom Commission,‖ was the response. That the same fate awaited TRAI if it did not challenge the babus 
was the worry. 
As the literature tells us, the young regulator is keen to test its powers and define its role within the arena. As 
is the case with any political entity, a regulator will look to maximize the scope of its control. Yet, even as 
TRAI attempts to carve out its position separate from the babus and from that position, reorder the arena, it 
has had to renegotiate that position with the babus and other actors within the arena.  
In this renegotiation of its position, TRAI has used attempted to regularize its position in the arena, yet has 
used a number of adjustments to justify why it is better placed to be in charge. For their part, the babus have 
also engaged in a this struggle, attempting to regularize their position (say through amendments to the TRAI 
Act) and through adjustments. But TRAI‘s attempts at adjustment by challenging the babus through 
references to ideas such as investor confidence and fairness were unlike anything the babus had seen before. 
Even when the Telecom Commission was created, it was not an assault by multiple well-connected 
businesspersons and public officials as in 1997. 
TRAI was promoting not only its position as regulator, but also looking to challenge the babus. TRAI was 
thus engaging in a ritual of defiance of the established bureaucracy as a means to establish its own primacy in 
the arena. These rituals of defiance included the various petitions that the private firms registered with TRAI 
against DoT and MTNL. In the months following TRAI‘s appearance on the scene, it was challenging the 
babus on tariff regimes that favored the incumbents, discussing awarding licenses for Internet service 
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providers, and questioning decisions on licensing, including the MTNL mobile telephony license. The fact 
that TRAI was defying the babus and attracting possible revenge was noted in the media at the time.*  
But this could not bother TRAI at the time; it had no choice. Apart from the undesirable fate of being 
subjugated to the babus, TRAI staffers explained to me that they were worried about the shame of how the 
―entire industry‖ would have seen TRAI as being unable to act as an independent regulator and take a stand 
against the babus. ―There was no choice,‖ one staffer concluded, ―TRAI would otherwise have been useless.‖ 
In the tussle about regulatory mandates, the key idea within TRAI at the time it seems, was that TRAI should 
exist as an agency that had a role to play in the arena. 
In his thinking of policy practice as theater, Streeter (1996) explains that much in policy has to do with the 
rhetoric and appearances of specific policy proceedings. In his analysis, Streeter questions how policy as a 
theatrical effort masks the lack of actual questioning and debate that various actors should engage in. Policy 
practice has much to do with the roles people play within the arena. 
It seems from my informants‘ stories that TRAI had to act as an independent and defiant regulator, or it 
would lose its credibility. Certainly, as I have mentioned above, this entire exercise did not question the 
fundamental fissures that exist within the Indian state.  
These rituals of defiance persist. At the time of my fieldwork, TRAI staff—even those who had worked with 
DoT earlier—continued to make decisions and take positions against the babus. In one case, a senior TRAI 
staff member, who had joined the regulator a few months before from DoT, commented to me that he had 
made so many decisions against DoT in that short time that he was worried he would not be welcomed back 
at DoT after his time at TRAI ended. A number of staff within TRAI believed that although they could not 
control the babus, it was the job of TRAI to be independent and question the decisions made there. A tension 
between the two agencies continues. A number of the regulator‘s policy recommendations are not accepted 
by DoT, and TRAI, for its part, keeps pushing for decisions that go against the interests of the babus. 
  
                                                   
* Soon after a decision by TRAI to quash a DoT tariff regulation, one newspaper quoted an analyst saying that, ―while 
the judgment in itself is very good and is based on facts, its tone is a little high-handed and it might have DoT fuming 
for the moment; they could get vindictive and create more problems‖ (―TRAI‘s first order,‖ 1997). 
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Chapter 7. Choice Making in Dispute Resolution 
The previous chapter took us through the process through which staffers at TRAI attempted to define the 
agency‘s role in the telecommunications arena. This attempt at regularizing TRAI led to a struggle with the 
babus, who were keen to maintain their own primacy. This struggle resulted in Parliament bowing to pressure 
from the babus and taking away TRAI‘s formal power to resolve disputes among actors in the arena. This 
power was awarded to a newly established agency, TDSAT, which was organized separately from TRAI.* 
Yet, even though the definition of a regulator‘s formal mandate might be a one-time or occasional affair, 
regularized by definition and amendment in the law, the definition of a regulator‘s position within the arena is 
not a one-time or occasional affair. Every transaction among individuals in the arena is an opportunity to 
renegotiate and adjust the agency‘s position. And an opportunity to resolve a dispute is an opportunity for an 
adjudicator to reposition itself in the arena.  
Even if the year 2000 saw the re-creation of a formally weaker TRAI—an agency without formal dispute 
resolution powers—the events that transpired in the following years demonstrated how the actions of various 
actors in the arena led to a revival of the regulator‘s role as dispute resolver. This chapter will show how 
choice making by both agency personnel and other actors in the arena intersected with the circumstances of a 
particular dispute to redefine TRAI‘s role. In doing so, this chapter illuminates how the formal mandate of a 
regulatory agency does not define its actual functions in the arena. 
This chapter focuses on events around another dispute regarding licensing of telecommunications services. In 
this case, the dispute was among the private sector firms in the telecommunications industry, although it was 
a result of the Government‘s actions in 1997. This chapter begins with an account of events in the licensing 
dispute. It then analyzes the reasons for why and the way in which TRAI became the site for dispute 
resolution in spite of its formal powers being limited. Through this chapter, we will also see how Nehruvian 
capitalist thinking and powerful ideas serve to order the way in which TRAI resolved the dispute. 
Many of my interlocutors refer to the dispute described here as the ―war‖ in the Indian telecommunications 
industry. My interlocutors believed that this episode was important in the history of Indian 
                                                   
* TDSAT is described in Chapter 3. 
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telecommunications. According to one of them, the problem was so severe that ―it could have derailed the 
entire telecom industry.‖ Another informant, an industry consultant, explained to me that there was a brief 
time during this dispute when the entire industry was ―sweating at the prospect of having a negative 
outcome.‖  
Moreover, as a witness to the goings on at the time, albeit as an outsider to the arena, I recall how the dispute 
amongst the various service providers had grabbed the attention of the media, political class, and some 
section of consumers. Most of my interlocutors were involved in this episode and much of this chapter is 
based on their accounts, put together after numerous baat cheet sessions and in many cases, from their 
comments and reminisces at various times, mainly occurring when something they were doing at the time 
reminded them of their experiences during the ―war.‖ To add flavor to this account, I was also able to get 
some information from TRAI staffers who were at DoT at the time of the dispute and hence close to the 
scene of the action but from a different perspective. 
Resolving the “War” 
Before beginning the description, it is important to provide an introduction to frame the genesis of the 
dispute in terms of the actions of the various institutions in the arena, based on accounts gathered from my 
interlocutors. 
Introducing “limited mobility.” Even though the babus‘ attempts to allow MTNL to offer mobile 
telephone services had failed due to TRAI‘s opposition, three years after TRAI stayed MTNL‘s attempt to 
secure a mobile telephony license, the babus went ahead and amended MTNL‘s license in 2000 to allow the 
corporation to use wireless services to supplement its fixed telephone services instead. The service was 
branded as ―limited mobility‖ wireless in local loop (WLL) services. 
It is necessary to take a short detour here to explain exactly what the babus were doing. MTNL was 
positioning the limited mobility services as an extension of its fixed wireline telephone services. This was 
smart wordplay meant to take advantage of ambiguities in the licensing regime. The rules of the 
telecommunications licensing regime distinguished between fixed telephone service (traditionally offered by 
wireline telephones) from mobile telephone services. By offering limited mobility service, the babus were using 
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the fact that as long as the telephone handset was limited in its mobility it was not ―mobile.‖ Even so, MTNL 
was using an otherwise entirely mobile technology known as Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA).*  
In order to deflect criticism from the mobile telephone operators—and likely learning their lesson from the 
run-in with TRAI and the private companies‘ bosses in 1997—the babus sought to justify this distinction by 
allowing MTNL‘s subscribers to use only fixed terminals, i.e., telephone instruments that had to be plugged 
into the wall for power. This meant that the subscriber could not move around with the handset as she could 
have if she had subscribed to a mobile cellular service. Furthermore, to keep mobility limited, the babus also 
put in place the requirement that subscribers should be mobile only within the area covered by the 
subscriber‘s local telephone exchange; unlike mobile telephones then, the calls could not continue if the 
subscriber moved into the next area—hence the limited.†  
This branding was necessary because MTNL wanted to offer something similar to a mobile telephone service 
without attracting the ire of the mobile telephone companies. Moreover, the classification gave MTNL some 
businesses advantages: the tariff regulations at the time made it such that prices of calls to and from mobile 
networks were substantially higher than calls within the fixed telephone network in that market. The price 
structure and license conditions were different, and typically less onerous for fixed than for the mobile 
licenses. 
MTNL went to TRAI with its proposal in 1999 and requested permission to begin offering a limited mobility 
service. The regulatory agency cleared this proposal but only approved fixed WLL service, asking MTNL to 
wait before it began limited mobility services. According to one senior staffer at TRAI, the Authority at the 
time was unsure about whether the supposed distinction between limited mobility and mobility was sufficient 
to hold off criticism from the private firms that the regulatory agency had allowed the babus to get away with 
an unfair attempt to enter their market.  
                                                   
* CDMA technology had been, by then widely used in Japan, South Korea, Brazil, the United States, and Canada to 
deploy ‗mobile‘ networks. From a technological perspective, CDMA and GSM are both mobile cellular technologies, 
and almost entirely fungible from a user perspective: they are two different ways to provide the same service. In effect, 
this meant that the BSOs were being allowed to deploy networks using a cellular technology after paying lower fees and 
having to charge their consumers less. The only thing holding them back from offering full-blown mobile cellular 
telephony services was regulatory diktat. 
† According to one description popular among the richer families in Bombay at the time, MTNL‘s service was nothing 
more than a glorified cordless telephone. For people who saw the mobile phone as a status symbol, settling for a MTNL 
limited mobility phone would signify cheapness, a way to distinguish their own fully mobile telephones from others‘ 
limited versions. 
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However, even after the regulatory agency ordered MTNL to wait, the babus, eager to begin mobile services, 
allowed its subscribers to own mobile handsets that had batteries as opposed to desk telephones that were 
tied to an electric socket. Likely to get the support for this move from the other (private) fixed telephone 
companies, the babus in October 1999 allowed all fixed telephone companies—MTNL included—to offer 
their WLL subscribers the use of handheld telephones. This brought all of these previously shackled 
companies to the point where they could offer so-called limited mobility services, although initially only 
MTNL was allowed that privilege, through a license amendment by DoT. 
MTNL rolled out its limited mobility service in October 1999. This decision set off a chain of events for 
which no one was ready. MTNL‘s limited mobility service, branded as Garuda—a mythical bird-like creature 
that was the mount of the Hindu deity Vishnu, the preserver—took off. Crowds gathered outside MTNL‘s 
otherwise deserted offices demanding the phone and service which offered, in the words of one MTNL press 
release, the ―common man‘s mobile phone service‖ (―Hundreds of takers,‖ 1999). This rush for limited 
mobility telephones came primarily from those who did not want to wait on the long waiting list that still 
existed for fixed wireline telephones. Moreover, the service was partially mobile while the costs were cheap 
like the fixed network.  
The huge rush for MTNL telephones led to minor riots in some stores when the phones sold out; people 
were eager to get their hands on these phones and were angry at having to wait. One reporter summed up the 
scene quite vividly: 
Flashing wads of cash and even bank drafts, thousands of Delhiites shoved, jostled and 
lunged for the prize-a limited coverage mobile phone from MTNL. The public sector 
enterprise responded in time-honoured fashion. It panicked at the site of the crowds, ran out 
of forms, failed to give proper information and finally called the police (―MTNL‘s mobile,‖ 
1999). 
While MTNL could not keep up with the demand at their stores, the success of the service had two 
significant outcomes. First, it spooked the mobile telephony firms and second, it exposed the high demand 
for affordable telephone service.  
The mobile telephone companies got worried because these rampaging crowds completely dismantled their 
business model at the time, which was to target the richer segments of the population. The babus and 
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regulatory staffers accepted this model because they were still accepting of the argument that the mobile 
telephone was a luxury. For a state that had for over a century held that even plain old telephones were a 
luxury, looking at the mobile telephone as a luxury was easy. This was also true internationally at the time, and 
my interlocutors had heard this message—that the ―mobile phone was for the classes and the fixed phone for 
the masses‖—repeated in global forums numerous times. This had set up an expectation that became a self-
fulfilling prophesy by the end of 1999. At that time, over 80 percent of the 381 million mobile telephones in 
use worldwide were in the world‘s rich countries, and even there, more common among the affluent. 
However, with the rush for MTNL‘s Garuda service, this thinking collapsed overnight, at least in the context 
of the Indian arena. This was worrying for the mobile companies because it meant that they could not protect 
their tariffs or duopoly position claiming that their services were a luxury. The success of MTNL‘s service 
also meant that there would be new operators looking to enter the market and pick up some of this demand. 
And indeed, sensing the opportunity, other private firms also started lobbying the Government for 
permission to offer limited mobility services in addition to their existing fixed WLL services. Here is where 
things turned quickly. 
In 2001, DoT approached TRAI for its formal views on whether DoT should amend all the fixed licenses to 
include limited mobility services. TRAI responded in the positive, noting in its formal recommendation to 
DoT the potential of these services to alter the landscape of Indian telecommunications. Staff involved with 
the decision explained that the benefits of these services were clear to them: wireless networks meant network 
deployment at a lower cost compared with wireline telephones, the possibility to connect a larger number of 
subscribers in less time, and an opportunity to reach policy targets. ―It was very clear to us that limited 
mobility was a huge opportunity for India,‖ explained one staffer. It also represented the introduction of 
more and new technology into the Indian market. While the mobile networks used GSM technology, the 
limited mobility networks used CDMA technology, which staffers recalled as being newer at the time.  
This represented an adjustment away from rules around the ‗classes‘ and to rules around the ‗masses‘, and 
TRAI staffers knew it. By allowing limited mobility, TRAI was allowing DoT to renege on its license 
agreements with the private mobile telephone companies that promised them duopolies. TRAI staffers were 
proposing that allowing limited mobility—as MTNL had shown—would ―revolutionize the market,‖ in the 
words of one senior staffer at TRAI. But they were also sure that this appeal to ideas of technological 
progress and inclusive telecommunications would not assure the Government of the private companies‘ 
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support. Knowing that allowing mobility, even if limited, would anger the mobile telephone companies, 
TRAI‘s sought to level the playing field. Noting that private firms‘ anger would center on the most 
contentious issue—that the fixed telephone companies had secured limited mobility at lower license fees—
TRAI proposed allowing limited mobility for the fixed telephone companies while asking DoT to 
compensate the mobile licensees by reducing their license fees.*  
DoT accepted TRAI‘s recommendations in less than a week and under significant pressure from prospective 
telecommunications providers—including a number of powerful Indian conglomerates—DoT immediately 
began awarding radio spectrum to fixed licensees. The possibility of providing limited mobility services with a 
fraction of the license fee payment attracted significant interest. DoT received 147 applications for basic 
telephony licenses, and the award of 40 of these licenses on a first-come-first-serve basis led to the creation of 
two national service providers whose core business was CDMA-based WLL service. 
Responding to the entry of competitors who received, in their opinion, preferential treatment from the babus 
and regulatory staffers, the mobile firms reacted negatively. From the outset, the mobile licensees were 
worried that the babus and TRAI might allow others backdoor entry into the mobile telephony market. When 
MTNL first made its plans for a mobile telephone service, these private firms went to TRAI for relief. Now, 
the mobile operators began complaining loudly in the press and to the Government that the limited mobility 
service was actually a cellular mobile service in disguise. Effectively, they claimed, the babus were allowing the 
fixed operators a backdoor entry into the mobile business without charging them high license fees or 
subjecting them to similar entry conditions, hurting the level playing field.  
The private firms took their complaint to the newly established dispute settlement tribunal, TDSAT, which 
turned it down. The mobile companies then stepped up their complaining and approached the Prime Minister 
to intervene, and then approached the Supreme Court, which accepted their argument calling the 
Government‘s move to allow limited mobility ―arbitrary, unreasonable, and unjust‖ (Desai, 1996, p. 121). In a 
submission to the Supreme Court, the cellular operators association noted (―Cell operators to move,‖ 2002): 
                                                   
* The cellular players are estimated to have paid up to Rs 9,000 crore (Rs 90 billion) as license fees to the government on 
an all-India basis. In contrast, WLL service providers are the fixed line operators who have paid no license fees to the 
government for the WLL service and only a marginal fee of Rs 495 crore (Rs 4.95 billion) on an-all India basis for 
operation as fixed line service providers (Mukherjee & Barman, 2002).  
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Wireless in Local Loop (WLL) mobility is no march of technology. CDMA technology 
which is being used to offer WLL (M) service is nothing but a full-fledged mobile 
technology, that is being used in the rest of the world since 1995 to offer mobile services 
under a mobile license. 
There was also perception among TRAI staffers associated with this proceeding that there was genuine worry 
in the Government, among the babus and regulatory staffers, on the outcome of this case. TRAI staffers were 
especially worried about the implications of a negative judgment from the Supreme Court. What would it 
mean for the fixed licensees who had just invested significant amounts—estimated in the billions of dollars—
into their networks and had exposed the huge latent demand for cheap telephone services? Given that TRAI 
considered protecting investor confidence as one of its roles, a negative ruling from the Court forcing the 
fixed licensees to shut down would damage that confidence irreversibly.  
Senior staffers at TRAI recall the feeling that without acting quickly and solving the licensing issue in its 
entirety, circumstances might have led to TDSAT or Supreme Court ordering the shutting down of limited 
mobility services. They felt that the impact on the growth of the industry would have been devastating. It 
would not have been possible to see continued growth of the subscriber base, reducing tariffs, or the kind of 
competition that the limited mobility firms had brought with their entry.  
Worried TRAI staff got an opportunity to act when the Supreme Court order in its December 2002 order did 
not stay the rollout of WLL-limited mobility services recognizing that many consumers as well as service 
providers had already invested in the service. It simply ordered TDSAT to reconsider the issue ―with special 
emphasis on the question of level playing field‖ (―Cell firms,‖ 2002) between the mobile and fixed operators.  
In February 2003, as TDSAT was deciding what to do next, private telecommunications firm Reliance 
Infocomm started its wireless service with limited mobility. Reliance‘s service was a little less limited, 
however. The company, the largest conglomerate in India and famous for its ability to enter and quickly 
dominate sectors as diverse as textiles and petrochemicals, began to offer its subscribers a service where they 
could roam for free between different local areas. In effect, this entirely invalidated the restrictions on limited 
mobility services and let Reliance, a fixed telephone company according to its license, to offer what was in 
practice a mobile telephony service. 
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As if this was not enough, a few months later, in July 2003, Reliance began its Monsoon Hungama (trans. 
tumult or uproar) subscription plan, which offered mobile handsets with a bundled service plan for the low 
upfront price of INR 501 (approximately US$11 at the time). Within two days, Reliance saw its subscriber 
base grow about 250,000—the same number of subscribers others were adding in a month (Verma & 
Sharma, 2003). In July alone, Reliance added about one million subscribers (Thakur, 2003). At the time, the 
total number of wireless telephone subscribers in India was about 12 million (Deshmukh, 2003). As one 
newspaper reported at the time, ―Reliance has… set the Indian cellular market on fire‖ (Zarabi, 2003). 
―Carpenters and rikshawallahs standing cheek by jowl with chic collegians outside the company‘s retail outlets 
across the country are waiting to go mobile‖ (Shastri, 2003). Indeed, the scheme was so successful that 
Reliance closed it after five days (―Runaway success,‖ 2003). 
As one TRAI staffer explained to me, looking back, this was the trigger point. When the Reliance offer came 
along, he explained, the market actually saw a ―hungama‖ and overnight TRAI staff recognized that they had 
to move quickly to prevent a complete implosion of the regulatory regime. In their view, the regulatory 
regime could no longer sustain distinctions between different degrees of mobility.  
As one TRAI staffer put it eloquently, ―Fixed wireless is an oxymoron. If you permit a service provider to use 
a mobile technology [as CDMA was], you cannot expect him to do anything but offer mobile services.‖ In his 
opinion, wireless meant mobile; there was no way any regulation would hold back what was a wireless service 
one day to become a mobile service the next. This TRAI staffer felt the regulatory regime could not control 
this oxymoron, at least not very well.  
Further, if Reliance continued growing and creating hungamas like this, there was no telling what the mobile 
telephone companies would do to respond and try to stop attrition in their market share and profitability. The 
mobile telephone companies could have appealed to the Supreme Court, which might have resulted in a stop 
to these services, upsetting excited new and potential telephone subscribers while jeopardizing the babus‘ and 
TRAI staffers‘ newfound plans for sector growth. 
As if to reinforce these concerns, TDSAT made a decision on the issue that according to TRAI staffers, 
promised further instability. In a split decision, the Chairman of the Tribunal said that the Government made 
a mistake by allowing limited mobility and should withdraw that right, while the majority decision (of the 
other two members) said that the Government should enforce the condition that mobility be actually limited 
to one local calling area (Desai, 1996). The majority decision required that the limiting should be in place by 
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the end of November 2003. Upset with this ruling, the mobile telephone companies appealed to the Supreme 
Court, leading to the possibility of a reversal in the allowance TDSAT gave the fixed telephone companies. 
According to one senior TRAI staffer, the split decision meant that there was scope for reversal, especially 
given that the minority opinion was both of the Tribunal Chairman and of the only judge on the panel. (It is 
useful to note that this indicates fields at work that could displace a two-to-one ruling, especially since the 
Supreme Court was the appeals court.) 
This time, the babus and TRAI staff began looking for a permanent way out of the conflict, one that would 
not continue the artificial restrictions on wireless technologies. Formally, TRAI made a proposal to DoT to 
allow the fixed license holders to ‗migrate‘ to full mobility if they paid the same license fees as the cellular 
operators.  
Also at this time, the appointment of Mr. Arun Shourie as communications minister in January 2003 was seen 
as a signal that the Government wanted to sort out the situation. Mr. Shourie‘s integrity was beyond doubt, 
and he was widely known as a hard-playing reformer, both requirements in what was bound to be a hard fight 
between powerful business interests. TRAI staffers felt that the positioning of Mr. Shourie was critical 
especially because no one in the arena could accuse him of corrupt behavior. ―Many people might disagree 
with him, but they cannot even think of accusing him of corruption,‖ said one senior staffer who had 
followed Mr. Shourie‘s career as a well-regarded journalist and political activist. Along with Mr. Shourie‘s 
appointment, Pradip Baijal, who had worked with earlier with Mr. Shourie as a senior bureaucrat, was 
appointed to head TRAI a month later. 
The dispute over limited mobility was now beginning to engage the press and senior political figures. In this 
context, senior TRAI officials say, Mr. Shourie asked TRAI, headed by Mr. Baijal, to design a new licensing 
regime quickly. This order from the Minister was a signal to both the babus and staff at TRAI that the time to 
act had come.  
Recognizing that the only ―practical way forward‖ was to set up an entirely new licensing regime that would 
eliminate any distinctions between the fixed and mobile licenses, TRAI began a consultation process on the 
issue. ―Neither of the TDSAT options was easily achieved,‖ explained one TRAI staffer. ―So we quickly 
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moved to respond to the Government‘s intention of preparing a unified licensing scheme that would simply 
eliminate all the problems.‖*  
The outcome of TRAI‘s efforts was the proposal to create a ‗unified access-service licensing‘ (UASL) regime. 
In terms of the license condition, a UAS licensee could provide any type of telecommunications service 
(voice, video, and data) over their last-mile access network using any type of technology. The mobile licensees 
had the option of switching to the new license (most of them did not), while fixed licensees had to pay a 
differential fee and migrate. In any case, TRAI suggested that the Government would only issue UAS licenses 
from that point on.  
The DoT accepted all of the recommendations and in a few days, it prepared a note for the Cabinet of 
Ministers requesting them to okay the creation of the new licensing structure. Simultaneously, mobile 
companies, angry at what they saw as another gift to the fixed licensees petitioned the Supreme Court for a 
hearing on the issue. Timing was now critical. If the Supreme Court reversed the new TDSAT decision, then 
the entire effort would go to waste and the fate of the telecommunications industry would have been left 
hanging once again. 
As it happened, the Cabinet both approved the TRAI-DoT proposal and to sweeten the deal for the mobile 
companies, offered them significant cuts in license fees and raised limits on foreign investment. After putting 
in place some measures to solve the immediate problem, i.e., fining the fixed licensees, TRAI and DoT 
worked together to create the new unified licensing regime that the Cabinet of Ministers approved on 
November 1—just before TDSAT order would have to be implemented. To further placate the mobile 
telephone companies, the DoT fined Reliance a penalty of Rs 15.81 billion for violating the conditions of its 
limited mobility license by offering free roaming. Soon after, the mobile operators withdrew their court cases 
(―Indian fixed,‖ 2003). This ended the war. The move towards unified licensing has since become widely 
recognized as emerging best practice in telecommunications licensing policy by organizations such as the 
World Bank and ITU (infoDev & the ITU, 2010d). 
                                                   
* Interestingly, during this period not long after their earlier struggle over roles, TRAI staffers informed me, the 
collaboration between the DoT and TRAI was strong, with both working to sort out all the issues related to licensing, 
interconnection, and tariffs that would go into making a new regime possible in a short time frame. 
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Making choices about roles, procedure, and policy. Before continuing with the analysis of this 
event, it is useful to consider the interesting revitalization of TRAI in a dispute resolution role. During my 
fieldwork in 2006, it was clear that some of the mid-level staffers at TRAI held the view that the separation of 
the dispute resolution functions (creating TDSAT) from the regulatory functions (the formally weaker TRAI) 
was a terrible tragedy and had forever hobbled the regulator‘s effectiveness. Interestingly however, none of 
these individuals were involved in the ‗war‘ described above, and the senior staffers who were at TRAI during 
this war were less upset by the separation of TDSAT from TRAI.  
Instead, as one of these senior staffers explained, ―TDSAT does not have the ability to get the service 
providers to resolve their problems quickly. It is like saying that every time there is a problem you should go 
to the court. Doesn‘t the police have role?‖ Recognizing the common practice in urban India to approach the 
police to settle disputes informally (see for example, Natarajan, 2005), this senior staffer was suggesting that 
TRAI was much like the police to TDSAT‘s court; why would service providers create a scene when TRAI 
could help them resolve their problems? 
There is thus something to learn here about regulatory procedures for dispute resolution, and simultaneously 
about the reasons for how this dispute was resolved as it was. In order to understand this, it is useful to make 
some observations. 
First, it is useful to identify the three simultaneous and interconnected but distinguishable procedures that 
were on-going to find a settlement to the war. The first was the formal judicial-legal procedure that involved 
TDSAT and the Supreme Court. The second was the informal political procedure that involved both sides 
making representations to key political figures with the ability to push through major policy changes, such as 
the Prime Minister. The first and second were sites of redressal of grievances. After all, the companies 
involved in the dispute were all major corporations that had significant political influence among the political 
leadership. And the dispute going to the specialized TDSAT, which was set up to ―adjudicate any dispute: 
between a licensor and a licensee; between two or more service providers; between a service provider and a 
group of consumers,‖ (Government of India, 2000, section. 14) was also reasonably predictable.  
Even though the first two procedures were important, the third—the regulatory procedure—made TRAI the 
main site of action. The dispute was settled through this procedure. This stands in contrast to the situation at 
the end of Chapter 6, where DoT was at pains to cut down TRAI‘s role in licensing-related matters. 
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Faced with a significant crisis in the telecommunications arena, the babus understood that they had to resolve 
the problem quickly before it would ―derail the industry.‖ Even though they had, just a few years ago, worked 
hard to curtail TRAI‘s dispute resolution powers, they went back to the regulatory agency and in the words of 
many of my interlocutors, worked closely and amicably with TRAI staff to sort out the problem and end the 
war. Seemingly disregarding the formal role of TDSAT or the reduced formal role of TRAI, the babus had 
suddenly re-made TRAI as the site for dispute resolution. This was an adjustment par excellence to the role of 
these agencies and was an important re-assertion of the regulatory field. 
Second, the arguments of the Supreme Court, TDSAT, TRAI, and at DoT seem to suggest that something 
other than license conditions was driving decision making. The Supreme Court supported limited mobility 
because it had led to an increase in the use of telephones; TRAI and DoT supported a favorable resolution 
that amended and did not enforce license conditions; the TDSAT order also allowed limited mobility to 
continue. Again, all of these arguments suggest adjustments rather than imposition of legal rule-based orders. 
What then explains the reasons for the outcome?  
In approaching the resolution of the dispute over licensing conditions, TRAI argued that the license 
conditions should be amended because of the importance of ideas such as the ‗march of technology,‘ ‗poor 
man‘s telephone,‘ and ‗fairness.‘ I first turn to analyzing the choice of procedures. 
Choosing Procedures 
Throughout the dispute, TDSAT and the Supreme Court played the role of serving as sites for formal 
adjudication. However, it should be clear from the above account that TRAI was simultaneously serving as a 
site for serious negotiation, along with agencies such as DoT and the Prime Minister‘s Office. This seems like 
a major reversal in the regulator‘s position within the arena and its formal role related to licensing. As we saw 
in Chapter 6, between 1997 and 1999, the babus successfully challenged TRAI‘s role to influence licensing 
policy. Yet, as one mid-level TRAI staffer recalled in the context of the WLL war, ―we worked closely and 
successfully with the same organization that was bent on closing us down just a few years ago.‖  
By opting to approach TRAI as a dispute resolution agent, it is possible to say that the Government and DoT 
did something legal studies calls forum shopping (Black, 1979, p. 590) and policy research calls venue 
shopping (Pralle, 2003). The focus of the work on choices in dispute resolution forums looks at how 
individuals make these choices, rather than these choices being the result of some structural determinants 
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such as caseload or jurisdictional or competency claims. A survey of the research on disputants‘ strategies to 
select ―remedy agents,‖ (Collier, 1975, p. 128) finds that individuals select among different legal systems or 
depending on awareness and exposure to an increasing number of agents. For instance, Tanner found that 
the Minangkabau of Indonesia choose to phrase their claims in terms of Islamic law, national law, or 
matrilineal customary law (Tanner, 1970). They would frame their conflicts and issues depending on these 
choices.  
There is also much work on forum shopping in legal studies. For example, Cover (1980) writes that even in 
modern and sophisticated legal systems such as that in the U.S., jurisdictional redundancy—the presence of 
multiple overlapping courts and remedy agents—has persisted because disputants and in some cases even 
these agents have uses for such redundancy. ―Strategic choice is a pervasive attribute‖ in the American legal 
system, for instance (Cover, p. 646). The existence of multiple forums for dispute resolution allows parties to 
choose the most favorable forum for its purposes. Redundancy might exhibit where disputants may select 
one of multiple courts for their dispute. Disputants may also engage in ―synchronic redundancy,‖ (p. 646) 
where they invoke more than one forum simultaneously. Echoing Tanner, he notes that disputants select 
forums depending on what aspects of the dispute they wish emphasized. In terms of fields, disputants may 
thus select a field as a site for remedy because that field has processual characteristics that align with the 
disputants‘ interests. 
The literature on venue shopping in policy studies also focuses on how ―advocacy groups and 
policymakers… seek out a decision setting where they can air their grievances with current policy and present 
alternative policy proposals‖ (Pralle, 2003, p. 233). Venue shopping recognizes that such advocates of specific 
policy positions are often ―frustrated by biases within institutional venues‖ and hence ―shop for… alternative 
venue[s] and attempt to move decision-making authority to a new policy arena.‖ By shifting venues, these 
advocates open a policy debate to a new set of actors and could see the application of new rules and new 
visions of policy outcomes. As Pralle notes in a review of this literature, ―theories and studies of policy 
change confirm that venue shopping is an integral part of the policy process, and at the heart of many 
political strategies‖ (p. 234). It is possible that the presence of multiple venues could slow down or stymie the 
intended policy change but it is also possible that the availability of multiple venues creates opportunities to 
overcome conservatism in traditional venues (Pralle, pp. 235-237). 
As I have noted, in the dispute over limited mobility, there were three simultaneous forums or venues in use: 
the regulator, the courts (TDSAT and the Supreme Court), and the political leadership (Prime Minister‘s 
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Office, other ministers and ministries). For TRAI staffers who were involved in resolving this dispute, 
however, there is little doubt that the regulatory agency was the main site of dispute resolution. 
According to my interlocutors, TRAI became the site of dispute resolution because the regulator allowed the 
babus an opportunity to show that these officials were making decisions about amending the licensing regime 
in a transparent fashion. While the babus were used to a system of making policy decisions behind closed 
doors, the people at TRAI were, by this time, recognized globally as functioning in a transparent manner, as 
one TRAI staffer put it. Further, given that DoT was ultimately under the control of the Minister, a unilateral 
decision by the Minister would trigger discussions about corruption and favoritism. 
But this does not explain why the courts did not become the primary site for dispute resolution. After all, 
with the public perception of courts as generally incorruptible, a court decision would have been viewed as 
‗transparent‘ and would have the advantage of being binding on disputants. When I asked this question the 
first time, I did not get a response from my interlocutor. The second time I posed this question, all I got was 
that ―everyone‖ had a better idea of what TRAI might say; especially after the court indicated it would not be 
averse to shutting down the limited mobility providers. 
Understanding why TRAI became the site for the dispute resolution process is also useful for our broader 
understanding of the prevalence of Nehruvian capitalist values and preferences among the senior staff at 
TRAI. These staffers got a dispute resolution role because of two fields that were in operation within the 
regulatory agency. Being Nehruvian capitalists, the staffers at TRAI were known for being transparent in their 
negotiations with the service providers and for having an approach to the policy questions at hand that was 
predictable. These fields were sustained by TRAI staffers‘ efforts to distinguish themselves from the babus, 
who were non-transparent, and the courts, which might not have cared for the telecommunications sector 
and its derailment. The following examines these fields and their importance. 
Transparency. The idea of transparency is a powerful one in regulation. Most regulatory agencies 
around the world are keen to claim that their decision-making procedures are ‗consultative‘—indicating that 
they depend on input from all stakeholders, a buffer against capture by a small set of private interests—and 
are ‗transparent.‘ For instance, the Better Regulation initiative of the Irish government proposes that: 
Enhancing regulatory transparency contributes to the quality of regulations, increases the 
likelihood of compliance and reduces the risk of ‗capture‘ or bias towards special interests. It 
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also empowers citizens by giving access to information which enhances their decision-
making abilities as consumers and as participants in the community (―Regulating better,‖ 
2004). 
Similarly, the ITU notes that ―transparent regulation‖ has numerous benefits such as ―enhance[ing] consensus 
and creat[ing] confidence in the regulator,‖ ―certainty and reliability,‖ ―accountability and legitimacy, 
reinforcing regulatory independence and reducing political and industry interference,‖ and ―ensuring a 
continuous regulatory record‖ (ITU, 2002, chap. 6). 
At TRAI, transparency had become a ritual. For staff, transparency meant the procedures by which they 
would present their understanding of a situation or issue and then accept comments from all stakeholders. 
Finally, they would prepare recommendations or regulations—in some cases these too were allowed round 
set of comments—and provide detailed explanations for why they chose one or the other solution to a 
problem.  
As a ritual, transparency involved three things for staff. First, they would prepare consultation papers that 
―lay out the issues‖ as many staff would say, and ―ask stakeholders to respond.‖ Consultation papers would 
also be somewhat standard in their form, beginning with an introduction to the issue at hand (in many cases 
quite detailed), a recounting of how other countries have addressed the issue, and a listing of questions to 
which stakeholders were asked to respond.  
Second, the stakeholders would comment and these comments would be collected and analyzed by the TRAI 
team working on the topic. Staff would pick up major themes from these responses, and then take this to the 
Authority. The Authority would organize, especially for issues it considered important, public and private 
meetings to discuss the comments of various stakeholders. I discuss the conduct of public ‗open house 
discussions‘ in Chapter 8. 
Finally, staff would prepare the required output. Staff felt that this part of the process was also transparent 
because it would involve a series of internal discussions and debates on the findings and possible 
recommendations. These discussions would involve meetings within the group working on the topic, and 
presentations and discussions with the Authority and the whole set of Advisors. My experience with these 
discussions was that staff would have heated arguments at times, with voices raised on some occasions, and 
faces turning red at other times.  
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Staff believed in this ritual of transparency. It gave TRAI‘s decisions legitimacy and distinguished the agency 
from the babus, who were, as I have noted, widely known for conducting most of their business behind closed 
doors. As one senior TRAI staff member noted, it was TRAI‘s ability to make decisions transparently that 
ensured all stakeholders would respect them. ―Otherwise, we would just be like those babus.‖ 
TRAI has reason to be proud of its transparency. Its consultation process has been recognized as best 
practice internationally, and many industry analysts and staff of service providers noted that the regulator was 
an outlier in a government notorious for seeking to obfuscate its regulatory processes. By 2001, this 
important characteristic had been consolidated in the agency (many staff thank the foresight of its first 
Chairman, Mr. Sodhi, for this). 
In the case of the licensing dispute, the babus understood well that industry observers and participants would 
interpret its entering into a new licensing agreement with the fixed licensees—some of which were major 
business conglomerates—on its own as a sign of a backroom deal. The mobile licensees had already termed 
the limited mobility service as a backdoor entry into the mobile market, and would have reacted even more 
negatively if such entry were regularized through a unilateral policy decision at DoT. It could have sparked off 
a series of corruption allegations, potential inquiries, and negative press reporting that neither the babus nor 
the political leadership at the time would have been keen to engage in. DoT had been widely panned for how 
it had awarded licenses to mobile telephone companies in 1993, and it likely saw a similar risk in going it 
alone again, especially when the political influence of the mobile telephone companies was significantly 
greater in 2003. Furthermore, the corruption investigation against an earlier Communications Minister—for a 
suspicious licensing process—would have been fresh in DoT staffers‘ memories (―Congress party,‖ 1996). 
Hence, even though the amended Act and improved relations among its officials would have encouraged the 
babus at DoT to approach TRAI, as important was the babus‘ desire to show that this process was transparent. 
Hence, TRAI‘s importance in renegotiating the licensing regime was likely the outcome of its rituals in the 
service of its brand of transparency and the widely held belief among actors in the regulatory regime that the 
regulator would make decisions in a transparent and consultative manner. 
Predictability. Even while transparency played an important role in determining which agency 
would take the lead in resolving the licensing dispute, one may also speculate about the desire of political 
agents in the Government (such as the babus, the Prime Minister, and other such officials) to ensure a 
predictable outcome for this important proceeding.  
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By the time that the mobile licensees approached TDSAT seeking a solution to the dispute, TRAI had already 
disclosed the outlines of the package that it thought would resolve the dispute: allow limited mobility to the 
fixed licensees but compensate the mobile licensees by reducing their license fees. Hence, the babus and the 
political leadership knew from the start that TRAI had a solution in mind that was acceptable to it (the next 
section looks at why this solution was acceptable).  
On the other hand, the babus were not as sure about the decision that would come out of the private 
deliberations of a court such as TDSAT or the Supreme Court. TDSAT was headed by a former Supreme 
Court judge famous for being ―no-nonsense‖ and the Supreme Court itself is famous for its judicial activism 
(even if episodic). It has a rich history of challenging the Government‘s policy decisions (Balakrishnan, 2009; 
Bhagwati, 1984).  
Once the matter went in front of these courts, the babus would lose any hope of predictability. The mobile 
operators also had the capacity to engage in a long-drawn judicial battle and could have taken the matter back 
to TDSAT or Supreme Court any number of times. As one senior TRAI official who had worked with DoT 
during the war explained, ―No one could predict what might happen.‖ Further, the dissenting minority 
opinion from TDSAT was severe. It asked that the Government should shut down all WLL operations, and 
―questioned the role of government and Telecom Regulatory Authority of India to permit this in the first 
place‖ (―TDSAT chief,‖2003). Importantly, this minority opinion came from a retired Supreme Court judge. 
―We had no idea if this might have been picked up on appeal,‖ this official explained, referring to minority 
opinion. Hence, ―the only option was to resolve the problem before the deadline‖ imposed by TDSAT in 
August 2003.  
It is useful to explore why a policy solution was ―the only option.‖ Disregarding the TDSAT judgment was 
not an option; that would have been a ―disaster,‖ as this official put it, referring to the possibility of being 
held in contempt of court. Or the issue might have gone back to the courts—going back out of the hands of 
TRAI or the babus. The biggest risk according to him was the potential disconnection of the millions of new 
WLL/limited mobility subscribers if the minority TDSAT opinion would become a majority opinion at 
TDSAT or the Supreme Court.  
As Mr. Shourie, the communications minister at the time, said in an interview to a national newspaper soon 
after the decision, ―The judgment is a good one, in fact it would have been difficult if it had gone the other 
way (declared [limited mobility] services illegal). What would we have done with the four million customers 
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using these WLL-mobile services?‖ (―TDSAT limits,‖ 2003). Mr. Shourie explained that the DoT would be 
going to TRAI asking for recommendations. The worry among those working at these institutions, was that if 
by any chance the issue went back to the courts, the courts might easily reverse their decisions and declare the 
limited mobility service illegal.  
Hence, there was a need for a quick solution that did not jeopardize and ―derail‖ the industry and this drove 
the Government to push for a policy solution that would override the legal dispute and cause both sides to 
withdraw from their court cases. By the time that TDSAT, acting on the Supreme Court‘s orders, sent the 
limited mobility question back to TRAI, the staff there knew that their chance to act was then or never. 
According to one industry analyst who had access to both TRAI and DoT officials at the time, the sense 
among them was one of concern that if they let this opportunity go by, the outcome would have been 
negative for the future of the industry. 
Three actors in the arena thus sought an adjustment to the formal method of dispute resolution, choosing an 
alternative venue from TDSAT that would allow transparency and predictability. The Supreme Court, 
TDSAT, and TRAI all offered possible venues to the Government, DoT, and the disputants where they 
could get a solution that was transparent in the sense that neither the press nor the public would perceive 
political influence. However, each of these venues also came with other characteristics that tempered their 
usefulness as sites for dispute resolution in the manner that these parties wanted.  
TRAI was the only site among these three that offered the possibility of predictability, because its interests 
were not in dispute resolution purely, but rather in resolving disputes in a manner that accommodated the 
interests of all parties. As such, TRAI offered a site for negotiation unlike the courts, which would most likely 
adjudicate, and that to in an unpredictable manner. Going to TRAI was thus a preferable option for the babus. 
In an interesting reversal of the typical dynamic, TRAI, weakened in its formal dispute resolution powers was 
actually more powerful as an informal dispute resolver because it was less likely—through the combination of 
transparency and predictability—to make a decision that would have ―derailed‖ the entire 
telecommunications sector. Thus, the seemingly less independent agency, which had to depend on DoT and 
the Government for its policymaking and dispute resolution powers, actually turned out to be more useful 
and hence more powerful in resolving this war.  
Furthermore, links between TRAI and DoT were stronger than ever during this period. Mr. Baijal, the then 
Chairman of TRAI was famously close to Mr. Shourie, the Minister of Communications. They were also 
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known as a tough pair of administrators who would force their way upon the babus and the disputants. This 
meant that the two organizations would be made to work together. This expectation was borne out: DoT 
accepted TRAI‘s recommendations on unified licensing in five days and took them to the Cabinet of 
Ministers almost without modification, an unusual occurrence. 
The Government also had an interest in ensuring that such a solution be found. Elections were coming up in 
mid-2004 and it was politically important to avoid disconnecting millions of subscribers, claim the addition of 
the potential millions more, and resolve this politically sensitive issue involving powerful business houses. 
Further, given the importance of the boom in telecommunications to their reformist and pro-business, pro-
private investment credentials, it was important that India should not suffer a loss of four million telephone-
subscribers months before an election. Mr. Shourie, a key leader in the party leading the coalition government 
of the time would have certainly known this. 
At TRAI, staffers felt that they had an opportunity resolve an unnecessary dispute and foster growth, 
promote competition, and drive down prices. While no political credit flows to TRAI for enabling a 
telecommunications revolution, almost every TRAI staffer I spoke with on the subject felt that being able to 
implement this solution in India was a matter of pride. This might seem like an unlikely source of 
momentum, but for them, the ability to resolve this ―war‖ was of utmost importance. And more importantly, 
as another involved staffer explained, it ―was a chance to show everyone that TRAI still had an important 
role to play‖ even after the Amendment and the creation of TDSAT. 
The choice of TRAI as an agency for dispute resolution was thus because of a wider set of political 
considerations related to the Government‘s and DoT‘s perceptions of the importance of the dispute and its 
outcome. No doubt that every possible useful venue was indeed approached—political, judicial, regulatory, 
and even the media—but TRAI became the main forum where the dispute was trashed out because of the 
twin benefits of transparency and predictability.  
Reasons for the Outcome 
The traditional view of dispute resolution suggests that an adjudicator should apply technical and unbiased 
rules fairly to the case at hand and come up with solutions that are then enforced through the coercive power 
of the state. The power of disputing parties to appeal to some higher (typically) judicial authority checks the 
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discretionary power of the regulatory agency, and suggests that the regulator will seek a technically sound 
solution. 
However, this is not how dispute resolution works in practice. ―Judicial activities must be considered in terms 
of political context,‖ writes Moore (1978, p. 205), and ―judicial decisions are often not ‗simple‘ applications of 
norms‖ (p. 209). The place of rules in judicial decisions cannot be assumed, she writes, but need to be 
examined. Similarly, Rosen (1989) argues that every judge sifts through a case trying to determine the 
indeterminable. The judge interprets the facts and rules in specific ways that reflect cultural concepts present 
and shared in society, but are not dependent on a rulebook (Rosen, see chapter 1).  
The central theme of this study is that regulatory agencies operate within larger social and political fields that 
influence how they resolve disputes. The values and preferences of the individuals at the regulatory agency, 
and their understanding of their role in society have an important impact on their decision-making. In 
particular, I argue that the decision-makers at TRAI demonstrate Nehruvian capitalist characteristics. 
Their decisions are not simple applications of rules or laws, but see the frequent use of Nehruvian capitalist 
values and preferences. These values and preference find resonance through fields that include other 
disputing parties, and they thus influence the trajectory of the dispute in terms of the procedures used, the 
logic of the outcome, and the enforcement of the result. Disputing parties also deploy arguments to lead the 
adjudicator to resolve the dispute in their favor. The adjudicator uses these arguments where possible to 
reassert their authority over the arena and where possible to ensure adherence to their decision among 
disputing parties. 
This section of the chapter looks at the influence of Nehruvian capitalist values and preferences on dispute 
resolution. These values and preferences helped determine the logic and the outcome of the dispute 
resolution process. Focusing on these values, we also uncover the underlying forces that were at play in the 
arena.  
According to my informants, the war had three interconnected yet distinct outcomes. The first was a new 
licensing regime that would ―unify‖ the fixed and mobile and eliminate distinctions between technologies. 
The second outcome was a major boost for the fixed operators, who could now ―migrate‖ to mobile 
telephone services after paying a higher license fee and possibly a fine. And the third was the ―sops‖ for the 
174 
 
original mobile operators in the form of concessions on license fees and an expansion of the scope of their 
licenses.  
Each of these outcomes was the result of ideas that were valued among the Nehruvian capitalists and played a 
role of directing the outcome. The push to unify licenses was the outcome of TRAI staffers‘ opinion that it 
would be impossible to hold back the ‗march of technology,‘ and any licensing regime that attempted to do so 
would fail in the end. The allowance to the fixed licensees to migrate followed from the hope that the 
additional competition and newer technology would allow more Indians to have access to telephony. And the 
quid pro quo to the mobile licensees was driven by a desire to ensure a fair solution. 
The „march of technology.‟ A few months after the licensing decision, senior staffers from TRAI 
were invited to speak at a local conference where DoT and industry people were also present. As the staffers 
were walking to the podium, one of them heard some of the audience snickering that the Telecom Regulatory 
Authority of India should be renamed ―Reliance Regulatory Authority of India‖ [in reference to Reliance, 
which benefited from the opportunity to migrate to the unified license].  
The staffers felt upset by this and instead of speaking on the topic to which they were assigned, they 
responded to this whispered accusation directly explaining that they had no choice in the issue: on one hand 
was to continue the status quo of false classifications that would continue leading to trouble. On the other was 
to adopt a new system of licensing that would reflect international best practices and solve the problem 
finally. After all, TRAI staffers explained, there was no way to stop the progress of technology and that it was 
necessary to eliminate the distinctions that caused all the trouble in the first place. 
Most TRAI staff that I spoke with accepted the idea that the ‗march of technology‘ was inevitable and 
dictated a shift in the licensing regime. As a number of staffers explained, the war exposed the fundamental 
weakness in the licensing regime; that this would have been only the first in a series of controversies and the 
only way to avoid continuous crises was to redesign the licensing regime. Maintaining licensing distinctions 
would be a retrograde step that opposed the introduction of newer and better technologies. 
Relying on the notion of the inevitability of continued problems if the licensing regime was not fixed, TRAI 
staff were keen to resolve the problem that limited mobility posed while addressing the longer term issue of 
technology neutrality—the idea that a regulatory regime should not dictate technological choices but focus on 
the quality and provision of services.  
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Similarly, the fixed operators also relied on the idea of the inevitable ‗march of technology‘ for why they 
should be allowed limited or even full mobility centered on how the use of a mobile technology for fixed 
service was not exploiting the technology fully, that it represented a missed opportunity for consumers and 
the country. The ‗march of technology‘ was thus happening in the here-and-now. Instead of representing a 
new technology that would enter the market in the future and challenge the licensing regime, proponents of 
limited mobility were projecting WLL itself as a technology cramped by regulation and waiting to break free.  
On the other hand, the mobile operators were adamant in how ―WLL [was] no march of technology,‖ but 
was based on a technology available long before mobile service began in India (―TDSAT ruling,‖ 2002). 
Another commentator called into question the application of the ―march of technology‖ concept only for 
WLL and not other technologies. He pointed out that other technologies such as Internet telephony, which 
also represented new opportunities, were ―still banned—though ‗the march of technology‘ is used as an 
argument to introduce other policy changes‖ (―Wireless crossing,‖ 2001). 
Introducing the engineering mindset. What explains the success of the ‗march of technology‘ 
concept in grabbing the attention of TRAI staffers? For one, the idea certainly appealed to what I call the 
engineering mindset of TRAI officials. Most TRAI‘s senior staffers have at least a Bachelor‘s degree in 
engineering or technology. Many of them have this degree in electrical, electronics, or telecommunications 
engineering, and some have advanced degrees in these or related subjects. This was the case at the time of the 
war and remains so even at the time of this writing.  
Apart from being members of the Indian technocracy, TRAI middle- and senior-level staff are also capable 
technical thinkers, with the ability to understand and grasp concepts related to technology quite easily. They 
also believed that attempts to control technology would be futile, and usually resulted in suboptimal use of 
the controlled technology. As they explained to me at different times, one of the underlying arguments was 
that permitting limited mobility would simply be allowing those CDMA networks to operate at their full 
capability, that is, as mobile networks. In their approach to technology, with their understanding that 
technological progress was inevitable and good, these Nehruvian capitalists were reflecting their technophilia. 
Here, I discuss how the engineering mindset worked in the context of this dispute.  
It was clear in speaking with TRAI staff that they believed that WLL represented an opportunity for Indian 
telecommunications, and that the licensing regime had wrongly classified it as a fixed wireless service. This 
does not mean that TRAI staff was unaware of the possibility that fixed operators were indeed using WLL as 
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means for backdoor entry into the lucrative mobile telephony market. However, they believed that it was 
unreasonable to think that regulation would be able to hold off the slow creeping of these operations in to 
the mobile domain. For them, limited mobility was akin to the head of the proverbial camel in the tent. 
Moreover, TRAI staffers were sensitive to the problems that India had faced in the past regarding 
technological choices. Much of the slow economic growth between the 1960s and 1980s was due to the 
Government placing heavy controls on what technologies could be used for which tasks (Katrak, 2002). 
During the era of ISI, control over technology imports was supposed to help develop the indigenous 
telecommunications equipment manufacturing industry (Aggarwal, 2000). Instead, it created wasteful state-
owned enterprises that, delayed by complex rules, often delayed procurement and ended up with outdated 
devices and components (Singh, 1989).  
In the early 2000s, India was firmly into its second decade of rapid economic growth since liberalization in 
1991, and there was an enthusiasm to avoid the mistakes of the past and instead encourage the use of the 
latest technologies. To this end, the 1994 telecommunications policy chose digital GSM technologies for the 
planned mobile telephone service because it was seen as a way to leapfrog the missed opportunities of the 
past. Now, in the 2000s, India was again looking like it might allow licensing to come in the way of 
telecommunications development.  
As various TRAI staff explained, either they needed to impose very strict rules to prevent any possibility of 
mobility, or they should just allow it. Their technical education led them to believe that developing a long list 
of rules on mobility would have been a bad idea for two reasons. First, even if they could develop the rules, 
enforcing them would have become impossible. By the height of the dispute the number of limited mobility 
subscribers had already crossed three million and they were spread all over the country. There was really no 
regulatory organization capable of checking if any of these subscribers was, in the words of one TRAI staffer, 
―carrying the handset from his living room to his bedroom.‖  
Second, CDMA was already in use around the world as a mobile technology. Globally the CDMA family of 
technologies constituted over 13 percent of all wireless mobile subscribers by March 2003 (Wireless 
Intelligence, 2010). There was really no long-term future where CDMA service providers would not push to 
make their services mobile. Consequently, they were keen to find a definite solution to the current problem 
with WLL and avoid similar situations in the future. 
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But the ‗march of technology‘ argument was critical for more than only TRAI staffers. The fixed operators 
who were keen to enter the mobile telephony market supported these views. By 2003, the number of wireless 
telephony subscribers had crossed 1.2 billion worldwide, and the number in India was 13 million. Private 
investors were all keen to secure a share of the huge untapped Indian market; by the late 1990s, the middle 
class alone was estimated to be about 30 million people—the equivalent of Canada, Saudi Arabia, or Malaysia 
in terms of population. And there was significant demand for telephone service; as late as 2005, the waiting 
list for wireline telephones was 1.2 million (it was 2.9 million in 2000). 
This Nehruvian capitalist technophilia seems to have had an effect on the judiciary as well. In its March 2002 
decision allowing limited mobility over WLL networks, TDSAT noted that, ―any new technology, which is in 
the interest of people can not be stopped‖ (―India‘s Supreme Court,‖ 2002, p. 1). Moreover, the Tribunal 
noted that: 
There can not be any legitimate expectation that no new technology will evolve and if any 
new technology comes, that will not be allowed to be adopted by any competitor of the 
petitioners. That will be illegitimate expectation. In the spirit of today‘s judgement and in 
order to get the maximum benefit of technology, the government should remove artificial 
barriers in the use of WLL… (― Tribunal upholds,‖ 2002, p. 1).  
Such thinking seems to have played a role in the Supreme Court‘s thinking on the matter as well. The Court, 
in its decision, explained: 
Taking an overall view of the case we are of the view that increasing teledensity of the 
country is an object which must be pursued with zeal and vigour. Nothing should be allowed 
to stand in the way of persuing [sic] this objective (―India‘s Supreme Court,‖ 2002, p. 1). 
According to one observer present in the Court room, after the repeated pleas of the lawyers defending the 
fixed operators, the Court recognized that maintaining an artificial distinction between similar technologies 
was unsustainable in the long-term. Hence, instead of ordering the services shut down or the licensing regime 
be adhered to without change, it suggested that TDSAT relook at its own opinion on the case and think more 
clearly about justifying its position. I will return to the engineering mindset in the following chapter. 
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The „poor man‟s telephone.‟ A reading of the Supreme Court‘s order of December 2002 on the 
issue of limited mobility gives us an interesting insight into the thinking of the apex court. In its judgment, the 
Court noted that: 
According to the [TDSAT], allowing WLL with limited mobility will render cheaper 
telephone services to the consumer… This finding is also borne out from the materials on 
record and it may not be possible for us to interfere with these findings... (―Cell firms,‖ 
2002).  
What does cheaper telephone service have to do with licensing reform or dispute settlement? As I discussed 
in Chapter 3, in the early 1980s, the Indian telecommunications network was recognized as the worst in the 
world. State-controlled incumbent MTNL was ridiculed as ―Mera Telephone Nahin Lagta‖—my telephone does 
not connect. The economic liberalization program saw telecommunications open up to private participation 
and competition.  
Yet, by the late 1990s, things had not significantly improved. From a business economics perspective, the 
fixed telephone operators that were licensed in the first round had failed. They had promised high license 
fees, determined at auction, which they could not pay. Most went bankrupt and shut shop as the costs of 
building and maintaining a wireline telephone network grew while their subscriber numbers stagnated (Desai, 
2006). Mobile telephone operators were better off, but were seeing slow growth and were charging tariffs 
unaffordable for most Indians.  
Moreover, the regulatory climate was weak—the private firms faced an incumbent that was keen to ―milk the 
cows‖ as Desai (2006, p. 47) puts it. The babus ensured that the mobile telephone operators had such licensing 
conditions that they could not recover their costs fully (Desai, p. 49). And as we have seen, attempts by TRAI 
in its early years to rectify this situation met with strong resistance from the babus who were uninterested in 
easing the market conditions for the private firms. 
As various TRAI staff explained to me, from their perspective, the situation was impeding the growth of the 
telecommunications industry. The goals of the national telecommunications policy looked unachievable at 
that point. The new policy, released in 1999, aimed to have a teledensity (number of telephones per 100 
people) of 7 by 2005 and 15 by 2015. In 2000, when the first rumblings of the MTNL fixed wireless WLL 
service began, teledensity (fixed plus mobile) was about 3.2, and growth was at a slow pace with the added 
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uncertainty of the success of the private firms. And not that TRAI was the only agency worried about 
attaining this goal. Shyamal Ghosh, the secretary of the DoT said that, ―Our challenge is to have a faster 
rollout to as many customers as possible‖ (Daniel, 2001).  
Fixed wireless offered a ray of hope. As one staffer explained, the introduction of MTNL and the private 
service providers with WLL led to competition in the market. Until that time, the mobile operators existed in 
a duopoly and were content to roll out services in the larger cities and at higher prices. Hence, for TRAI, the 
introduction of limited mobility services embedded a two-fold benefit. First, it allowed more competition 
with cheaper tariffs, and second, it allowed faster rollout of fixed services, helping cut costs. The hope was 
that this would promote growth in the subscriber base, helping the Government reach its policy targets. 
Yet, TRAI was fully aware of the potential confusion in the licensing regime well before the war began. There 
was official communication between TRAI and DoT on the topic of licensing the fixed operators and 
allowing them to provide wireless services. As some later press reports suggest, the letter contained a 
forewarning of the potential regulatory arbitrage opportunity provided by a lax licensing policy. The TRAI 
Chairman at the time, Mr. Verma, wrote to Mr. Ghosh in 2001 explaining that there should be clear technical 
restrictions on the fixed providers to ensure they do not become de facto mobile operators (Gupta, 2003). In 
the event, of course, the fixed operators became mobile and the mobile operators complained loudly taking 
the case to TDSAT, and then appealing to the Supreme Court.  
But from the perspective of growing the telecommunications market, my interlocutors said that the 
introduction of wireless in local loop services and the ‗fixed wireless‘ concept paid rich dividends. By 
December 2003, the number of fixed lines including WLL (fixed) was 42.1 million, and the number of mobile 
WLL subscribers 6.45 million. Cellular mobile subscribers were at 21.99 million, up from 10.53 million 
subscribers in December 2002. By December 2004, when the unified licensing system was in place, the total 
number of mobile subscribers (now including CDMA and GSM) was 48.01 million—the ex-limited mobility 
operators were at about 12 million (TRAI, 2005). TRAI staffers believed that this growth between 2001 and 
2003 was due to the increasing competition and reducing tariffs led by the introduction of limited mobility 
services. 
And it is this rapid growth that gave the fixed operators cover in their dispute with the mobile operators, 
especially with the Government at the time, which was keen to take credit for overseeing the boom in 
telephone services. This Government, which was a center-right coalition known as the National Democratic 
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Alliance (NDA), pointed this out clearly in their Manifesto for the 2004 elections. In that document, the 
NDA promised to ―increase the number of telephones in the country from 70 million to 300 million in five 
years‖ (Prabhat, 2004, section 3).  
In its recap of achievements over its 1998 to 2004 rule, the coalition-leader the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
(Indian Peoples Party) put ―digital connectivity: telecom for all‖ as a section in their ―pocketbook,‖ an 
operations manual for party workers. Some of the statements here highlight the importance the Government 
placed on getting telecommunications policy right: 
Mobile phone was a symbol of luxury yesterday. Today it is an affordable tool of 
empowerment for the common man. Policy of encouraging competition has directly 
competition has directly benefited the common man. Share of private sector in telecom 
services up from 4.7% in March 1998 to 35% in January 2004 (BJP, n.d., pp.20-21). 
The idea of the ‗common man‘ getting a telephone remains a politically powerful idea, again close to the 
Nehruvian capitalists‘ desire to use technology for the public good, and valuing technology as a means out of 
poverty and ignorance. In fact, it not only was powerful enough for the fixed operators to feel they had some 
cover with the Government; they were also confident it would give them leeway with the Supreme Court. 
Even when the mobile companies decided to appeal TDSAT‘s decision to the Supreme Court, ―the basic 
private operators [were] not in the least bit worried. They [were] confident that the Supreme Court will 
dismiss the petition challenging the poor man‘s mobile.‘‖ (Rambabu, 2002). 
The mobile companies recognized this line of argument by state agencies, political parties, and the fixed 
operators. The chief executive of mobile firm Hutchison-Essar, soon after MTNL was allowed to begin its 
limited mobility services, lamented: ―Populism has taken over compared with the national interest‖ (Daniel, 
2001, p. 1). They also claimed that the only reason WLL services were cheaper was because of regulatory 
discrimination. In an open letter to the TRAI Chairman in January 2003, the mobile operators‘ association 
wrote that, ―limited mobility services were ‗obviously more affordable‘, as this had been ‗specially created‘ for 
them, thanks to the authority‘s ‗discriminatory‘ regulation, and it had nothing to do with the ‗march of 
technology‘ as it was made out to be‖ (―Cell cos,‖ 2003). 
Yet they could offer no counter to the proposed adjustment that drew on powerful organizing ideas. 
Commenting on pressure from the mobile operators to halt the introduction of limited mobility, the then 
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communications minister Ram Vilas Paswan ―asserted that the Government would not concede to the 
pressures of private cellular operators against introducing the WLL phony (wireless in local loop) which 
would benefit the rural public‖ (―No yielding,‖ 2001). Similarly, ―highly-placed‖ bureaucrats in the DoT also 
clarified that, ―the decision to allow fixed mobility has been taken with a view to increasing tele-density and 
bringing in more competition among the players‖ (―DoT rubbishes,‖ 2001).  
More importantly, these ‗highly-placed‘ sources felt that the mobile operators were only trying to stall the 
introduction of competition. According to one press report, these sources explained that, ―there is no point 
in [the mobile operators] crying wolf every time the department tries to bring in more competition. All efforts 
are being made to ensure a level playing field as well as means of quicker roll-out with the introduction of 
new technologies providing cheaper communication‖ (―DoT rubbishes,‖ 2001). 
Indeed, even in its orders to TRAI after the Supreme Court asked it to relook at the issue, TDSAT was clear 
on the positive developments due to limited mobility even as it ―introduced an unsettling element‖ in the 
industry. I quote: 
The cheaper alternative offered by Limited Mobility Service, even though not exactly 
substituting all that fully mobile services can and do offer, has certainly introduced an 
unsettling element in the Cellular Mobile Industry, particularly in the Metro Cellular areas. 
Prices have crashed dramatically, incentives to retailers and consumers have multiplied, and 
the increasing competition has led to more price-cuts and offering of several supplementary 
and /or value-added services which will sooner or later have an impact on both growth and 
profitability. While in this bonanza the consumer is definitely the beneficiary, one needs to 
see as to whether the continuation of the aggressive price wars would ultimately benefit the 
industry and also the consumer (TDSAT, 2001, sec. 68). 
In other words, the fixed operators had a significant advantage in terms of being seen as the harbingers of 
competition, cheaper telephone services, and more subscribers. For a country eager to escape from its 
reputation of having the worst telephone network in the world, these were not benefits to be disregarded. 
Ideas such as the ‗common‘ or ‗poor man‘s telephone‘ do not suddenly appear in policy debates. Rather, 
specific actors deploy them to shore up support for their position or damage the opposite side. It is useful to 
query about what might have happened in the case of the poor man‘s telephone—it was certainly an idea that 
182 
 
the Government seems to have believed in, but one specific private actor also had an important role to play 
in popularizing it and taking it from being an idea to being instead a tangible political artifact. 
Adjusting the law in deference to a father‟s son. Even the ‗common man‘, ready to be 
emancipated by the ‗march of technology‘, needs someone to pull him out of his wretched condition of 
disconnection. India‘s common man may have found such champions among the Nehruvian capitalists at 
TRAI, but these individuals remained less well-known than one individual who did much to precipitate the 
war. 
This individual was Mr. Mukesh Ambani, the Chairman and Managing Director of Reliance Industries, India‘s 
largest private sector conglomerate. Reliance Industries in 2004 was a conglomerate in a class of its own. In 
2004, Reliance had revenues of US$17 billion, equaling its market capitalization, employed over 11,000 
people, and had 2.3 million shareholders (supposedly the largest number for any publicly listed firm in the 
world) (Reliance Industries Limited, 2004). For his part, Mr. Ambani was India‘s richest man, immensely well-
connected in political and economic circles. 
Mr. Ambani was also instrumental in developing the concept for inexpensive WLL-based services offered by 
Reliance Infocomm, his conglomerate‘s telecommunications firm. He had a powerful story to tell about why 
he believed in the idea of the ‗common man‘s telephone.‘ It is a story that has now become folklore in India.  
The story goes that one day his father, Dhirubhai Ambani, the founder and patriarch of the Reliance 
conglomerate, once asked Mukesh about how expensive it was to call his family in the small town of 
Chorwad from his residence in Bombay. When Mukesh told his father that it would cost about INR 40,* the 
elder Ambani remarked that there would be a telecommunications revolution only when the people could 
made telephone calls at the same price as sending a postcard (then INR 1). This conversation and the simple 
pricing rule presented to Mukesh by his father (who passed away in 2002) spurred his deep interest in the 
telecommunications business. 
This simple story is powerful because it conveys both the importance of the Reliance Infocomm business 
model of cheap telephone calls and reinforces it with a touch of ‗duty-to-my-father‘ that is an important local 
                                                   
* At the approximate time that this happened, the USD/INR exchange rate was about US$1 to INR 43, which meant 
that a one minute telephone call would be priced at about US$1. 
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custom with its own power of coercion (especially when the father and son in question lead the largest 
conglomerate in the country). In front of persuasive folklore such as this, ideas about contract law and license 
fees had weak, if any, standing. Further, while the content itself is politically powerful—more, cheap 
telephones as a duty to my father/our country—the party that told these stories are also very important.  
Yet, even though Mr. Ambani‘s story has value as an adjusting force when it comes to licensing reforms in 
Indian telecommunications, his company also attracts criticism from many for its ability to manipulate the 
Indian legal and regulatory system for their own benefits. According to some, the conglomerate operates in its 
own zone. This image is reinforced by the known history of Reliance benefiting from its ability to manipulate 
the license-quota-permit raj that controlled the Indian political economy from 1950 to 1984. However, many 
Indians do not begrudge them this because another widely held notion is that most of Reliance‘s legal 
innovations, other adjustments to orders imposed during the raj, were acceptable because many felt they were 
in the interest of the nation. This includes ending incumbents‘ monopolies, introducing new technologies 
(everything from polyester fabrics to CDMA networks), and challenging the Government to change its 
restrictive regulations.  
The influence Reliance has over the regulatory system cannot be underestimated. The conglomerate is 
rumored to have close professional and personal ties with almost every key bureaucrat and politician in India. 
Given that its companies have revenues equivalent to about 4 percent of GDP, its health is economically 
important and its ability to influence policy is undeniable. One can gauge the importance of a firm like 
Reliance from the humor that grew around it. One quip was that until 1980, the growth model in India was 
self-reliance, after 1980 it was ―only Reliance.‖ More seriously, after Dhirubhai‘s sons split their empire, 
courts have openly deferred to their mother, Kokilaben, to resolve disputes between them. In a dispute 
between the brothers‘ companies over natural gas pricing—ongoing at the time of this writing—the Supreme 
Court in effect asked them to, in the words of one observer, sit at the feet of their mother and ask her 
guidance. The fiscal impact of their mothers‘ decision to the Government was estimated at as much as 
US$109 billion (Murali, 2009). It seems that if there were a group of individuals in the arena that could come 
close to operating within their own ordering systems, it would seem to be the owners and employees of 
Reliance. 
Reliance also marketed the limited mobility phone very strategically, positioning it as the poor man‘s phone 
and ensuring that no political power could really oppose its plans. All through, Reliance—the leading 
proponent of limited mobility—repeated the same ideas: more competition, cheaper service, more phones, 
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more subscribers, new technology. It helped, of course, that the riotous response to the launch of MTNL‘s 
Garuda service, or to Reliance‘s Monsoon Hungama offer, had carpenters and rickshaw-pullers line up beside 
college students (Shastri, 2003). Such a curious juxtaposition of individuals from different classes seeking 
inclusion into Mr. Ambani‘s ‗telecommunications revolution‘ attests to the power of Reliance‘s marketing 
campaign as well as the overwhelming demand for inexpensive telephone service. 
Reliance was able to pool its massive financial resources into a near-national rollout of the WLL service, 
undercut the competition in pricing even if it did not have all the benefits that MTNL did (in terms of 
existing telecommunications infrastructure and other permits), and put at the disposal of the fixed operators 
its legal and political capital. This national rollout, and the fast-growing subscriber base that Reliance 
attracted, had the effect of worrying the Government about the impact of a negative decision on WLL. 
Reliance‘s story is important because the conglomerate had the ability to influence the arena through a whole 
range of socially and politically powerful ideas—a duty of a son to his father, the common man‘s phone, and 
the potential for a telecommunications revolution in India. Just as the babus had the power to organize the 
arena, so too did Reliance. Given its political power and image as a company looking to serve the common 
people as a way to serve a national icon‘s—the elder Mr. Ambani‘s—dream, Reliance and its ideas in support 
of limited mobility were strong enough to overcome tough arguments about the legality of limited mobility or 
the importance of adhering to license regimes. Reliance was thus successful at creating a range of useful 
adjustments that it backed up with its financial and political power; situational adjustments in the arena that 
supported an effective coup d‘état against the mobile telephone companies.  
Fairness. Reflecting a Nehruvian capitalists‘ desire to seek consensus among warring factions, the 
staff at TRAI worked closely with the babus to set up the third outcome of the dispute. This outcome 
included the various financial sops given to the erstwhile mobile licensees through cuts in license fees 
equivalent to about INR 9.6 billion (about US$200 million in 2003) (―Rs 960 cr,‖ 2003)—and ‗policy sops‘ 
such as raising limits on foreign investments and easing certain types of mergers (―Mobile services,‖ 2003).  
It was widely understood among my interlocutors that it was necessary to placate the mobile licensees by 
offering them some compensation for their losses due to the entry of new competitors to get them to drop 
the litigation against the fixed licensees and to shore up support for the migration to unified licensing. As I 
have described in the foregoing, the mobile operators were opposing the migration of WLL services to full 
mobility, a move that created more competition and which they saw as a ‗backdoor‘ entry.  
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The unification of the licenses due to the ‗march of technology‘ and the migration of WLL to full mobility 
accommodated the ‗poor man‘s mobile telephone,‘ but the mobile operators complained that they had paid 
heavy license fees and spent billions on setting up their networks. How would they be able to recover from 
the sudden shift in business economics? 
As the Government was working towards the unified licensing solution, TRAI and DoT were also working 
on ―calculating what the effect of unified licences on GSM service companies will be, to arrive at a fair 
compensation‖ (Gupta, 2003). The idea of fair compensation was a demand of the mobile operators since the 
initial stages of the dispute. In a December 2000 press interview, the director general of the mobile operators‘ 
association proposed that, ―introducing mobile WLL as a third service just to accommodate [fixed service 
providers] alone would be an unfair move… in that case a fair compensation is a must for cellular industry‖ 
(Anand & Business Times Bureau, 2000). Even when TRAI made its recommendations on the introduction 
of WLL services, it suggested that the mobile licensees should be compensated for the potential reduction in 
revenues through some reduction in license fees. 
As I have also discussed, for TRAI staff, the idea of a ‗level playing field‘ is an important one. They recognize 
that the underlying task of the regulatory agency is to ensure fair competition on such a ‗level playing field.‘ 
The terms of the entry of the fixed licensees into mobile telephone services included fines and penalties, as 
well as license fees based on a recent auction of mobile telephone licenses. 
However, the number of service providers had increased from what was promised earlier (through the 
unification of licenses, entry of MTNL/DoT into the mobile telephony business, and the entry of a fourth 
mobile service provider). As a result, TRAI and DoT staffers felt that the erstwhile duopoly mobile licensees 
should be compensated for facing a different business environment than they had earlier. 
This fairness was strategic. It was not clear to TRAI whether the mobile licensees would accept the unified 
license regime and end this war. The possibility of non-acceptance posed a problem for TRAI, which was 
looking to push through the license unification before the TDSAT deadline of December 2003 that would 
expose the industry to the risk of an order from a court to shut down limited mobility services. The mobile 
licensees also made threats that they would freeze investments and continue the legal battle—neither of 
which was a desirable outcome for TRAI (or DoT) for reasons that I have alluded to earlier. Hence, it was 
essential to arrive at a ‗fair‘ solution that would ‗level the playing field‘ for the mobile and fixed licensees, and 
quickly. In the event, satisfied with the effort to level the playing field and compensate them for the increased 
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competition, the mobile licensees did accept the conditions of the migration and withdrew their cases from 
the Supreme Court and TDSAT. 
Affordability vs. democratic communication. Taking ideas such as the ‗poor man‘s telephone‘ at 
their face value is tremendously risky. Such an approach will hide important assumptions and questions from 
view. Importantly, it would hide how order is created when individuals deploy ideas such as ‗affordability‘. 
Only when we examine these ideas, their meaning, and their sources of power will we understand if the 
meaning of the idea and our interpretation of it are equivalent. 
To make this point, let us look closely at the idea of ‗affordability.‘ I have discussed how this idea was 
powerful within the arena and how this power helped the regulator and other actors justify their positions and 
actions in licensing reforms (and we will see in Chapter 8, spectrum policy). Indeed, within the Indian arena, 
it might be difficult to find an idea more powerful than the ‗poor man‘s telephone,‘ the more visually 
appealing version of affordability. 
At first glance, a focus on affordability might be interpreted as a focus on democratic communication*: that 
the Indian arena is pursuing policies and regulatory approaches that make communication inclusive for all. 
Undoubtedly, more Indians have access to communication today than before liberalization. TRAI proudly 
publishes reports on how India‘s telephony subscriber base is growing by millions every month. Yet, does this 
mean that India‘s telecommunications are more universal? Or that they are more democratic? 
The answer most likely received from the insiders might be that 30 percent of the population remains 
uncovered, that US$5 billion available in the Government‘s universal service fund remains unspent, or that 
the poorest cannot yet buy a mobile telephone. The question becomes: does a focus on affordability truly 
serve those intentions? 
I argue that affordability serves more as a distraction than a means to evaluate the availability of 
communications services. For one, the idea that cheaper services leads to more users is tied to the theory of 
demand and supply commonly used in microeconomic thinking. Such thinking breaks down when services 
are necessities (exhibiting price inelasticity, as economists like to say). The question then becomes one of 
                                                   
* Here, I focus on one aspect of democratic communication related to telecommunications, that is, universal service. 
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whether telecommunications services are a necessity or not. Such a debate will go back to political 
preferences.  
Importantly, equating affordability with access is problematic because it typically presupposes the 
involvement of private sector firms in the provision of such services for a fee. I have seen suggestions of 
subsidized telecommunications services being deemed unsustainable (for such private providers) or plainly 
socialist (threatening a return to the dark days before economic liberalization). Industry analysts from the 
investment banks supporting telecommunications firms thus focus on the lowest possible tariffs that would 
support profitable private provision. In one case, an analyst commented that some specific dollar average 
revenue per user was the lowest possible tariff equivalent. Anything lower and the firm he advised would be 
―unprofitable.‖ 
Suggesting that universal telecommunications service should be tied to private firms‘ profitability indicates a 
disconnection between the concept of affordability and democratic notions of access. As McChesney writes, 
―the historical record of communication regulation indicates that… once the needs of corporations are given 
primacy, the public interest will invariably be pushed to the margins‖ (McChesney, 1996 under Policy and the 
Profit Motive). Communication regulation, he writes, has become a process of creating incentives for firms, 
―to pay them to act differently such that their profits do not fall‖ (McChesney, 1996 under Policy and the 
Profit Motive). Although India‘s telephone services are now among the most affordable, in absolute terms, in 
the world, that at least a third of the population is still left uncovered is concerning. And the extent to which 
the notion that extending services to such areas is ‗high cost‘ or ‗low revenue‘ is astounding. This language 
has now become integral to the discussion on universal telecommunication service—more evidence of how a 
social objective towards democratic communication has been superseded by the profit motive. 
A focus on affordability is also problematic because it indicates that permitting the profit motives of private 
firms as long as they keep prices low could overpower concerns about adjustments to licensing regimes or 
reversals in policy positions. Service providers‘ claims that such moves would lead to affordable 
communications are, as I have discussed in earlier sections, a claim that adjustments are essential to 
affordability and hence directly to accessible communications. However, as Schiller writes, ―it should be 
generally apparent, although it is not, that the aims and practices of the commercial market are not always in 
step with the social requirements of the human commonwealth‖ (Schiller , 1992, p. 196). 
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Unfortunately, in most cases the earlier model of public sector-led telecommunications completely failed. As I 
have described earlier, not only was public telephone service poor quality but it was also expensive and 
limited. There are thus legitimate doubts about the potential for public sector-led service provision. 
Interestingly, since liberalization, the rhetoric within the arena has shifted to account for improved 
performance at the state-controlled firms as a response to the entry of the private firms and the resulting 
competition. The idea that private participation has led to improved public sector performance thus allows a 
continued and unquestioned preference for private sector-led telecommunications service provision. 
This leaves considerations about democratic telecommunications and specifically universal access behind the 
preference for private sector-led growth. Profit-making firms are considered apt recipients of funds from the 
Government to provide service to high-cost or low-revenue communities and areas. Any discussion of the 
state-controlled service providers getting part of these funds results in complaints from the private firms 
about how fund allocation is non-transparent. Worries are aplenty in the arena, especially after the fund 
crossed US$1 billion, about its capture by the Government to fund non-telecommunication activities.  
Even though the regulatory agency might want to point this out and take action, it is possible that it might be 
tied down due to choices it has made in the past. When a regulatory agency such as TRAI has to rely on 
private firms for its position in the arena, it creates obligations and constraints across fields that might 
prevent the regulator from breaking out of unwanted positions. Maybe in a situation where the regulatory 
agency did not see private firms as essential to its survival or if it had not built up its vision of 
telecommunications as reliant on private investment, the agency might have been able to take a more 
aggressive stand for democratic communication. 
When private firms discuss affordability, they are speaking in terms maximizing coverage as far as profit 
maximization permits, while when the regulator discusses the idea, it is likely discussing how more Indians 
might access telecommunications. Such a disconnect between an idea and its meaning, and a divergence in 
meaning suggests that although challenging, scholars and regulators alike must venture beyond ideas into 
understanding the deeper implications for their agenda. 
The Impossibility of Anything Else 
Looking at the manner of how the dispute between the fixed and mobile telephone companies was resolved, 
one can begin to detect an invisible yet powerful idea. Let me initially state it as my interlocutors would say: 
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―There was no other way out.‖ As such, one might argue that the outcome of the regulatory dispute was 
known in advance of the rush to unify the licensing regimes and level the playing field. If there were no 
alternative, surely both the fixed and mobile companies would have known how their dispute would have 
ended. What locked the arena into a tight space where alternatives were absent? And what does this mean for 
regulatory dispute resolution?  
I have discussed some of the forces that we could argue eliminated alternatives. For one, elections were 
coming up and disconnecting four million new telephone users would have been a public relations nightmare 
for the Government. Even the Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of disconnecting these many 
subscribers.* Moreover, the bulk of these subscribers were with telecommunications firms owned by major 
conglomerates with significant political and financial power, not parties the Government wanted to irritate 
before the election. The involvement of the Prime Minister in the dispute—he was lobbied by both sides—
points to the political stakes at play. 
It is possible that even if elections were not held as they were in April and May 2004, (less than a year after 
the decision), the outcome of the dispute would have been similar. The elections did add additional pressure 
for a quick solution that did not risk disconnecting millions of subscribers. After all, a number of TRAI staff 
believed that there was no other option but to reorganize the licensing regime in a manner that would allow 
both fixed and mobile telephony companies to operate in the market. As I have described in detail above, 
they supported this thinking with the arguments that regulation could not halt the march of technology, that 
reforming the licensing regime would bring telephones to more Indians, and that being fair dictated that the 
mobile telephone companies should be compensated. There was, in their thinking, no other way out. 
Which brings me to the question: what might have happened if someone—TRAI, TDSAT, or The Supreme 
Court—had made the decision to stop limited mobility services? What was the alternative outcome that had 
worried everyone? The worst case that I may speculate is that these service providers‘ licenses would have 
been suspended or at worst revoked. This would have meant a loss of the investments and expenses made in 
network deployment, subscriber acquisition, and service provision for these companies. They might have had 
to scrap their networks. In all, this would have been a loss of a few billion dollars‘ worth. What made this 
                                                   
* The Supreme Court commented that, ―We are unable to accept [shutting down limited mobility], since it would be 
grossly detrimental to consumer interest and also on account of the fact that several fixed-service operators have already 
provided this facility‖ (―SC asks tribunal,‖ 2002). 
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such an unwanted outcome? Asking such a question to my interlocutors, I only got confused looks back. Was 
I being serious, asked one? How would anyone accept such an outcome? 
In his critique of the policy of commercial broadcasting in the U.S., Streeter argues that some ideas are so well 
established within the policy arena that they remain unquestioned organizing principles. His analysis identifies 
corporate liberalism as such an idea. This idea influences social practices and structures within that arena. It 
organizes debate and designates which issues and positions might be questioned and which might not. Such 
ideas become invisible to insiders, remaining unquestioned and powerful. 
It would seem that similarly, the idea of corporations losing money was unacceptable to insiders in the Indian 
arena. The idea that the limited mobility companies would have to disconnect subscribers and write off the 
billions of dollars‘ worth of investments and expenses was, it seems, ridiculous.  
Especially worrying for these actors and the limited mobility providers, then, was that the TDSAT Chairman, 
Justice Wadhwa, was known for writing judgments that did not support this idea. In an extensive analysis of 
his career as a judge and his proclivity for being a ―no nonsense‖ judge, the Business Standard newspaper 
wrote: 
What the cellular industry has also begun talking about is Wadhwa‘s judgement of July 26, 
1999 when, as part of a two-member bench of the Supreme Court, he directed that [an] 
underground shopping complex… be demolished as it was illegal… In other words, the 
cellular industry‘s saying that if Wadhwa is convinced the limited-mobile service is illegal, he 
will not hesitate to shut it down irrespective of the investment that has been made in it 
(―Walking softly,‖ 2003).  
Mr. Wadhwa‘s minority opinion was, predictably, along these lines. He wrote, ―the Government had a pre-
determined mind in allowing basic operators to offer the service, which was not only ‗invalid‘, but also a 
‗breach of contractual terms‘ with the cellular operators‖ (―Telecom dispute ,‖ 2003). He also suggested the 
DoT had pushed TRAI to allow limited mobility services: that the authorities had ―ulterior motives‖ and 
―grant[ed] favour to the basic phone companies… the whole thing proceeded on specious pleas to grant 
benefit to fixed service providers‖ (Dikshit, 2003). As I have described above, he asked that TRAI shut off 
these services. 
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Given the directness of Mr. Wadhwa‘s opinion, and his standing as a retired judge of the Supreme Court, it 
was possible that the Court might have latched onto his opinion and sided with him. TRAI staffers felt that 
something else had to be done and an acceptable solution had to be found. The rush within DoT and TRAI 
to find a policy solution that would override judicial diktat and lead the mobile telephone companies to drop 
their cases suggests that these actors were truly concerned about this outcome. 
TRAI‘s efforts to protect private firms‘ investments, even though this meant adjusting adherence to contracts 
the Government had signed with other firms, suggest that securing these investments was more important to 
it than adhering to the legal framework. Arguments about the march of technology and the poor man‘s 
telephone thus supported these values and preferences.  
One might ask how the mobile operators fit here. If the regulatory agency was looking to protect private 
firms, why would it hurt some and help others? I propose that the importance of fairness to the overall 
regulatory decision is critical to understand this. Put another way, any solution in favor of the fixed telephony 
companies was implicitly bound to concessions or sops to the mobile telephony companies. This 
understanding was tied to the idea of fairness: if we are going to accommodate limited mobility against the 
wishes of the mobile telephony companies, we should offer something to them as well. 
From TRAI‘s perspective, compensation was necessary because the Government was looking to end the war 
quickly, before the Supreme Court could take up the issue again or before the matter went back to TDSAT. 
For the formal legal process to halt, the mobile telephony companies had to drop their cases, something they 
were not going to do if the fixed telephony companies had won all of the spoils. Hence, arguing that it was 
only fair a surprising range of actors (the Supreme Court, TDSAT, and TRAI) sought to level the playing 
field and provide some sops to the mobile telephony firms as well. The Government first tried, during 
arguments in front of the Supreme Court, to level the playing field by offering the mobile telephone 
companies the opportunity to rollout fixed telephone networks (―Sorabjee offers,‖ 2002). The issue was 
settled when the Government included financial concessions and increased the limit for foreign ownership in 
telecommunications. It is clear that these concessions were an incentive for these companies to drop their 
cases; they were approved only after cases were withdrawn. 
From the vantage point of 2010, it is possible to suggest that this entire dispute was well played by the mobile 
telephone companies. As beneficiaries of the idea that nothing should upset the investments made, they 
might have been able to predict that the Government would be willing to work out a favorable deal with 
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them in order to regularize the limited mobility operations. Hence, they persisted in their formal legal dispute 
as a threat to extract the maximum benefits possible from the increased level of competition. 
It is not certain if this was the thinking among the mobile telephone companies at the time. Certainly, these 
companies were upset by the entry of the limited mobility players. They should also have been able to sense 
the difficulty of shutting off a network owned by a conglomerate as powerful as Reliance (or the other major 
limited mobility player, Tata). The implications of the success of MTNL‘s Garuda service and the quick 
decision by Government to license additional fixed operators were also likely well understood by these 
companies. 
From their perspective, it might have seemed like a win-win situation. If their legal challenges to limited 
mobility had succeeded, they would have retained their control over the market. And in the event that they 
failed or were forced to negotiate (as it did happen), they might have expected to have been able to pressure 
for some concessions. They could use the powerful organizing idea that investments and subscribers could 
not be disconnected, it seems that the companies on both sides of this dispute were confident in their own 
way about the outcome.  
When such invisible values and preferences exist, it may be possible for parties to benefit strategically from a 
dispute. I am not suggesting that this is what the Indian mobile telephone companies did, but only am 
suggesting that this is what they might have done if they knew the Government would not do anything 
leading to the disconnection of subscribers or the reversal of investments. With such knowledge, one camp 
might use the act of dispute to extract benefits for themselves, acting as an aggrieved party that needs to be 
compensated. And when regulators continue to let such values and preferences remain invisible, they will 
likely capitulate to such demands. 
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Chapter 8. Expertise and Ideas in Policymaking 
July in New Delhi is typically hot, humid, and uncomfortable. Average temperatures touch 103F and the 
humidity makes one perspire unbearably when the electricity goes out, which happens once every few days 
for at least two hours at a time. It is also a time when the desert winds from Rajasthan come into the city, 
making the heat even sharper.  
It was thus a relief on a July day in 2006 to find myself in the large conference hall of the Ashoka Hotel, 
listening to the discussions on India‘s radio spectrum policy. This event, hosted by TRAI, was an ‗open house 
discussion‘ or simply ‗open house,‘ organized a few weeks after the agency had released a consultation paper 
asking interested parties to propose how India should distribute spectrum that could be used for third-
generation (3G) mobile telecommunications.  
After the event closed, as was its common practice, the TRAI Chairman hosted a buffet lunch for attendees. 
Standing in line, waiting to fill my plate, I began speaking with the person who was next in line.  
The conversation was social, with this man asking me about how it was to study in the U.S. He wanted that 
his only child should also go to study in the States, he explained. She wanted to become an engineer, he 
explained. Answering that I had also studied telecommunications engineering for my undergraduate degree, I 
said that I would be happy to speak with his daughter and asked him to connect us on email. He smiled and 
said, ―She‘s still in the seventh grade.‖ 
A few minutes after I sat down to eat, my lunch line partner having gone his own way, a mid-level TRAI 
staffer joined me at the table. He asked me what I was speaking with this man about, likely having been in 
line just behind us. I casually explained that it was about my experiences studying in the U.S. 
―Good. I thought he was trying to teach you something about spectrum. What would he know anyway? He 
does not have an engineering background.‖ 
*** 
Expertise plays an important role in regulation. Expertise is one of the various normative explanations for the 
creation of regulatory agencies. Arguing that the analysis of various industrial activities in modern times 
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requires a high level of technical* skill, a number of academics have justified the creation of specialized 
regulatory agencies staffed with technically competent experts (Majone, 1996). Some also argue that creation 
of such groups of experts reduces the influence of political actors on decision-making that requires ‗unbiased‘ 
and ‗scientific‘ rule application (Hall, Scott & Hood, 2000). The independent regulatory agency, one analysis 
explains, ―are assumed to incarnate impartiality, expertise and a rationality unblemished by dirty party politics 
that is the legitimacy on which independent regulators are originally founded‖ (Johannsen, 2003, p. 26).  
Yet expertise has specific social and political characteristics. It embeds within it a specific concept of social 
hierarchy that prefers some forms and bearers of knowledge over others. It also reflects political 
arrangements to define what individuals engaged in some discussion could and could not say or to include or 
exclude individuals from dialogue on specific topics (see Streeter, 1996, pp. 132-148).  
The previous chapters have focused on how individuals at TRAI struggled against others in the arena—most 
notably the babus—to get ahead and establish their primacy over that arena. In this chapter, we will turn our 
attention to the role of expertise in these individuals‘ attempts to define a role for the regulatory agency. The 
earlier two chapters have been based on baat cheet with TRAI staff. This chapter uses participant observation 
as its primary data collection method. 
This chapter focuses on the role of expertise in regulatory life, analyzing how staffers at TRAI used particular 
expertise to prepare the agency‘s recommendations to the DoT on radio spectrum allocation, the process 
where these agencies decide which frequency bands are used for what services, for example 3G wireless 
telecommunications services.† In India, the process of spectrum allocation begins when TRAI consults with 
‗stakeholders,‘ prepares recommendations on allocations, and submits them to the DoT. The DoT then 
implements the allocation and goes on to assigning the band to specific users and monitoring them for 
compliance with usage rules.  
This chapter also explores how TRAI staffers have established and used their position as experts who can 
consider and make policy on important issues such as spectrum allocation to maintain their role in the arena. 
As the episode that opened this chapter indicated, the preference, at least among my interlocutors, was for 
                                                   
* I use the word technical here, as distinct from technological or engineering, to mean knowledge of specialized topics. 
† For instance, regulators internationally have allocated the 100 MHz band for FM radio and the 700 MHz band for 
television services. Similarly, regulators make decisions about which bands may accommodate 3G wireless services, 
which allow high-speed data services over mobile devices. 
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expertise in engineering. They often spoke of making policy about spectrum allocation as engineers would, 
using engineering analysis to answer questions that regulatory agencies in other countries have addressed 
using different approaches such as legal analysis or microeconomics.  
By acting as experts and playing the role of making transparent, unbiased decisions, TRAI staffers have 
positioned their agency as unique in the arena, mainly positioning themselves as different from the politicized 
babus who would ‗plainly‘ listen to directions from the minister. Yet, as this chapter will show, this expertise 
only serves as a carrier of political and social values and preferences that play, as always, an important role in 
decision making within the arena. 
This account also exposes how policymaking is a dispute resolution process, in spite of efforts to display 
policymaking as a thoughtful, politically neutral process. Unlike post hoc dispute resolution where some actors 
claim that others have harmed them, policymaking is a dispute between multiple actors and their agendas. 
Every actor wants the decision maker to listen to its viewpoint and accept its proposals. A policymaking 
process sees many arguments that attempt to connect the policy question with social and political fields that 
could order decision-making. Every actor uses ideas and concepts that suggest going another way will have 
negative implications for some or the other constituency. Moreover, analyzing spectrum policymaking is 
particularly interesting because it helps expose the ways in which the forces of globalization restrict the 
freedom of regulators, especially in developing countries. 
By 2006, the debate on how the Government should allocate spectrum for 3G services was ongoing for over 
five years. 3G services had made their debut internationally in 2001 in Japan, and soon after, discussions 
began within the Government about the introduction of these services. The first serious discussion about 3G 
policy began when TRAI released a consultation paper in May 2004 requesting comments on a range of 
issues including allocation. However, the telecommunications ministry dismissed those recommendations and 
in June 2006 asked TRAI to revisit the issue. A team within TRAI, of which I was a member, published a 
consultation paper in June 2006 that requested public comments on a range of issues to do with 3G spectrum 
policy.* The following account takes us through the release of this consultation paper to the publication of 
the regulator‘s recommendations to the Government in September 2006. 
                                                   
* The paper also included a discussion on broadband wireless systems, but this is out of the scope of this chapter. 
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An Expert‟s Approach to Spectrum Policy 
In late May 2006, just as I had arrived in New Delhi to begin my fieldwork at TRAI, DoT formally requested 
the regulator for its policy recommendations on radio spectrum allocation. Given my interest in this topic, I 
volunteered my services to the TRAI Secretary, who was responsible for the farming out of work within the 
agency. He agreed and asked me to work with the responsible team on this topic. 
A team, comprising mainly of staff at one of the technical divisions, had just begun preparing a consultation 
paper on this topic. The division had five technical staff, with the division headed by an Advisor. Two of 
these staff and one staffer of another technical division were assigned to be in the core team working on the 
spectrum policy recommendations. With my arrival, the core team working on the recommendations thus 
included four people.  
The group organized according to the professional seniority-based hierarchies that were established within 
TRAI and broadly speaking, the Indian civil services bureaucracy. Consequently, the most senior staffer in the 
group was ultimately responsible to the Authority for the recommendations. This person would lead 
presentations to and discussions with the Authority, even though other team members had the opportunity to 
comment and contribute to discussions during meetings and presentations.  
In the beginning, given that I was by far the youngest in the team and the person with the least amount of 
professional experience, I was asked to support the team. The team especially sought to benefit from the fact 
that I was adept at using the computer (and especially software such as Microsoft Word, Excel, and 
PowerPoint), and that I had knowledge of and access to online research resources. I thus began by helping 
the team leader with background research, document drafting, quantitative analysis and modeling, and 
preparing presentations. But as time went by and the other team members appreciated the work that I was 
doing and my substantive contributions to the policy debate, they began to include me in meetings and 
discussions with the Authority on substantive issues. Towards the end of the period of preparing this set of 
recommendations, in September 2006, I was contributing extensively to the policy discussion and serving as 
the lead author of the recommendations.  
The team would meet in one of the larger offices in the TRAI building to discuss these issues and ideas. Most 
of these meetings were informal. All team members attended these discussions, and they began with two a 
week and as work progressed and deadlines approached, were held multiple times a day. For the last two days 
197 
 
prior to the release of the recommendations, two team members and I were on the telephone or meeting 
every few minutes, discussing line by line the draft of the final recommendations. Once a week, the senior 
member of the team would meet with the Authority to update them on progress and to get their guidance on 
specific questions facing the team. I joined many of these meetings as well. There were also regular leadership 
meetings, where the Authority and the Advisors all sat in the conference room and debated on specific 
questions. These more-formal meetings also became more frequent as the deadline approached. 
All of the team members were trained as engineers. They had educational history and job experience in the 
engineering disciplines, particularly in electronics and telecommunications engineering. All four of us talked 
about spectrum allocation as an engineering problem. These telecommunications policy professionals took an 
‗engineering approach‘ to resolving policy questions related to spectrum allocation. This preference for 
discussing policy in technological terms also fit with their Nehruvian capitalism. I call this specific 
characteristic the ‗engineering mindset.‘  
The „engineering mindset.‟ The engineering approach to spectrum policy differs from other 
approaches such as say an ‗economic approach‘ or a ‗legal approach.‘ For instance, in many countries, the 
economic approach of policymakers leads to them framing discussions about spectrum allocation in terms of 
the demand and supply of a scarce natural resource. This notion of scarcity leads to discussions about the 
right price for spectrum, an economic response to the problem of allocation. Indeed, this is the prevalent 
approach, with many countries that follow the Anglo-Saxon economic model leading the charge to price and 
allocate spectrum through methods such as auctions, for example.* 
However, the literature on spectrum policy also suggests that it is possible to discuss spectrum allocation as 
an engineering problem (Benkler, 2002; Gerald & Farber, 2002). In this approach, the discussion does not 
focus on managing scarcity but on controlling electromagnetic interference among radio devices. Engineers 
suggest that spectrum availability could be increased if the probability or effect of interference were reduced. 
In one widely quoted analysis of spectrum policy, computer scientist and Internet pioneer David Reed 
proposed that, ―bad science created the broadcast industry.‖ Explaining from his perspective—an engineer‘s 
perspective—that ―there‘s no scarcity of spectrum any more than there‘s a scarcity of the color green,‖ Reed 
argued for managing interference by improving the design of wireless devices and antennas (Weinberger, 
                                                   
* One proponent of spectrum auctions asks about the U.S. ―why were auctions, with obvious efficiency and equity 
advantages, so long in coming?‖ (Hazlett, 1998, p. 529).  
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2003). In another presentation, Reed suggested, ―spectrum regulation should recognize physics‖ (Reed, 2002, 
slide 27). This is a different approach to spectrum management: it suggests that the finiteness of spectrum is 
temporary and ill conceived, with the amount of spectrum available to use increasing as technology advances.  
When engineers think about policy, then, they tend to analyze policy questions in terms of their technical 
characteristics instead of figuring what markets might be affected. For example, they look for optimal 
network and device design to minimize interference rather than efficient market-based allocation strategies 
for finite natural resources. The engineering approach also privileges technological assessments and analyses, 
the framing of policy choices as technological or technical problems, and the discussion of the features of 
technologies rather than policies (e.g., talking about interference mitigation rather than market mechanisms 
for spectrum allocation).  
Finally, the engineering approach creates a field of its own within which these team members operated. The 
engineering approach symbolizes specific types of expertise and orders thinking and behavior. This approach 
organized how the team members worked and thought through the question at hand. As a field it included 
those individuals who could demonstrate certain forms of expertise while excluding others (I describe this in 
the opening episode and again below), and it permitted some sorts of discussions while dismissing others 
(also described below). The ideas and comments of those deemed to be technologically competent through 
either education or experience had greater value for my teammates than those of people without such 
expertise.  
The engineering mindset was in full display as the team used the engineering approach to address questions 
of spectrum allocation for 3G services, questions formulated as an engineering problem. The following 
account thus exposes how expertise symbolized by the ‗engineering approach‘ worked as a field, influencing 
how the team decided about the issue at hand and why it decided to solve in a particular way. Furthermore, it 
also discusses why the team preferred the engineering approach, and how the stakeholders in the 
policymaking process accepted this field and used it to propose ideas in their attempts to get a decision that 
would benefit them to the detriment of their competitors. 
Spectrum allocation as an engineering problem. Talk about third-generation (3G) spectrum 
allocations had begun in India in the late 1990s, the same time when international standardization bodies had 
defined these 3G technologies. 3G was supposed to improve the data carrying capacity of mobile telephone 
networks and offered telecommunications firms the opportunity to add new services to their line-up. 
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According to my team members, 3G had become a topic of discussion in the arena because of the 
opportunity they felt it provided for India to expand the reach of Internet services. The babus were happy, 
they explained, because 3G meant new lines of business for BSNL and MTNL, while TRAI staffers, 
including the longer-serving members of the team, felt that India adopting 3G would not only showcase its 
‗technology-friendly‘ regulatory framework but also help popularize Internet use. TRAI staffers were 
optimistic that 3G could become the first link to the Internet for many people who did not own a computer 
but owned a mobile telephone. 
In line with this optimism, TRAI had made policy recommendations to DoT in 2005 proposing that the 
Government should award the existing wireless telephone companies free radio spectrum to deploy 3G 
services. Some of the staffers at TRAI believed that giving this spectrum free was essential if 3G services 
were to be affordable enough for mass adoption. While this view prevailed at TRAI, it did not convince the 
babus.  
DoT rejected these recommendations. This rejection was explained as follows: soon after TRAI submitted 
these recommendations, one of the larger telecommunications firms, Tata Indicomm, proposed that it would 
have been willing to pay about US$350 million for one block of frequencies that it could use for 3G. Given 
that five such blocks were available, the Government could potentially raise close to US$2 billion dollars 
through the sale or lease of this spectrum. This was too tempting an offer to resist for the Government, and 
specifically for the powerful Ministry of Finance.  
According to one senior staffer at TRAI, the affordability and mass adoption argument failed because the 
Government believed—ironically enough—that the sale of 3G spectrum could raise sufficient money to 
offset the cost of social protection and welfare programs that the Government was planning. The Nehruvian 
capitalists at TRAI might have believed in the emancipating power of technology. But for the Government, 
the political gains from cash-disbursing social safety-net programs were far greater. 
Consequently, DoT asked TRAI for a new set of recommendations on 3G spectrum ‗allotment.‘ It is useful 
to make one comment here. Even though the team working on the recommendations possessed the 
engineering mindset, they ‗knew‘ from the outset that the spectrum would have to be priced. After the wide 
publicity that the letter from Tata to the Government had received, the unsaid message to TRAI was to 
rethink the proposed free allotment of spectrum to the telecommunications companies. For the team, this 
unsaid message was well understood. Interestingly, one might also consider how this approach to achieving 
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these unstated objectives was also part of the engineering approach; in engineering terms, the team at TRAI 
was solving a problem within given boundary conditions. These engineers had to provide an answer, not ask 
questions. 
It is also important to consider that this team was making decisions not long after the ‗war‘ over limited 
mobility, with all its attendant talk of backdoor entry and backroom deals. During one early team meeting to 
discuss options for the recommendations, one team member, having just read the 2005 recommendations, 
explained that, ―If we give the spectrum free, it will probably lower the prices of services.‖ To this, another 
team member, who had been with TRAI longer, responded that, ―Everyone will think that we have made 
some kind of deal with these companies. And in any case, a free gift will not be valued.‖ It is thus important 
to note that even though these individuals had a supposedly neutral and expertise-driven engineering 
approach, they had to adjust their thinking to fit the political preferences—imagined or real—of more 
powerful players and interest groups. 
Most the team working on these rethought recommendations, including me, were new to the proceeding. We 
had not participated in preparing the previous set of recommendations. Some of the team members had 
contributed to the earlier recommendations, but were critical of the recommendations that the spectrum 
should be given away free. The choice of team members by the Secretary was thus strategic, helped by the 
happy coincidence that most of these people had recently joined TRAI or had been promoted within the 
regulatory agency. 
Soon after DoT sent the letter to TRAI, the team prepared and released a consultation paper on the topic and 
asked for responses from all interested parties, including the service providers, telecommunications 
manufacturers, and public. As with most discussions on spectrum policy, the questions focused on three 
stages of the allotment process. First was allocation, the identification of the bands that 3G services would 
use. Second was assignment, designing how the Government would select the users of the bands. The final 
step was to determine the price of the spectrum assigned. At a minimum this would include an annual fee the 
users would pay the Government to use the spectrum, but it could and often has included a significant 
upfront fee that the users pay to gain access to the spectrum.* 
                                                   
* It is also interesting to understand the ideas and procedures used to price spectrum, a widely covered topic in the 
literature. However, this is out of the scope of this study and hence I leave it for another research project. 
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I focus on the allocation stage in this chapter for two reasons. First, the team considered allocation to be the 
most important stage. The recommendations would have to identify how much radio spectrum would be 
available for 3G—the more the amount, the less contentious the assignment stage. In the words of one team 
member, ―allocation sets the stage for everything else. If we can allocate more spectrum, the assignment and 
pricing is simplified because all of the potential users can get spectrum.‖ However, he also recognized that ―if 
we cannot [allocate a large amount of spectrum], then we have to undertake a much more complex 
arrangement to select users and price the spectrum.‖  
However, even though team members were keen to allocate as much spectrum as possible for 3G services, 
they knew that they faced limits that were out of their control. The amount of spectrum available depended 
on how much the DoT‘s spectrum management unit and especially the military would be able to free given 
other constraints. And an important problem facing the team was that they expected this policymaking 
process to involve a dispute among service providers. Rather than being a simple decision-making process, it 
would in effect be a dispute resolution process.  
Policymaking as dispute resolution. For the team, the entire spectrum policy question was framed 
in terms of concepts such as ‗frequency bands,‘ ‗interference,‘ ‗band plans,‘ ‗antenna characteristics,‘ and so 
on. In this electromagnetic rendition of spectrum policy, what mattered to my teammates were the details of 
the technological aspects of the policy proposals that various telecommunications firms were providing them. 
What follows is a framing of the policy questions the team sought to answer in the manner that it was 
described within the team, within TRAI, and within the arena. 
The erstwhile fixed telephony companies used CDMA technology, which uses the 800 MHz band in India. 
The mobile telephony companies used GSM technology, which uses the 900 MHz and 1800 MHz bands. 
Each technology also has its own path to evolve to data-capable 3G services. For GSM, the 3G technology is 
WCDMA, and at the time of this spectrum policy discussion, WCDMA mainly used the 2.1 GHz band. 
In the case of CDMA, the 3G technology was an upgrade: the 2G version is known as CDMA2000 1xRTT, 
while the 3G version is CDMA2000 1xEV-DO (henceforth EV-DO). In 2006, EV-DO technology was 
available in the 450 MHz, 800 MHz, and 1900 MHz bands. A chart of the bands the 2G and 3G versions of 
GSM/WCDMA and CDMA/EV-DO technologies use is in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: A chart showing the various standard spectrum bands in use for 2G and 3G networks (TRAI, 2006, 
p. 23). Sections in black overlap in the standard band plans, creating the overt reason for the dispute. 
EV-DO technology had one very important advantage. Because it was an upgrade on the CDMA 2G version, 
it could operate in the same bands as the 2G version. To evolve, CDMA service providers mainly had to 
upgrade the software and change some network elements. The more difficult part of evolving from 2G to 3G 
CDMA was that users‘ handsets had to be compatible with EV-DO technology. But here too, the CDMA 
networks had an advantage. India‘s CDMA boom had happened after 2002, and it was thus possible that 
many Indian CDMA subscribers had or would soon have compatible handsets. Hence, my teammates 
understood, in the simplest case, CDMA operators could migrate from 2G to 3G in their own bands, while 
GSM operators would move to the 2.1 GHz band and begin 3G services there.  
In spite of these advantages, the CDMA operators complained that they had no space to expand and include 
3G services. According to DoT‘s frequency allocation plans, CDMA networks were only allocated the 800 
MHz band. These companies continuously represented to the team that the resulting limited allocation (of 20 
MHz of spectrum) was insufficient for them to move to 3G ‗in-band.‘ A move in-band to 3G would require 
them to dedicate some part of their already limited spectrum assignment to data transmissions and reducing 
their capacity to carry voice calls—the major application for mobile communications networks in India. The 
CDMA operators also claimed that requiring them to do this was unfair because the GSM networks got more 
than 80 MHz for their 2G systems alone; the CDMA networks would have to fit both 2G and 3G into 20 
MHz while GSM operators would get up to 140 MHz for both. 
Consequently, the CDMA operators wanted access to additional spectrum, especially if the Government 
wanted them to offer 3G services. The additional spectrum they requested was in the 1900 MHz band, 
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known as the Personal Communication System (PCS) band. This was the overt point where the policymaking 
process became a dispute. 
The GSM network operators, all of whom seemed keen to begin WCDMA services, opposed the idea that 
CDMA operators should get the 1900 MHz band. They opposed this allocation because parts of that band 
overlapped with the 2.1 GHz band—their preferred band for WCDMA services. After all, they argued, 
WCDMA networks operated in the 2.1 GHz band globally and it was the most commonly used band.  
My engineering-minded teammates framed the dispute as a choice among three possible options: only 2.1 
GHz, only 1900 MHz, or some hybrid arrangement. This was the same choice available to TRAI for its 2005 
recommendations. At that time, TRAI dropped the option of 1900 MHz only, the preferred band for EV-
DO supporters. This option was discarded because the military was using that band and was unwilling to give 
it up, and because the required handsets to the Indian mix of bands were not available at the time (TRAI, 
2005). Neither of these conditions had changed at the time of the 2006 recommendations and the team did 
not reconsider this option. 
Thus, my teammates felt that there were only two ‗realistic‘ policy options on allocation to 3G services: either 
allow only the 2.1 GHz band or to allow both the 1900 MHz and 2.1 GHz bands and make the two operate 
simultaneously. They labeled the second option the ―mixed band allocation.‖  
The preference within the team was to open up as much spectrum as possible, implying that the team‘s 
attention focused on finding out if the mixed band allocation worked. If it worked, it would allow both GSM 
and CDMA companies to migrate to 3G using their preferred technologies. If it did not work, the team 
would have to disappoint one of the two sides, a repeat of the 2005 recommendations. Given that the team 
did not consider the 1900 MHz band-only option realistic, this meant that the CDMA companies would have 
to be disappointed, leading to a possible renewal of older disputes among these companies—something the 
team and most senior staffers at TRAI seemed keen to avoid. 
The team was thus interested in the feasibility of mixed band allocation. Framed within their engineering 
approach, this translated into a question of whether such allocation was technically feasible, that is, would it 
work ―in practice?‖ With the team seeking an answer to the technical feasibility of the mixed band allocation 
option, the debate over spectrum allocation turned into a debate over the technological characteristics of 
wireless telecommunications. 
204 
 
Rituals of transparency: The importance of “open houses” and “consultation.” In their effort 
to resolve the debate over spectrum allocation, my teammates sought to ensure an ‗open‘ and ‗transparent‘ 
process of ‗consultation‘ to make a ‗well-informed‘ decision. In seeking a transparent decision making 
process, my teammates were returning to the procedure that TRAI staff had repeatedly used: industry 
consultations. After all, one of my teammates explained, the telecommunications firms (and not TRAI) had 
access to the best and latest technological information. This made it imperative for the team to engage with 
representatives of all of these firms to understand all the ‗facts.‘ 
Policymaking at TRAI was an iterative process, which is to say that as the proceeding continued, it got more 
into specific details and that findings and recommendations were constantly revised and updated based on 
discussions internally and externally. The consultation process on spectrum policymaking began with the 
publication of the consultation paper in June 2006 and ended when the Authority released its 
recommendations in September 2006.  
Between June and September, there was a series of events—meetings, presentations, discussions, and 
debates—that iteratively informed the content of TRAI‘s recommendations. Some of these events were 
internal, such as the team meetings or presentations to and discussions with the Authority. Some events were 
with outside participants, such as when representatives of the various service providers would come in to 
TRAI‘s office and make a presentation to the Authority and Advisors. And a few events were public, when 
TRAI met with stakeholders in public forums to discuss the questions in the consultation paper or its ideas 
for the recommendations. 
After each event, the team would reconvene in the meeting room and discuss the implications of that event. 
In some cases, the event would yield interesting results. One such meeting was with a group of electrical 
engineering faculty from the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi. In other cases, the team did not see 
anything useful come out of the meeting. It was surprising to see how some seemingly important meetings 
were actually not useful. 
One of the most important of events was the ‗open house discussion‘ held in July that year. The ‗open house‘ 
was an important and regular ritual for TRAI whenever it was engaged in preparing high profile 
recommendations. TRAI would release its consultation papers and ask for comments from any interested 
party within some period. A few days after the window for comments closed, TRAI would organize these 
open house discussions, which were meant to be open to all interested parties; the Secretary would send 
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specific invitations to the commentators, but also publish open invitations in major newspapers, seeking to 
attract the widest publicity. 
TRAI would organize open houses in a large hall located in a conference center or hotel in Delhi. The exact 
venue depended, as the administrative staff member in charge of booking these halls explained, on how many 
people were expected to attend, which in turn was a function of how high profile the issue to be discussed 
was. In some cases, TRAI would also organize open houses in other cities including Bombay or Bangalore 
depending on the perceived level of interest.  
Typically, the hall would be arranged with a dais on one side and tables arranged in a U-shape around it. The 
dais would have a few chairs and a table, usually covered with a white table cloth, where the Authority 
members would sit, along with the Secretary and the Advisor concerned with the matter being discussed. In 
the case of the open house on 3G spectrum policy, the venue of this discussion was a large hall in the Ashoka 
Hotel, located in Central Delhi.  
The typical open house had three parts. In the first, the Chairman provided brief opening remarks to set the 
stage for the discussion. In some other open houses, the Chairman would pass the floor to one of the other 
persons sitting on the dais for their comments.  
The second part of the discussion shifted to the Authority posing the various questions included in the 
consultation paper. The various participants at the open house began providing their responses to these 
questions, going in an orderly fashion where the Authority would call on one of the participants, who would 
then launch into their responses. 
In this manner, the open house progressed with each party discussing its viewpoint. In this open house, 
representatives from the GSM operators warned that the mixed band allocation would not work, while 
representatives from the CDMA operators suggested it would. An officer from the military‘s wireless wing 
said that it would need time to relocate from both bands, and some technical specialists from the Department 
of Space, which occupied some frequencies identified for other wireless services, also commented on the 
difficulty they faced in moving out from those bands. 
Following these presentations, the formal discussion closed with a note of thanks from the Chairman, and the 
third part of the open house, the lunch, began. During the lunch, representatives from the various service 
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providers quickly gathered around the TRAI senior staff, seeking to underscore their viewpoints with some or 
make polite conversation with others. The Chairman left quickly, and the middle level TRAI staff including 
the team sat down together to eat lunch.  
As we were exiting the hall and getting into the cars that would take us back to the office, I asked one of the 
senior members of the team about his opinion on the open house discussion. ―It was not really that useful,‖ 
he said, ―All of them are repeating the same thing they were saying last time. We will have to think of this on 
our own.‖ 
Yet, the open house, along with the entire consultation process, remains an important ritual for TRAI; a ritual 
that reinforces the image of TRAI as an agency that listens to all and makes its decisions in a ‗transparent 
manner‘. I opened this study with a description of an open house discussion on telemarketing. And since 
2006, TRAI has had numerous other such open houses. In the earlier days, especially when the limited 
mobility disputes were ongoing, open houses were known for being noisy and disorderly occasions. ―We used 
to get these local strongmen and low level politicians coming in and yelling for or against some company or 
decision,‖ recalled one senior TRAI official. Apart from reiterating the regulator‘s transparency, the milder 
and orderly version of the open house that I saw had one thing in common with its noisier predecessors. 
Their utility as an information gathering mechanism was limited. ―But we continued doing [open house 
discussions] because at least they were all shouting at us and everyone could see that no one liked what we 
were doing!‖ If no one agreed with TRAI, TRAI was favoring no one; that impression itself was worth being 
yelled at plus the cost of lunch. 
Thus, TRAI staff were aware that the agency‘s importance in the arena depended on its reputation as 
‗transparent.‘ I have discussed how TRAI‘s transparency led it to become a key player in dispute resolution, 
even after its formal powers to resolve disputes had been stripped off. Here we see how the desire to display 
transparency created specific rituals, such as open house discussions and consultations. TRAI‘s new found 
position with respect to spectrum policymaking was also an outcome of this adherence to the rituals of 
transparency. This transparence was an important factor leading DoT to return to TRAI for a rethinking of 
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recommendations; the babus at DoT could have made a spectrum policy on their own, but also were aware 
that this could have led to accusations of foul play.* 
The Engineer as Policymaker 
The most common events were meetings where the team met with representatives of the various service 
providers and associated telecommunications manufacturers focused on engineering-related topics such as 
‗interference characteristics of radio antennas,‘ the ‗appropriate distances between antennas‘ of the two 
technologies, and the ‗characteristics of the filters‘ that might be required to overcome the problem of ‗inter-
carrier interference‘ between these two technologies. In these meetings, the team sought to structure the 
policy choice in front of it as a problem in radio engineering on which it wanted technical facts from the 
service providers and manufacturers. Keen to position themselves as experts, my teammates defined the 
policy choice as an engineering question: would mixed band allocation work or not?  
Building on the engineering approach, the team also met with some faculty members of a research group 
based in the Indian institute of Technology, Delhi (IIT). The team wanted this research group to prepare a 
report on whether the mixed band allocation was feasible. The group submitted its findings after a few weeks. 
The findings were positive, suggesting that mixed band allocation would work if networks would deploy 
specific technical fixes to overcome any risk of incompatibility. Choosing IIT Delhi was both a matter of 
convenience and strategic thinking. IIT Delhi was located near TRAI‘s office and had excellent research 
facilities that could conduct the required research. But IIT Delhi was also an academic institution, with the 
attendant notions of being apolitical and beyond bias.  
Streeter also mentions a similar view within the interpretive community of the Beltway. A shared premise is 
that of the ―autonomy and neutrality of expertise,‖ and one of the ―institutional homes‖ for such neutral 
expertise is the research university (Streeter, 1996, p. 118). However, ―universities can be too independent,‖ 
and policymakers are interested in research that does not ―stray… far outside the proper bounds of policy 
research‖ (Streeter, p. 119). By going to the IIT campus, the team was not only going to (most of their) alma 
mater, but were also approaching the electrical engineering department, where the technical nature of their 
question would get its due attention without the possibility of such straying out of bounds.  
                                                   
* Indeed, at the time of this writing, an ex-minister of telecommunications and the babus are caught in a scandal related to 
‗allocating spectrum in a non-transparent way‘ (―CAG indicts,‖ 2010).  
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I propose that the team chose the engineering approach for three reasons. First, as I have described above, 
the team consisted of staff that had an engineering mindset with most of them trained in engineering and 
having worked in the technical branches of the Government prior to joining TRAI.  
Second, the focus on these questions as technical problems that had to be solved through an engineering 
approach highlights the preference for technological expertise at TRAI, and specifically of the group working 
on spectrum policy. They privileged technical knowledge, engineering expertise, and looked for analyses that 
would conform to their expectations of what constituted appropriate policy research, in this case, a technical 
analysis of interference and its implications for 3G spectrum policy. This stands in contrast with the lawyer- 
or economist-heavy staff working on similar issues in countries such as the U.S. or U.K. Most of the staffers 
working at TRAI were engineers by training, including those working on the spectrum policy consultation. 
Most had graduated from the elite Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) system, and prided themselves on 
their ability to regulate the industry, as one said, ―as engineers rather than economists.‖ 
There were few economists and lawyers at TRAI, which may be surprising to some because these are typically 
the most prevalent professionals in regulatory agencies internationally. These economists or lawyers were 
usually in the legal or economic divisions, where their function was clear. Similarly, staffers trained in finance 
typically worked at the financial analysis division. This segregation was seen as a natural order by TRAI staff. 
First, they were proud of the fact that engineers dominated TRAI. Staff knew that other countries‘ regulatory 
agencies were dominated by lawyers or economists, but saw the dominance of engineers as a positive for 
TRAI. As one staffer explained to me: 
What do lawyers or economists know about technology? Nothing. Instead they listen to the 
private companies and follow their advice without question. Here we are able to approach 
regulation from a technical standpoint. We can understand an issue and respond accordingly. 
This makes us neutral. 
The notion of the superiority of the ‗engineer‘ is well entrenched in Indian society. It is often said that parents 
want their sons to become either ‗engineers, doctors, or officers‘ (the last referring to members of the civil 
service). As Srinivasan writes, the understanding among Indians is as follows: ―Science for the bright and the 
boys, Arts for the lazy, the dull and the girls and Commerce newly emerging for the not so bright but 
ambitious… Arts and social science is not even perceived as an ‗education‘‖ (Srinivasan, n.d., p. 3).  
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The opportunities for respectable employment since colonial times have been tied to technical competency: it 
was easier to find a high paying job in the British raj after training as an engineer, accountant, or lawyer as 
opposed to history, literature, or political science. In 1882, for example, the Indian Education Commission 
clarified that the education system should prepare ―native youth‖ for ―industrial and commercial pursuits‖ 
(Vakil & Natarajan, 1966 as cited in Srinivasan, n.d., p. 8). No doubt, the raj wanted to reward its subjects with 
employment if they were useful to the processes of colonialism; one might also argue that technical subjects 
are easier to control than those that encourage creativity and discuss concepts such as freedom, equality, or 
rights.  
Even today, young Indians with an engineering degree are in higher demand on the marriage market. The 
entrance examination for the IITs is almost legendary in terms of its competitiveness; a few percent pass the 
test. For many, graduating from one of these institutes is a sure way to overcome poor social standing such as 
class or ‗caste‘ barriers. On the other hand, most Indians (still) view the humanities and social sciences as a 
path for underperforming students, lazy children, the rich and unconcerned, or girls that have traditionally 
been looked upon as destined for a career as ‗housewives‘ rather than professionals. In a society famously 
stratified based on access to knowledge, the engineer is the new priest.  
And technical work has been considered less corrupted than business or politics. Most Indians will view a 
successful lawyer, bureaucrat, or businessperson suspiciously; they are assumed to have ‗played the system‘ to 
succeed. However, the technical professions such as engineering or medicine are seen as ‗cleaner‘ and where 
success is dictated by competency rather than craftiness. Accusations of corruption or crime leveled against a 
businessperson rarely attract any attention, but similar findings about technical specialists are met with 
surprise and disappointment.  
This leads me to the third reason I believe the team chose the engineering approach: it felt that taking an 
engineer‘s perspective and ‗solving‘ this problem would attract less resistance from the disputing service 
providers. My interlocutors saw technical solutions as apolitical: the laws of physics and electromagnetics 
decided the outcome and not political preference, limiting the possibility of resistance and protecting them 
from controversy. Discussing interference, electromagnetic theory, and the placement of antennas would 
make it clear that neither group would feel privileged or perceive any unfair behavior. At a number of times in 
the discussion—both internally and with visitors—the team made it clear that it was interested in unbiased 
technical inputs on the possibility of the mixed-band allocation. ―Let‘s not get into the politics,‖ one team-
member would say, ―but let‘s focus on the technological aspects.‖ Put another way, the companies had made 
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choices among technologies, and TRAI was evaluating the best technical solution to address the technologies‘ 
needs, not the companies‘ preferences.  
However, even as the team was positioning its technical solution as apolitical, it had to face the problem of 
questioning the findings of a previous technical analysis conducted during the previous consultation on this 
issue. In its May 2005 recommendations, TRAI had included technical analysis showing the mixed band 
allocation as unfeasible and made a firm statement to that effect (TRAI, 2005). Yet, in the face of this finding, 
the team reconsidered it given the preference to allocate as much spectrum as possible. The idea that more 
spectrum was good—to avoid more disputes, an obviously political desire—trumped the suggestion that 
technical analysis was beyond contestation. I return to this debate about facts, and the interesting 
contradiction between the technical analyses and the clash of ideas subsequently. 
Responding to the engineering approach. The team‘s interest in using an engineering analysis to 
make its decision thus drew upon the ordering power of a field in the arena that that preferred technical 
analysis, sought to present political questions as engineering questions, and indicated to the other actors in the 
field that the debate should be couched in an engineering language. The risk of violating this field was losing 
TRAI‘s attention and being branded as seeking to get a political solution rather than something that was 
apolitical and based on neutral technical analysis. Consequently, the disputing parties adopted an engineer‘s 
approach to the presentation of how and why TRAI should make its decisions.  
Here I would like to discuss how the disputing parties fit into the field. Both sides put forward their 
technologists to make the case for each side. These technologists, from the GSM and CDMA operators and 
their associated telecommunications equipment manufacturers, made a series of presentations to the team 
and in some cases to the Authority itself. The content of these discussions almost always focused on the 
technical feasibility of the mixed band allocation, with both sides making highly technical arguments for why 
it was possible or not, depending on their positions. Given the training and inclination of those present, these 
discussions focused on the technical issues to attempt to find the solution that would work. 
These technologists would usually come in with other representatives of the companies (I identify these other 
types of representatives below). The team would usually meet them in the conference room next to the 
Chairman‘s office, although it was rare for the Chairman or other Authority members to join unless the 
speaker was someone of high standing (such as a Chief Technology Officer). The technologist would usually 
begin a PowerPoint presentation that laid out the company‘s view on the issues in front of TRAI, here the 
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question of mixed band allocation. The presentation would usually end up being a discussion on the 
intricacies of the graphs, equations, or diagrams on the slides presented. Usually, these meetings would end in 
the technologist being thanked for their viewpoint.  
The especially interesting presentations were from some of the equipment manufacturers that produced both 
EV-DO and WCDMA equipment, and hence had clients on both sides of the dispute over mixed band 
allocation. The team was especially interested in hearing from these companies, because it felt that these 
companies would be neutral and provide the real picture about the possibility of coexistence between these 
two technologies. However, these presentations did not make any conclusion. On being pressed to give an 
answer by the senior member of the team, one technologist from one of these companies simply answered: ―I 
do not know.‖ Engineering expertise has its limits. 
These technologists were one category of representatives of the disputing parties. Technologists included 
company staff that worked in the technical divisions of the service providers or were senior technical staff of 
the equipment manufacturers. They included people such as senior engineers, network designers, researchers, 
and in some cases Chief Technologists. These technologists shared the engineering background of the team at 
TRAI. They also had worked in technical capacities for many years and could talk about interference, 
antennas, and filters just as well or better than TRAI staff. Among the various representatives of the disputing 
firms, these individuals were typically more acceptable to TRAI staff because of the view that technologies 
could rise above the petty business or political interests that other representatives held.  
It is also useful to point out here the other types of representatives that existed. One was the company 
executives, including the CEOs and Managing Directors and other such high-level staff. Typically, these 
executives did not come by TRAI more than once during a proceeding and that too only when the meeting or 
matter at hand was of great importance, such as this 3G spectrum consultation; doing so would dilute the 
effect of having them attend the meetings. The word of such executives was highly valued and especially 
when TRAI staff felt that they were ―visionaries‖ and ―thought leaders.‖ Sure, they had to serve the interests 
of their shareholders, but at the same time, the perception was they were not interested in moves that would 
secure petty profits at the expense of their reputation.  
The final type of representatives was the government affairs staff of these companies whose job it was to 
liaise between TRAI and their own companies. This group, due to the nature of their work, would be the 
most frequent visitors to TRAI. They were also seen as the least neutral because TRAI staff perceived them 
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as carriers of messages from the company, taking stands that would benefit the company they represented as 
opposed to being true to some higher standard or apolitical like the technologists.  
The team also did not take kindly to such biased government affairs staff attempting to make technical 
arguments. Only technologists could really be apolitical, it seems; the government affairs staff could not be 
apolitical, only pretend to be so.  
In one case, a representative of one of the industry lobbies had sought a meeting to discuss the mixed band 
allocation. This person was someone who, based on earlier interactions within the team, I could see that the 
team clearly perceived as a government affairs staff rather than a technologist, and certainly not important 
enough to be considered an executive. When the representative began his presentation, and the first slide 
displaying a diagram of the mixed band allocation, I could see a look of mild surprise among the team around 
the table in the meeting room. Was this government affairs person attempting to make a technological point? 
No one said anything then, and the visitor made his presentation to a silent audience. However, once he 
finished, the questions from the team that followed displayed a hidden unhappiness with this actor. The 
questions were deliberately intensely technical in nature. The visitor attempted answers, appending an ‗I am 
not an engineer‘ disclaimer to almost each one. But the questions kept getting more technical until the 
discussion was almost entirely among team members. After the presenter had left, one staff turned to the 
other asking, ―Why was he trying to talk about something he did not know about?‖ The other simply 
shrugged as everyone filed out of the room and back to their offices. 
In my opinion, the presentation in itself was not poor, and it was clear from his repeated disclaimers that the 
visitor was unwilling to position himself as a technologist. Yet, the mere attempt to tread into sacred territory 
and breach the divide between political regulation and apolitical technology had earned this government 
affairs specialist the annoyance of the team. 
On the other hand, when technologists came in with plainly biased presentations—nothing else could be 
expected from employees of one or the other disputing firms—the response was flat. There certainly were 
questions about why someone claimed the mixed band allocation worked or did not work. The discussion 
went to specifics, as I have written, about some or the other antenna characteristic or network deployment 
strategy. But even in cases where the technologist was reiterating the company viewpoint, the discussion 
never veered into a shaming of the presenter about how they were disturbing the apolitical nature of the work 
they were doing as technologists.  
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When I asked one of my teammates about this interesting lack of response on this politicization of 
technology, his answer was plain: ―They are expected to present their company‘s viewpoint.‖ What did this 
mean for the desire to get a neutral point of view? ―They are presenting the technical issues. We will make the 
decision based on all their inputs.‖ 
This contradiction between the apolitical nature of technology and the engineering analysis, and the 
obviousness of political preferences among supposedly neutral technologists is difficult to resolve. One might 
propose that TRAI staff wanted to pursue an apolitical approach by selecting an engineering approach and 
that they did not expect the private firms to pursue the same path. But this downgrades the engineer‘s 
neutrality compared to business agendas. If the team was willing to accept that, why did they expect that their 
own decision-making would have been different, with their engineering analysis under the influence of 
political agendas? 
Indeed, the mere act of TRAI asking for a second opinion on the technical feasibility of the mixed band 
allocation is symptomatic of the possibility of choosing between supposedly irrefutable technical evidence. 
The staff in 2006 sent the question to the famed IIT Delhi, a technical institution known for its engineering 
mindset, and preferred that conclusion over one prepared by a consulting firm in 2005. Again, technologists 
trump others, even if their conclusions are open to debate. As a field then, engineering analysis orders the 
manner of debate, but is also set within larger fields, or at the very least, is subject to adjustment under the 
influence of other fields. 
In his landmark study of the politics in technical artifacts, Winner poses the question: do artifacts have 
politics? (Winner, 1980). Rather than accepting the neutrality of technology, we must inquire about the 
political properties of technology and then recognize how these properties, usually hidden from view, might 
influence action and thought. Winner‘s central argument is that technological artifacts are rarely, if ever, 
apolitical, and establish patterns of power and authority. Along similar lines, an oft-repeated statement about 
technology standards (such as GSM, CDMA, EV-DO, and WCDMA) suggests that such standards have 
nothing to do with technology and everything to do with politics.* 
                                                   
* ―Standards are fundamentally political and have nothing to do with technology‖ (Luna, 2007 as cited in Gibson, 2007, 
p. 2).  
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Considering Winner, I would like to point out two levels of politics at play in the discussions about India ‘s 
3G spectrum allocations. At the first level is the politics that is playing out in the manner of the debate at 
TRAI; the choice to use an engineering analysis is in itself a political choice with specific implications for 
relationships among various actors and related to the desire of the staff at TRAI to solve the problem facing 
them. Here, the choice to use the language of technology was a strategic choice that drew on the authority 
TRAI staff felt they had over the topic,* as I have discussed above, and the shared notion, even if only 
rhetorically, that an engineering solution would be neutral and apolitical.  
As Streeter (1996) proposes in his discussion of policy practice as theater, one may say here that in the case of 
the politically neutral nature of the engineering approach, it is not important that the actual decision making 
process based on this approach is neutral, but that it seems that it were. People at TRAI, the service 
providers, and the telecommunications manufacturers all know that the effort to make the decision-making 
process seem neutral is theatrical. As such, the notion of the apolitical nature of technology creates a 
powerful field within which the rest of the debate occurs. But what is keeping this field active? What is the 
incentive for these actors to join this field or the disincentive from being apart? 
For TRAI staff, as I have pointed out, deciding on a hot button political issue as an apolitical engineering 
problem gives them cover from accusations of favoritism. It is also a subject that they are familiar with, an 
area of expertise. Importantly, no one in their right mind would dare to suggest, at least in public, that these 
engineers have no clue what they are talking about. That would not be polite nor politically rewarding. 
For the service providers and their supporters, talking in engineering terms is useful in a number of ways. 
First, playing their part and sending in highly educated and experienced technologists maintains the process 
of treating the question as an engineering problem, even while it offers them an opportunity to be self-
serving. Talking in alternative terms would likely upset the decision-makers and in any case, why should they 
do it when they get to promote their interests under the garb of an apolitical discussion? 
Second, and importantly, it becomes clear quickly that talking about spectrum allocations in technical terms 
gives them the benefit of also promoting certain ideas as irrefutable truths, just like the technical and scientific 
                                                   
* As Streeter (1996) writes on the role of expertise in policymaking, ―an equally important trick in policy analysis is the 
use of a method that safely positions one‘s work as neutral and objective… Ordinary people have mere opinions, but 
experts have knowledge and reason‖ (p. 137). TRAI staff positioned themselves as engineers to gain this advantage.  
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solutions that TRAI staff might promote. Put another way, all the parties saw a benefit in talking like 
engineers. I now turn to this aspect of the engineering approach. 
For the greater good. Recognizing that the TRAI team was focusing on the engineering aspects of 
the spectrum policy problem, the other actors in the field also began to couch their arguments for and against 
the mixed band allocation in technological terms. On the one hand, this meant a series of presentations from 
the technologists in these firms on the issue. Yet, given that even as the engineering solution was being 
positioned as an apolitical and irrefutable one, actors also knew that they could use adjustments from other 
fields to get the upper hand in this dispute. 
Consequently, although the language of the debate remained technological, the technologists and regulatory 
staff at the CDMA and GSM operators also sought to show how their solution meant better and less 
expensive 3G service to Indian consumers. These technologists thus linked the supposedly apolitical 
engineering discussion to a political preference for affordable telecommunications. Apart from suggesting 
adjustments to the field of the engineering approach, these arguments also begin to suggest how global 
considerations influence local policies by calling upon local circumstances and values. 
The key argument of the technologists working at and for CDMA companies against the 2.1 GHz-only plan 
was that globally, CDMA equipment was only available ‗in volume‘ in the 1900 MHz band. They presented 
the evidence to support this stand by showing how EV-DO equipment and handsets that worked in the 2.1 
GHz band were difficult to find.  
However, these CDMA technologists did not leave the argument at that. Instead, they linked this 
technological point to an important field that I have discussed in the context of dispute resolution: 
affordability of telecommunications services. They communicated that if TRAI‘s spectrum policy forced 
CDMA operators to use the unusual 2.1 GHz band, costs to these firms would increase. This is because they 
would have to procure network equipment and mobile handsets from a smaller base of suppliers and for 
smaller volumes; with few other networks using EV-DO in the 2.1 GHz band, manufacturers would have to 
specially customize their assembly lines for India. Higher costs would mean higher prices for subscribers—
something undesirable for a regulator and Government keen to expand the telecommunications user base and 
promote Internet services.  
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The technologists from the GSM/WCDMA companies had their own arguments, framed as technological 
facts, against the mixed band plan. Their main argument was that the mixed band plan would reduce the 
amount of spectrum available to them to offer 3G services. This meant lower supply and hence firms would 
have to compete with one another to get access to the resource. Following this simplistic market analysis, 
reduced availability of spectrum and increased competition would mean that firms would have to pay more to 
win the spectrum that is now worth more because of its scarcity. More costly spectrum, discussed as a ‗raw 
material,‘ would drive up the prices of services. Hence, mixed-based allocation would lead to higher prices. 
Looking to cement their technological argument, the technologists also argued that the interference resulting 
from the mixed band allocation would hurt the provision of 3G services and measures to mitigate would 
increase costs, again pushing prices up. 
It is useful to digress a short while and consider the metaphors at play here. Much has been written about 
how governments think about the radio spectrum. This collection of electromagnetic waves travelling at 
various frequencies may be visualized in a variety of ways. Various scholars, governments, and actors have 
visualized it in ways that serve their own interests or fit with their notions of natural resources. For instance, 
many analysts consider spectrum to be similar to land. Terminology fits with this visualization; it is possible, 
for instance, to re-farm spectrum and reallocate it to new uses or users. However, the visualization also has 
specific political implications. Thinking about spectrum as if it were land means that the state will try to assign 
property rights to it, something that has been the fascination of many regulators.  
Alternatives to the land analogy include thinking about spectrum as if it were an ocean, where different users 
can share the same space as long as they do not collide.* This visualization suggests that rather than property 
rights, users need to coordinate amongst themselves and can share the resource. Other visualizations and 
metaphors have also been used, and are too many to mention here.†  
The interesting term used often in debates about spectrum policy in India is to discuss spectrum as a ‗raw 
material.‘ This term has significance in two senses. First, by suggesting that wireless communications is an 
                                                   
* For example, the Economist newspaper commented: ―What is the best analogy for radio spectrum? Is it, as most 
people intuitively believe, a palpable resource like land, best allocated through property rights that can be bought and 
sold? Or is it, thanks to technological progress, more like the sea, so vast that it doesn‘t need to be parcelled out (at least 
for shipping traffic), in which case general rules on how boats should behave are enough to ensure that it is used 
efficiently‖ (―Freeing the airwaves,‖ 2003).  
† For an analysis of how visualizations influence policy debate, see Sandvig, 2007.  
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industrial process, with a definite input leading to an output, calling spectrum a ‗raw material‘ indicates that 
there is a direct link between the cost of the raw material and the output. This description of spectrum 
suggests that the Government should be careful about how it taxes raw materials, rather than focusing 
attention on how spectrum is reusable, shareable, and at least theoretically, infinitely divisible. It is thus a 
specific visualization of spectrum. 
A second significance of terming spectrum a raw material is to invoke the era of rigid industrial controls 
where industrial activities were constrained not only in terms of outputs (using production quotas) but also 
inputs (rationing of inputs, which at the time were ‗raw materials‘ such as steel, coal, or oil). In effect, by 
describing spectrum as a raw material that is essential to the production of communications services, the 
regulator and Government is being reminded that it should not slip backwards into the dark ages of the 
controlled economy. 
Interestingly, the entire concept of ‗raw materials‘ suggests that these firms were sure that the Government 
would end up charging some fee for access to this spectrum. The idea of pricing spectrum is hotly debated, 
with powerful arguments on both sides. Yet, within the Indian arena, there was little debate on this, and 
certainly none during this proceeding. Part of this was because most actors felt that the Government had 
rejected the previous recommendations (of 2005) because those had suggested giving away the spectrum free. 
Second, one of these firms, part of the Tata conglomerate, had already indicated that it would not mind 
paying `15 million for access to a block of spectrum; it was unlikely this offer would be turned down. But this 
lack of debate over this fundamental question points to a deeper lack of capacity within the arena to have a 
policy debate as is the case in say the U.S. or U.K., and indicates the worry within the Indian bureaucracy that 
giving away any state resource free would attract suspicions of corrupt behavior. 
For example, during one discussion at TRAI on the specifics of the possible auction mechanism to be used, 
the presenter, a professor from an Indian university, proposed the use of the Vickrey auction. In this system, 
the winner of the auction pays the second highest price, the discount meant as a reward for telling the truth 
during bidding, and also to avoid the winner‘s curse, where auction winners overextend themselves and 
cannot pay up when the time comes.*  
                                                   
* Wikipedia, 2010b  
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Some of the TRAI staff in the meeting appreciated this idea. They had seen the effect of bidders 
overextending themselves during earlier auctions and were keen to avoid the same outcome here, especially 
since 3G auctions have been some of the most expensive. However, any chance of this innovative solution 
being adopted was crushed when one of the senior members of the staff shouted out that this was not the 
Vickrey auction, but a ―bikrey‖ (trans. literally as ‗sale‘, but meant as ‗give away‘) auction. ―Everyone will think 
we have eaten the rest of the money! Do you think you can explain to a politician where the difference 
went?‖ 
I end this brief analysis here, with the note that the use of such metaphors point to actors in the arena 
bringing in seemingly disconnected yet powerful ideas to play in an effort to influence the outcome of the 
policymaking process. 
Returning to the technologists‘ arguments to TRAI, it is possible to recognize their attempts to connect the 
policy choice to wider social and political goals regarding affordability and access while remaining well within 
the field of the engineering approach. Yet, they were communicating ideas about how the team should 
choose one or the other allocation, all the while taking the pains to appear bound by the natural order of 
things: supply and demand, and the realities of global manufacturing. In doing so, they were speaking as the 
team wanted them to, using engineering ideas such as the costs of manufacturing or the use of spectrum as a 
raw material in some imagined industrial process.  
Globalized Technology 
What remained in the background throughout this episode was another group that drew upon the organizing 
power of fields such as affordability to influence the outcome of spectrum policymaking in India: the 
globalized telecommunications manufacturing industry. All through these debates and discussions on mixed 
band allocation, all the actors in the arena knew and agreed on a few unsaid but critical pieces of knowledge 
such as ‗these technology standards were imported,‘ the ‗equipment and handsets that companies and 
consumers would use would also be imported.‘ Hence, decisions about spectrum allocation were in reality 
decisions about which types of hardware would be imported.  
However, given that the global telecommunications manufacturing industry is highly concentrated in a few 
countries and with a few companies, I propose that the team at TRAI really had little choice to begin with. 
Put another way, the individuals at TRAI, like decision-makers in many other regulatory agencies, are tied to 
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particular choices by the nature of globalization that restricts policy choices. To understand this is to 
understand some of the processes of globalization and their influence on policymaking. Throughout this 
discussion, it is important to note that global forces appear and influence outcomes through a range of fields 
based in the local context that have tremendous ordering power and influence the decision makers within the 
team.  
The lack of real choice. The telecommunications manufacturing industry was present all through 
the proceeding on spectrum policy. This is a globalized group, but not in the sense of being decentralized, but 
rather as built around a highly centralized industry that has a few poles: the U.S., Western Europe and there 
especially the Scandinavian countries, Japan, South Korea, and more recently, China. Without exception, the 
service providers import their equipment while consumers use handsets and other devices that are 
manufactured in these countries. Companies in this industry include Nokia Siemens Networks, Ericsson, 
Motorola, Huawei, ZTE, Samsung, and LG. 
Little telecommunications manufacturing takes place outside of these poles, and any that does is typically less 
valuable. Since 2006, a few local handset manufacturers have appeared, but are again limited to lower value or 
what the Chinese refer to as shanzai.* A number of countries have companies that manufacture optic fiber 
cables, but this is comparatively less valuable than the equipment that lights up these cables, or does the data 
processing before transmission.  
This group of companies has significant influence over the individuals at TRAI. This influence is felt in two 
ways. First, as we have seen in this Chapter, babus and TRAI staffers are bound by choices allowed by the 
technology standardization efforts that these companies have significant influence over. Second, these 
companies maintain and reassert their power by tapping into local fields that have great organizing power.  
I propose that through these two sources of influence on TRAI staffers, the global manufacturing industry 
seriously constrains these individuals‘ choices in important matters such as spectrum policy. For this, it is 
necessary to tell two stories. The first is about the development and widespread adoption of the international 
                                                   
* See a basic introduction to shanzai here: Wikipedia, 2010c. In India, there is a long history of knock-offs based on 
foreign brands; it was possible to find Colgat toothpaste, for example, or Reebak shoes. A joke in Bombay in the 1990s 
referred to how local shops were selling clothes ‗made in U.S.A.‘ but that this was the Ulhasnagar Stitching Association, 
referring to a neighborhood that hosted many such entrepreneurs. Now, a number of shanzai mobile telephone 
manufacturers have started serving the Indian market, selling the ‗iFone‘ or ‗BlackCherry‘ (Naaptol, 2010).  
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standards and technologies for 3G services. The second is about the lack of a local manufacturing base for 
telecommunications equipment in India. Both have to do with the phenomenon of globalization. 
The story of standards in wireless telecommunications for mobile telephony is remarkably similar to the 
famous (and continuing) struggle between airplane manufacturers Boeing and Airbus (Newhouse, 2008). 
Both cases have an American firm engaging with a European consortium for international dominance of their 
markets. In the case of mobile telephony, the struggle was between groups led by the American firm 
Qualcomm, the creator of CDMA technology, and by the European Conference of Postal and 
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), the agency that initially promoted GSM technology. The 
CEPT quickly turned over control over the standardization process to the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI), a ―quasi-governmental organization with the power to create essentially 
mandatory telecommunications standards for Europe‖ (Franzinger , 2003, p. 1699).  
CDMA technology began with the development of wireless technologies for the U.S. military in the mid-
1970s. In 1990, Qualcomm, an American start-up based in San Diego, California proposed the first CDMA-
based wireless communications technology. In 1993, the Telecommunications Industry Association / 
Electronic Industries Association Interim Standard-95, better known as IS-95 standard, the first commercially 
deployed CDMA technology, was published. By 1995, cellular networks based on the IS-95 standard known 
as IS-95A, better known by the trade name cdmaOne, were deployed beginning with Hong Kong‘s 
Hutchison. In a few years, these systems were deployed in South Korea, Japan, and Peru (CDMA 
Development Group [CDG], 2010a). As of 2009, IS-95-based systems are widely deployed in countries 
spanning the range of economic development such as Brazil, the U.S., Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and Nigeria (CDG, 2010b).  
The European GSM technology was chosen in an effort to create a pan-European mobile telephone service; 
until that time, each country supported its own standard that fit its own spectrum availability. The first GSM 
deployments were in 1991 starting with Finland. European manufacturers, like their U.S. counterparts, 
responded to the European spectrum allocations and the spectrum assignments of their service providers‘ 
clients.  
When it came to the development of 3G technologies, each family had its own technological evolution and 
had spectrum allocations that matched the situation in their home bases. The ITU followed the 
recommendations from the World Radiocommunication Conferences in 1992 and 2000 to identify five 
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different bands that 3G systems could be deployed in.* These bands included those used for 2G networks (a 
nod to those who might look for in-band 3G), and two new bands that were meant to support the extended 
need for spectrum as 3G developed.†  
As I have discussed before, the CDMA transition from 2G to 3G (i.e., CDMA to EV-DO) does not need a 
new band. Rather, CDMA allows ‗in band‘ 3G services. Indeed, most EV-DO systems today operate in the 
800 MHz band as well as other bands. The FCC began an auction of frequencies in the USPCS 1900 MHz 
band in 1994 (FCC, 2007), mainly because it recognized that the 800 MHz band used by cellular services in 
the U.S. was coming close to exhaustion and additional frequencies were needed. The 1900 MHz band was 
chosen because it had previously been used for first-generation digital mobile phone services. With both the 
relatively large markets at the time—the U.S. and Canada—simultaneously making this decision, equipment 
manufacturers began producing CDMA equipment in this band.  
On the other hand, the GSM standard chose to use the 2.1 GHz band because the structure of the 
technology and the way in which it used spectrum was entirely different, needing an entirely new network.  
Based on the decisions of individual states, the ITU, and the service providers, U.S. 3G services, using EV-
DO began in the 800 MHz and 1900 MHz bands, and Europe‘s 3G service providers began using the 2.1 
GHz band for WCDMA. Following the spectrum allocations to the service providers, the equipment 
manufacturers developed hardware for these technologies in these frequencies. 
The implication of these decisions for the team was that equipment for 3G networks was available for India 
in the bands selected and used by governments and service providers in Western Europe and North 
America.‡ When the Indian Government began seriously contemplating the introduction of 3G services in 
2004, it was a later entrant in the market. 3G networks had already been deployed in 37 countries by that 
                                                   
* It is out of the scope of this study to examine why the ITU went with these standards. However, the strength of the 
Western European and American manufacturers and service providers, combined with the voting power of their 
governments would suggest that the outcomes of the WRCs and ITU processes would have been aligned with the 
interests of these players. 
† The bands were 806-960 MHz (used for 2G GSM and CDMA), 1710-1885 MHz (used for GSM, i.e., the 1800 MHz 
bad), 1885-2025 MHz (the 1900 MHz band), 2110-2200 MHz (2.1 GHz band), and 2500-2690 MHz (2.5 GHz band). 
‡ Japan and South Korea also developed their own systems and standards, but were not as aggressive in marketing these 
outside of their markets. Consequently, these countries‘ standards did not figure as much in the discussions at TRAI, 
except for as examples, and hence I have not included them in this analysis.  
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time, and there were over 20 million subscribers using those networks in these bands. Hence, there was 
already a wide range of 3G equipment that operated in specific bands. 
Consequently, the team began its consultation on spectrum allocation not on a clean slate, but rather within a 
well-defined market that imposed specific limits on what bands the spectrum policy team could consider 
when discussing 3G. India had a choice between the 2.1 GHz band or the 1900 MHz band—nothing else. In 
framing the 3G debate like this, it does not seem like much of a debate. It instead seems like asking an airline: 
Boeing or Airbus? There is no fundamental questioning of the underlying mechanisms of organizing 
spectrum or challenging the global standards for 3G services. The team had to follow these international 
norms, part of the use of global standards and the structure of the globalized telecommunications 
manufacturing industry, as it was developing its policy options.  
It is important to ask here why India‘s spectrum policymakers had to choose between these two standards 
and not go some other way. Put another way, what was forcing India to adopt globalized standards? What 
coercive power were these global firms able to draw upon? The answer has two parts. First, the desire within 
Government and TRAI for affordable telecommunications meant that the disputing parties presented their 
findings in terms of affordability. Even though they were battling with each other, these actors also delivered 
a shared underlying message: that any unusual arrangement that violated global standards or did not use the 
global manufacturing base would deny India the benefits of ‗scale‘ and increase costs.  
Second, even if India‘s policymakers wanted to go for some alternative, unusual arrangement, they would 
have to call upon manufacturing capability when it came time for network deployment. However, India ‘s 
local telecommunications manufacturing capability had been reduced to almost nothing by 2006.  
The net result of these considerations—a desire to ensure affordability and the missing local manufacturing 
base—was that the team‘s choices were limited. I now examine these two considerations. 
The coercive power of scale. As I have indicated above, technologists from the mobile telephone 
companies made it clear that the team should not question the prevailing global standards because doing so 
would rob India off the benefits of ‗economy of scale.‘ Indeed, the service providers (and equipment 
manufacturers) claimed that the only way forward for India was ‗global harmonization‘ in spectrum planning. 
According to this argument, the only way to keep the costs of 3G networks down, and hence ensure 
affordable services was to deploy mass manufactured and standardized equipment. Anything else would mean 
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breaking the manufacturer‘s ability to roll out large numbers of (and hence cheaper) antennas, handsets, and 
other hardware. The costs would go up, and the success of 3G in India would be threatened. 
What is especially interesting is that technologists from both sides used the global harmonization argument. 
The EV-DO group used it to argue that the only way forward for India was the mixed-band allocation, 
allowing them to procure and use standard, globally harmonized CDMA equipment in the widely used 1900 
MHz band. Any other possibility, such as they using the 2.1 GHz band or alternatives such as the 450 MHz 
band would result in diseconomies of scale and higher costs. And higher costs meant higher prices for 
subscribers. 
On the other hand, the WCDMA group argued that the mixed band allocation would go against global 
harmonization. This, they argued, was because mixed band would mean altering the working of their 
equipment so that the EV-DO networks would not interfere with them. Not only did this add to the cost, but 
it also did not assure error-free functioning of the WCDMA network.  
With this, ‗volumes‘ became the new law, and with it, TRAI‘s policymaking function had to accept global 
manufacturing, over which it had no control. The coercive power of ‗volumes‘ or ‗economies of scale‘ came 
from the link between global standards, lower per-unit costs of telecommunications equipment, and the 
resulting intuitive larger addressable market (the larger number of potential users). For the team, it was 
essential that the regulator continue its tradition of keeping the costs of telecommunications as low as 
possible.  
TRAI staff would often get questions from the press and from other Governments during the 3G proceeding 
about whether India was ready for 3G services, or whether the focus should remain on voice-centric 2G 
services. The concern here was that if 3G services were introduced at the wrong time, telecommunications 
companies would divert investments from 2G services to these new networks, which were more capital 
intensive and would result in higher revenues but across a smaller number of urban, high-income users. A key 
argument of the regulator and some mobile companies to push through licensing reform was that the mobile 
telephone was quickly becoming the ‗poor man‘s telephone.‘ Would it be fair to give up the potential further 
growth of these networks just to keep up with technology? 
Being accused of promoting what some sections of the press and public saw as a luxury service (i.e., 3G) over 
a mass-market service (i.e., 2G) was something that the TRAI staff as a whole and certainly the team working 
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on the 3G issue was keen to avoid. Almost to underscore this concern, a few days prior to the deadline for 
the recommendations, a journalist asked a senior member of the team about whether 3G would mean 
anything for rural India. The answer provided somewhat satisfied the journalist, but made this team member 
worried about the implications for the recommendations, which were to be released shortly thereafter. ―Have 
we done enough to ensure that the recommendations cover rural areas?‖ he asked the rest of the team shortly 
after the interview. The consensus within the team was that we had, linking the new technology to improved 
access to information and economic opportunities. ―Let‘s make sure we emphasize this point,‖ was the 
suggestion of another team member. 
The team also agreed that the introduction of 3G should not disturb the expected investments towards the 
more popular 2G services. This discussion also played out in debates over whether the team should 
recommend spectrum auctions or not, because auctions were seen as a large expenditure that would suck up 
network investments especially in 2G.  
The technologists from the mobile telephony companies had made the choice clear: TRAI had to either 
follow global standards for spectrum allocation one way or the other, or risk pushing costs and prices higher. 
Another interesting aspect of this choice was that it was always considered made; no one seriously considered 
that TRAI would stray from the global standards. Put another way, the influence of the globalized 
telecommunications industry was indirect, invisible, and unquestioned. One key reason was because of the 
implications for business economics, but the other, also important reason was because the team believed that 
India did not have the capacity to carve its own path. I explore this below. 
Local equipment manufacturing. It is useful to compare India to the some other countries that 
were not bound in their policy debates in spectrum management. Prominent among these is the United 
States. Since 2003, the U.S. has seen a vigorous and mainstream debate on spectrum allocation that includes a 
number of policy choices to which TRAI has not yet opened up. For example, one key debate in the U.S. 
spectrum policy arena focuses on the utility of the spectrum commons model where intelligent wireless 
devices share spectrum. The success of wireless local access networks (using technologies such as Wi-Fi) 
drove much of this debate. Importantly, the U.S. is a leading developer and manufacturer of such 
technologies. Another country that has a rich tradition of indigenous wireless technology development is 
South Korea. In recent times, they have developed and deployed WiBro technology that works in a ‗non-
standard‘ spectrum band. The fact that both South Korea and the United States can do this is a testament to 
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the significant telecommunications equipment-manufacturing base that exists in both countries, a fact of 
which most if not all TRAI staffers are well aware.  
However, while South Korea and the U.S. are seen as long-standing industrial powers with significant 
technological expertise, most Indians have begun to take China‘s technological prowess seriously only since 
the mid 2000s. Until that time, Indians knew Chinese firms mainly for cheap knock-offs of international 
brands. By the mid-2000s, they had made a serious entry into technology manufacturing and were beginning 
to undercut the competition by offering highly inexpensive networking and user equipment. 
This was also about the time when the Chinese government supposedly asked domestic telecommunications 
companies to hold off on introducing 3G technologies until the time the indigenous 3G TD-SCDMA 
technology would be developed, and prevented them from deploying any other (American or European) 
system.  
At one point a technologist from a mobile telephone company expressed great admiration for the Chinese 
who in spite of facing tough competition from international equipment suppliers and established global 
standards were trying to strike it out on their own. ―India could probably do the same,‖ he said, ―if it had the 
manufacturing base that the Chinese have.‖ These examples go to prove that the ability of a policymaker to 
engage in a truly open debate on spectrum management is linked to the local capacity to produce ‗non 
standard‘ equipment.  
Why India has not been able to develop a strong high-technology manufacturing base requires a detailed 
examination of the political economy development of the country since independence. Indeed India has 
lagged behind in information technology manufacturing when compared with its success in IT services. While 
it is out of the scope of this study to engage in a thorough discussion on this topic, it is nevertheless useful 
from the point of view of understanding the impact of globalization to outline some of the basic reasons for 
the limited telecommunications equipment-manufacturing base in India. 
When India became independent in 1947, the country began experimenting with Soviet-style economic 
planning. One of the hallmark decisions early on was to engage in ISI. The intention was twofold: first, it was 
supposed to enable the development of indigenous economic capacity; second, it was a response to centuries 
of colonial rule driven by mercantilist expansion—India wanted to place itself in a position where it would 
never again be susceptible to foreign economic control. 
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While this was well intentioned, the outcome was sub-optimal. Between 1950 and 1984, India saw a rapid 
expansion in its public sector at the expense of the development of its private sector. Problematically, this 
translated into a system of patronage and state control instead of fostering innovation and economic 
development. 
One of the sectors to suffer under the weight of public sector morass was telecommunications and indeed, 
overall the information technologies manufacturing industry. The Government set up the Indian Telephone 
Industries (ITI) in 1948, the first public sector enterprise in independent India, to manufacture 
telecommunications equipment. ITI maintained a monopoly on the industry between 1948 and 1984, when 
the first stage of liberalization led the Government to open up the manufacturing of customer equipment 
such as telephones and fax machines to private sector companies (Subramanian, 2004). 
Although ITI was supposed to be the indigenous manufacturer, it did not have the capacity to undertake the 
research and development needed to build its own portfolio of technologies. One study showed that ―the 
share of own-technology products in [ITI‘s] business mix stood at barely 8 per cent, as against 83 per cent for 
transfer of technology products, while the remainder came from services‖ (Subramanian, 2004, p. 5240). 
In addition to its dependence on multinationals for technology, by the 1980s ITI also felt the increasing 
pressure from ―cheap Chinese imports flooding the domestic market in the wake of the WTO accords‖ 
(Subramanian, 2004, p. 5240). All of this led to the ITI management fearing that ―in the long run its 
manufacturing activities ‗may not be sustainable‘‖ (Subramanian, p. 5240). To add to the poor performance of 
ITI, much of the technology that was imported was not suitable for Indian conditions such as low quality 
electric power, the hot summers or intense monsoons, and the dust and humidity. 
In the mid 1980s, the Government sought to overcome the gaps in innovation in telecommunications by 
establishing a telecommunications research laboratory named C-DOT (Center for Development of 
Telematics). C-DOT was reasonably successful in developing technologies for the fixed line telephony 
network that were suited to Indian conditions. Further, it was also able to transfer these technologies to 
public and private sector enterprises (Mani, 2005).  
However, C-DOT failed to anticipate the rapid move to wireless telecommunications in the 1990s and both it 
and ITI were caught ―totally unprepared‖ (Subramanian, 2004, p. 5233). Because C-DOT was a research 
laboratory without particular links to business strategists or even a definitive Government strategy, it 
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continued focusing on wireline technologies even as other developing countries saw exponential growth in 
wireless technologies. Thus, as the demand for wireless equipment grew, C-DOT was not in a position to 
offer these technologies to ITI, leading it and the private companies that were now in the market to look for 
suppliers outside India. ITI entered into an agreement with Lucent and Qualcomm to gain access to the 
necessary wireless technology (Subramanian). However, with the reduction of barriers to equipment imports, 
the case for telecommunications companies to rely on ITI to import equipment disappeared. As a result, for 
the time between 1948-2008, ITI provided for about 44 percent of all wireline telephones in India, but only 4 
percent of wireless connection (ITD Limited, n.d.), the company has consistently made a loss since 2002 
(ITD Limited, 2009). 
Consequently, compared with the technological innovation in this industry seen in countries such as South 
Korea, Japan, the United States, and in Scandinavia, India has been a laggard by any measure. Most of the 
engineering graduates that could have contributed to this industry found themselves working for American or 
British companies. India was left with a state-controlled manufacturing industry that famously could not even 
produce telephones that were on par with global standards. The missed opportunity of developing a capability 
in wireless telecommunications proved to be almost the last straw for companies such as ITI. 
When the telecommunications industry was liberalized in the 1990s, the limited ability of domestic suppliers 
to satisfy demand and widespread knowledge of their poor quality led service providers to import much of 
their equipment. The global manufacturing industry was the source for equipment deployed in India. This has 
not necessarily been a negative for the telecommunications industry; the size of the Indian market and its 
attractiveness for equipment manufacturers seeking to build their market share has led to significant discounts 
for the Indian market while leading prices lower elsewhere. However, as a result, India imports most of its 
telecommunications equipment and continues to have a limited manufacturing base in the industry.  
For TRAI to break the mold forged by global standards is consequently difficult if not impossible. The absent 
manufacturing base precludes the Government or TRAI from engaging in policy discussions about new 
spectrum allocations or from making decisions such as the Chinese, Americans, or South Koreans. Rather, 
the regulator and Government must remain bound to global standards and their accompanying ‗globally 
harmonized‘ spectrum allocations. Again, the message from the disputing parties was that doing something 
unusual in India means risking higher costs and higher prices to subscribers; this is something that goes 
against the preference for low cost, affordable, widespread telecommunications in India. 
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This is an important point: adherence to global systems of manufacturing or trade may be enforced not only 
by formal organizations or through legal action, but also by these systems‘ ability to capitalize on powerful 
local fields. A country that goes against global standards will get a clear warning from equipment 
manufacturers and service providers that their choices will be politically unsustainable or socially problematic. 
The language of globalization was translated into a language of local choices and implications. In this case, the 
disputing parties sought TRAI‘s adherence to global standards and efforts to open and manage markets by 
linking these choices to the valued objective of low-cost telecommunications to the team and the intermediate 
concept of ‗economies of scale‘ in manufacturing. The lack of a manufacturing base, perpetuated by the 
processes of globalization, reduced the possibility that India could break away from this global standard. 
Deviation and the Mixed Band Allocation 
Towards the end of the consultation process, as the team prepared its recommendations for the Government, 
we sought to address the problem of scarcity of spectral ‗raw material‘ and create the means to ensure the 
affordability of 3G services. Within the team, there was debate about whether TRAI should recommend the 
mixed band allocation, and the team was undecided on what it should do. Mixed band allocation would open 
the largest possible amount of spectrum for 3G. Furthermore, the evidence from the IIT Delhi study had 
shown that theoretically, at least, the coexistence of these two technologies was possible. And the CDMA 
lobby had proposed that they would organize a trial for a mixed band system to prove this in practice. 
Yet, this was an untested idea. No other country had chosen a mixed band allocation and even after 
theoretical analysis and trials, as one team member said, ―no one would actually be able to predict how it will 
be work in the middle of Delhi,‖ a crowded business district. Moreover, the military, which occupied the 
1900 MHz band, was ambiguous about its ability to relocate elsewhere. 
The choice was thus between an untested idea and less spectrum. It was around this choice that the team 
debated. After a few days of the discussion going nowhere, one senior member of the team put forward his 
proposal. It would only be fair, he said, to give both sets of operators what they wanted. He continued to 
explain that the mixed band allocation was the only way to ―appease‖ both the CDMA and GSM companies. 
Otherwise, TRAI would be ―killing off the group that had a non-standard allocation.‖ With little further 
debate, the team agreed to go in for the mixed band allocation. 
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Once again, the idea of fairness makes its entry into an issue facing the regulator. In this case, the idea of 
fairness acted as a justification to supplement the engineering approach and go for a technical proposal to 
solve the 3G spectrum allocation problem. But it served to ―appease,‖ in the words of this team member, 
both sides in the dispute and ensure that both sides would be able to move towards the lowest cost of 
network deployment and service provision. The idea that forcing one or the other to deploy networks in a 
non-standard band would kill them, this team member was drawing in ideas from the service providers and 
suggesting that instead of making a choice between technologies, the regulator should just let both get what 
they want. The idea of being fair ultimately prevailed, but it did face some short-lived opposition based on the 
theoretical nature of the mixed band proposal. However, these worries were brushed aside with the response 
that a trial would make things clear and that the regulator should not shy away from making innovative 
decisions. 
What made the idea of fairness so attractive here? First, as one team member explained to me shortly after 
the recommendations were released, that both the CDMA and GSM operators had been integral to the 
success of mobile telephony in India. Competition among them had brought down prices and driven 
coverage. By not allowing such competition to continue into the 3G era, he explained, the regulator would 
have missed another opportunity to grow the market through competition. Importantly, this team member 
explained that going with the 2.1 GHz-only plan would have also disturbed the ―level playing field‖ because 
one technology could source equipment at global standard prices while the other would be forced to go with 
customized equipment. Hence, the only fair alternative would be to go with the mixed band allocation. 
Second, as was clear from the discussions within the team, TRAI was keen to avoid another major clash 
between the GSM and CDMA companies. The dispute over licensing of limited mobility services had closed 
in 2003, and the CDMA companies had criticized the recommendations on 3G in 2005, where TRAI 
recommended the 2.1 GHz band-only option. Eager to avoid criticism and further disputes, the team favored 
a fair solution that would satisfy both sides. 
Importantly, the attempt to be fair was based on the engineering approach. The team felt that the suggestions 
of the IIT Delhi study were sufficiently detailed in terms of the types of technical measures both networks 
had to design to avoid interference in the case of a mixed band allocation. With a technical solution available, 
and a preference for fair treatment as well as for opening as much spectrum as possible, the team felt that the 
mixed band allocation might actually balance all of the competing interests.  
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Furthermore, the team felt that it could get away with a non-standard arrangement because of an argument 
put forward by the disputing parties, the notion of volumes. Team members felt that just as disputing parties 
were attempting to use the idea of affordability derived from economies of scale as an organizing field, the 
huge potential market India offered to willing and cooperative service providers and equipment 
manufacturers was too good to resist. The team reckoned that service providers would absorb the additional 
costs of doing business in India. Even a 10 percent 3G service subscription rate among the about 250 million 
subscribers India had in 2006 meant bumping up the global 3G subscriber base (then about 90 million) by 
about 30 percent. This view on scale within the TRAI team was different from the disputing parties.  
While they sought a solution that suited these business interests, the team was looking at 3G as a service with 
strong growth potential. At least some of the team members believed that concerns among service providers 
about costs linked with a non-standard allocation would be hushed in the drive for revenues, market share, 
and equipment sales by the service providers. This idea of India as a large untapped market that deserved 
attention and had significant growth potential links with the idea that India deserved its rightful share of 
foreign investments: as one of the world‘s largest emerging economies, TRAI staff was of the opinion that 
the prospects for growth in telecommunications were tremendous.  
In the end, the team proposed and the Authority recommended a compromise solution. It recognized that 
the mixed band allocation was technically feasible and also desirable to allow both the CDMA/EV-DO and 
GSM/WCDMA companies to offer 3G services in their preferred bands. TRAI recommended to the DoT 
that it should allow a trial where both systems are designed according to the specifications provided in the IIT 
Delhi report. If the trial were successful, TRAI recommended that the DoT should open a small section of 
the 1900 MHz band to accommodate the CDMA service providers and hence endorse the mixed band 
allocation. 
Even after suggesting the mixed band allocation, TRAI‘s recommendations did not ask that the babus should 
accept this option. Rather the recommendations suggested that the trial of the mixed band allocation should 
be the final trigger point for the go-ahead that DoT provided. This suggests the team wanted proof that the 
arrangement could work. But is also signals two other concerns. First, the team was unsure that the mixed 
band allocation would work in practice, as I have mentioned earlier. The trial would clarify the matter and 
silence any opposition from the WCDMA group or lead to a dismissal of the proposal from the EV-DO 
group with a clear technical answer that as one TRAI staffer put it, ―would be difficult to question because we 
will make them run the trial among themselves.‖ Yet, the recommendation on a trial again calls into question 
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the undisputable nature of the engineering approach. Not only was the theoretical analysis questioned and 
reversed, but the trial itself was not expected to provide final results rather only some indication of whether 
mixed band allocation would work, but not how well. 
Finally, even as this deviation from international practices seems at first glance as a new approach to 3G, it is 
only a minor play on the global regime. India‘s service providers and regulator could not change the bands in 
which 3G would be allocated, and only combined global standards as opposed to truly innovate and deviate 
from the regime. 
On the influence of globalization on policymaking. I wish to comment briefly on the 
implications of these findings for the thinking about globalization in policymaking. Specifically, what does 
this chapter tell us about how globalization works in the trenches of regulation? 
The abstract version of globalization describes it as a ubiquitous and powerful force that forces government 
and countries to behave in certain ways. This suggests that globalization has coercive power within itself—the 
process of globalization itself makes its subjects act in certain ways. However, as is evident in this chapter, in 
the trenches of regulatory life, globalization is an invisible force that remains silently in the background. Its 
power comes from proponents‘ arguments that if countries wish to do something unique and local, they risk 
unaffordable communications and violating economies of scale. Consequently, this chapter suggests that 
globalization remains hidden in the daily activities of TRAI‘s staffers. It enters the arena in subtle and diverse 
ways, as discussions about the economies of scale in equipment manufacturing, and in the material form such 
as base stations and antennas that are constructed by a few countries with significant power to set global 
technological standards. 
As I have pointed out earlier, the ‗economies of scale‘ argument served as a more effective and indeed used 
coercive tactic than any allusion to international law or global trade agreements. I do not wish to belabor the 
point here, but rather to point out that such arguments served the function of ordering the thinking of 
TRAI‘s spectrum team. Specific agents, who seek to benefit from countries‘ adherence to the globalized way 
for their own benefit, deploy locally relevant ideas to make their point and simultaneously continue the 
process of globalization.  
In India, linking globalization to talk about costs and affordability is what makes globalization a powerful 
argument. Other arguments could work in different situations. For a country heavily dependent on foreign 
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aid, an argument about how adherence to ‗international practices‘ may increase acceptability among 
international donors may work. In countries with local manufacturing capacity, regulatory agencies might be 
asked to allocate spectrum for innovative companies or uses.* 
In conclusion, I propose that globalization speaks a local language. Not only does it relegate itself into the 
background because none of the participants in these debates talk about it directly, but it also speaks in terms 
that are relevant to local policy objectives and the structures of local policy debate. Recognizing, analyzing, 
promoting, or countering globalization—and potentially other similar phenomena such as liberalization and 
democracy—require similar attention to their local manifestations.  
Engineering: Expertise or Excuse? 
The engineering approach seems to define how these regulators think about what they do. Much of the staff 
in TRAI seems to characterize their thinking as ‗engineers.‘ They view the approach as apolitical and able to 
yield results and decisions that will be widely accepted as neutral. Yet, the engineering approach is not only 
subject to manipulation with debates about supposedly indisputable technical facts, but it is in itself a political 
response to situations.  
When regulators face difficult questions that have significant implications for actors in the arena, they attempt 
to find mechanisms to position themselves as neutral and beyond political influence. Streeter (1996) refers to 
this as the neutrality of expertise, and as a characteristic of the interpretive community that operates inside the 
Beltway. In the U.S., the preference is for economic thinking and legal analysis, where public policy is often 
equated with legal theory and case law, or with microeconomics and halfway sciences such as risk analysis. 
The rule of law, as Streeter puts it, is supposed to overcome the rule of men. 
Similarly, in her study of economic policymaking in Mexico, Babb (2001) looks at the histories of the 
professionals who influenced policy. In the post-revolutionary period, individuals who were committed to 
revolutionary ideals made economic policy. The next phase saw a nexus between business and academia, 
especially through the creation of private universities. Students from these universities began to enter the 
public sphere and began a struggle within the state. The 1980s saw a number of U.S.-trained free marketers 
                                                   
* For example, supporters of the avant-garde spectrum-as-commons approach to allocation commonly use the 
innovation argument in the U.S. 
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enter public service and with them, Mexico shifting towards liberalization. By the 1980s, Mexican economic 
policy had become oriented towards a neoliberal free-market doctrine.  
For insiders, the shift to neo-liberalism in 1980‘s Mexico was common sense: ―neoliberal reforms occurred 
because they were the most efficient policy available‖ (Babb, 2001, p. 173). However, Babb suggests that 
much had to do with the engineering of this policy shift by technocrats and their advisors who were trained in 
this tradition. She especially focuses on the role of Mexican and U.S. universities (such as MIT and Chicago) 
acting as a conduit for highly credentialed and conservatively trained economists to enter public service at the 
Central Bank and Ministry of Finance in Mexico. This also professionalized economics as a science, with a 
mathematical approach and clear rules and principles.  
A preference for economic methods of policymaking is really just that, a preference. As Schwartz (1984) 
writes in one review of economic analyses of policy, ―the range and frequency of differences of opinion 
among… expert economists, engender[s] doubts about the role of economics in formulating policy‖ (p. 184). 
Once these experts went beyond generalizations about the objectives of policy, they vastly differed in 
particulars. This goes on to propose that these differences imply that the policy problems are ―more political 
than scientific‖ (Schwartz, p. 184). 
In the Indian telecommunications arena, I found that the preference is for solutions based on engineering 
expertise, where the laws of physics were supposed to have dictated the choices made in the spectrum policy 
exercise, or where the inevitability of technological progress was an important pillar to justify re-regulation of 
the licensing regime. Instead of the rules of mathematical economics as Babb found, for example, in this 
arena, the rules of physics and the professional engineers-as-policymakers were supposed to make 
telecommunications regulation apolitical and above the rule of men. 
However, just as with other rules, the rule of men prevailed. Various actors in the arena, including the 
regulator, adjusted the engineering approach to suit immediate circumstances. Even if the engineering 
approach could have been apolitical, the linking of political preferences to technologies overcame that hurdle. 
The manner of the debate in India is thus unique. Their belief in the engineering approach allows India‘s 
regulators to claim neutrality in method and results. However, just as Streeter‘s insiders or Babb‘s economists 
were subject to political forces from the local and global, so too did the forces of globalization and the 
pressures imposed by private capital play a key role in the Indian experience.  
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However, while Streeter found that corporate liberalism underlies much of the policy for commercial 
broadcasting in the U.S., I did not find a similar underlying unifying concept in India. There is a preference 
for private provision of telecommunications services among the staff of the regulator. However, this 
preference remains hidden behind visions of regulation or policy as apolitical, engineering activities. And here 
lies the risk. There is no specific harm in using one or the other technique to arrive at a decision—certainly, 
some approach is necessary—but pretending that one approach will yield the ‗best‘ outcome while not 
considering the values or preferences it hides allows manipulation for some while providing false reassurances 
to others. 
This choice of an engineering approach has other risks. There are well-understood political objectives such as 
universal telecommunications, most powerfully described as promoting affordability and the ‗poor man‘s 
telephone.‘ The engineering approach frames this objective in a technological sense, considering increased 
access equivalent to a specific problem that can be ‗solved‘ rather than a difficult and likely intractable social 
issue. Framing this problem as one of affordability (and in many cases coverage) allows the discussion to shift 
to focus on concerns about the costs of network deployment, of so-called ‗raw materials‘ such as radio 
spectrum, and on the availability of low cost telecommunications equipment.  
This focus has almost eliminated concepts such as democracy or equity in debates about universal service in 
the arena. For instance, there is significant tension between liberalization and democratization in universal 
telecommunications, and the focus on affordability and its related technological factors tends to silence 
discussions on the implications of associated policymaking on democratic communications (Lenert, 1998). 
Again, as Streeter‘s work also finds, reference to these concepts is usually fleeting and any sustained 
investigation is met with blank stares or as Streeter also noted, ―cause their eyes to glaze over‖ (Streeter, 1996, 
p. 119).  
The engineer as policymaker should thus admit the political nature of its decisions, while recognizing the 
limits of the engineering approach and looking beyond to other sources of power and fields at play. Only 
when a regulator will do this will it recognize what parts of the problem are missing. 
What does this episode of spectrum policymaking tell us about how policy is made? First, this episode 
provides us with an alternative approach to thinking about policy. The influence of an expertise based 
engineering approach on the policymaking process here is beyond doubt. The entire debate and process was 
portrayed within the team and impressed upon participants as if it were an engineering problem in search of a 
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solution. But policy was made through an iterative process where the team participated in multiple events and 
kept refining its recommendations. There were events that influenced the outcome, such as the IIT Delhi 
findings, and some that at least directly did not. Policymaking was thus developed through an exploratory 
process as opposed to some clear analysis that led to an inevitable answer. 
This process also led to a debate about facts. Although the entire process followed an engineering approach, 
and the field created by this approach framed the process as apolitical and technical, it really was political in 
that the team chose to privilege certain types of information and questioned those pieces of information that 
did not conform to other fields. Again, the ideas of fairness and affordability, and a desire to avoid deepening 
dispute among the service providers led the team to seek out the mixed band allocation. The technical 
analysis that led the team to this policy choice was preferred, although it conflicted with other engineering 
‗facts‘ that supported other policy choices. 
Thus, this episode suggests that in policymaking, the engineering approach and the engineer as policymaker is 
no less political than other approaches (such as the economic or legal). The field created by the engineering 
approach, which is expected to ensure apolitical and contention-free answers to policy questions, is subject to 
much situational adjustment where actors bring in other fields that have ordering power to alter the 
(expected) apolitical nature of the engineering approach. In this episode, these situational adjustments 
included arguments about the ‗economies of scale,‘ concern about fairness, and the important field of 
affordability that also has tremendous power in the Indian arena. 
This finding closely aligns with Streeter‘s identification of a pattern in the ―world of broadcast policy.‖ He 
finds that ―matters subject to decision, to choice, are presented as problems of a neutral and technical nature, 
whereas subjective matters of value, of high politics, are treated as outside the reach of the speaker‖ (Streeter, 
1996, p. 133). TRAI staffers discuss allocation of spectrum bands, an immensely politically charged 
discussion, as if it were a technical issue, where the neutral engineering approach would lead them to a 
solution. Yet, the policy making process was more than application of laws of nature; it was a political 
discussion about the implications of mobile telecommunications for development, embedding social 
preferences about the duty of a son to his father, and considerations of affordability that linked to global 
phenomena. 
And by considering the role of technical expertise, we saw how globalization has influenced and indeed 
constrained policymaking. The concentration of telecommunications manufacturing in a few countries 
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ensures that staff at TRAI can only choose between a few options. Rather than a long list of options that 
participants would suggest exists in policy discussions, there is a rather limited set of choices. The realities of 
manufacturing mean that TRAI cannot do something truly innovative; even its mixed band allocation was a 
minor deviation to international practice. Consequently, it is possible to suggest that options for policymakers 
in other settings may also be constrained by similar global forces that draw upon the ordering power of local 
fields. 
Again, values and concepts seen in action previously make their entry into the decision-making process. In 
this case, fairness was one such idea, but one which here had a somewhat different meaning. Earlier, fairness 
meant protecting the private firms against the dominant state-controlled company MTNL and then meant 
balancing out benefits to both sets of disputing private firms, a continuation of which we see here. This is a 
particular version of fairness, but one that has significant ordering power in the arena to the point where it 
can push policy decisions.  
In this episode for example, the idea of fairness helped the concept of the mixed band allocation find its way 
to the recommendations at the very end. It also underlies the preference the team had to allocate as much 
spectrum as possible for 3G services. I discuss this field in more detail in the next and concluding chapter of 
this study. 
Another idea that makes its entry in the arena again is the concept of TRAI as a transparent decision-maker. 
Transparency is again critical for the regulator both as a strategy to reduce the amount of resistance to its 
decisions, and as a way to justify its existence in the arena. In an arena and as part of a state that is notorious 
for under-the-table dealings and corruption, the presence of such an agency, which at least tries to be 
transparent, has a powerful organizing effect on the arena. Some of the rituals associated with transparency 
might not yield the results as they are expected to—the open house discussions not leading to any new 
information, for instance.  
Yet these rituals and the effort TRAI takes to show itself as transparent keeps it active as the agency that at 
least entertains everyone‘s viewpoints and justifies its decisions in terms of the inputs received over the 
consultation process. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the notion that TRAI is transparent, and the 
idea that transparency in Government business is a positive both lead to TRAI being seen as a necessary 
participant in important and high-risk policymaking processes. 
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The Evolving Idea of Fairness 
It is useful to conclude this chapter by considering the evolution of the idea of fairness. Actors and especially 
the regulator represented this idea in different ways, most commonly as the ‗level-playing field.‘ This idea was 
present across these three episodes with subtle differences.  
In the first episode, when the regulator was new to the arena and the private firms weaker than the 
incumbent, the regulator called on the idea of the level playing field to stop the state-owned incumbent from 
entering the market where these private firms operated. The idea then was that the notion of fairness required 
that the incumbent should follow the same rules as the private firms if it wanted to start a mobile telephone 
business. 
However, in the second episode, the idea of fairness played out differently. When the fixed telephony 
licensees broke into the mobile telephony market, the regulator allowed these new entrants in while awarding 
sops to the harmed parties in the name of fairness. The idea of fairness thus evolved into meaning that the 
private firms should be rewarded for letting the regulator and Government get away with major re-regulation. 
This is not surprising given the ability of these private firms to hold up re-regulation in the courts indefinitely, 
a function of their much-enhanced political and financial position in 2003 compared with 1997. 
By 2006, when the regulator had to make a policy decision that could potentially harm one or the other set of 
private firms, it decided to be fair and made a policy decision that accommodated both sides‘ demands. Not 
doing so would ‗kill off‘ one side and this was seen as a negative outcome, conflicting with the intentions of 
the regulator to keep the market competitive and bring down prices for all telecommunications users. Such a 
balancing act also reflected that the two sides involved, which included all the private firms grouped by 
technology choices, were both powerful enough to undermine the regulator‘s decision. Indeed, if we track the 
fate of this decision, the 3G spectrum allocations finally happened only in 2010; much of the four-year delay 
was attributed to the private firms‘ unwillingness to accept how the Government was proposing to conduct 
the auction. 
Fairness as an idea is attractive in the abstract. However, ideas do not stay stable. Rather, the regulator used 
the idea of fairness to respond to shifts in the political balance among actors in the arena while keeping the 
overall approach seemingly constant. As the private firms became more powerful, the concept of fairness 
shifted from the regulator using the idea of fairness to protect them from the incumbent to the regulator 
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using the idea of fairness to prevent a fight between them, or even, one might say, protect itself from their 
wrath. 
This evolution raises an interesting point. When one looks at these three episodes together and considers how 
the arena has shaped up post liberalization, it becomes clear that the regulatory effort has been directed 
towards the continuation of private sector participation in telecommunications. One could identify this as a 
field, with its own order and backed up by the enforcing power of visions of India‘s telecommunications 
sector, the actions of international agencies, concerns about falling behind in attracting private investors and 
so on. 
During the evolution of the arena, described in Chapter 3, ideas that privileged the state as the provider of 
telecommunications services prevailed. These ideas spilt over into the initial period of the post-liberalization 
era. Until 1997, as Desai (2006) described, sort of poetically, the babus treated the new entrants as ―milch 
cows‖ (p. 45). The babus also tried to subdue the regulator, but realized that this new agency was unlike others 
it had encountered previously. By 2006, however, the situation was different. The state was doing all it could 
to ensure that services provided by the private firms were undisturbed, that they would not be derailed, and 
that they would have the best conditions in which they (and not only the public sector firms) would be able to 
provide universal and affordable telecommunications services. 
The entry of the regulator in 1997 is not coincidental. It was the first entity that defended the position of the 
private firms, and it has since become a supporter of continued and even expanded private participation 
service provision in telecommunications. 
I do not wish to judge this outcome. My experience has been that most Indians think that liberalization has 
only improved telecommunications services; undoubtedly, we have seen an exponential increase in access 
along with a steep drop in prices. But there are certainly important questions about whether this is the best 
approach, or if this approach will truly allow democratic and equitable access to telecommunications services. 
India has seen much innovation towards low cost mobile telephony, but there is still much to be done in 
terms understanding if and how the poorest should or will have telephone service; at least about 30 percent 
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of the population is still un-served, and universal service programs have been delayed for no apparent 
reason.* 
The problem with fields that are hidden from view behind ideas such as fairness is that it is difficult to 
understand them and their implications because they stay out of reach of analysts and actors within the arena. 
Their invisibility also prevents an analysis of what the coercive forces are that give the field its ordering 
power. All of this makes it difficult to identify who is driving the field, even though it is possible to suggest 
that these fields are everywhere and nowhere, insider wisdom or common sense at its most potent as a set of 
informal rules that no one breaks for no obvious reason.  
 
  
                                                   
* Reports suggest that India‘s universal service fund has about US$5 billion lying unused. This might not be the best 
solution to improved access to telecommunications, but it certainly represents a missed opportunity to improve access at 
least to some part of the uncovered population. 
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Chapter 9. The Construction of Regulatory Independence 
In her analysis of the political nature of adjudication, Moore focuses on the question how an adjudicating 
body secures its position. She explains, ―every settlement of dispute by such an authority is political at least to 
the extent that it reiterates the right to exercise authority and asserts the legitimacy of the political entity that 
allocated the authority‖ (Moore, 1978, p. 208). Moore continues: ―That political entity may be more or less 
well established… It may be fighting to maintain itself or it may be virtually unchallenged. These 
considerations affect the decision of dispute, both in shaping the regular procedures and in coloring the 
decisions of particular issues‖ (p. 208). As this study has shown, TRAI is such an authority, where its staffers 
attempts to maintain its position and secure its role and continued existence in the arena have shaped its 
decisions, procedures, and approach to regulation. 
This study has provided an account of how staffers at one regulatory agency, TRAI, have struggled and 
worked since the agency‘s establishment in 1997 to assert and maintain their position in the arena of Indian 
telecommunications. In closing the study, we return to the question with which this study began and identify 
some of the implications of this study for the broader world of regulation beyond Indian 
telecommunications: How does a regulatory agency become and remain independent?  
This conclusion focuses on three results of this study and discusses their implications. First, it will discuss the 
ways in which staffers at TRAI have attempted to define a permanent regulatory field around the agency as a 
way to ensure its existence. Second, it focuses on how a regulator‘s role is co-created, summarizing the 
finding of this study regarding how a regulatory agency is not alone in creating and sustaining the regulatory 
field. Third, it will discuss the implications of this study for our thinking of regulatory independence. This 
study will close with a brief discussion of future directions for research. 
Defining a Field 
In terms of the analytical framework used in this study, a group of individuals at TRAI has been engaged in 
the creation and maintenance of a field around the agency. The extent of this field varies but generally has 
come to include the private firms and the babus. Within this field, TRAI staffers have the ability to order 
behavior even as they make and apply rules related to the activities going on in the telecommunications 
industry. In being able to sustain this field since 1997, one might say that these individuals have been 
successful in setting up and operating a regulatory agency. 
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It is important to recognize that TRAI staffers have been involved in political activity to create and sustain 
this field. They could not rely solely on a formal mandate to set up this field and have had to rely on other 
means to define the processual characteristic for this field. Even though the law gave TRAI some power to 
establish this field, it has relied on strategic differentiation, specific ideas, rituals, and other actors to expand 
and maintain the field.  
Strategic differentiation. The concept of independence is politically constructed; in the case of 
TRAI, the broad idea of regulatory independence was defined in terms of ensuring the agency‘s continued 
existence in spite of the efforts of the babus to assimilate or shut down this agency. Because the interpretation 
of ‗independence‘ at TRAI could be translated into ‗avoiding the fate of the Telecom Commission,‘ i.e., 
assimilation, the maintenance of this field around independent regulation was defined through the actions and 
ideas that held the babus back from taking over that field.  
Such an interpretation of regulatory independence had its germination before TRAI was even created. The 
babus had resisted the creation of the agency and had managed to delay its introduction in the arena for three 
years. After Parliament authorized the creation of TRAI in 1997, the babus began to try and restrict the 
agency‘s ability to regulate. The leadership at TRAI had to seek ways in which they could hold off the babus 
and establish a field in which the regulatory agency would be effective.  
In order to be effective, this field would have had processual characteristics—the ability to make rules 
internally and impose order. Here, the strategic differentiation that TRAI undertook from the babus comes 
into play. TRAI staff made strategic choices on how to be different from the babus. In their resistance of the 
babus and their seeking the support of the private firms in establishing its role in the arena, the leadership at 
TRAI began to display Nehruvian capitalist characteristics. Where the babus seemed anti-new entrant, TRAI 
supported the then fledging private firms; where the babus seemed opaque and secretive in their decision 
making, TRAI was transparent and consultative; where the babus seemed to follow political orders, TRAI 
used an engineer‘s approach brought to bear on policy questions.  
Being different was likely the most important strategy that made TRAI relevant for multiple entities and 
allowed the agency to establish its position in the arena. Other regulatory agencies might thus look at TRAI as 
an example of how strategic differentiation within the arena could help them become valuable to other actors, 
including belligerent actors. The specifics of strategic differentiation—identifying what fields are useful to 
plug into and which ideas have organizing power—will depend on the particular context of regulation. 
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Nehruvian capitalism has meaning in an Indian context, while America‘s corporate liberalism, or Dubai‘s 
Islamic megalomania* have their own locations.  
Yet, reaching out across multiple social and political fields to balance out the power of multiple parties might 
create its own limitations and set up obligations that complicate the regulator‘s decision making in the future. 
A regulatory agency, like any political entity, will have to consider its surroundings to understand what fields 
and ideas will carry its agenda forward and help it in its struggles to define and maintain its position. 
Ideas. By referring to and calling upon multiple ideas, TRAI staff also managed to adjust and order 
behavior. Seeking strategic differentiation, TRAI also defined its role in the arena in terms of Nehruvian 
capitalist ideas such as ‗investor confidence‘ and ‗fairness‘ that appealed to powerful actors in the arena. 
Ideas—the ‗common man‘, ‗affordability,‘ the ‗march of technology‘, ‗a son‘s duty‘, ‗India should do better 
than Pakistan‘, etc.—have meanings and organizing powers of their own in the local situation.  
These ideas had ordering power, and put together, they have helped the regulatory staffers at TRAI to create 
a regulatory field that has become seemingly permanent. These ideas induce compliance because they prefer a 
strong position for the private sector firms; by calling upon these ideas, regulatory staffers are calling upon 
others—powerful politicians, businesspersons, and international agencies—who support this preference and 
are willing and able to intervene on these ideas‘ behalf against anyone who seems to go against these ideas. By 
calling upon these ideas, TRAI created constituencies of supporters that sought the agency‘s continued 
existence even when the babus tried to shut down the regulator.  
But this also had the effect of creating dependencies. TRAI staff have since been bound, at least to some 
extent, to the idea of supporting ‗private sector-led growth‘ even though my interlocutors would privately 
voice their doubts about the commitment of private firms to, say, the universal service or the national 
development agenda. The regulatory field has come to depend on the parties with the ability to induce 
compliance to these ideas for its maintenance.  
Rituals. It is possible to suggest that TRAI‘s continued existence owes much to the actions of some 
small set of individuals such as the first Chairman or this or that senior staffer. However, what is important to 
recognize is that the regulatory agency has remained relevant, even if to a lesser or greater extent, after these 
                                                   
* For one analysis of such a growth mode, see Sagerklint and Porntepcharoen (2009).  
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individuals have long moved on to other jobs and professions. Something else has also helped TRAI maintain 
its field. 
I propose that TRAI‘s continued ability to fight off attempts at assimilation, to re-declare its position in the 
arena, and keep the regulatory field alive has had to do with specific rituals. These rituals include those 
relevant within the organization, e.g., the ritual of defiance against the babus, and those where other actors 
participate, e.g., rituals around transparency such as consultations. TRAI staffers use both types of rituals to 
remind people of their role and to shore up their position. 
These rituals came out of adjustments that were made, purposefully or by accident, at specific times by 
specific individuals. For example, the first Chairman led a charge against the babus and defied their attempts to 
assimilate the agency in 1997. Repeated over time, by different staffers, this defiance soon became a regular 
feature of life for TRAI staffers; it became a ritual. Similarly, choosing to be transparent in decision making 
led to the first consultations and discussions with various parties. This adjustment, again meant to 
differentiate the arena from the babus, was seen as valuable among the private firms—this was the first time 
someone was asking them for their opinion on policy issues—and soon became another regular feature of life 
at TRAI.  
Even though rituals will differ, it is critical to note that rituals could help reinforce the position of the 
regulatory agency. The downside is that the ritual becomes more important in form than for its content. It is 
not clear if the lengthy consultation on spectrum policy resulted in much more than tinkering on the edges of 
a largely (externally) pre-defined outcome. Yet, in terms of positioning the regulatory agency, key rituals and 
their symbolism are important, and could create a sense of identity (identifying someone as TRAI staff, for 
example) or set up permanent fields (a defiant agency) that provide the space for serious discussion on 
substantive issues. 
Other actors. The regulator had to assert its mandate and set up its social field rather than have a 
readymade one as soon as it entered the arena. Given the limits to its formal mandate and challenges from the 
babus, TRAI had to rely on informal sources of coercive power. For this, TRAI has consistently had to rely on 
other actors, whether in the formal or informal definition of its role. In seeking to establish TRAI‘s position 
in the arena, the regulatory staffers found support in the private firms who were also resisting the babus‘ 
attempts to disturb their own duopoly in mobile telephony.  
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In adopting this role, the Nehruvian capitalists at TRAI defined a unique role for themselves and although the 
agency seemingly lost formal power in 2000, it had been successful in creating and sustaining a field around it 
that other actors found useful to be members of. This field was sustained through rituals of defiance and 
transparency, and with politically attractive ideas such as fairness and support for an active role for the private 
firms in telecommunications. Being part of this field was useful to the private firms and assured TRAI of a 
constituency that would seek to continue its existence. 
Since 2000 however, TRAI has also had intermittent support from the babus, especially when they need the 
regulatory agency to help them make decisions on difficult or sensitive issues. In the case of the licensing war 
or spectrum policy, for example, the babus relied on TRAI‘s reputation of transparency and expertise to 
diffuse potential criticisms related to corrupt or politically motivated decision-making. Yet, the babus, like the 
private firms, understand that TRAI has a broadly predictable approach to policymaking, one that prefers the 
continuation of service provision by private firms. TRAI might adjust its Nehruvian capitalist approach, or 
extract concessions on certain issues (e.g., telemarketing or MNP) but the general trajectory of 
telecommunications policy and regulation has been in the direction of greater private sector participation in 
service provision. 
TRAI‘s experience provides a powerful example of how the formal definition of a regulatory agency in a law 
is only one part of the process of defining and maintaining regulatory independence. Even though the law 
offers staff at a regulatory agency some ability to order the arena, like any law, it is unable to order the entire 
arena on its own. By the time a regulatory agency enters the arena, that arena usually has many actors already 
present. There are organizing fields and relationships already set up and functioning. The agency, armed with 
its formal mandate, is a late entrant into the arena and its own field of action intersects, overlaps, and 
combines with these already existing fields and relationships. 
For those who are thinking about creating, reviving, or sustaining a regulatory agency in other circumstances, 
two implications of this late entry are clear. First, regulatory independence has to be constructed through 
ongoing processes of recruiting supporters, defining fields, developing rituals and associating with ideas. A 
regulatory agency may not be able to rely on its formal mandate alone, and importantly, must recognize that 
its role will be defined as much through its own actions as through the actions of other actors in the arena. 
This brings us to the second implication of this study, that the regulator‘s position in the arena is co-created 
through ordering and adjustment. 
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Co-creating a Regulator 
The agency‘s position with respect to other actors in the arena is constantly being asserted, challenged, 
adjusted, and negotiated. Consequently, the regulator‘s role and position in the arena is constructed through a 
variety of activities and by a variety of individuals both within and outside the regulatory agency; the formal 
mandate offers only part of an explanation for the regulator‘s role in the arena. 
In this study, we have seen how the regulatory mandate was co-created by the actions of the regulatory 
staffers, the babus, and the private firms. We have uncovered that the actions of other actors in the arena—
here the babus and the private firms—have helped define TRAI‘s role. The regulatory agency‘s efforts to 
differentiate itself as expert, transparent, pro-private sector have all come out of the opportunities given to it 
by these other actors to play a role in regulatory and policymaking procedures since 1997.  
TRAI became important in 1997 because the private firms approached it repeatedly appealing for protection 
against the babus. If these firms were not present, TRAI might have met the same fate of the Telecom 
Commission. With no active supporters for its cause beyond specific political figures (even if the list included 
the then-Prime Minister), the Commission was quickly found to have no support and no one to provide it a 
role for its sustenance. Without a role and faced by the babus who ruled supreme at the time, the Commission 
was quickly assimilated. TRAI survived this fate because it not only spoke the language of its supporters, but 
because it had supporters. 
TRAI‘s actions also made the agency useful to the babus. The babus made TRAI the site of proceedings 
seeking to resolve the ‗war‘ around licensing of telecommunications services. The babus brought TRAI into 
the dispute resolution process because it had defined its role as a place for transparent decision-making, even 
as its preference for more and better technology, for negotiated solutions, and for the continuance of private 
firms‘ telecommunications services was known. Even though it is possible to classify this as a case of simple 
venue or forum shopping, what is important to recognize here is that the regulatory agency was seen as a 
possible venue for dispute resolution, something the babus were unwilling to do just a few years before. 
Hence, since 2002, TRAI has remained an agency that can help both the babus and private firms in their 
quests. TRAI had, through its choice of ideas and rituals, been able to create a field where other actors 
supported some aspect of the agency‘s role, allowing it to maintain its position in the arena. Because it serves 
as a site for consultations, for debate, and for transparent decision-making, TRAI has carved out for itself a 
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well-defined role even though the babus control the ultimate decision-making. Consequently, TRAI continues 
to have supporters, and interestingly these supporters have almost perfectly offset cycles; the babus need 
TRAI to help them sort out the private firms (babus can rely on their internal mechanisms for BSNL and 
MTNL) and the private firms need TRAI to help them dialog with the babus. This creates an almost perfect 
balancing of support for the regulatory agency.* 
This co-creation of a regulator‘s role has important consequences for the thinking about regulatory 
independence. Specifically, it means that a regulator is always engaged in political activities, either through the 
processes through which it tries to establish its position in the arena, or in how it makes decisions on 
regulatory and policy questions. The regulatory staffers‘ thinking, ideas on which they rely, and their reliance 
on certain forms of expertise are choices made to establish and re-assert that position. 
The implication for other regulatory agencies from this finding is that, apart from recognizing and working 
with their semi-independence, they could embrace the reality of a co-created regulatory mandate and attempt 
to build support among different stakeholder groups for their agenda. Here too, the problem of multiple 
overlapping and sometimes contradicting fields might come into play; it is possible that a regulatory agency 
creates conflicting obligations that it cannot balance. If this happens, the regulatory agency risks losing its 
credibility among its constituents. 
The Semi-independent Regulatory Agency  
The individuals working in a regulatory agency are constantly engaged in the tasks associated with their 
positioning in the arena, and they draw on other entities to help them with that positioning. This means that 
the regulatory agency is not independent in the traditional sense of the word. Rather an agency depends on 
other entities, involved through the use of specific ideas and rituals, to get ahead in struggles to establish its 
position and role.  
Drawing from the analytical framework used in this study, I have chosen to label the position of regulatory 
agencies as semi-independent. It is useful to consider regulatory agencies as semi-independent in order to 
emphasize the political nature of their organization and functioning. Specifically, regulatory agencies are 
                                                   
* This does not mean that TRAI is immune to a situation where both the babus and the private firms might abandon the 
regulator, just that the fieldwork has not exposed such a concern or situation. 
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embedded within larger fields, drawing their power and influence from their ability to plug into those fields 
through ideas and rituals. Moreover, regulatory agencies are political in that their role within the arena is co-
created with other organizations, even as the regulatory agency might attempt to insert itself into the arena by 
relying on its own organizing potential (drawn from its formal mandate or from its fields-based ordering 
ability). 
If one recognizes the semi-independence of regulatory agencies, one immediately must accept that regulatory 
activities are political and social in nature, and embed both global and local characteristics. This study has 
provided a number of examples of how the individuals at TRAI regulated telecommunications through a 
combination of formal and informal rules and norms. These ordering systems were sometimes global and 
sometimes local. But in all cases, TRAI staffers made decisions by applying combinations of these various 
ordering systems.  
Semi-independence has implications for both the procedures used in regulatory activities, and the decisions 
made regarding policy or regulatory questions. It is useful to consider these two separately, even though—as 
this study has shown—these two aspects of regulatory life are inter-related. 
Semi-independence in procedures. Individuals in the arena have multiple agencies to which they 
can turn to for assistance in times of need. In this study, we have seen how TRAI was one of many possible 
sites for dispute resolution. Aggrieved parties could also approach TDSAT, the Courts, DoT, or even political 
figures or institutions such as Parliament. Consequently, for a regulatory agency such as TRAI to become a 
site for dispute resolution, for instance, the regulator should project itself as an agency that can help them. 
This does not mean that the agency will always be called upon in every case, but that if the agency must have 
a role in the arena, it should at least be called upon in some cases (and maybe in the more important cases at 
least some of the time). 
In terms of fields, this means that the procedures should serve to expand the regulatory field to include as 
many other entities as possible. It is possible that the formal mandate might help with this, allowing an agency 
such as TRAI to try and insert itself into relationships suo moto. It is also possible that informal understandings 
about how the regulatory agency might be useful as a site for dispute resolution, because as we have seen in 
this study, the agency follows certain desirable procedures that get disputing parties to listen to its decisions. 
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In the case of TRAI, its efforts at strategic differentiation led it to position itself as a transparent, 
consultation-driven, fair agency with appropriate procedures to underscore these characteristics. It did so to 
appeal to the private firms, but these characteristics also appealed, even if later, to the babus. As a result of this 
positioning, TRAI was able to become valuable to others in the arena and continue its existence. 
Such positioning suggests that a regulatory agency has to look at defining procedures that are of value within 
the political and social circumstances in which it is operating. In doing so, the regulatory agency will be 
constrained in various ways by the legal frameworks, political regimes, and values and preferences of the 
individuals operating within the regulatory agency as well as the larger arena. But in any case, the regulatory 
agency‘s choices will be constructed as a response to the preferences and behaviors of other entities in the 
arena. 
Semi-independence in decision making. Every time the regulatory agency makes a decision on 
some issue, it is re-declaring its ability to make that decision. Consequently, decisions are in themselves 
statements about the regulator‘s position in the arena, and hence, as is argued above, must be linked with 
larger social and political considerations. 
A regulatory agency‘s decisions are embedded within larger contexts. An agency may make a decision that 
contravenes a legal rule but through an adjustment calling upon a field with immense political or social value. 
It might need such an adjustment because of the particular circumstances at hand. In the case of TRAI and its 
proposals regarding the dispute between fixed and mobile telephone service providers, the legal regime—
flawed though it might have been—was put aside while using arguments related to the march of technology 
and the poor man‘s telephone among others. 
As has been discussed previously, such adjustments are done because the regulatory agency is placed within 
larger fields that individuals use to apply specific pressures. For instance, if an individual talks about how their 
proposal will make the poor man‘s telephone a reality, a regulatory agency might find it difficult to reject the 
proposal if affordability and inclusion are important organizing principles in the arena. In the case of India, 
they are; TRAI does not want to be seen as doing something that contradicts efforts to make 
telecommunications more affordable. The argument by the supporters of limited mobility was thus powerful, 
even as it illuminated the semi-independence of TRAI. 
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The implications for regulation. Semi-independence thus has some interesting implications for our 
thinking about regulation. From a glass-half-full perspective, the ability of a regulatory agency to draw upon 
those larger fields actually creates opportunities for the agency to come into its own and probably become 
more powerful than it might have been in a world where only rules ruled. TRAI‘s formal mandate was limited 
to begin with, and was further constrained over time through the actions of the babus. But by calling upon 
social and political fields, the agency was able to extend its ordering power in the arena. For other agencies 
looking to establish their role, their connections with these larger fields might thus prove useful. 
From a glass-half-empty perspective, accepting semi-independence as a feature of regulation means that 
regulatory agencies will never be ‗independent.‘ The undesired outcome: that these larger political or social 
forces will forever crimp agencies‘ ability to regulate in the public interest, for example. Many theories of 
regulation begin with the premise that regulation should be politically independent to be valid; if semi-
independence exposes regulation to political influence, it damages regulatory theorists‘ main argument to 
credibility. 
Considering the semi-independence of regulatory agencies might also help address the dilemma regarding the 
balance between the independence and accountability of regulatory agencies. If a regulatory agency‘s position 
and actions in the arena are determined not only by its own actions, but also by the actions of other actors, it 
is possible that fears of a regulatory agency running away with its own interpretation of its mandate might be 
overdone. Rather, the regulatory agency operates within constraints defined by its formal mandate along with 
the support and resistance of other actors.  
Finally, as was discussed in relation to the notion of affordability, the creation of obligations across fields 
might lead a regulatory agency to be constrained in its ability to step out of these fields or break with 
obligations of the past. It is not easy for TRAI, for instance, to challenge the private firms beyond a specific 
point; too many interactions and relationships have been set up, and the agency even depends on the private 
firms for support towards its continued existence.  
It is thus not possible to say that semi-independence is a positive or negative condition. But considering semi-
independence will help illuminate the political nature of regulation and help us understand better the ways in 
which regulation is a social and political activity in any case. 
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Directions for Future Research 
This study offers but one view of how a regulatory agency works. As with any ethnographic endeavor, it 
captures and re-presents only a slice of life in the arena. I was fortunate to have the level of access to write 
this study, but that by no means suggests that I could possibly capture all the goings on at TRAI. Not only 
were there so many more people whose stories, actions, and words have been left out of this account, but 
even if I had somehow written about all of them, it would be practically impossible to provide a ‗whole‘ view 
of regulation and regulatory life. Furthermore, the specific question that I have pursued here and my own 
perspectives that led me to some elements of the answers limit the scope of this study. I thus close this study 
with three proposals for possible future research on regulation. 
First, this study is one of the few that uses an ethnographic approach to understand regulation. There is scope 
for many more studies that seek to identify the social and political roots of the regulatory function in modern 
society. Regulatory agencies have become widespread not only in the economic sectors such as 
telecommunications, electricity, or railways, but also in the social sectors such as education, health care, and 
the environment. Hence, a deeper understanding of what regulators think they are doing and how that relates 
to broader theoretical questions about the role of these agencies, their working, and their success or failure 
will only help us in understanding the implications of the proliferation of such agencies. 
Second, within the field of telecommunications regulation, this study has only provided an example of one 
country and one agency. There is scope to observe and understand how telecommunications regulation—a 
supposedly globally uniform activity with universal principles—applies global ideas in locally specific ways. 
Such studies will help us understand important phenomena such as globalization while deepening our 
understanding of the social and political nature of regulation in specific situations. There is scope for 
comparative research that considers how ideas such as regulatory independence or topics such as spectrum 
policy take on specific meanings in these specific situations. Doing so will help scholars and practitioners alike 
in how they design and operate such agencies; it will provide a rich basis to think through the implications of 
the creation of such agencies. 
Finally, for those who study India, this study should have provided new insights into the working of the 
Government and its specialized agencies. This study provides some insight into how political and social ideas 
enter into the operation of the Government and offers those who wish to understand and reform the state a 
deeper understanding of what might and might not be possible to achieve. Even as attempts to reorder and 
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restructure the working of the state through legal and political action continue, studies such as this one would 
provide a way to consider the outcomes of formal and informal ordering and adjustment. 
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